{ "id": 1455826, "name": "Jessie James MANNING v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Manning v. State", "decision_date": "1994-09-19", "docket_number": "CR 94-323", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "6", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "318 Ark. 1" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "883 S.W.2d 455" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "314 Ark. 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1912808 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/314/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 Ark. 529", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1896975 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/311/0529-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 Ark. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1892780 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/296/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 Ark. 20", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1889840 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/298/0020-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 Ark. 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1906110 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/309/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 Ark. 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1675859 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/262/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 Ark. 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1914686 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/313/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 Ark. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1907765 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/316/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ark. 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1935011 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/312/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 Ark. 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1900959 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/306/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 Ark. 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1907732 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/316/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-64-401", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 508, "char_count": 7861, "ocr_confidence": 0.888, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8945312759022866e-07, "percentile": 0.7294405967297707 }, "sha256": "433cee545ee71bf05052407427d52c611810b594231e93f354c847d9730b3c6d", "simhash": "1:07cf54c3246a327a", "word_count": 1345 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:28:16.788487+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Jessie James MANNING v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice.\nAppellant Jessie James Manning was found guilty by a Columbia County jury of delivery of cocaine and was sentenced as a habitual offender to a forty-year term of imprisonment and a $1.00 fine. Manning argues two meritless points on appeal, stating that the trial court erred both in failing to grant his motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, and in failing to give adequate consideration to his due process rights. We affirm.\nFacts\nOn July 1, 1992, Officer Sylvester Smith, a Task Force Officer with the Thirteenth District, was contacted by a deputy prosecutor to purchase some cocaine in the Magnolia area. The deputy told Officer Smith that he would be working with a man by the name of Eddie Easter. On or about this same date, Easter\u2019s cousin, Manning, the appellant, was at a friend\u2019s residence in Magnolia when Easter and Officer Smith came by and asked about purchasing crack cocaine. Manning stated that he would take them where they could make a purchase. Manning then entered Officer Smith\u2019s vehicle, and the three journeyed across town, during which time Officer Smith gave Manning $40.00 to purchase the cocaine. At destination, Manning entered a residence, stayed briefly, then returned to Officer Smith\u2019s vehicle, and handed him a rock of cocaine.\nManning was arrested January 6, 1993, and an information was filed on April 20, 1993, charging him with delivery of cocaine under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-64-401. He filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. Thereafter, an amended information was filed charging Manning as a habitual offender. Subsequent to the seating of the jury but prior to opening statements, the trial court allowed the State to verbally amend the information, changing the date on which the alleged incident occurred from July 2, 1992, to July 1, 1992. A jury trial was held on September 10, 1993, and Manning was found guilty as charged.\nI. Speedy trial\nAlthough Manning filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, his abstract does not reflect the trial court\u2019s ruling on his motion. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 4-3(g), it is the duty of the appellant in a criminal case to abstract such parts of the record which are material to the points to be argued in the appellant\u2019s brief. Jackson v. State, 316 Ark. 509, 872 S.W.2d 400 (1994). We have further held that the failure to abstract a critical document precludes this court from considering issues concerning it. Jackson, supra; Porchia v. State, 306 Ark. 443, 815 S.W.2d 926 (1991). For these reasons, we will not address this argument on appeal.\nII. Due process rights\nAlthough Manning alleges several sub-points of error on appeal in support of his argument that his due process rights were violated, it is noted that his abstract of the trial record fails to reveal that these issues were raised at trial. Even so, Manning presents the following eight sub-points of error in his brief:\n(1) He was used as an unwitting informant while on parole;\n(2) The prosecutor threatened to file charges against him and revoke his parole if he did not testify;\n(3) The fourteen-month delay in prosecuting the case prejudiced him;\n(4) The act of having agents of the State seek him out to ride across town with them to buy and deliver of one rock of cocaine was unfair;\n(5) The law enforcement community had no reason to suspect him of selling drugs;\n(6) The amendment of the information charging him as a habitual offender two days prior to trial was unfair;\n(7) The amendment of the information changing the date of the criminal act on the date of the trial was unjust; and\n(8) His forty-year sentence for delivery of cocaine was both unjust and disproportionate.\nThe State asserts, and we agree, that none of these numbered allegations was raised or objected to at trial, with the exception of the two amendments to the information noted in points (6) and (7). We have long held that we will not consider matters which are raised for the first time on appeal. Hayes v. State, 312 Ark. 349, 849 S.W.2d 501 (1993). This being the case, we limit our review to items numbered (6) and (7).\nRegarding item number (6), Manning\u2019s assignment of error pertaining to the amendment charging him as a habitual offender, we recently discussed the Habitual Offender Act, its purpose, and when an amendment to an information may be made alleging its violation in Baumgarner v. State, 316 Ark. 373, 872 S.W.2d 380 (1994). An information may be amended up to a point after a jury has been sworn provided that it does not change the nature of a crime or create unfair surprise. Kilgore v. State, 313 Ark. 198, 852 S.W.2d 810 (1993). Accordingly, an amendment adding a habitual offender allegation does not change the nature or degree of the crime or create an additional offense or an independent crime; rather, the amendment authorizes a more severe punishment in the event that the defendant is convicted. Baumgarner, supra; Finch v. State, 262 Ark. 313, 556 S.W.2d 434 (1977). For these reasons, permitting the first amendment to the complaint was not error.\nThe remaining issue, numbered (7), is whether it was unjust for the trial court to permit the prosecutor to amend the information on the day of the trial to correct the date of the offense. Simply put, we will not glean prejudice to the substantial rights of the accused from a discrepancy in dates. Lewis v. State, 309 Ark. 392, 831 S.W.2d 145 (1993); Tackett v. State, 298 Ark. 20, 766 S.W.2d 410 (1989). In Lewis, the State first charged the defendant for delivery of marijuana on March 29, 1990. Based on an error in the investigating officer\u2019s notes, the State filed an amendment to the information showing an offense date of March 21, 1990. At trial, the State amended the information a second time following the officer\u2019s testimony which clarified the correct date as March 29, 1990.\nWhile there were two amendments regarding the dates and an eight-day discrepancy in Lewis, there was only one amendment of the date and a one-day discrepancy in the case before us. In any event, Manning has not demonstrated how he was prejudiced by the amended information. Where time is not essential to the charged offense, the absence of any date in the information is not fatal to the charge. Lewis, supra; Bonds v. State, 296 Ark. 1, 751 S.W.2d 339 (1988). Here, time is not essential to Manning\u2019s charge of delivery of cocaine, and thus his argument must fail.\nThe State in its brief notes that Manning\u2019s due process argument is essentially an assertion that his conviction should be reversed because of cumulative error. We acknowledge that cumulative error can require reversal even in the absence of objections made at trial. See Dillon v. State, 311 Ark. 529, 844 S.W.2d 944 (1993). However, the record before us does not support such a claim.\nWe have faced similarly vague allegations in Franklin v. State, 314 Ark. 329, 863 S.W.2d 268 (1993), in which the defendant asserted cumulative error, stating that the circuit judge\u2019s biased attitude and demeanor against him from the outset resulted in a \u201cdark cloud\u201d being placed on his trial. In rejecting the cumulative-error argument in Franklin, we noted the failure on the part of defense counsel to present specific examples of bias, to object to the court\u2019s conduct, to make a record, or to ask the judge to recuse.\nIn sum, we see little difference, if any, between the vague allegations in Franklin and the allegations presently before us. Here, we cannot say that the cumulative conduct of the trial court denied Manning due process.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Claudell Woods, for appellant.", "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Brad Newman, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Jessie James MANNING v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 94-323\n883 S.W.2d 455\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered September 19, 1994\nClaudell Woods, for appellant.\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Brad Newman, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 31, "last_page_order": 36 }