{ "id": 1455722, "name": "Roy LEGGETT v. CENTRO, INC., d/b/a Arkansas Division of Centro, Inc.", "name_abbreviation": "Leggett v. Centro, Inc.", "decision_date": "1994-11-21", "docket_number": "94-317", "first_page": "732", "last_page": "738", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "318 Ark. 732" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "887 S.W.2d 523" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "294 Ark. 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1895759 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/294/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "250 Ark. 610", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1636931 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/250/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 Ark. 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1900938 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/306/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 Ark. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1900923 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/306/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 Ark. 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1900889 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/306/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "717 S.W.2d 784", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1873673, 1873755 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/290/0129-01", "/ark/290/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 Ark. 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1873755 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/290/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 Ark. 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1916722 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/305/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 Ark. 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1889923 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/298/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 Ark. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1889843 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/298/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 12-9-108", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "205 Ark. 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1488245 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1943, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/205/0604-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 F.Supp. 222", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 306699 ], "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/110/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 Ark. 942", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1470245 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "a cause of action under the act is \"purely statutory\"" }, { "parenthetical": "a cause of action under the act is \"purely statutory\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/212/0942-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 Ark. 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1753627 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/275/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-107", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "268 Ark. 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1715529 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/268/0269-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 Ark. 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1895759 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/294/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 Ark. 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1900938 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/306/0239-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 662, "char_count": 12378, "ocr_confidence": 0.88, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0618759656446941e-07, "percentile": 0.5573029547282486 }, "sha256": "e0e787b3a44fbfe81895e95ca7f4ee6d907b0740421b65ae327c4f2b44f2bdb7", "simhash": "1:41e1fd0ca1af8678", "word_count": 1998 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:28:16.788487+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Hays, J., dissents." ], "parties": [ "Roy LEGGETT v. CENTRO, INC., d/b/a Arkansas Division of Centro, Inc." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice.\nAppellant Roy Leggett worked as a machine operator for appellee Centro, Inc. His job required repetitive gripping activities which he claimed caused his elbow to hurt. Leggett went to a doctor who diagnosed Leggett\u2019s condition as tennis elbow tendinitis. The doctor related Leggett\u2019s injury to his job. Upon Leggett\u2019s return to work, his injury and pain continued, and he subsequently received medical treatments and physical therapy. Leggett\u2019s physician released him with a ten percent permanent disability to his right arm, and opined Leggett should not return to a job requiring repetitive gripping motions or heavy lifting. The physician recommended Leggett be retrained in another vocation which did not require use of the right hand or arm. Eight days after receiving the physician\u2019s letter, Centro terminated Leggett, stating it had no position that met the physician\u2019s restrictions.\nLeggett filed suit against Centro, alleging Centro\u2019s actions in discharging Leggett constituted unlawful retaliatory conduct for Leggett\u2019s having filed a workers\u2019 compensation claim. Centro\u2019s defense was largely based upon its contention that, because of the restrictions placed on Leggett by his physician, Leggett could no longer perform his job; nor did Centro have other jobs Leggett could perform. Following a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in Centro\u2019s favor from which Leggett brings this appeal.\nLeggett\u2019s points on appeal involve the correctness of jury instructions 7, 8 and 9 to which he objected below. These instructions, along with instruction 6, are not pattern instructions found in Arkansas Model Jury Instructions. Instead, they were apparently drawn in an attempt to meet the principles of law announced in Wal-Mart, Inc. v. Baysinger, 306 Ark. 239, 812 S.W.2d 463 (1991). That being so, we first discuss the Baysinger decision before evaluating the parties\u2019 instructions and objections thereto.\nIn Baysinger, Baysinger filed an action against Wal-Mart, alleging she had worked for Wal-Mart but that Wal-Mart wrongfully terminated her because she had prosecuted a workers\u2019 compensation claim. The trial court instructed the jury.on wrongful discharge, and the jury returned a verdict in Baysinger\u2019s behalf. Wal-Mart appealed, arguing Baysinger\u2019s exclusive remedy was under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, and the trial court lacked jurisdiction of the wrongful discharge claim she filed. This court rejected Wal-Mart\u2019s argument.\nIn upholding Baysinger\u2019s wrongful discharge claim, we recognized the general rule that, when the term of employment in a contract is left to the discretion of either party, or left indefinite, or terminable by either party, either party may put an end to the relationship at will and without cause. The Baysinger court noted that well-defined exceptions existed to the at-will doctrine and held that a public policy exception occurs when an employer discharges an employee for claiming workers\u2019 compensation benefits. Id. This court further held that the employee has the burden to establish a prima facie case of wrongful discharge which is made by substantial evidence that the workers\u2019 compensation claim was a cause of the discharge. Id. After the employee makes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the employer to prove there was a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the discharge. Id. The Baysinger court explained such a reason might be the one offered by Wal-Mart, namely, that employee/Baysinger did not have the physical ability to do her job, or any other job which might have been provided at that point.\nIn the present case, the trial court gave instructions 6, 7, 8 and 9 which the court believed covered the law applicable in a wrongful discharge case. No one objected to instruction 6 which basically stated that, while an employee, as a general rule, can be terminated at will without any reason or cause, an employee may not be terminated for claiming workers\u2019 compensation benefits since to do so would violate Arkansas\u2019s law and public policy that such claims and benefits be paid.\nThe court next gave instruction 7 which spelled out that Leggett, as employee, had the burden to establish a prima facie case of wrongful discharge by showing (1) he sustained damages, (2) he was discharged from employment with Centro, (3) a cause of the discharge was his workers\u2019 compensation claim and (4) the wrongful discharge was the proximate cause of his damages. This instruction defined prima facie case as one which has proceeded upon sufficient proof to that stage where it will support a finding in Leggett\u2019s favor if evidence to the contrary is disregarded, and in determining whether Leggett had proved the third element, that a cause of the discharge was his workers\u2019 compensation claim. The jury was instructed that Leggett did not have to prove that the sole motivation for discharge was the workers\u2019 compensation claim, but rather the claim was one of the causes of discharge. The next paragraph of instruction 7 contained language to which Leggett objected and that paragraph, with objectionable language emphasized, reads as follows:\nIf you find from the evidence in this case that each of these four propositions has been proved, then the burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove that there was a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for the discharge. For example, such a reason might be that the employee did not have the physical ability to do his job. (Emphasis added.)\nThe trial court concluded its instructions bearing on wrongful discharge by giving instructions 8 and 9 which respectively related that Centro was not required to keep an employee (Leggett) who was unable to perform the duties he was performing prior to his injury and that, by law, Centro was not required to offer Leggett alternate jobs, within its factory, equal to Leggett\u2019s restrictions.\nAt trial, and now on appeal, Leggett\u2019s objection to instruction 7 is that the instruction erroneously listed one of Centro\u2019s defenses, namely, that Centro could prove it discharged Leggett for a legitimate non-retaliatory reason by showing Leggett did not have the physical ability to do his job. Leggett further claims instructions 8 and 9 compound the error in instruction 7 by making further evidentiary comments by instructing the jury \u201can employer is not required to keep an employee who is unable to perform the duties he was performing prior to his injury\u201d and \u201cArkansas law does not require Centro to offer Leggett alternative jobs within the factory equal to his restrictions.\u201d\nWe agree that the language he objects to in instruction 7 and instructions 8 and 9 unnecessarily singled out particular facts for undue emphasis. Harlan v. Curbo, Guardian, 250 Ark. 610, 446 S.W.2d 459 (1971). In instruction 6, the trial court thoroughly and correctly instructed the jury concerning Arkansas\u2019s discharge-at-will law and its public policy exception pertaining to an employee\u2019s right to make a valid claim for workers\u2019 compensation benefits. By instruction 7, it then instructed the jury that, if Leggett failed to establish a prima facie case of wrongful discharge or if Centro had proved it had \u201ca legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge, then the jury\u2019s verdict should be for Centro.\u201d However, the trial court continued with instruction language that directed the jury\u2019s attention to the facts that Centro was not required to keep Leggett if he was unable to perform his prior duties, nor was it required to offer Leggett an alternative job. Centro incorrectly argues that instructions 8 and 9 set out the law as found in Baysinger. Instead, Baysinger merely suggested that an employee\u2019s inability to perform his or her prior job or other available jobs were examples of legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for discharging the employee. By using these examples in its instructions, the trial court gave added impetus to reasons why Centro could discharge Leggett and thereby diminished its earlier instruction that, even if Centro had other reasons for terminating Leggett, Leggett had only to prove that his workers\u2019 compensation claim was one of those reasons.\nFor the reasons given above, we reverse and remand the case for a new trial.\nHays, J., dissents.\nWe note that the proper recovery of damages in a public policy wrongful discharge action is the sum of lost wages from termination until the day of trial, less the sum of any wages that the employee actually earned or could have earned with reasonable diligence. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 743 S.W.2d 380 (1988). Additionally, an employee can recover for any other tangible employment benefit lost as a result of the termination, but future damages are not recoverable. Id.", "type": "majority", "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice." }, { "text": "Steele Hays, Justice,\ndissenting. I respectfully disagree that this case should be tried a second time. The trial court labored to instruct the jury in a manner consistent with Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Baysinger, 306 Ark. 239, 812 S.W.2d 463 (1991), and was, I believe, reasonably successful. Some indication of that effort is demonstrated by the fact that the language of instruction 7 which the majority dislikes (\u201cFor example, such a reason might be that the employee did not have the physical ability to do his job.\u201d) is included in instructions 3 and 4 requested by the appellant.\nBut I would affirm the trial court on a different ground. In Baysinger, a majority of this court fashioned from whole cloth a cause of action for retaliatory discharge of an employee for filing a workers\u2019 compensation claim. That decision was crafted largely on Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239,743 S.W.2d 380 (1988) and M.B.M. Co., Inc. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980), neither of which had the slightest connection with the law of workers\u2019 compensation. The opinion in Baysinger mentions the provision of the Arkansas Workers\u2019 Compensation Act imposing penalties on an employer who discriminates against an employee who files a claim [Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-107 (1987)], but made no serious analysis of the exclusive remedy doctrine. I need not repeat the view expressed in dissent to the Baysinger decision (Special Justice Alan Epley and Hays, J., dissenting; Brown, J., dissenting on other grounds) except to emphasize that this court has said repeatedly that it has no power to create a cause of action not provided for in the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act; that its remedies are exclusive. Seawright v. U.S.F. & G. Co., 275 Ark. 96, 627 S.W.2d 557 (1982); Barth v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 212 Ark. 942, 208 S.W.2d 455 (1948)(a cause of action under the act is \u201cpurely statutory\u201d); in Huffstettler v. Lion Oil Co., 110 F.Supp. 222 (W.D.Ark. 1953), Judge Miller wrote that only the legislature could create new causes of action under Amendment 26, creating the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act; and in J.L. Williams & Sons, Inc. v. Smith, 205 Ark. 604, 170 S.W.2d 82 (1943), this court wrote unanimously that if the legislature had not provided for court review, then the courts could not have considered workers\u2019 compensation cases at all.\nThe errancy of the Baysinger decision was confirmed by the General Assembly at its first session following Baysinger. Act 796 of 1993 reaffirms the exclusive remedy doctrine and specifically annuls Baysinger and two other ill advised decisions of this court.\nIn a comparable situation we applied Act 44 of 1989 [Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 12-9-108(a) (1987)] retroactively, overruling Grable v. State, 298 Ark. 489, 769 S.W.2d 9 (1989) and Mitchell v. State, 298 Ark. 536, 769 S.W.2d 18 (1989). See Ridenhour v. State, 305 Ark. 90, 805 S.W.2d 639 (1991). In White v. State, 290 Ark. 130, 717 S.W.2d 784 (1986), we said: \u201cthe courts have no power to perpetuate a rule of law which the legislature has repealed.\u201d I submit that Baysinger is an aberration that never should have come about and appellant\u2019s asserted cause of action for retaliatory discharge is non-existent.\nMapco, Inc. v. Paine, 306 Ark. 198, 812 S.W.2d 483 (1991); Thomas v. Valmac Industries, 306 Ark. 228, 812 S.W.2d 673 (1991).", "type": "dissent", "author": "Steele Hays, Justice," } ], "attorneys": [ "Gibson, Hamm & Westphal, by: Nancy L. Hamm, for appellant.", "Roy & Lambert, by: Jerry L. Lovelace, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Roy LEGGETT v. CENTRO, INC., d/b/a Arkansas Division of Centro, Inc.\n94-317\n887 S.W.2d 523\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered November 21, 1994\n[Rehearing denied January 9, 1995.]\nGibson, Hamm & Westphal, by: Nancy L. Hamm, for appellant.\nRoy & Lambert, by: Jerry L. Lovelace, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0732-01", "first_page_order": 758, "last_page_order": 764 }