{
  "id": 1910560,
  "name": "DILLARD DEPARTMENT STORES, INC. and Peggy Hallmark v. Mary ADAMS and Wayne Adams",
  "name_abbreviation": "Dillard Department Stores, Inc. v. Adams",
  "decision_date": "1993-12-13",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Dudley and Brown, JJ., not participating."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "DILLARD DEPARTMENT STORES, INC. and Peggy Hallmark v. Mary ADAMS and Wayne Adams"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "David Newbern, Justice.\nDillard Department Stores (Dillards) and Peggy Hallmark appeal from a judgment in favor of Mary Adams and her husband, Wayne Adams, the appellees. The Adamses sued Dillards and Ms. Hallmark for outrage and malicious prosecution. Dillards and Ms. Hallmark contend the Trial Court erred by allowing the jury to decide whether the tort of outrage had been committed because the evidence was insufficient to substantiate the claim. They also contend there was insufficient evidence for the jury to award punitive damages or, in the alternative, the punitive damages awarded were excessive. We find merit in the appellants\u2019 first argument and reverse and remand the case. We need not address the appellants\u2019 other contentions.\nMary Adams was shopping for a bathing suit at Dillards in Jonesboro. She tried on several suits in one of the store\u2019s dressing rooms. Peggy Hallmark, a sales manager with Dillards said that, through the vents in the dressing room door, she observed Ms. Adams switch the price tags on two bathing suits. Except for minor differences in testimony by Ms. Hallmark and Ms. Adams there is no dispute as to the remainder of the relevant events.\nMs. Adams left the dressing room with a bathing suit and continued shopping in the store. Ms. Hallmark continued observing Ms. Adams until Ms. Adams purchased the bathing suit with her Dillard\u2019s credit card. As Ms. Adams was leaving the store, Ms. Hallmark and a security guard stopped her. Identifying herself as \u201cDillards security,\u201d Ms. Hallmark asked Ms. Adams if she would accompany them to the rear of the store.\nIn a manager\u2019s office, Ms. Hallmark confronted Ms. Adams about switching the price tag to obtain the bathing suit she had purchased at a price lower than that originally marked on that suit. Ms. Adams denied any wrongdoing. The store manager and the Jonesboro Police were called. The store manager questioned Ms. Adams and then took her picture and told her she was banned from the store. The police arrived and issued a citation to Ms. Adams who was then escorted from the store. The entire incident lasted from twenty minutes to an hour.\nAfter the incident Ms. Adams suffered from depression. Her husband became so concerned he quit his job as a truck driver as he felt the need to stay at home due to his wife\u2019s condition. Ms. Adams saw a psychologist and a psychiatrist. Both diagnosed her as being depressed. Medication was prescribed for her, and her condition stabilized somewhat.\nA theft charge against Ms. Adams was dismissed by the Jonesboro Municipal Court.\nThe Adamses sought punitive and compensatory damages, including damages for loss of consortium for Mr. Adams. Dillards and Ms. Hallmark moved for a directed verdict at the end of the Adamses\u2019 evidence and objected to the jury being instructed on the tort of outrage at the close of the evidence. They were overruled. The jury, after being instructed on the torts of outrage and malicious prosecution, returned a general verdict in favor of Ms. Adams for $3,500 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages and awarded Mr. Adams nothing.\nOutrage\nThe question we must answer is whether Ms. Adams presented sufficient evidence to send the case to the jury to decide whether Dillards and Ms. Hallmark committed the tort of outrage.\nOutrage, or intentional infliction of emotional distress, was first recognized by this Court, in its current form, in M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980). We stated \u201cone who by extreme and outrageous conduct wilfully and wantonly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress and for bodily harm resulting from the distress.\u201d We said, \u201c[b]y extreme and outrageous conduct, we mean conduct that is so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.\u201d We were quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 46, cmt. d (1977).\nIn subsequent decisions, we have addressed outrage in a cautious manner. \u00d3ur recognition of this tort is not intended to \u201copen the doors of the courts to every slight insult or indignity one must endure in life.\u201d Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 743 S.W.2d 380 (1988); Hess v. Treece, 286 Ark. 434, 693 S.W.2d 72 (1985); Tandy Corp. v. Bone, 283 Ark. 399, 678 S.W.2d 312 (1984).\nWe cannot say Ms. Adams presented sufficient evidence for a jury instruction on the tort of outrage. Ms. Adams testified the entire incident lasted less than an hour. During that time she was not physically touched, and while Dillards employees may have questioned her in a confrontational manner, there is no evidence that their tone was abusive or harassing. Ms. Adams testified that Ms. Hallmark initially confronted her in a professional manner and in such a way as not to draw the attention of any other customers.\nWe do not mean to say that Dillards\u2019 employees\u2019 actions were merely a \u201cslight insult.\u201d We recognize Ms. Adams may well have suffered mental distress as a result of them. She was accused of a crime of which she was not convicted. We cannot, however, find in the facts alleged or shown the kind of \u201cextreme degree\u201d of outrageous conduct \u201cas to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in civilized society.\u201d Whatever the merits of the claim of Dillards and Ms. Hallmark as to Ms. Adams\u2019s conduct (and we assume no merit in them for purposes of this appeal) nothing that was done constituted conduct fitting our definition of \u201coutrage.\u201d\nMs. Adams contends we should not reverse the jury\u2019s verdict because it was a general verdict and the jury was properly instructed on the additional tort of malicious prosecution which could have been the basis of the awards made. That may be so, but we cannot know whether the general verdict was given wholly or in part for the tort of outrage which should not have been before the jury. In Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 743 S.W.2d 380 (1988), we were confronted with the same problem. The tort of outrage had gone to the jury without sufficient evidence in support of it. Other tortious conduct, in that case wrongful discharge, was also alleged, and a general verdict was returned. We said, \u201cWe cannot ascertain if [the jury] based its verdict... on the claim of outrage or wrongful discharge or both. Since the issue of outrage was improperly submitted to the jury, we cannot affirm the judgment of the trial court.\u201d We have recently dealt with analogous cases in which a jury has been improperly instructed and the party complaining about the error has been unable conclusively to show prejudice. We have made it clear that when an erroneous instruction has been given and a jury has rendered a general verdict from which prejudice due to the error cannot be ascertained, we must reverse, Skinner v. R.J. Griffin, Inc., 313 Ark. 430, 855 S.W.2d 913 (1993), unless some additional factor makes it clear that the erroneous instruction was harmless. See Davis v. Davis, 313 Ark. 549, 856 S.W.2d 284 (1993). We find nothing in this case which would make the instruction on outrage harmless.\nReversed and remanded.\nDudley and Brown, JJ., not participating.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "David Newbern, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Penix, Penix and Lusby, by: Bill Penix and Robin Nix, for appellants.",
      "Mike Bearden, for appellees.-"
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "DILLARD DEPARTMENT STORES, INC. and Peggy Hallmark v. Mary ADAMS and Wayne Adams\n93-583\n867 S.W.2d 442\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered December 13, 1993\n[Rehearing denied January 18, 1994]\nPenix, Penix and Lusby, by: Bill Penix and Robin Nix, for appellants.\nMike Bearden, for appellees.-"
  },
  "file_name": "0303-01",
  "first_page_order": 333,
  "last_page_order": 337
}