{ "id": 1914657, "name": "STATE of Arkansas v. William Leonard GADDY", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Gaddy", "decision_date": "1993-07-05", "docket_number": "CR 93-220", "first_page": "677", "last_page": "683", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "313 Ark. 677" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "858 S.W.2d 81" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "296 Ark. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1892763 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/296/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 Ark. 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1892736 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/296/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "267 Ark. 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1719842 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/267/0469-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 553, "char_count": 10018, "ocr_confidence": 0.905, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.189537415419438e-07, "percentile": 0.5910456555575248 }, "sha256": "81cf573c80965c60e957f597a9a8d6b15cb1530e6a480d759d7698ea4804ff2c", "simhash": "1:96abd01477629cf6", "word_count": 1684 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:14:05.799320+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Holt, C.J., not participating." ], "parties": [ "STATE of Arkansas v. William Leonard GADDY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Steele Hays, Justice.\nThe state brings this appeal from an order dismissing a felony information charging the appellee, William Leonard Gaddy, with criminal attempt to commit capital murder. Gaddy had been charged previously with the same offense in case No. 91-2562 and with possession of cocaine with intent to deliver in case No. 91-1734. While these two cases were pending the deputy prosecuting attorney (Fowler) and defense counsel (Clouette) arrived at a plea agreement by which the attempted murder charge would be dropped, and the cocaine charge reduced to mere possession with a sentence recommendation of three years probation and a fine of $200.\nOn December 30, 1991, the parties appeared before the circuit judge for the purpose of presenting the plea agreement. Those proceedings, in part were as follows:\nTHE COURT: I have a plea statement here and there\u2019s a recommendation.\nMS. FOWLER: Your Honor, that\u2019s correct. The State would have a couple of preliminary motions as to Mr. Gaddy if you would like for me to take them up now.\nTHE COURT: Yes, I wish you would please.\nMS. FOWLER: The State would move in 91-2562 to nol pros.\nTHE COURT: All right.\nMS. FOWLER: And in 91-1734, State would amend Count 1 to be possession of cocaine rather than possession with intent to deliver.\nAfter Ms. Fowler summarized the facts the following occurred:\nTHE COURT: All right. And the recommendation is three years probation. I\u2019m just a little surprised by that on these facts? The officers agreed to it?\nMS. FOWLER: Yes, Your Honor, they did.\nMR. CLOUETTE: Well \u2014\nTHE COURT: No, you don\u2019t need to approach.\nMR. CLOUETTE: Well, I was going to tell you why.\nTHE COURT: Well I understand that\u2019s not necessary. I\u2019ll accept the plea or the recommendation. Okay. Mr. Gaddy, this is your understanding of the disposition of the case, what you\u2019ve set here, three years probation, two hundred dollar fine and costs and expungment under Act 3467? Do you understand that sir?\nMR. GADDY, DEFENDANT: Yes.\nTHE COURT: And that\u2019s what you agreed to do?\nMR. GADDY, DEFENDANT: Uh huh.\nTHE COURT: Okay. I\u2019m going to grant, carry out your motion to grant the nol pros and I\u2019ve done that and I\u2019m going to grant the motion to reduce this to possession upon acceptance of your plea of guilty. Let me ask you to raise your right hand please, Mr. Gaddy.\nAfter establishing that Gaddy understood his rights and that a factual basis for a guilty plea existed, the trial judge, Judge Lessenberry, accepted the plea, entered judgment in accordance with the agreement and the hearing ended.\nOn February 6,1992, the state again filed a felony information charging Gaddy with attempted capital murder. Gaddy moved to dismiss or to compel the state to adhere to the plea agreement entered into between Gaddy and the state. After hearing testimony from Ms. Fowler, Mr. Clouette and Judge Lessenberry, the trial court ordered the information dismissed.\nThe state appeals on two points of error: one, the trial court erred in concluding there was a plea agreement contingent on the state filing a nolle prosequi with regard to the charge of attempted capital murder pending against Gaddy and, two, the trial court erred in dismissing the charge because Gaddy\u2019s sole remedy was the withdrawal of his guilty plea. We are not persuaded by the state\u2019s arguments and, accordingly, we affirm the order appealed from.\nI\nThe state argues that Rules 24.5 and 25.3 (b; d) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure mandate that the terms of the agreement be specifically set forth on the record in open court when the guilty plea is entered. Irons v. State, 267 Ark. 469, 591 S.W.2d 650 (1980). The purpose of those provisions is to protect the accused from any misunderstanding concerning the law or his rights. Pettit v. State, 296 Ark. 423, 758 S.W.2d 1 (1988). The state submits that the protection applies to the state as well as to the defendant. The state urges that the transcript of the hearing does not establish that Gaddy\u2019s plea of guilty to possession of cocaine was specifically made contingent on the entry of a nolle prosequi of the attempted murder charge.\nThe state\u2019s contention is debatable at best. It is true the record does not contain an express assertion that the attempted murder charge is being dropped as a condition of the agreement, but it is readily implicit in the record of those proceedings. Indeed, we would be hard pressed to sustain the argument even if we had nothing more than the brief excerpt quoted above, as it seems plain enough that Ms. Fowler was stating the terms of the plea bargain in response to the trial judge\u2019s question concerning the plea statement and recommendation being presented to him. At that point the state moved unequivocally to \u201cnol pros\u201d the attempted murder charge (91-2562) and to reduce the cocaine charge (91-1734) to mere possession. A fair reading of the record permits no inference that these developments were unrelated. Granted, the letter of the rules invoked by the state might be better served by a fuller explanation of the proposed agreement, but we cannot say the record is fatally defective.\nBeyond that, the principals all testified to their understanding of the plea agreement: Mrs. O\u2019Kelley (formerly Ms. Fowler) testified that cases 91-1734 and 91-2562 were both assigned to her as deputy prosecutor; that she foresaw problems with the proof in both cases and had little hope of a conviction in the attempted murder case; that she and Mr. Clouette discussed the cases many times and finally entered into an agreement that the attempted murder charge would be dismissed and the drug case reduced to simply possession with a fine and probation. \u201cThe agreement was to dispose of both cases ... a final resolution.\u201d Her testimony as to the connection between the nolle prosequi and the guilty plea was categorical. She said she did not anticipate either of the charges ever being refilled or changed after the December 30, 1991, hearing or she would have asked that case No. 91-2562 be dismissed outright, rather than the more customary nolle prosequi.\nMr. Clouette\u2019s testimony was entirely consistent with Mrs. O\u2019Kelley\u2019s: he testified, \u201cThe agreement was a package deal. . . a complete understanding.\u201d\nJudge Lessenberry testified that he had no specific recollection of the events, but after reviewing the transcript, he said, \u201cI recollect that it was my impression that this was a final disposition of both cases.\u201d\nThe state submits that this testimony is not sufficient to overcome the mandatory requirement that the record of a guilty plea agreement be made part of the contemporaneous record when the plea is entered. We disagree that the rules dictate that result in the context now posed. Rule 24.5 provides that the plea agreement be stated. That occurred in this case, at least to the extent necessary to a resolution of the arguments advanced by the state. Rule 25.3 (b; d) is even less stringent (again, in the context now before us) by providing that if the plea agreement contemplates that other charges will be reduced or dismissed, \u201cupon request of the parties the trial judge may permit the disclosure\u201d of the agreement and the reasons therefor. In this instance all parties and the trial court fully understood the terms and conditions of the plea agreement and the record of that proceeding is reasonably faithful to that understanding. The problem now extant cannot be attributed to any omission in that proceeding, but to the evident fact that the state later became dissatisfied with the bargain.\nII\nThe state maintains that if there was a valid plea agreement which the state subsequently breached, Gaddy\u2019s only recourse would be the option of withdrawing his guilty plea. That seems paltry relief indeed for the state\u2019s breach of a binding plea agreement, grounded on nothing more than a change of heart.\nThe state draws an analogy between the trial court\u2019s dismissal of the second attempted murder charge against Gaddy and a contention by the appellant in Vagi v. State, 296 Ark. 377, 757 S.W.2d 533 (1988), that he was entitled to the specific performance of an alleged plea agreement under which he would have to serve only ten years of a life sentence imposed on a guilty plea to first degree murder. A majority in Vagi found no evidence of such an agreement, while two justices rejected Vagi\u2019s argument on a different ground, i.e., even if there were such a provision in the plea agreement, the trial court may not be compelled to impose specific performance of a plea bargain between a prosecutor and the defendant, since the trial court is not bound by the agreement. Thus, relying on language in the concurring opinion, the state presses us to hold that withdrawal of his guilty plea, rather than specific performance of the agreement, is Gaddy\u2019s only remedy.\nWe are not persuaded by the argument. In the first place, this case is distinguishable from Vagi, where the defendant was seeking to specifically enforce a provision which was not shown to have been part of the agreement and which was dependent upon an indeterminate future event, i.e., the commutation of Vagi\u2019s sentence by the Executive Department. Whereas here, the state is seeking to undo an agreement into which it clearly entered and which the trial court had approved and executed in all respects.\nNor do we see this as a case of specific performance, as the state contends. The trial court ordered nothing performed, nor did it direct that any provision of the agreement be carried out; it merely left intact that which the parties had agreed on and which had been approved and fully executed by a judgment entered accordingly.\nFor the reasons stated, the order is\nAffirmed.\nHolt, C.J., not participating.", "type": "majority", "author": "Steele Hays, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Clint Miller, Senior Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellant.", "McArthur & Finkelstein, by: William C. McArthur, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE of Arkansas v. William Leonard GADDY\nCR 93-220\n858 S.W.2d 81\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered July 5, 1993\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Clint Miller, Senior Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellant.\nMcArthur & Finkelstein, by: William C. McArthur, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0677-01", "first_page_order": 713, "last_page_order": 719 }