{ "id": 1907799, "name": "ARKANSAS STATE EMPLOYEES INSURANCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE v. ESTATE OF Brent Ronald MANNING", "name_abbreviation": "Arkansas State Employees Insurance Advisory Committee v. Estate of Manning", "decision_date": "1994-02-28", "docket_number": "93-885", "first_page": "143", "last_page": "147", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "316 Ark. 143" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "870 S.W.2d 748" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "34 Ark. App. 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137786 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/34/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 Ark. 1019", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1642923 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/225/1019-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 Ark. 195", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1730835 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/239/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-65-318", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 Ark. 8", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1895793 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/294/0008-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 Ark. 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1724189 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/241/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-65-317", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(l)" }, { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 Ark. 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1902430 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/307/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-65-107", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "259 Ark. 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1619171 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/259/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 Ark. 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1898925 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/310/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ark. 199", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1935073 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/312/0199-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 482, "char_count": 8066, "ocr_confidence": 0.901, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4028461809353012e-07, "percentile": 0.6450650211653266 }, "sha256": "9a4f0c32911bd1ecaf400bc7c5481d03d7243c70ec5089b8af0d97527fa77913", "simhash": "1:5eeefec5d024f72e", "word_count": 1324 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:45:44.703271+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ARKANSAS STATE EMPLOYEES INSURANCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE v. ESTATE OF Brent Ronald MANNING" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice.\nThis case was instituted in probate court where the parties argued the applicability of this court\u2019s recent decisions in Higginbotham v. Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 312 Ark. 199, 849 S.W.2d 464 (1993), and Shelter Mutual Insurance Company v. Bough, 310 Ark. 21, 834 S.W.2d 637 (1992). Brent Manning, a minor, was seriously injured as a result of his motorcycle being struck by a vehicle owned and operated by Bob Hulsizer. Brent\u2019s mother was subsequently appointed Brent\u2019s guardian by the probate court, so she could enter into a proposed settlement of Brent\u2019s tort claim against Hulsizer. Hulsizer was agreeable to settle the claim for $25,000, which reflected the policy limits of his State Farm Mutual Automobile Company insurance policy.\nBrent\u2019s father intervened in this probate proceeding, requesting the trial court to allocate the funds from any settlement in accordance with the terms of the subrogation clause of the group health insurance policy the father maintained with the State Employees Insurance Advisory Committee. Because Brent was a dependent of his father and thereby covered by his father\u2019s insurance plan, $37,407.51 of Brent\u2019s medical expenses had been paid by the state employees insurance.\nRelying upon this court\u2019s decision in Bough, the probate court entered its order on March 11, 1993, rejecting the Committee\u2019s request for subrogation. In its ruling, the lower court stated the general rule that an insurer is not entitled to subrogation unless the insured had been made whole for his loss and any additional payments would cause the insured to receive a double recovery. The probate court then specifically found that Brent\u2019s loss exceeded the total of the amounts paid by the state insurance and State Farm policies ($37,407.51 plus $25,000 = $62,407:51), and accordingly denied the Committee had any right of subrogation to any part of the monies paid by State Farm to Brent\u2019s estate.\nAfter the probate court\u2019s decision on March 11th, the Committee filed a \u201cmotion for reconsideration\u201d citing this court\u2019s March 1, 1993 ruling in Higginbotham and claiming that this more recent holding indicated that the Bough decision was not controlling of the facts here. More specifically, the Committee argued below (and now on appeal) that when an express subrogation clause is contained in the insurer\u2019s policy (not found in Bough), the subrogation agreement is controlling \u00e1nd permits the insurer to be reimbursed from the tortfeasor to the extent of the value of benefits or services furnished the insured by the insurer. The Committee\u2019s motion was deemed denied, and the Committee brings this appeal contending the lower court erred in failing to follow the Higginbotham decision.\nWe are unable to reach the merits of the parties\u2019 arguments as to whether the Bough or Higginbotham decision controls the instant case because the probate court had no subject matter jurisdiction to reach the ruling it rendered. In fairness to the trial court, this jurisdiction issue was not raised below, but Brent does argue it in this appeal. Even if Brent had failed to raise the jurisdiction issue on appeal, this court has said repeatedly that it is not only the right but the duty of this court to determine whether it has jurisdiction of the subject matter. Hilburn v. 1st State Bank of Springdale, 259 Ark. 569, 535 S.W.2d 810 (1976). It is also settled law that subject matter jurisdiction is always open, cannot be waived, can be questioned for the first time on appeal, and can even be raised by this court. Id.\nProbate court has exclusive jurisdiction over all matters of guardianship, other than guardians ad litem in other courts. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-65-107(a) (1987); Forehand v. American Collection Serv., Inc., 307 Ark. 342, 819 S.W.2d 282 (1991). In addition, the court in Forehand has stated that a guardian is under a duty to pay from the estate all just claims against the estate of the ward. See also Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-65-317(a)(l) (1987). And under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-65-317(b), any person having a claim against the estate of the ward for services lawfully rendered to the ward or his estate for necessities furnished to the ward, or for the payment of a lawful liquidated claim or demand against the estate of the ward, the probate court, after notice and appropriate hearing, may direct the guardian to pay the claim. See also First State Bank, Gdn. v. Thessing, 241 Ark. 150, 406 S.W.2d 865 (1966). These statutory provisions also bring into focus the settled rule that probate court is a court of special and limited jurisdiction, having only such jurisdiction and powers as are conferred by the constitution or by statute, or necessarily incidental thereto. Eddleman v. Estate of Farmer, 294 Ark. 8, 740 S.W.2d 141 (1987). Finally, upon petition of the guardian of a ward\u2019s estate, the probate court may make an order authorizing the settlement or compromise of any claim by or against the ward or his estate, whether arising out of contract, tort, or otherwise, and whether arising before or after the appointment of the guardian. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-65-318(a) (1987).\nBrent argues the Committee\u2019s petition in this matter is designed to specifically enforce the subrogation provisions of the state\u2019s health insurance plan, and because specific performance is an equitable remedy it is cognizable only in chancery court. Hilburn, 259 Ark. 569, 535 S.W.2d 810; Morton v. Yell, 239 Ark. 195, 388 S.W.2d 88 (1965). This court, however, has steadfastly adhered to the rule that equity will not enforce, by specific performance, a contract relating to personalty unless special or peculiar reasons exist which make it impossible for the injured party to obtain relief by way of damages in an action at law. Morris v. Sparrow, 225 Ark. 1019, 287 S.W.2d 583 (1956); Stacy v. Hsi-Chi Lin, 34 Ark. App. 97, 806 S.W.2d 15 (1991). Here, the Committee\u2019s purported claim or loss would undoubtedly be satisfied by the reimbursement of the monies it has expended for medical expenses in Brent\u2019s behalf. And because such damages are available in an action at law, we see no merit in Brent\u2019s attempt to characterize the Committee\u2019s action or claim as one for specific performance.\nThe second part of Brent\u2019s jurisdiction argument is not as easily dismissed. In this regard, Brent points to the language in \u00a7 28-65-317(b) which permits the probate court to pay claims against the estate of the ward (1) for services rendered to the ward for necessaries or (2) for payment of liquidated claims or demands against the Ward\u2019s estate. The Committee here has not framed its request to the probate court asking it to require the guardian to pay for necessaries provided Brent. Instead, the Committee requested the lower court to permit the Committee to be subrogated to Brent\u2019s rights against Hulsizer to the extent of the services or benefits provided Brent. Brent contested the Committee\u2019s claim to subrogation. In particular, the Committee asked the court to distribute Brent\u2019s settlement proceeds in accordance with the terms of the subrogation clause of the Committee\u2019s insurance plan. The Committee never requested or demanded recovery of any specific money amount(s).\nFor these same reasons, we also conclude the Committee\u2019s petition fails to assert or meet the requirements of a liquidated claim under \u00a7 28-65-317(b). As discussed above, probate court is a court of special and limited jurisdiction and has only such powers as are expressly conferred by statute or the constitution or necessarily incident thereto. Having failed to assert or present a constitutional or statutorily cognizable claim to the probate court, we must set aside the lower court\u2019s order which denied the Committee\u2019s petition.", "type": "majority", "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: M. Wade Hodge, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellant.", "Godo & Dossey, by: Samuel M. Reeves, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ARKANSAS STATE EMPLOYEES INSURANCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE v. ESTATE OF Brent Ronald MANNING\n93-885\n870 S.W.2d 748\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered February 28, 1994\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: M. Wade Hodge, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellant.\nGodo & Dossey, by: Samuel M. Reeves, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0143-01", "first_page_order": 175, "last_page_order": 179 }