{ "id": 1914581, "name": "Mike NAZARENKO v. CTI TRUCKING CO., INC. & Randy Justice", "name_abbreviation": "Nazarenko v. CTI Trucking Co.", "decision_date": "1993-06-28", "docket_number": "93-118", "first_page": "570", "last_page": "585", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "313 Ark. 570" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "856 S.W.2d 869" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "313 Ark. 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1914601 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "court's failure to give an admonitory instruction was not prejudicial error in the absence of a request" }, { "parenthetical": "court's failure to give an admonitory instruction was not prejudicial error in the absence of a request" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/313/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 Ark. 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1873742 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/290/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 Ark. 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1906036 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120" }, { "page": "150" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/309/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ark. 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1878573 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/284/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 Ark. 224", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1746939 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "one of the four exceptions to the collateral source rule is where collateral source evidence is used to rebut the plaintiff's testimony that he was compelled by financial necessity to return to work prematurely or to forego additional medical care" }, { "parenthetical": "one of the four exceptions to the collateral source rule is where collateral source evidence is used to rebut the plaintiff's testimony that he was compelled by financial necessity to return to work prematurely or to forego additional medical care" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/279/0224-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 Ark. 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1756155 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/271/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 Ark. 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1904333 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/308/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 Ark. 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1898854 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/310/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 Ark. 207", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1914608 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/313/0207-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ark. 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1878683 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/284/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 Ark. 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1672745 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/263/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "255 Ark. 526", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8722418 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231-2", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/255/0526-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 916, "char_count": 23485, "ocr_confidence": 0.906, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.5934723647333284e-07, "percentile": 0.8873526989411352 }, "sha256": "0ac3802426ec60c6e2c79e862f99dc8f540085ad8906c59077d05e957cda905e", "simhash": "1:033ec22af584812f", "word_count": 4140 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:14:05.799320+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Mike NAZARENKO v. CTI TRUCKING CO., INC. & Randy Justice" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice.\nMike Nazarenko sued CTI Trucking Co., Inc. (CTI) and its driver, Randy Justice, appellees, for his injuries and damages resulting from their negligence. The jury returned a verdict in the appellees\u2019 favor. Mr. Nazarenko then filed a motion for a new trial claiming the trial court committed an error of law by permitting testimony favorable to the appellees in violation of the collateral source rule. The trial court denied the motion and Mr. Nazarenko appeals. We agree with the trial court and affirm.\nMr. Nazarenko sustained back injuries during the delivery of a roll of carpet by CTI to his employer, Sherwin-Williams, located in Arkadelphia. According to Mr. Nazarenko, he and Mr. Justice were unloading a large roll of carpet using a \u201ccarpet jack\u201d when Mr. Justice pushed the roll and caused a steel pipe part of the carpet jack to strike Mr. Nazarenko in the chest. To avoid being crushed, Mr. Nazarenko caught the raised carpet roll weighing about 800 bounds. He alleged that this caused his back injury which required surgery.\nMr. Nazarenko brought suit claiming that Mr. Justice was negligent in handling the roll of carpet as it was being unloaded from the truck and that he was entitled to monetary relief for the resulting damages he suffered. After the jury returned a verdict for CTI, Mr. Nazarenko filed a motion for a new trial on the basis that the trial court committed an error of law in allowing defense counsel to proceed with a line of questioning which violated the collateral source rule.\nIn ruling against Mr. Nazarenko on this motion, the trial court found:\nThe Court granted a pre-trial motion in limine whereby the Defendant\u2019s counsel was prohibited from mentioning Workers\u2019 Compensation or bringing such matter to the jury\u2019s attention.\nThe first witness called by the Plaintiff was Mitch Fendley [Branch Manager of Sherwin-Williams] and he testified about Workers\u2019 Compensation.\nThe Plaintiff testified he had not been going back to the doctor as he could not afford it. He further testified he couldn\u2019t go back to Henderson State University as he owed them a bill and could not pay it.\nThe defense in chambers requested that they be allowed to cross-examine the Defendant concerning the Workers\u2019 Compensation settlement where he received medical payments and a sum of money, that he testified before the Law Judge that he was going to use the money to pay his bills and return to college. The Court denied the defendant the right to present such testimony unless the Plaintiff continued to \u201copen it up\u201d before the jury. In other words, the Court would not allow the jury to be mislead [sic] by the Plaintiff.\nThe trial continued and there was no mention of insurance, nor [sic] was it inferred.\nUnder the facts before us, we cannot say that the trial court erred in denying the motion for a new trial.\nThe record reveals the trial court granted a pretrial motion in limine prohibiting CTI from referring to Mr. Nazarenko\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation payment which covered some of his medical bills. However, this information was furnished to the jury by Mr. Nazarenko\u2019s own witness, Mitch Fendley, the branch manager of Sherwin-Williams, when Mr. Fendley stated on direct-examination that on the day of the incident he \u201csuggested that [Mr. Nazarenko] go to the doctor and, of course, that day I called \u2014 Sherwin-Williams has an eight hundred number for their workers\u2019 compensation program within the company.\u201d He next said, \u201cI called them and notified them, and we had Mike [Nazarenko], I believe, report to Dr. John Bomar for treatment.\u201d\nIn his brief, Mr. Nazarenko states that he is not seeking appellate relief because Mitch Fendley\u2019s testimony was \u201cpresented to the jury unsolicited by him and was prejudicial to him\u201d since his own attorney brought workers\u2019 compensation out on direct examination, but instead he \u201chas come before this court seeking relief. . . because appellee\u2019s counsel then intentionally and deliberately aggravated the prior injection of workers\u2019 compensation to the jury with his questioning of Mr. Nazarenko.\u201d Mr. Nazarenko supports his position by quoting at length trial testimony and exchanges between the court and counsel as follows.\nMr. Nazarenko testified on direct examination:\nQ: Since Dr. Gocio released you, have you had flareups from time to time with your condition?\nA: Yes, sir.\nQ: Have you been going to the doctor?\nA: No, sir.\nQ: Why not?\nA: I really couldn\u2019t afford to go see him, and at one time when I was still kind of like in his care, I couldn\u2019t get over to Hot Springs. I didn\u2019t have a car at the time. I didn\u2019t have a phone, and basically it wasn\u2019t because of the money problem.\nQ: Did you go back to see Dr. Bomar recently?\nA: Yes, sir, I did.\nQ: Did Dr. Gocio refer you back to his care?\nA: Dr. Gocio said it would be all right for me to see Dr. Bomar. He didn\u2019t have any objections to it. He was talking that I would need some kind of like a rehabilitation, and he agreed that Dr. Bomar would be all right to see.\nAfter these questions, the following bench conference took place out of the hearing of the jury.\nMr. Murray (Defense Counsel): Judge, the evidence, from the testimony of Dr. Gocio, is that this gentleman didn\u2019t seek medical attention for a period of a year or a year and a half.\nMr. Chaney (Plaintiffs Counsel): What?\nMr. Murray: The Claimant, from 1991 until sometime in 1992, has testified that he didn\u2019t get medical treatment because he couldn\u2019t afford it. I think he\u2019s opened the door for me to inquire, not about insurance, but about the fact that his medical bills had, in fact, been paid.\nMr. Chaney: I would strongly disagree with that, your Honor. He testified the bills had been incurred, and then the future medical care that Dr. Gocio predicted that he would need, five hundred to a thousand a year \u2014 he hasn\u2019t been spending that in the last year or so.\nMr. Murray: He said he hadn\u2019t gone to the doctor because he couldn\u2019t afford it. That\u2019s why he didn\u2019t go back\nMr. Chaney: We\u2019re talking about the future medical.\nCourt: Mr. Murray, I\u2019m going to overrule your request, and let\u2019s proceed.\nMr. Murray: Okay, thank you.\nMr. Nazarenko later testified as follows upon cross-examination.\nMr. Nazarenko: When I worked at Sherwin-Williams, I had to take the hours that I was getting. They only have so many hours allotted to part-time employees, and I got as many hours as I could get.\nQ: You lack 9 hours having your college degree in Sociology?\nA: Yes, sir.\nQ: Are you working on that now?\nA: No, sir, I have to pay back a grant that I lost in \u201888 before I can return to school, and that\u2019s been a problem right now.\nQ: Do you remember testifying in February of 1992, here in Arkadelphia, Arkansas, that you were planning on going back to school, getting those 9 hours, and taking a sit-down type job?\nA: What time was this?\nQ: February of 1992.\nA: I don\u2019t recall who I would have talked to about that. I\u2019ve talked to a number of people about returning back to school, but I don\u2019t recall talking to you about it.\nQ: No, you didn\u2019t talk to me.\nA: Okay.\nQ: You were testifying in February of \u201892 that you planned to go back to college \u2014\nA: Who was I testifying to cause I don\u2019t \u2014 the only time I remember testifying was to you back in July of \u201891,1 believe.\nAt this time, CTI\u2019s counsel stated that he did not want to risk the possibility of a mistrial, and the trial judge asked the attorneys to approach the bench. The following conversation then took place:\nMr. Murray: He testified before Dail Stiles [the administrative law judge] that he was going to take his [workers\u2019 compensation] settlement in the amount of $8900.00 and go back to school.\nMr. Chaney: Your Honor, I would say that this is just highly prejudicial and it\u2019s designed to circumvent making an end run around the Court\u2019s previous ruling not to talk about insurance.\nMr. Murray: Well, Judge, in that regard, they opened up insurance a long time ago in the voir dire, after they were he ones that requested the \u2014\nMr. Chaney: No. No sir.\nCourt: In order words, what you\u2019re saying is that he made his statement under oath that he was going to go back to school to take 9 hours \u2014\nMr. Murray: And get him a sit-down job.\nCourt: Well, what he doesn\u2019t understand right now is who you were talking about, or where that statement was made.\nMr. Chaney: Your Honor, I think it would be highly prejudicial to open the door to bring out the whole worker\u2019s compensation deal at this stage of the game.\nMr. Murray: I think it is, too. You\u2019re the ones that opened the door, not me.\nMr. Chaney: No, sir, he\u2019s the one asking the questions. He\u2019s trying to open his own door.\nCourt: Workman\u2019s Comp, came out on Fendley\u2019s statement on direct.\nMr. Murray: It sure did.\nMr. Chaney: It didn\u2019t come out that he got any benefits.\nMr. Murray: See what they want is the advantage of certain testimony and then the part that hurts them, they don\u2019t want that before the jury, and I don\u2019t want to risk a mistrial.\nMr. Chaney: Mr. Murray is the one eliciting the testimony.\nCourt: I can see where he would want the statement in, but to do so is going to open up the \u2014 I can see it just as sure as the world that he\u2019s going to end up saying it was before a worker\u2019s comp, judge. I don\u2019t see how you\u2019re going to get around it.\nMr. Chaney: It\u2019s not relevant, your Honor, what happens in a worker\u2019s comp, case about what somebody\u2019s plans might be.\nCourt: I don\u2019t think it\u2019s worth the risk of opening it up. Can you go on without it?\nMr. Murray: I think I can.\nCourt: Okay. Proceed.\nMr. Nazarenko was further questioned on cross-examination by CTI\u2019s attorney:\nQ: When you went to college, you went to college on a football scholarship? Is that correct:\nA: Yes, sir.\nQ: And what are you having to pay back?\nA: It\u2019s a grant.\nQ: A grant?\nA: It\u2019s a grant that was supposed to pay for a year\u2019s worth of schooling.\nQ: Why would you have to pay a grant back?\nA: Something came up that I did not have enough hours to qualify for the grant, and they had let me into school at the time with the saying that I would have the grant, and I come to find out at the end of the year, spring of \u201888, and when I got ready to go back in the fall of \u201888, they said that I was having to pay back $915.00 to the school.\nQ: $915.00?\nA: Yes, sir.\nQ: And that\u2019s the reason you\u2019re not going to school now?\nA: Yes, sir.\nAt this point, another bench conference was held:\nMr. Murray: His [workers\u2019 compensation] settlement was for $8900.00, and he just now said the reason he couldn\u2019t go back to school was because he had to pay back $900.00, and he told Judge Stiles that he planned to go back to college to get his degree with that money. Now, if I can ask what he told Judge Stiles, in February of 1992, that he intended to go back to college, that\u2019s what I would like to do.\nCourt: And you won\u2019t mention any money?\nMr. Chaney: Well, he\u2019s trying to open his own door again, Judge. The man was way behind on his bills, and what he might plan to do in one case is simply not relevant to this action.\nMr. Murray: I don\u2019t know anything about his being behind on his bills. He hasn\u2019t testified to any of that, Judge.\nCourt: I guess the problem is if he got eight thousand dollars case money, and he says he couldn\u2019t go back to school because he couldn\u2019t pay the nine hundred and fifteen, it would become relevant that \u2014 well, it would appear that he\u2019d say one thing under oath one time, and then something else under oath at another time. That\u2019s to his credibility, is where he\u2019s going.\nMr. Murray: That\u2019s exactly what I\u2019m referring to, Judge. I won\u2019t mention workers\u2019 comp. I\u2019ll just ask him if he told Judge Stiles he was going to take $8900.00 that he got and go back to school.\nMr. Chaney: He wants to taint this whole thing with the workers\u2019 comp.\nCourt: Okay, are you referring to him as Dail Stiles?\nMr. Murray: Yes, I\u2019ll do that. I\u2019ll leave administrative law judge and workers\u2019 comp, totally out of it.\nCourt: In other words, you won\u2019t go any further about money or anything else, as far as the settlement or anything like that, just detail Dail Stiles as that because I don\u2019t\u2014\nMr. Murray: I\u2019m just going to ask him if when he got $8900.00, did he tell Dail Stiles he was going to take that money and go to college, and get his nine hours, and get him a sit-down job.\nMr. Chaney: Which is an attempt to taint this trial with that prejudicial evidence when he is eliciting this whole line of testimony himself.\nMr. Murray: Judge, it\u2019s the credibility of the witness.\nCourt: Of course, the only problem is, like I say, Fendley said on opening that he reported the injury to his workers\u2019 compensation.\nMr. Murray: I\u2019ll leave insurance and workers\u2019 comp, totally out of it.\nCourt: They\u2019re aware already of workers\u2019 comp.\nMr. Chaney: Well, it\u2019s prejudicial for the jury to know that collateral source benefits are received whether they\u2019re workers\u2019 comp, or social security, and Mitch didn\u2019t say anything about him getting any benefits.\nMr. Murray: We\u2019re not talking about collateral source. We\u2019re not going to discuss workers\u2019 comp.\nMr. Chaney: It is a collateral source, and you just said you want to tell them he got $8900.00.\nAt this time an in camera conference was held off the record and out of the hearing of the jury. The trial then resumed.\nMr. Nazarenko\u2019s testimony on cross-examination by Mr. Murray continued:\nQ: Do you have any outstanding medical bills at this time?\nMr. Nazarenko: Outstanding medical bills \u2014 I\u2019ve got a\u2014\nQ: That hasn\u2019t been paid?\nAt this time, another bench conference was held out of the hearing of the jury:\nMr. Chaney: He\u2019s doing it again, your Honor, trying to come in with an improper line of questioning. The Plaintiff can say he incurred the bills, and it would be highly improper and prejudicial to start questioning him about what got paid and what\u2019s not\u2014\nMr. Murray: I just asked if he had any unpaid bills. I think that\u2019s a fair question. It\u2019s that he paid them or didn\u2019t pay\u2014\nMr. Chaney: It\u2019s an improper line of questioning.\nCourt: It\u2019s stipulated that he incurred fourteen thousand\u2014\nMr. Murray: Fourteen thousand worth of medical. We\u2019ll stipulate that he incurred them. I just want to know if he\u2019s got any outstanding ones.\nMr. Chaney: That\u2019s an improper questioning.\nCourt: I\u2019m going to overrule.\nMr. Nazarenko\u2019s cross-examination by Mr. Murray continued:\nQ: Do you have any outstanding medical bills?\nMr Nazarenko: I\u2019m not real sure what you mean by outstanding medical bills.\nQ: Not paid.\nA: Not that I\u2019m aware of. I do receive bills in the mail from a Dr. Pellegrino, and I have \u2014 that\u2019s all that I know of. I\u2019ve seen Dr. Bomar since then, and if those are outstanding and haven\u2019t been paid for, then I assume that they\u2019re outstanding.\nQ: You saw Dr. Bomar just a short time ago before this trial, right?\nA: Yes, sir.\nBased on these excerpts and Mr. Nazarenko\u2019s arguments on appeal, we glean that the crux of his complaint is that the cumulative effect of defense counsel questioning him about unpaid medical bills and unpaid college debts violated the collateral source rule and that the trial court was in error in not granting a new trial.\nArkansas R. Civ. P. 59 governs the award of a new trial to a party in a lawsuit. Rule 59(a) sets out eight grounds for the granting of a new trial and, without citing this rule, Mr. Nazarenko presumably argues on appeal he is entitled to a new trial pursuant to the eighth ground, error of law, because the collateral source rule was violated. Under Ark. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(8), a new trial may be granted where an error of law occurred at trial and was objected to by the party making the application and that error materially affected the substantial rights of the moving party.\nWe summarized the error of law argument for a new trial in Security Ins. Co. v. Owen, 255 Ark. 526, 501 S.W.2d 229 (1973):\nError of law occurring at the trial and objected to by the moving party is one of the statutory grounds for a new trial. The trial court has a broad latitude of discretion in the granting of new trials. This discretion is not limited to cases where sufficiency of the evidence is the ground for the motion. Of course, the latitude of the trial judge\u2019s discretion is much broader where the question is whether a jury verdict is supported by a preponderance of the evidence, because of the peculiar advantage of his position in evaluating all the factors bearing upon it. In determining questions as to errors of law, his position is not of the same superiority to that of the appellate court. Still, the action of the trial judge on a motion for new trial upon a statutory ground should not be reversed in the absence of manifest abuse of his discretion.\nManifest abuse of discretion in granting a new trial means a discretion improvidently exercised, i.e., exercised thoughtlessly and without due consideration. Under the circumstances prevailing here we are unable to say that the circuit judge exercised his discretion improvidently, thoughtlessly or without due consideration.\nSecurity Ins. Co. at 529-30, 501 S.W.2d at 231-2 (citations omitted). See also Crowder v. Flippo, 263 Ark. 433, 565 S.W.2d 138 (1978).\nOn appeal, Mr. Nazarenko cites Patton v. Williams, 284 Ark. 187, 680 S.W.2d 707 (1984) in support of his argument, but his reliance on our holding in Patton is misplaced. In Patton, the appellee\u2019s attorney conducted his cross-examination of the appellant in such a way that he invited comment on the payment of certain medical bills by a collateral source and then used the appellant\u2019s response to portray him as being an untruthful person, when, in fact, the appellant had told the truth. The record before us does not reflect any similarities between the conduct of counsel in this case and counsel in Patton.\nHere, evidence of workers\u2019 compensation coverage was first brought to light by Mr. Nazarenko\u2019s own witness and not mentioned again until Mr. Nazarenko, on direct examination, testified that he could not afford to go see a doctor. Obviously, his testimony in this regard was subject to cross-examination on this point. We cannot say that CTFs counsel, on cross-examination, invited comment as to payment by a collateral source and then attempted to use his response to show he was an untruthful person.\nThere are close similarities between this case and our recent decision in Babbitt v. Quik-Way Lube & Tire, Inc., 313 Ark. 207, 853 S.W.2d 273 (1993) in which we held there was no error where the trial court allowed a defense attorney to cross-examine a plaintiff in a tort case on insurance coverage after the plaintiff testified that she had not been to a doctor to obtain medical care because she didn\u2019t have the money when she in fact had medical coverage under her husband\u2019s insurance policy. We said:\nOur recent case of Younts v. Baldor Elec. Co., 310 Ark. 86, 832 S.W.2d 832 (1992) controls. There, during direct examination, counsel asked Younts whether he had been able to reopen his business after the fire, and Younts said, \u201cHaven\u2019t been able to afford it.\u201d Defense counsel argued during an in-camera hearing that Younts\u2019 testimony opened the door for counsel to show Younts had received an insurance settlement. The trial court agreed, and we affirmed on appeal. In doing so, we cited the general rule that it is improper for either party to introduce or elicit evidence of the other party\u2019s insurance coverage and stated this principle is part of the collateral source rule which excludes evidence of benefits received by a plaintiff from a source collateral to the defendant.\nWe further recognized in Younts, that, when a party testifies about his or her financial condition in a false or misleading manner, he or she opens the door for the introduction of evidence which might otherwise be inadmissible under the collateral source rule. See also Peters v. Pierce, 308 Ark. 60, 823 S.W.2d 820 (1992). In upholding the trial court\u2019s rule to allow defense counsel to inquire of Younts\u2019 insurance settlement, we stated as follows:\nIt is important to recognize that Younts\u2019 testimony came when he was being questioned by his own counsel. The question asked was whether he had rebuilt the physical facilities of his business. The question was wholly irrelevant to any question in the case other than possibly that of mitigation of damages which does not appear to have been at issue. The dissenting opinion seems to conclude as a matter of fact that Younts was telling the truth or that he answered in good faith. We have no way to determine that. Appellate courts do not make those decisions. The important point is that Younts\u2019 response that he could not afford to rebuild could very well have been misleading to the jury. In Peters v. Pierce, supra, and in York v. Young, [271 Ark. 266, 608 S.W.2d 20 (1980)], we held that in such a situation the collateral source rule does not prevent introduction of evidence of insurance.\nIn the present case, Babbitt\u2019s counsel invited Babbitt to explain why she saw him before having seen a doctor. The purpose of such questioning was to give Babbitt an opportunity to say, \u201cI didn\u2019t have the money . . . [t]hey want their money up front when you go to the doctor... I didn\u2019t have the money then.\u201d As was the situation in Younts, Babbitt\u2019s counsel\u2019s question and Babbitt\u2019s response had no relevance to any issue in the case. Instead, Babbitt\u2019s testimony that she could not go to a doctor for treatment could have mislead the jury. Under these facts, we are unable to say the trial court abused its discretion in permitting Quik-Way\u2019s counsel to elicit information that afforded the jury a complete and full picture of Babbitt\u2019s financial situation.\nBabbitt at 210-11, 835 S.W.2d at 275 (emphasis added). See also Evans v. Wilson, 279 Ark. 224, 650 S.W.2d 569 (1983) (one of the four exceptions to the collateral source rule is where collateral source evidence is used to rebut the plaintiff\u2019s testimony that he was compelled by financial necessity to return to work prematurely or to forego additional medical care), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 284 Ark. 101, 679 S.W.2d 205 (1984).\nIn light of our holdings in Younts and Babbitt, we cannot say that there was a manifest abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.\nMr. Nazarenko also argues that CTI\u2019s counsel further aggravated the prior injection of workers\u2019 compensation into the trial by stating in closing argument that Dr. Gocio had testified that Mr. Nazarenko\u2019s medical bills had been paid. Examination of the record reflects that Mr. Nazarenko did not object to this statement during closing, nor did he request the trial court to instruct or admonish the jury concerning the remarks of counsel in this regard. As we said in Miller v. State, 309 Ark. 117, 120, 827 S.W.2d 149, 150 (1992), \u201cfew tenets are more firmly established than the rule requiring a contemporaneous objection in order to preserve a point for review on appeal.\u201d Watson v. State, 290 Ark. 484, 720 S.W.2d 310 (1986). Thus, this issue was not properly preserved for appeal. See also Sheridan v. State, 313 Ark. 23, 852 S.W.2d 772 (1993) (court\u2019s failure to give an admonitory instruction was not prejudicial error in the absence of a request).\nFor all the foregoing reasons, we affirm.", "type": "majority", "author": "Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Wright, Chaney, Berry & Daniel, P.A., by: Don P. Chaney and Benny M. Tucker, for appellant.", "Walter A. Murray, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Mike NAZARENKO v. CTI TRUCKING CO., INC. & Randy Justice\n93-118\n856 S.W.2d 869\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered June 28, 1993\nWright, Chaney, Berry & Daniel, P.A., by: Don P. Chaney and Benny M. Tucker, for appellant.\nWalter A. Murray, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0570-01", "first_page_order": 606, "last_page_order": 621 }