{
  "id": 1453648,
  "name": "W. Hunter WILLIAMS, Jr. v. Kayoko ASHLEY",
  "name_abbreviation": "Williams v. Ashley",
  "decision_date": "1995-01-09",
  "docket_number": "94-543",
  "first_page": "197",
  "last_page": "201",
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    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
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      "reporter": "Ark.",
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        1935141
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      "year": 1993,
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      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-22-301",
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      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:29:57.133828+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "W. Hunter WILLIAMS, Jr. v. Kayoko ASHLEY"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Donald L. Corbin, Justice.\nAppellant, W. Hunter Williams, Jr., an attorney, appeals the order of the Mississippi County, Chickasawba District, Chancery Court determining the final amount owed to him by his former client, appellee, Kayoko Ashley, as compensation for legal services rendered. Jurisdiction of this appeal is properly in this court pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(3). We affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nThe facts of this dispute commenced on March 10, 1993 when appellant and appellee entered into a written contract pursuant to which appellant agreed to act as legal counsel to appellee in connection with her proposed divorce action. In return, appellee agreed to pay appellant\u2019s out-of-pocket expenses in addition to a fee for his legal services of $400.00 for preparation of the initial pleading and certain other specified documents if the divorce was uncontested, or $75.00 per hour for his time expended if the divorce was contested. Appellant commenced appellee\u2019s divorce action in the Mississippi County, Chickasawba District, Chancery Court by filing her initial pleading, and rendered certain other legal services to appellee as her legal counsel in connection with the divorce during the next six months. The divorce was contested.\nDuring this time, appellant billed appellee periodically for his time and advanced expenses, and payments were made on the account. On September 30, 1993, appellee fired appellant. Thereafter, the parties were unable to agree on the final payment due appellant. Appellant filed a \u201cMotion To Withdraw As Attorney Per Client\u2019s Termination of Attorney\u2019s Services, Motion For Court To Interpret Contractual Lien For Attorney\u2019s Fees and Expenses, and Motion For Court To Determine Fees And Expenses Due Attorney\u201d in the trial court which resulted in an extensive hearing on January 7, 1994. On January 26, 1994, the court entered its order which consisted of a three-page document entitled \u201corder\u201d and incorporated by reference the chancellor\u2019s separate three-page letter ruling dated January 10, 1994. From this order, the instant appeal is made.\nThe order decreed as follows: appellant was entitled to withdraw as appellee\u2019s counsel pursuant to appellee\u2019s termination of appellant\u2019s services; the March 10, 1993 letter agreement entitied appellant to \u201chis hourly time\u201d once appellee\u2019s husband retained counsel and the divorce was contested; an attorney is entitled to assert a lien pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-22-301 et seq. which is applicable to all attorney-client contractual arrangements and such a contractual relationship existed between appellant and appellee; appellant was entitled to a reasonable fee for his services rendered to the date of his termination in the amount of $1,250.00, and to his expenses in the amount of $197.55; appellee was entitled to credits for sums which had been paid on the fee in the amount of $900.00, and for sums which had been paid on the expenses in the amount of $104.75; and appellant was entitled to a lien for the total net balance of $442.80.\nAppellant\u2019s first argument is that the chancellor, after finding the parties had a contract and that appellant was entitled to his hourly rate under that contract, protected under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-22-301 et seq., then erred by failing to follow \u201cthe existing attorney lien law\u201d by awarding a \u201creasonable fee\u201d rather than a fee based upon the parties\u2019 contract rate. In support of his contention, appellant argues the trial court in the instant case made no finding that appellant was discharged for cause. Appellant then cites this court to our decision reported as Crockett & Brown, P.A. v. Courson, 312 Ark. 363, 377-A, 849 S.W.2d 938, 946 (1993), a case in which we clarified, by supplemental opinion denying rehearing, that the attorney\u2019s lien statutes, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-22-301 to -304 (\u201cattorney\u2019s lien statutes\u201d), do not apply to cases in which an attorney is terminated for cause. See Crockett & Brown, P.A. v. Wilson, 314 Ark. 578, 864 S.W.2d 244 (1993).\nInitially we note appellant raises no argument challenging either the trial court\u2019s out-of-pocket expenses award, or its allowance of credits for prior payments on appellee\u2019s account, or its order that appellant is entitled to assert an attorney\u2019s lien for the net award balance of $442.80. Instead, appellant\u2019s argument is directed solely to the standard by which the trial court measured its award of the attorney\u2019s fee. Accordingly, this court\u2019s opinion on this point of appeal is confined to that issue.\nAppellant relies in error on the attorney\u2019s lien statutes to support his argument that the appropriate standard for the trial court\u2019s measure of the fee award is the parties\u2019 contract. As noted above, the attorney\u2019s lien statutes are not applicable where the discharged attorney was dismissed for cause. Courson, 312 Ark. 363, 377-A, 849 S.W.2d 938, 946; Wilson, 314 Ark. 578, 864 S.W.2d 244. In the instant case, the trial court\u2019s findings of fact characterized the parties\u2019 attorney-client relationship as follows:\nThe relationship between the attorney and his client started to break down owing to her inability to communicate with her attorney. It appears that she was referred to office staff and a number of conferences either by telephone or in person were with the attorney\u2019s secretary rather than the attorney. This is not to blame anyone involved in the situation; rather, it is simply an explanation of how the relationship between these parties started to deteriorate. Respondent states that she did, in fact, have several conferences with her lawyer and that the hearing in the early part of April was entirely unjustified for the reason that she had already notified him the matter would be continued upon motion of her husband and he had no need to be at the courthouse. Then the hearing was finally conducted in the latter part of April and from that point forward the client was never able to communicate with petitioner. Petitioner\u2019s time sheet . . . corroborates her statement that there was no further communication with Mr. Williams after the temporary hearing. She finally discharged him in September and retained another attorney who has undertaken to represent her in this lien hearing.\nWe review chancery cases de novo on the record, and will not disturb the findings of the chancellor unless clearly against a preponderance of the evidence. Norwood v. Robinson, 315 Ark. 255, 866 S.W.2d 398 (1993). Since the question of the preponderance of the evidence turns largely on the credibility of the witnesses, we defer to the superior position of the chancellor. Id. In the instant case, it is implicit in the trial court\u2019s findings of fact that appellant was discharged by appellee for cause. Hence the attorney\u2019s lien statutes are neither applicable nor in issue in this case, Courson, 312 Ark. 363, 377-A, 849 S.W.2d 938, 946, and appellant\u2019s argument must fail. The chancellor\u2019s award of a reasonable fee for appellant\u2019s services rendered to the date of his termination is entirely harmonious with our holding in Courson which is the controlling authority in the instant case.\nAppellant\u2019s second argument is that the trial court erred in finding appellant was not entitled to charge appellee for appellant\u2019s time based on conferences held between appellee and appellant\u2019s legal support staff, and for appellant\u2019s time spent in receiving interim payments made on appellee\u2019s account. Appellant\u2019s third and final argument is that the award of $1,250.00 was insufficient. Appellant cites no legal authority in support of these arguments; such failure alone warrants their dismissal on appeal without further consideration. McElroy v. Grisham, 306 Ark. 4, 810 S.W.2d. 933 (1991).\nThe trial court\u2019s judgment is affirmed.\nin his motion to determine fees and expenses, appellant submitted for the trial court\u2019s approval the amount of $2,274.35 for his final attorney\u2019s fee and expenses. The portion of this sum allocable to the attorney\u2019s fee was computed by reference to the contractual $75.00 per hour rate.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Donald L. Corbin, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Janet Moore-Hart, for appellant.",
      "Charles C. Gardner, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "W. Hunter WILLIAMS, Jr. v. Kayoko ASHLEY\n94-543\n890 S.W.2d 260\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered January 9, 1995\nJanet Moore-Hart, for appellant.\nCharles C. Gardner, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0197-01",
  "first_page_order": 231,
  "last_page_order": 235
}