{
  "id": 1935044,
  "name": "B.A.R. ENTERPRISES, INC. and R.A.P. Sales, Inc. v. PALIN MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Inc.",
  "name_abbreviation": "B.A.R. Enterprises, Inc. v. Palin Manufacturing Co.",
  "decision_date": "1993-04-05",
  "docket_number": "92-700",
  "first_page": "500",
  "last_page": "501",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "312 Ark. 500"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "850 S.W.2d 322"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "309 Ark. 139",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1906075
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1992,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/309/0139-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:48:25.249850+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "B.A.R. ENTERPRISES, INC. and R.A.P. Sales, Inc. v. PALIN MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Inc."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice.\nAppellants, B.A.R. Enterprises, Inc. and R.A.P. Sales, Inc., bring this appeal from a default judgment entered in behalf of appellee, Palin Manufacturing, Inc. Palin is an Arkansas company which manufactures and sells sludge consolidation filters, and these filters were comprised of goods Palin purchased from B.A.R.\u2019, another domestic company. Sometime in February of 1986, R.A.P., a Wisconsin company, agreed to market Palin\u2019s filters. R. A. Phipps, who has an interest in B.A.R. and R.A.P., was to use his best efforts on R.A.P.\u2019s behalf and in furtherance of its agreement with Palin.\nThe parties performed their agreement until September of 1988, when Phipps went to work for Texo Corporation, which was both a customer of Palin\u2019s but was also a competitor of other customers of Palin. Palin then initiated this suit, alleging R.A.P. could no longer perform under the parties\u2019 agreement because of Phipps\u2019 employment with Texo. Among other things, Palin sought to prohibit the wrongful use of Palin\u2019s customer lists and to enforce noncompetition restrictions to which the parties had agreed. Palin also sought damages from R.A.P. for certain \u201cstart-up\u201d monies that Palin incurred and asked the court to determine any indebtedness existing between Palin and B.A.R.\nApparently, the parties\u2019 counsel made some attempt to resolve their differences immediately after Palin filed suit, but those negotiations quickly faded. James Ward, a Wisconsin attorney representing both R.A.P. and B.A.R., asked Palin\u2019s attorney to agree to extend the time to answer Palin\u2019s complaint, but when Palin\u2019s counsel said that he would check with his client, Ward responded saying he would answer immediately. Ward prepared an answer which was filed timely on R.A.P.\u2019s behalf, but his answer for B.A.R. was one day late.\nPalin moved to strike B.A.R.\u2019s answer as untimely and requested both answers be struck because Ward was not licensed to practice law in Arkansas and Ward had not complied with the state\u2019s \u201cPractice by Comity\u201d requirements found in Rule XIV. Ward opposed Palin\u2019s motion merely by filing an affidavit that related (1) his prior talks with Palin\u2019s counsel, (2) his decision to file answers for R.A.P. and B.A.R. immediately after negotiations failed, (3) when he mailed the respective answers and (4) his willingness to secure local counsel and to comply with Rule XIV.\nNothing further occurred in this lawsuit until two years later when the trial court granted Palin\u2019s motion to strike R.A.P.\u2019s and B.A.R.\u2019s answers. The court then entered a default judgment finding R.A.P. owed Palin $11,308.80 in damages, declaring the non competition and customer list issues as moot and further holding all remaining disputes between the parties had been adjudicated. R.A.P. and B.A.R. filed no motion to set aside the default judgment under ARCP 55(c), but merely filed a notice of appeal instead.\nIn this appeal, R.A.P. and B.A.R. generally argue the trial court\u2019s enforcement of the Rule XIV requirements is too harsh and that the goals and policies of ARCP 55 would be furthered by remanding this cause for trial on the merits. In this connection, they claim a meritorious defense exists and that hiring of out-of-state counsel in these circumstances constituted excusable neglect. Finally, B.A.R. argues R.A.P.\u2019s timely answer should inure to B.A.R.\u2019s benefit because both the defendants had a timely common answer. None of these arguments were raised below, and as Palin points out, this court has repeatedly held that it will not countenance arguments raised for the first time on appeal. Lytle v. Wal-Mart, 309 Ark. 139, 827 S.W.2d 652 (1992). Because R.A.P. and B.A.R. failed to present these issues below, we affirm.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Williams H. McKimm, for appellants.",
      "Evans, Farrar, Reis & Associates by: Bryan J. Reis, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "B.A.R. ENTERPRISES, INC. and R.A.P. Sales, Inc. v. PALIN MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Inc.\n92-700\n850 S.W.2d 322\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered April 5, 1993\nWilliams H. McKimm, for appellants.\nEvans, Farrar, Reis & Associates by: Bryan J. Reis, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0500-01",
  "first_page_order": 530,
  "last_page_order": 531
}