{ "id": 1443776, "name": "Joy PUGH, et al. v. ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al", "name_abbreviation": "Pugh v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance", "decision_date": "1994-06-13", "docket_number": "93-1148", "first_page": "304", "last_page": "308", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "317 Ark. 304" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "877 S.W.2d 577" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "316 Ark. 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1907742 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/316/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 Ark. 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1910527 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/315/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 Ark. 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1912736 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/314/0553-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 Ark. 572", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1906029 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/309/0572-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 Ark. 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1916682 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/305/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 Ark. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1871434 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/292/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 Ark. 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1902475 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/307/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-56-126", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-114-204", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 Ark. 138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1898913 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/310/0138-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 440, "char_count": 7115, "ocr_confidence": 0.855, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.405923931455657e-07, "percentile": 0.7994309706859357 }, "sha256": "3fd6edcc98e3c9e42481765d05f1fd138a3c09a9f26f9002bf15c4697d0e03db", "simhash": "1:80cc844542079ee4", "word_count": 1185 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:37:34.960752+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Joy PUGH, et al. v. ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Steele Hays, Justice.\nThis is an appeal from a summary judgment in a medical malpractice case. The trial court applied the decision in Weidrick v. Arnold, 310 Ark. 138, 835 S.W.2d 843 (1992), holding that the malpractice claim was time-barred. That holding is challenged on appeal and we affirm.\nJoy Pugh, appellant, filed a medical malpractice suit in 1987 against Warner Brown Hospital and two doctors, James Weedman and Durwood Flournoy, all appellees. St. Paul Fire and Marine is the carrier for the hospital. The complaint alleged negligence in the treatment of Mrs. Pugh\u2019s husband, resulting in his death. The negligent acts complained of occurred on May 26, 1985. On September 29, 1989, Mrs. Pugh took a voluntary nonsuit. On September 24, 1990, she served appellees with notice of intent to sue, a prerequisite for a medical malpractice action under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-114-204 (1987). On November 24, 1990, she refiled the complaint. Appellees moved for summary judgment on December 19, 1990, alleging her action was barred by the statute of limitations. The motion was denied.\nOn February 25, 1993, appellees filed a motion for reconsideration of summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, applying a recent case, Weidrick v. Arnold, supra, retroactively, and finding the action was time-barred. Mrs. Pugh urges this was error.\nAppellant recognizes the two-year limitation provided in \u00a7 16-114-203 for medical malpractice claims, but contends because she took a nonsuit, she comes within the savings statute, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-56-126 (1987), which gives her a year to refile from the time of her nonsuit. Appellant\u2019s suit, however, was not refiled within a year, but more than two months after the one-year extension had run. Appellant insists that fact does not defeat her claim because the ninety-day (formerly seventy-day) extension provided under \u00a7 16-114-204(b) was applicable to the savings statute and gave her the additional time needed to file her complaint.\nIn Weidrick, supra, this court held the requirement for notice of intent to sue in \u00a7 16-114-204(a) was superseded by ARCP 3. That opinion did not specifically deal with section (b), which provided the ninety-day extension. The trial court ruled, however, that Weidrick was intended to supersede section (b), and that it was to apply retroactively. Thus under the trial court\u2019s holding appellant was denied the extended time allowed under \u00a7 16-114-204(b).\nWhether Weidrick should have been applied retroactively has been addressed in the briefs and oral argument. However, it is unnecessary to reach that issue as we hold the extension provided in \u00a7 16-114-204 was not intended to apply to the savings statute. Without that extension, regardless of the application of Weidrick, appellant\u2019s claim is barred as it was not refiled within one year as required by \u00a7 16-56-126.\n\u00a7 16-114-204(b) provides:\nIf the notice is served within sixty (60) days of the expiration of the period for bringing suit described in \u00a7 16-114-203 [two years] the time for commencement of the action shall be extended ninety (90) days from the service of the notice.\n\u00a7 16-56-126 provides:\nIf any action is commenced within the time respectively prescribed in this act, in \u00a7 \u00a7 16-116-101 \u2014 16-116-107, in \u00a7 \u00a7 16-114-201 \u2014 16-114-209, or in any other act, and the plaintiff therein suffers a nonsuit. . . the plaintiff may commence a new action within one (1) year after the nonsuit suffered. . . .\nUnder the wording of \u00a7 16-114-204(b), the ninety-day extension period applies to only the two-year limitation in \u00a7 16-114-203. The savings statute is not mentioned. Similarly, the savings statute makes reference to the medical malpractice act but expressly states a one-year limitation and does not mention the ninety-day extension.\nThe basic rule of statutory construction, to which all other interpretive guides must yield, is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Roy v. Farms & Merchants Ins. Co., 307 Ark. 213, 819 S.W.2d 2 (1991). When a statute is clear, it is given its plain meaning and we do not search for legislative intent. That intent must be gathered from the plain meaning of the language used. Hinchey v. Thomasson 292 Ark. 1, 727 S.W.2d 836 (1987). Here the plain language of \u00a7 16-56-126 does not include the addition of the ninety-day extension provided for in \u00a7 16-114-204. Appellant\u2019s claim was therefore not timely refiled.\nAppellant raises another point. Prior to the order granting summary judgment, appellant engaged in pretrial discovery. After summary judgment was entered on June 25, 1993, she filed a motion under ARCP 60(b) on July 13, 1993, questioning some developments involving discovery: the reasonableness of certain expert fees, the failure of two experts to refund their fees when they were not deposed, and the propriety of the trial court\u2019s denial of subpoenas for some of the experts. The trial court denied the motion and appellant argues that was error.\nWe affirm the trial court\u2019s denial of the motion because appellant was precluded from bringing a Rule 60(b) motion on the grounds requested. Appellant\u2019s motion should have been made under ARCP 52(b), for an amendment to the trial court\u2019s findings. That motion, however, must be made within ten days of entry of judgment and in this case the motion was not timely.\nRule 60(b) allows a motion within ninety (90) days of the judgment but that rule limits the grounds for bringing the motion. Phillips v. Jacobs, 305 Ark. 365, 807 S.W.2d 923 (1991); Jackson v. Arkansas Power & Light, 309 Ark. 572, 832 S.W.2d\n224 (1992). We have interpreted Rule 60(b) narrowly and said most recently in Ingram v. Wirt, 314 Ark. 553, 864 S.W.2d 237 (1993):\nIn interpreting the language in ARCP 60(b) we have said that the \u201cmiscarriages of justice\u201d referred to in the rule are a reference to those clerical errors or mistakes described in Rule 60(a). Phillips v. Jacobs, 305 Ark 365, 807 S.W.2d 923 (1991).\nThe appellants in Ingr\u00e1m made a motion under Rule 60(b) claiming the trial court had erred in refusing to admit certain evidence at a motion to vacate. Rule 60(a) provides for setting aside a judgment due to \u201cclerical mistakes in judgments . . . arising from oversight or omission. . . .\u201d We found in Ingram that \u201csuch a clerical mistake was not demonstrated\u201d and affirmed the chancellor\u2019s refusal to admit the evidence.\nHere too appellant has failed to demonstrate that a clerical mistake of the type referred to in Rule 60(a) was made and the motion should not have been heard. While the trial court did hear the motion, it nevertheless denied it so the right result was reached even if not on the grounds we assert here. Miller v. Nix, 315 Ark. 569 (1994).\nAffirmed.\nWc have since dealt with that question and in Thomas v. Cornell, 316 Ark. 366 (1994) we held that both sections (a) and (b) of \u00a7 16-114-204 were superseded by ARCP 3.", "type": "majority", "author": "Steele Hays, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Mathis & DeJanes, for appellant", "Dennis L. Shackleford, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Joy PUGH, et al. v. ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.\n93-1148\n877 S.W.2d 577\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered June 13, 1994\nMathis & DeJanes, for appellant\nDennis L. Shackleford, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0304-01", "first_page_order": 330, "last_page_order": 334 }