{ "id": 1449546, "name": "Tamara TACKETT v. CRAIN AUTOMOTIVE d/b/a Car Pro", "name_abbreviation": "Tackett v. Crain Automotive", "decision_date": "1995-06-12", "docket_number": "94-1457", "first_page": "36", "last_page": "39", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "321 Ark. 36" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "899 S.W.2d 839" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "844 F.Supp. 517", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 11933375 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/844/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 Ark. 732", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1455722 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/318/0732-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 Ark. 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1900938 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/306/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-107", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "306 Ark. 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1900889 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/306/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 Ark. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1900923 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/306/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 Ark. App. 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139744 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/40/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 Ark. 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1900938 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/306/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 11-9-102", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(5)" } ], "opinion_index": 2 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 407, "char_count": 6607, "ocr_confidence": 0.882, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2904894003902405e-07, "percentile": 0.6196768614695297 }, "sha256": "7bdd24a92b08a224e2bec9520a6024e75cd641b13f0aa945bc4f39d0c1ce355b", "simhash": "1:2b02158be3eebb3e", "word_count": 1104 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:21:00.559388+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Glaze, Corbin, and Brown, JJ., dissent.", "Glaze, J., joins in this dissent." ], "parties": [ "Tamara TACKETT v. CRAIN AUTOMOTIVE d/b/a Car Pro" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "David Newbern, Justice.\nTamara Tackett, the appellant, was injured in a car accident while working for the appellee, Crain Automotive. She filed a workers\u2019 compensation claim and was off the job for a time. When she was given a medical release to return to work, she was told her job had been eliminated due to slow business. She sued Crain Automotive for discharging her in retaliation for her having filed her worker\u2019s compensation claim. She asserted that Crain Automotive had hired others to do the work she once did. We affirm the Trial Court\u2019s decision granting Crain Automotive\u2019s motion, which cited Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b), to dismiss Ms. Tackett\u2019s claim.\nBy Act 796 of 1993, the General Assembly eliminated the cause of action for retaliatory discharge described in Walmart v. Baysinger, 306 Ark. 239, 812 S.W.2d 463 (1991). Section 41 of the Act declares its effective date to be July 1, 1993, and concludes as follows: \u201cFurthermore, the provisions of this act shall apply only to injuries which occur after July 1, 1993.\u201d Ms. Tackett\u2019s compensable injuries occurred prior to July 1, 1993. In its brief in support of its motion to dismiss, Crain Automotive stated Ms. Tackett was discharged after July 1, 1993. In her response, Ms. Tackett did not disagree with that statement.\nIf Ms. Tackett\u2019s physical or compensable injury were the subject of her present claim, no doubt Act 796 would not apply. The claim with which we now are concerned, however, is her claim for retaliatory discharge which is not a compensable injury under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. Ms. Tackett\u2019s discharge, and her complaint alleging that it was retaliatory, occurred after the cause of action was abolished. Although we and a United States District Court have, subsequent to July 1, 1993, considered cases of retaliatory discharge, the cases were ones in which the complaint was filed before that date. Leggett v. Centro, Inc., 318 Ark. 732, 887 S.W.2d 523 (1994); Brown v. Pepsico, Inc., 844 F.Supp. 517 (W.D.Ark. 1994).\nWhile we might agree that Ms. Tackett had, as she puts it, a \u201cvested interest\u201d in having remedies for her physical or compensable injuries evaluated according to the law at the time they occurred, she has cited no authority, and we know of none, in support of her argument that her wrongful discharge claim should be governed by any law other than that in effect at the time it occurred. We have no doubt that it was the intent of the General Assembly to abolish the cause of action for wrongful discharge as of July 1, 1993.\nAffirmed.\nGlaze, Corbin, and Brown, JJ., dissent.", "type": "majority", "author": "David Newbern, Justice." }, { "text": "Donald L. Corbin, Justice,\ndissenting. I dissent. Historically, since the inception of the Arkansas Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, an endless string of case law has espoused that the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act is a remedial act for the benevolent and humanitarian purpose of protecting our injured workers in this state. See, e.g., Osmose Wood Preserving v. Jones, 40 Ark. App. 190, 843 S.W.2d 875 (1992). The legislature and the courts have zealously enforced this principle until the legislature began to shift direction in the 1980\u2019s. The courts continued to steadfastly protect this principle until today\u2019s decision.\nTraditionally, the Arkansas Workers\u2019 Compensation Act and the interpreting case law construed the term \u201cinjury\u201d as being synonymous with \u201ccompensable injury.\u201d There is no doubt that the legislature\u2019s intent in the passage of Act 796 of 1993, in fact its avowed purpose, was to overrule our decisions in Thomas v. Valmac Indus., Inc., 306 Ark. 228, 812 S.W.2d 673 (1991), Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Baysinger, 306 Ark. 239, 812 S.W.2d 463 (1991), and Mapco, Inc. v. Payne, 306 Ark. 198, 812 S.W.2d 483 (1991), wherein we had this to say about Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-107 as it existed then, prior to Act 796:\nThis statutory provision is the clearest announcement by our legislature of a strong public policy that condemns retaliatory conduct by an employer who refuses to reemploy an employee for exercising a statutorily confirmed right to compensation for job-related injuries.\nMapco, 306 at 201, 812 S.W.2d at 485.\nBecause of the historical and traditional usage of the term \u201cinjury\u201d being synonymous with \u201ccompensable injury,\u201d words of art under our compensation act, the legislature, which certainly removed the right of an injured employee to a remedy for retaliatory discharge, utilized the term \u201cinjury\u201d in the emergency clause of the Act to mean its customary, historical and traditional usage. It is the filing of a claim for workers\u2019 compensation by an employee injured on the job that is the nexus to any remedy or benefit available under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, even under that act as it existed as of the date of appellant\u2019s \u201ccompensable injury.\u201d True enough, the refusal to rehire did not occur until after July 1993, but it flowed naturally from the occurrence of the filing of benefits for the January 1993 compensable injury.\nGlaze, J., joins in this dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Donald L. Corbin, Justice," }, { "text": "Robert L. Brown, Justice,\ndissenting. I disagree that the new act applies to the facts of this case. The Emergency Clause attached to Act 796 of 1993 reads:\nIt is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the Workers\u2019 Compensation Law is in immediate need of substantial revision; that this act accomplishes immediate revision; and that this act shall go into effect as soon as is practical which is determined to be July 1, 1993; and that unless this emergency clause is adopted, this act will not go into effect until after July 1, 1993. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after July 1, 1993. Furthermore, the provisions of this act shall apply only to injuries which occur after July 1, 1993. (Emphasis added.)\nThe effective date of Act 796 was July 1, 1993. The injury to Tamara Tackett occurred on January 8, 1993. I can only read the term \u201cinjuries\u201d in the Emergency Clause to refer to Ms. Tackett\u2019s injury caused by the car accident while working at Crain Automotive. That is the common meaning given to the term throughout the Workers\u2019 Compensation Code. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 11-9-102(5), ll-9-702(a)(l)(B) (Supp. 1993). The Act by its own language does not apply to this fact situation.\nI respectfully dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Robert L. Brown, Justice," } ], "attorneys": [ "David H. McCormick, for appellant.", "Boyett, Morgan, Millar & Killough, P.A., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Tamara TACKETT v. CRAIN AUTOMOTIVE d/b/a Car Pro\n94-1457\n899 S.W.2d 839\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered June 12, 1995\nDavid H. McCormick, for appellant.\nBoyett, Morgan, Millar & Killough, P.A., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0036-01", "first_page_order": 62, "last_page_order": 65 }