{ "id": 1912730, "name": "Michale Ray FURLOUGH v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Furlough v. State", "decision_date": "1993-09-13", "docket_number": "CR 92-1442", "first_page": "146", "last_page": "151", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "314 Ark. 146" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "861 S.W.2d 297" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "308 Ark. 137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1904334 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/308/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 Ark. 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1906036 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/309/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ark. 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1935119 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/312/0082-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 483, "char_count": 8240, "ocr_confidence": 0.919, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.308539159853785e-07, "percentile": 0.6238755618570813 }, "sha256": "cb19c87873e37e258b335578fef00fd601bcbecc5ed95719c46adca118b7ccf2", "simhash": "1:f6ebe850776c24f2", "word_count": 1359 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:22:56.854306+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Michale Ray FURLOUGH v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice.\nMichael Furlough appeals his conviction of aggravated robbery. Because he had four felonies, he was tried and convicted as a habitual offender and received a sentence of forty years imprisonment. He raises two points for reversal.\nFirst, Furlough argues the trial court erred in allowing into evidence two officers\u2019 reports containing Furlough\u2019s confessions to robbing the Hurry Back store in El Dorado and an attempted robbery at Calion, Arkansas. Furlough was charged with the robbery on December 17, 1991, and afterwards he moved for discovery under Ark. R. Crim. P. Rule 17. On March 12, 1992, four days prior to trial, defense counsel first learned from Lt. Carolyn Dykes that she and Sergeant Byron Sarter had read Furlough his rights after his arrest, and each officer had obtained separate oral confessions from Furlough concerning the Hurry Back store robbery and the attempted robbery at Calion. The officers included these confessions in their respective reports and filed them with the El Dorado Police Department where they remained until Furlough\u2019s counsel located them on March 12. Furlough subsequently moved to suppress the confessions, and the trial court ordered a continuance until a hearing could be conducted on Furlough\u2019s motion. A hearing was held on April 23, 1992, when the trial court denied Furlough\u2019s motion and set a new trial for May 14, 1992.\nFurlough contends that he never confessed to any robbery and that the trial court should have disallowed introduction of the officers\u2019 reports containing his purported confessions because the state failed to disclose this material pursuant to Discovery Rule 17.\nRule 19.7(a) contains the following list of remedies that the court may employ when a party has failed to comply with the rules of discovery: (1) order such party to permit the discovery or inspection of materials not previously disclosed, (2) grant a continuance, (3) prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the material not disclosed, or (4) enter such order as it deems proper under the circumstances. It is within the trial court\u2019s discretion which sanction to employ, and here the trial court offered Furlough a continuance to deal with the surprise caused by the state\u2019s failure to reveal the officers\u2019 reports containing the confessions. See Reed v. State, 312 Ark. 82, 847 S.W.2d 34 (1993). We have held a continuance may be sufficient to cure the state\u2019s failure to comply with the discovery rule. Id. Here, Furlough fails to show how he was prejudiced. The trial court\u2019s continuance gave Furlough two months to prepare his case after having become aware of the officers\u2019 reports. Accordingly, we find no merit to Furlough\u2019s first argument.\nNext, Furlough contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for mistrial when Lt. Dykes, on direct examination by the state, referred to \u201cother robberies\u201d with which Furlough was not charged. That colloquy follows:\nState: All right. What did Mr. Furlough tell you about his involvement in this armed robbery?\nDykes: He told me very little. He denied having committed any robberies. In fact Mr. Furlough became hostile and belligerent as I attempted to interview him concerning the robberies . . .\nState: Can you be a little more specific about how he demonstrated this hostility or what kinds of things he was saying to you that demonstrated hostility?\nDykes: I went into detail to explain to Mr. Furlough why he was a suspect in the other robberies that he was not charged with.\nDefense Counsel: May we approach the bench?\nCourt: Yes.\nPROCEEDINGS OF SIDE BAR:\nDefense Counsel: You\u2019re talking about a bunch of stuff here that he\u2019s not even been charged with. She\u2019s mentioned other robberies three times.\nCourt: Is that your objection?\nDefense Counsel: Yes, I\u2019m objecting to it, and moving for a mistrial.\nCourt: Well, I think there is a problem with eliciting testimony about other events with which the defendant has not been charged.\nState: The only basis at this point is the fact that the confession includes a confession to one of the other robberies. I\u2019ll limit the questions and I\u2019ll be very specific.\nDefense Counsel: I would move for a mistrial, Your Honor.\nCourt: Well, it\u2019s going to be denied.\nState: I will limit the testimony just to this particular incident. But in the conf\u00e9ssion there will be testimony that he has confessed to that robbery at the Hurry Back and also to the store in Calion.\nCourt: Mr. Hoggard [defense counsel], do you wish me to instruct the jury that they\u2019re not to consider other events with which this defendant [is] charged?\nDefense Counsel: I would respectfully request that, Your Honor. But I want it noted that I make my exception to the ruling of the Court in not granting a mistrial.\nTO OPEN COURT:\nCourt: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, Lieutenant Dykes and one other officer have made reference to what has been described as a series of robberies or other robberies. I simply want to remind the jury at this time that this case involves only the specific offense, an incident, that has been described and as alleged in the information. This trial does not concern itself with other previous events and you are not to consider these references in any way with respect to your deliberations as to the specific charges in the case that we have before the Court and the jury today.\nYou may proceed.\nState: Lieutenant Dykes, perhaps I need to ask you a more narrow question. You spoke with him about his participation in this robbery, is that right?\nDykes: That\u2019s correct.\nState: And did he give you answers with regard to this robbery?\nDykes: Very few answers. Mr. Furlough spent most of his time in his conversation attempting to, how shall I say, explain to me that he was not capable of having committed those robberies.\nState: I want to know about this robbery.\nThe foregoing colloquy reflects the trial court agreed that Dykes\u2019 references to other robberies were inadmissible and upheld Furlough\u2019s objection by giving a cautionary instruction. Nonetheless, Furlough maintains on appeal that only a mistrial would have corrected the introduction of such objectionable testimony.\nAs this court has said on numerous occasions, mistrial is a drastic recourse and should be ordered only when the fundamental fairness of the trial itself has been manifestly affected. Miller v. State, 309 Ark. 117, 827 S.W.2d 149 (1992). A mistrial is to be granted only where any possible prejudice cannot be removed by an admonition to the jury. Porter v. State, 308 Ark. 137, 823 S.W.2d 846 (1992). Here, the trial court gave the jury an admonition to limit its concern and deliberations to the offenses alleged in the state\u2019s information and not to consider the references to other robberies. Defense counsel requested such an admonition, and while he continued his request for a mistrial, counsel made no objection to the remarks or cautionary instruction the trial court made in this regard. In view of the trial court\u2019s admonition, we believe the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Furlough\u2019s mistrial motion. The trial court\u2019s admonition was particularly appropriate in light of Furlough\u2019s confessions which apprised the jury not only of his admission to having committed the aggravated robbery of Hurry Back, but also of his attempted robbery in Calion, Arkansas. Certainly, Dyke\u2019s references paled in comparison to Furlough\u2019s actual confessions to the robbery with which he was charged.\nIn sum, we conclude the trial court\u2019s admonition during Officer Dykes\u2019 testimony was sufficient to remove any prejudice caused by the officer\u2019s improper reference to other robberies. Therefore, we affirm.\nAlthough Furlough moved to suppress his confessions because the state failed to provide them in timely fashion, no objection was made to strike the Calion attempted robbery offense because he had not been charged with such an offense. The other robberies alluded to by Dykes dealt with a series of separate robberies.", "type": "majority", "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Jay E. Hoggard, for appellant.", "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Brad Newman, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Michale Ray FURLOUGH v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 92-1442\n861 S.W.2d 297\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered September 13, 1993\nJay E. Hoggard, for appellant.\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Brad Newman, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0146-01", "first_page_order": 172, "last_page_order": 177 }