{ "id": 1443735, "name": "Steve McCOY, Administrator of the Estate of Georgia (McCoy) Walker, Deceased v. Billy WALKER", "name_abbreviation": "McCoy v. Walker", "decision_date": "1994-05-16", "docket_number": "94-96", "first_page": "86", "last_page": "91", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "317 Ark. 86" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "876 S.W.2d 252" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "149 S.W. 330", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1912, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ark. 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1350605 ], "year": 1912, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/104/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-9-209", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 Ark. 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1912814 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/314/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "9 S.W.2d 10", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1928, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "177 Ark. 912", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8725669 ], "year": 1928, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/177/0912-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 Ark. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1910452 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/315/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 Ark. 661", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1914654 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/313/0661-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-1-102", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 28-39-201", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 435, "char_count": 8160, "ocr_confidence": 0.892, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.814429646181866e-07, "percentile": 0.9316489108052246 }, "sha256": "bd1670793bca660f29797d2c2b89323a7ff775dbc0ae84cc8fea58b6c0f7ef08", "simhash": "1:132abed2a0fdf482", "word_count": 1320 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:37:34.960752+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Steve McCOY, Administrator of the Estate of Georgia (McCoy) Walker, Deceased v. Billy WALKER" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Steele Hays, Justice.\nThis case involves homestead rights and the interpretation of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 28-39-201 and 28-1-102(a)(1) (1987). Appellant Steve McCoy, Administrator of the Estate of Georgia (McCoy) Walker, contends the minor grandchildren of a decedent who would inherit from the decedent under the laws of descent and distribution have homestead rights under the Arkansas Probate Code. We find no merit in his argument and affirm the order of the probate court.\nGeorgia and Tommy McCoy married in 1961. They built a home on twelve acres in Cross County. The McCoys had four children and their daughter, Sherry, had three children: Holly Parrish, Tommy Parrish, and Linda Parrish. Following the death of Sherry Parrish, her three minor children moved in with Georgia and Tommy McCoy. Subsequently, Georgia and Tommy McCoy were appointed guardians of the three children.\nTommy McCoy died and Georgia McCoy continued to serve as guardian of her three grandchildren. In 1990 Georgia McCoy married the appellee, Billy Walker. Billy and Georgia (McCoy) Walker resided in Georgia\u2019s home in Cross County. In addition, Sherry\u2019s three children and Steve McCoy continued to reside in the decedent\u2019s home in Cross County.\nGeorgia died intestate on July 9, 1993. She owned the home and surrounding twelve acres which was non-marital property. Her three surviving children were over the age of twenty-one. At the time of Georgia\u2019s death, Holly was thirteen, Tommy was eleven and Linda was eight. Steve McCoy is now the guardian of Georgia\u2019s grandchildren and administrator of her estate.\nBilly Walker was awarded homestead rights in the home, however, a petition to award homestead rights to the grandchildren was denied. Steve McCoy appeals from that order.\nSteve McCoy contends the decedent\u2019s minor grandchildren are entitled to homestead rights under Ark. Code. Ann. \u00a7 28-39-201 (1987). Section 28-39-201, Rights of surviving spouse and children, provides in part:\n(a) If the owner of a homestead dies leaving a surviving spouse, but no children, and the surviving spouse has no separate homestead in his or her own right, the homestead shall be exempt and the rents and profits thereof shall vest in the surviving spouse during his or her natural life.\n(b) However, if the owner leaves one (1) or more children, the child or children shall share with the surviving spouse and be entitled to one-half (1/2) the rents and profits till each of them arrives at twenty-one (21) years of age \u2014 each child\u2019s right to cease at twenty-one (21) years of age \u2014 and the shares to go to the younger children and then all to go to the surviving spouse. The surviving spouse or children may reside on the homestead or not.\nThe statute specifically limits homestead rights to the surviving spouse and to the \u201cchild or children\u201d of the decedent. However, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-1-102 (1987), Definitions, provides in part:\n(a) As used in this code, unless the context otherwise requires:\n(1) \u201cChild\u201d denotes a natural or adopted child, but does not include a grandchild or other more remote descendant or an illegitimate child except such as would inherit under the law of descent and distribution; ...\nSteve McCoy claims the definition of \u201cchild\u201d found in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-1-102 includes a grandchild who would inherit under the law of descent and distribution. Since the grandchildren would take their mother\u2019s share of Georgia\u2019s estate under the laws of descent and distribution, McCoy submits they would be \u201cchildren\u201d entitled to homestead rights under the probate code. Walker, however, maintains the language, \u201cexcept such as would inherit under the law of descent and distribution,\u201d simply modifies \u201cillegitimate child\u201d and not \u201cgrandchild.\u201d\nThe first rule in considering the meaning of a statute is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Mountain Home Sch. Dist. v. T.M.J. Builders, Inc., 313 Ark. 661, 858 S.W.2d 74 (1993). The basic rule of statutory construction to which all other interpretive guides defer is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Id. In interpreting a statute and attempting to construe legislative intent, the appellate court looks to the language of the statute, the subject matter, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, the. remedy provided, legislative history, and other appropriate means that throw light on the subject. Gritts v. State, 315 Ark. 1, 864 S.W.2d 859 (1993).\nWe hold the General Assembly did not intend for a grandchild to be defined as a child under \u00a7 28-1-102(a)(1). First, \u201c[i]n its ordinary sense the word \u2018or\u2019 is a disjunctive particle that marks an alternative, generally corresponding to \u2018either,\u2019 as \u2018either this or that\u2019; it is a connective that marks an alternative.\u201d Beasley v. Parnell, 177 Ark. 912, 9 S.W.2d 10 (1928) (emphasis added). Although the definition of \u201cchild,\u201d as it was originally enacted in Act 140 of 1949, contained the word \u201cnor\u201d rather than the word \u201cor\u201d immediately prior to the phrase \u201can illegitimate child,\u201d the word \u201cnor\u201d is a disjunctive conjunction. Thus, it is clear the legislature intended to mark separate categories.\nFurther, referential and qualifying phrases, where no contrary intention appears, relate only to the last antecedent. Sutherland Stat Const \u00a7 47.33 (5th Ed). On the other hand, evidence that a qualifying phrase is supposed to apply to all antecedents instead of only to the immediately preceding one may be found in the fact that it is separated from the antecedents by a comma. Id. In the case at hand, there is no comma separating \u201cillegitimate child\u201d and the modifier \u201cexcept such as would inherit under the law of descent and distribution.\u201d Thus, we find the General Assembly intended for \u201cexcept such as would inherit . . .\u201d to only modify \u201cillegitimate children.\u201d See Richardson v. State, 314 Ark. 512, 863 S.W.2d 572 (1993).\nAdditionally, it is significant that the General Assembly specifically addresses the circumstances in which an illegitimate child may inherit real or personal property. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-9-209 (1987). This acknowledges a distinction between an illegitimate child who may inherit under the laws of descent and distribution and one who may not. We believe the General Assembly intended to grant homestead rights to those illegitimate children who could inherit under the laws of descent and distribution. The General Assembly has determined that certain classes of illegitimate children should be treated \u201cin the same manner as a legitimate child.\u201d \u00a7 28-9-209. Consequently, there was a need to differentiate between classes of illegitimate children, hence the language in \u00a7 28-1-102 (a)(1). However, there is not a similar provision which contemplates treating a grandchild or a \u201cmore remote descendant\u201d in the same manner as a child.\nFinally, the decision in Brown v. Brown, 104 Ark. 313, 149 S.W. 330 (1912), provides additional guidance. In Brown, the appellant contended the minor grandchildren of the decedent were entitled to share the homestead with the widow. This Court concluded that under the plain language of the Constitution, the homestead exemption was limited to the widow and children. The Court concluded grandchildren were not mentioned or provided for under Ark. Const, art. 9, \u00a7 6, which addresses the homestead right of the widow and minor children.\nArk. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-39-201 follows the language of Ark. Const, art. 9, \u00a7 6. As in the Constitution, \u00a7 28-39-201 does not mention or provide for grandchildren. Although Steve McCoy relies on the definition in \u00a7 28-1-102, it is significant that the General Assembly elected to track the language of the Constitution in enacting \u00a7 28-39-201.\nAccordingly, we find the trial court correctly determined the minor grandchildren were not entitled to homestead rights in the home of Georgia Walker.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Steele Hays, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Killough & Ford, by: Danny W. Glover, for appellant.", "Joseph Boeckmann, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Steve McCOY, Administrator of the Estate of Georgia (McCoy) Walker, Deceased v. Billy WALKER\n94-96\n876 S.W.2d 252\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered May 16, 1994\nKillough & Ford, by: Danny W. Glover, for appellant.\nJoseph Boeckmann, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0086-01", "first_page_order": 112, "last_page_order": 117 }