{ "id": 1912739, "name": "NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. Jeannie WORTHEY, Individually and as the Mother and Next Friend of Dustin Worthey, A Minor", "name_abbreviation": "Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. Worthey ex rel. Worthey", "decision_date": "1993-09-20", "docket_number": "93-87", "first_page": "185", "last_page": "192", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "314 Ark. 185" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "861 S.W.2d 307" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23-89-403", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 Ark. 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1895780 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/294/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 Ark. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1896933 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/311/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 Ark. 611", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8721290 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "620" }, { "page": "423" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/266/0611-01" ] }, { "cite": "9 Ark. App. 34", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136391 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36" }, { "page": "637" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/9/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 Ark. 849", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1672623 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/263/0849-01" ] }, { "cite": "799 F.2d 437", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1605671 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/799/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "3 Ark. App. 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6715319 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/3/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-20-104", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-20-105", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-20-101", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(2)" }, { "page": "(3)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-19-206", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-14-207", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 645, "char_count": 13319, "ocr_confidence": 0.902, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.921732618643261e-07, "percentile": 0.8466661569844419 }, "sha256": "c2aa0e529e73b506852115084084d23f90896964184d816a78a2f407755dd1ee", "simhash": "1:3a6995d4f5060969", "word_count": 2153 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:22:56.854306+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Brown, J., concurs." ], "parties": [ "NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. Jeannie WORTHEY, Individually and as the Mother and Next Friend of Dustin Worthey, A Minor" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice.\nJeannie Worthey and her husband Kenneth obtained an automobile liability policy from Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. on their two pickup trucks and Cadillac. The policy covered the Wortheys and their son Dustin, for all bodily injuries sustained by them and caused by an accident and arising out of another\u2019s ownership, maintenance, or use of an uninsured automobile. The Wortheys also owned a 1975 Honda Trail 70 vehicle which they did not insure; it is that vehicle which is the center of this litigation.\nIn short, Dustin was operating the Trail 70 vehicle on a county road when an uninsured motorist ran into Dustin. Nationwide refused to pay for Dustin\u2019s injuries, so Jeannie, as Dustin\u2019s next friend, brought suit against Nationwide to recover under the uninsured motorist coverage of the Wortheys\u2019 policy with Nationwide. The trial court awarded judgment against Nationwide from which Nationwide now appeals.\nNationwide argues that Dustin is excluded from the uninsured motorist coverage of Wortheys\u2019 policy because the policy terms provide that \u201c[I]t (the uninsured motorist coverage) does not apply to bodily injury suffered while occupying a motor vehicle owned by you or a relative living in your household, but not insured for Uninsured Motorists coverage under this policy.\u201d Nationwide contends the Worthey Trail 70 vehicle was a motor vehicle and therefore excluded from coverage since the Wortheys owned the vehicle but failed to insure it for uninsured motorist coverage.\nWorthey counters Nationwide\u2019s contention by arguing the Trail 70 is not a motor vehicle. The trial court agreed with Worthey, and Worthey submits the evidence presented below clearly supports the trial court\u2019s holding.\nBoth Worthey and Nationwide point to the policy which defines \u201cmotor vehicle\u201d as follows:\n[A] land motor vehicle designed to be driven on public roads. They do not include vehicles operated on rails or crawler-treads. Other motor vehicles designed for use mainly off public roads are covered when used on public roads.\nIn discussing the foregoing definition, Worthey cites cases and Arkansas statutes to support her position that the uninsured Trail 70 vehicle owned by the Wortheys and operated by Dustin was not a motor vehicle and therefore did not come within the uninsured motorist exclusion provision of Nationwide\u2019s policy. For clarity sake, we first dispel any thought or suggestion that the Trail 70 vehicle is not a motor vehicle under state law. Second, we will consider if the language contained in Nationwide\u2019s policy definition of motor vehicle permits or dictates a different result.\nUnder Arkansas Registration and Licensing laws, motor vehicle means every vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires, but not operated upon rails. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-14-207 (Supp. 1991); see also Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-19-206 (1987) for the same definition. Obviously, a Trail 70 is self-propelled, and is further included within the statutory definition of a \u201cmotor-driven cycle,\u201d which is a motor vehicle having a seat or saddle for use of the rider and designed to travel on no more than three wheels in contact with the ground and having a motor which displaces 250 cubic centimeters or less. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-20-101(2) (1987). It is also clear that when a motor-driven cycle (which by definition includes a Trail 70 motor vehicle) is operated on the streets and highways of Arkansas, that vehicle must be registered and licensed. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-20-105 (Supp. 1991). In addition, state law requires such a motor vehicle be equipped with standard equipment, including a headlight, tail light, red reflector, horn and standard muffler. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-20-104 (1987).\nHere, the Wortheys knew their Trail 70 had a 70 cc engine, they allowed Dustin to ride the vehicle on public streets and knew the accident giving rise to this litigation had occurred on a public road. From the record before us, we have no doubt that, under state law at least, the Worthey Trail 70 vehicle was a motor vehicle (motor-driven cycle), and because it was used upon public streets, was subject to Arkansas\u2019s registration and licensing laws. Thus, if statutory law alone controlled the terms or coverage of the Nationwide policy here, Dustin obviously could not recover since he was operating a Trail 70 motor vehicle when injured and the motor vehicle had not been insured by the Wortheys for uninsured motorists coverage. Having said this, however, does not resolve the issue concerning the Nationwide policy definition of motor vehicle \u2014 which differs from the one defined by statutory law \u2014 and whether that difference precludes Nationwide from using the uninsured motorist exclusion provision of its policy to deny Dustin damages. We believe it does.\nAs previously set out above, the Nationwide policy defines \u201cmotor vehicle\u201d as a land motor vehicle designed to be driven on public roads. Because the policy definition limits \u201cmotor vehicle\u201d to one \u201cdesigned to be driven\u201d (not merely used) on public roads, such a definition appears somewhat narrower than that contemplated by Arkansas\u2019s statutory law. Thus, Worthey argues that, because she offered evidence below that the Trail 70 vehicle Dustin operated was designed and intended for use off the public road, such vehicle did not come within the policy definition of motor vehicle. This being so, she concludes the uninsured motorists coverage exclusion simply is inapplicable and cannot be used to prevent Dustin\u2019s recovery for the damages he sustained.\nIn support of Worthey\u2019s argument, she cites Carner v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ark., 3 Ark. App. 201, 623 S.W.2d 859 (1981), which factually is similar to Worthey\u2019s present situation. In Carner, the insurance automobile policy covered three cars owned by Carner, the insured, and it provided further that the named insured or relative could recover necessary medical service expenses for bodily injury sustained through being struck by a motor vehicle while not occupying any other motor vehicle. Carner\u2019s son was riding on a friend\u2019s motorcycle when the motorcycle was struck by a car, and in seeking medical expenses under the policies covering his three automobiles, Carner contended the motorcycle which his son rode was not a motor vehicle as defined by the policies issued on Carner\u2019s automobiles. Carner pointed to the definition of motor vehicle contained in his policies which provided that the term means a land motor vehicle designed for use principally upon public roads. The court of appeals held that, in determining the character of the vehicle in issue, it must consider (1) the vehicle\u2019s actual use, (2) the design and intended use by the manufacturer and (3) how it is commonly used. When considering Carner\u2019s proof relative to these factors, the court rejected earner\u2019s contention by finding the evidence was insufficient to show that the vehicle his son was riding was not a trail bike rather than a motorcycle. To the contrary, the court held that the record showed the vehicle was a motorcycle which by definition was a motor vehicle.\nWorthey argues that, contrary to the insured\u2019s failure of proof in Carner, she presented ample proof below that the Trail 70 vehicle was designed and intended for use off public roads. Based on that proof, the trial court here found that under the Nationwide policy terms, the Trail 70 was not a motor vehicle and such finding should be affirmed unless determined clearly erroneous.\nIf sufficiency of the evidence in this appeal proved the determinative issue, we might readily differ with Worthey\u2019s view that the evidence bearing on the three factors noted in Carner require a finding that Worthey\u2019s Trail 70 is. not a motor vehicle. While Worthey certainly offered evidence indicating that the Trail 70 was not designed and manufactured for use on public roads, considerable proof also showed that Dustin\u2019s actual use of the vehicle was on public streets and roads. As to the third factor in Carner or how the Trail 70 was commonly used, we do not find the evidence or argument compelling on either party\u2019s side of the issue.\nThe clear answer to whether the uninsured motorist coverage provision in Nationwide\u2019s policy bars Worthey recovery is found in the third sentence of the policy definition of motor vehicle, and when reading it, in determining whether an ambiguity exists as a matter of law. It has been held that where a term is defined in the policy, the court is bound by the policy definition. Enterprise Tools, Inc. v. Export-Import Bank, 799 F.2d 437 (8th cir. 1986). It is also settled that an insurer may contract with its insured upon whatever terms the parties may agree upon which are not contrary to statute or public policy. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Smith, 263 Ark. 849, 568 S.W.2d 11 (1978).\nUnder Arkansas law, the intent to exclude coverage in an insurance policy should be expressed in clear and unambiguous language, and an insurance policy, having been drafted by the insurer without consultation with the insured, is to be interpreted and construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer. Baskette v. Union Life Ins. Co., 9 Ark. App. 34, 36, 652 S.W.2d 635, 637 (1983). If the language in a policy is ambiguous, or there is doubt or uncertainty as to its meaning and it is fairly susceptible of two or more interpretations, one favorable to the insured and the other favorable to the insurer, the one favorable to the insured will be adopted. Drummond Citizens Ins. Co. v. Sergeant, 266 Ark. 611, 620, 588 S.W.2d 419, 423 (1979).\nKeeping in mind the foregoing rules, we direct our attention to the policy language contained in the third sentence following the policy definition of motor vehicle which reads, \u201cother motor vehicles designed for use mainly off public roads are cover\u00e9d when used on public roads.\u201d In reading this language in conjunction with the first sentence defining motor vehicle, it appears to say that even motor vehicles not designed to be driven on public roads are covered under the policy when the vehicle is used on public roads. Nationwide attempts to argue the reference to the word \u201ccovered\u201d does not mean covered by the policy, but instead means the definition of motor vehicle covers an off-road vehicle when it is used on a public road. Nationwide\u2019s explanation for the term \u201ccovered\u201d in this context is somewhat puzzling. Significantly, we think, Nationwide offers no reason or purpose why such coverage language would be placed in the definition section of the policy, especially when the policy contains provisions which exclude physical damage, personal injuries and uninsured motorist coverage when such damages are sustained when occupying an insured\u2019s off-road motor vehicle. Nevertheless, the language employed in the policy unquestionably lends itself to the reasonable interpretation we mentioned above, namely, that the policy provides coverage even when off-road motor vehicles are used on public roads. Because we hold an ambiguity exists in Nationwide\u2019s policy, we must adopt the interpretation that favors the insured in these circumstances, and in doing so, hold Dustin\u2019s injuries were covered under the Nationwide policy. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court\u2019s decision and award favoring Worthey. While we recognize the trial court decided this case on a different theory, the court sustains a trial court\u2019s ruling if it reached the right result. Bushong v. Garman Co., 311 Ark. 228, 843 S.W.2d 807 (1992).\nIn conclusion, we mention Nationwide\u2019s second point for reversal wherein it argues the trial court erred in allowing into evidence a report from the Code of Federal Regulations which indicated that a mini-bike was not a motor vehicle under the terms or meaning of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966. Of course, this evidentiary point has no relevance on whether Nationwide\u2019s policy contained an ambiguity. Whether an insurance contract is ambiguous is a question of law. Enterprise Tools, Inc., 799 F.2d 437. Thus, the federal report admission into evidence has no relevance to this case as decided on appeal and suffered no harm by its introduction below.\nAffirmed.\nBrown, J., concurs.\nWe note that this court has held this type uninsured motorist exclusion is valid. See Crawford v. Emcasco Insurance Company, 294 Ark. 569, 745 S.W.2d 132 (1988); see also Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23-89-403 (1987).\nThis definition does not include a motorized bicycle. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-20-101(3).\nAt one point, we hypothesized that perhaps the Nationwide policy would cover certain medical or physical damages when an insured\u2019s off-road vehicle was struck by another\u2019s insured vehicle even though the policy coverage would not extend to uninsured motorist coverage. This possibility was dismissed when examining other parts of the policy which appear to exclude all damages when sustained under such circumstances.", "type": "majority", "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Mixon & McCauley, for appellant.", "Henry, Walden & Halsey, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. Jeannie WORTHEY, Individually and as the Mother and Next Friend of Dustin Worthey, A Minor\n93-87\n861 S.W.2d 307\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered September 20, 1993\nMixon & McCauley, for appellant.\nHenry, Walden & Halsey, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0185-01", "first_page_order": 211, "last_page_order": 218 }