{ "id": 1914585, "name": "James R. HARSHAW v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Harshaw v. State", "decision_date": "1993-05-03", "docket_number": "CR 92-1318", "first_page": "51", "last_page": "53", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "313 Ark. 51" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "852 S.W.2d 318" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "309 Ark. 59", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1906010 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/309/0059-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 Ark. 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1916824 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/305/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 12-9-108", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 Ark. 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1889923 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/298/0536-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 237, "char_count": 3562, "ocr_confidence": 0.889, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.06977568962514803 }, "sha256": "25310cad7f30deffed92042fe9048e3fa6a04f8c6e842a2f74a8573a352a9f15", "simhash": "1:c58dfad7676c56c9", "word_count": 592 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:14:05.799320+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "James R. HARSHAW v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Robert Dudley, Justice.\nAppellant was convicted of driving while under the influence of intoxicants. On appeal he argues that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his motion to suppress the evidence of his blood-alcohol level because the arresting officer did not meet the standards for training set by the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training. The court of appeals certified the case to this court. We affirm the judgment of conviction.\nPreviously, Ark. Code .Ann. \u00a7 12-9-108 (a) read:\nA person who does not meet the standards and qualifications set forth in this subchapter or any made by the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training shall not take any official action as a police officer, and any action taken shall be held as invalid. (Emphasis added.)\nIn accordance with the language of the statute, we applied the exclusionary rule to searches and seizures by an officer who did not meet the standards and qualifications. See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 298 Ark. 536, 769 S.W.2d 18 (1989). The General Assembly amended the statute, and repealed the last phrase, so that the exclusionary rule would no longer be applied in cases involving officers who were not qualified. It passed Act 44 of the First Extraordinary Session of 1989, codified as Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 12-9-108(a) (Supp. 1991), which provides:\nActions taken by law enforcement officers who do not meet all of the standards and qualifications set forth in this subchapter or made by the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training shall not be held invalid merely because of the failure to meet the standards and qualifications. (Emphasis added.)\nIn accordance with the language of the amendment, we ceased applying the exclusionary rule to cases in which the officer failed to meet the standards. See, e.g., Barnes v. State, 305 Ark. 428, 810 S.W.2d 909 (1991).\nAppellant argues that Act 44 of 1989 should be interpreted to mean that the exclusionary rule is not applicable when a governmental unit fails to meet the employment standards for officers, but that it is applicable when the governmental unit fails to meet the training standards. The argument is without merit. The act makes no distinction between employment standards and training standards. It refers to \u201cactions\u201d taken by officers \u201cwho do not meet all of the standards\u201d and then provides that such actions \u201cshall not be held invalid merely because of the failure to meet the standards and qualifications.\u201d (Emphasis added.) When the words used in a statute have a well-defined meaning, and the wording of the statute is clear, we give those words their plain meaning. McGee v. Armorel Pub. Schs., 309 Ark. 59, 827 S.W.2d 137 (1992). In this case, the act applies to \u201call of the standards.\u201d The words used are clear. There is no room for an interpretation that makes a distinction between employment standards and training standards.\nAppellant\u2019s second point of appeal is that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence a certified copy of his driving record. He contends that the document violates the rule against hearsay, apparently because of some deficiency in its form. We affirm this point under Rule 9(e) of the Rules of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals because there is no abstract of the document.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Robert Dudley, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert Meurer, for appellant.", "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: J. Brent Standridge, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "James R. HARSHAW v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 92-1318\n852 S.W.2d 318\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered May 3, 1993\nRobert Meurer, for appellant.\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: J. Brent Standridge, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0051-01", "first_page_order": 77, "last_page_order": 79 }