{
  "id": 1443832,
  "name": "Dennis THORNTON v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Thornton v. State",
  "decision_date": "1994-09-12",
  "docket_number": "CR 94-180",
  "first_page": "626",
  "last_page": "628",
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      "cite": "317 Ark. 626"
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      "cite": "883 S.W.2d 453"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
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    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
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      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-60-116",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "year": 1993,
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      "cite": "309 Ark. 422",
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      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
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      "reporter": "Ark.",
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      "year": 1979,
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    {
      "cite": "341 U.S. 223",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "U.S.",
      "case_ids": [
        1148002
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      "year": 1951,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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        "/us/341/0223-01"
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    {
      "cite": "284 Ark. 21",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1878690
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1984,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/284/0021-01"
      ]
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    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-65-102",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "year": 1993,
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    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-65-103",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "year": 1993,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:37:34.960752+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Dennis THORNTON v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "David Newbern, Justice.\nIt is \u201cunlawful . . . for any person who is intoxicated to operate or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle.\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-65-103(a) (Repl. 1993). \u201cIntoxicated,\u201d as defined in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-65-102(1) (Repl. 1993), includes being\ninfluenced or affected by the ingestion of alcohol, a controlled substance, any intoxicant, or any combination thereof, to such a degree that the driver\u2019s reactions, motor skills, and judgment are substantially altered and the driver, therefore, constitutes a clear and substantial danger of physical injury or death to himself and other motorists or pedestrians.\nDennis Thornton was found to be in control of a vehicle and, upon being questioned by the arresting officer, stated he was not drunk but had been \u201csniffing paint.\u201d Subsequent blood analysis showed the presence of toluene. He was convicted of driving while intoxicated.\nMr. Thornton does not question the testimony that he appeared to be intoxicated and failed a standard test in that respect at the scene of his arrest. Nor does he challenge the scientific testimony that ingestion of toluene causes disorientation, dizziness, and a slowing of motor skills. Rather, he argues that the term \u201cintoxicant\u201d as used in \u00a7 5-65-102(1) is unconstitutionally vague. We hold the statute gave him sufficient notice of the illegality of his conduct and thus affirm the conviction.\nIn Long v. State, 284 Ark. 21, 680 S.W.2d 686 (1984), a similar challenge was made to the term \u201cintoxicated\u201d found in the statute now codified as \u00a7 5-65-103(a). The term was defined in Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 75-2502(a) (Supp. 1983), the same as it is now defined in the successor statute, \u00a7 5-65-102(1), except for inclusion in the new law of the term, \u201cany intoxicant.\u201d We held the former definition was sufficient because it gave fair warning to a person of ordinary intelligence of conduct which would constitute the offense described. We said, \u201cThe Constitution does not require impossible standards of specificity and a statute is sufficiently clear if its language conveys sufficient warning when measured by common understanding and practice. Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951); Davis v. Smith, 266 Ark. 112, 583 S.W.2d 37 (1979).\u201d\nIn State v. Torres, 309 Ark. 422, 831 S.W.2d 903 (1992), we added, referring to the Davis case, \u201cit is not necessary that all kinds of conduct falling within the reach of the statute be particularized and the statute will not be struck down as vague only because marginal cases could be put where doubts might arise.\u201d\nIn addition to our conclusion that \u00a7\u00a7 5-65-103(a) and 5-65-102(1) give fair notice, standing alone, of the conduct prohibited, we note that the General Assembly has recognized toluene as an intoxicant and made it a crime to ingest it for the purpose of becoming intoxicated. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-60-116 (Repl. 1993). Mr. Thornton points out that the statute concludes, \u201cFor the purposes of this section, any condition so induced shall be deemed to be an intoxicated condition.\u201d He contends we thus cannot transfer that definition of \u201cintoxicated\u201d to the law governing driving while intoxicated. We agree with that argument and cite \u00a7 5-60-116 only to show that the General Assembly has recognized toluene as an intoxicant.\nOur conclusion is that the addition of the term \u201cany intoxicant\u201d to \u201calcohol, a controlled substance, or a combination thereof\u2019 has not made the definition vague. A person of ordinary intelligence knows that the use of a substance tending to put him or her in the condition described in \u00a7 5-65-102(1) constitutes use of an \u201cintoxicant\u201d and that being in control of a motor vehicle shortly thereafter may violate the law.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "David Newbern, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "William R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, by: Kent C. Krause. Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.",
      "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Clint Miller, Acting Deputy Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Dennis THORNTON v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 94-180\n883 S.W.2d 453\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered September 12, 1994\nWilliam R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, by: Kent C. Krause. Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Clint Miller, Acting Deputy Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0626-01",
  "first_page_order": 654,
  "last_page_order": 656
}