{
  "id": 1449608,
  "name": "Ronald Allen FARMER v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Farmer v. State",
  "decision_date": "1995-07-03",
  "docket_number": "CR 94-1398",
  "first_page": "283",
  "last_page": "288",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "321 Ark. 283"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "902 S.W.2d 209"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "284 Ark. 211",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1878659
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1984,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/284/0211-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "298 Ark. 344",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1889862
      ],
      "weight": 4,
      "year": 1989,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/298/0344-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "466 U.S. 668",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "U.S.",
      "case_ids": [
        6204802
      ],
      "year": 1984,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/us/466/0668-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 450,
    "char_count": 8840,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.884,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 9.627803171582888e-08,
      "percentile": 0.527094436779905
    },
    "sha256": "374d587108a5b5e9726bade07b11f3d52d73a7c697699c6b65a32acb9794ed41",
    "simhash": "1:ec6d120c456cd2ab",
    "word_count": 1487
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:21:00.559388+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Ronald Allen FARMER v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Per Curiam.\nThe appellant Ronald Allen Farmer was convicted of first degree battery by a jury and sentenced to ten years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. The conviction was affirmed by the Arkansas Court of Appeals in an opinion not designated for publication. Farmer v. State, CACR 93-781 (June 1, 1994). The mandate was issued on June 21, 1994. On August 1, 1994, the appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. That petition was denied and the appellant brings this appeal.\nTo prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must show first that counsel\u2019s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the \u201ccounsel\u201d guaranteed the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the petitioner must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which requires showing that counsel\u2019s errors were so serious as to deprive the petitioner of a fair trial. Unless a petitioner makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction resulted from a breakdown in the adversarial process, that renders the result unreliable. A court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel\u2019s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. The petitioner must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel\u2019s errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt, i.e., the decision reached would have been different absent the errors. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. In making a determination on a claim of ineffectiveness, the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury must be considered. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).\nWe affirm the trial court\u2019s denial of post-conviction relief unless it is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Atchison v. State, 298 Ark. 344, 767 S.W.2d 312 (1989). Where the evidence is sufficient to support a ruling either way, it cannot be said that the trial court\u2019s ruling was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence; the credibility of a witness is a question for the trier of fact in Rule 37 proceedings. Atchison v. State, 298 Ark. 344, 767 S.W.2d 312 (1989).\nThe appellant claims that the trial court erred in not finding his attorney ineffective when his attorney failed to ensure the presence of witnesses who could support his claim of self defense. The appellant\u2019s conviction arose from a barroom fight. The bartender testified for the state that the appellant threw a beer pitcher at the victim, stomped on the victim\u2019s head, and continued to beat him after he was unconscious. She testified that the appellant also lifted the victim\u2019s arm and intended to stomp on it but the fight was stopped. The bartender conceded on cross-examination that she would not have seen it if the victim had hit the appellant first; she also stated that she did not see the whole fight. Paul Hill, a patron in the bar, testified that the appellant hit the victim in the head with the beer, \u201cknocked him out,\u201d and jumped up and down on his chest. Hill testified that he could not positively say that the victim did not hit the appellant first. Paul Hill\u2019s wife, Marsha, testified that the appellant hit the victim in the head with a pitcher of beer.\nThe manager at the bar testified for the defense that the victim had been barred from the tavern because of disorderly conduct and that she had heard him called \u201cBone Crusher.\u201d The appellant testified in his own behalf that the victim hit him first, causing the ensuing fight. He stated that the victim hit him in the bridge of the nose and knocked him off the bar stool. He testified that he thinks that the victim hit him with a cue ball. The appellant stated that the victim started towards him so he threw the pitcher of beer at him.\nThe defense apparently supplied the names of John Black and David Vanderford as witnesses. When the witnesses\u2019 names were called on the date the trial was first set, March 10, 1993, David Vanderford was present but John Black was not present. The court ordered all witnesses to return for the trial the date of which was moved to March 18, 1993. On March 10, the defense attorney asked the judge to issue a contempt warning for John Black but the court pointed out that there was no return on Black. The defense attorney said that he would reissue the subpoena. On the date of the trial neither John Black nor David Vanderford were present or called as a witness. The appellant\u2019s attorney did not ask for a continuance to secure the witnesses\u2019 presence.\nThe appellant\u2019s petition for post-conviction relief alleged, among other things, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present any evidence to corroborate his claim of self-defense. He stated that David Vanderford and Johnny Black could have testified on his behalf. He conceded that Vanderford was also charged in the crime and is now a fugitive but averred that Black was available to testify and was not called. At the hearing on the petition for post-conviction relief, the appellant\u2019s trial attorney testified that John Black was subpoenaed but that he did not ask for a continuance when Black failed to appear for trial. The trial attorney testified \u201c... I believe Mr. Black was a cousin of [the appellant] and we felt reasonably certain that he would show up.\u201d The trial attorney testified incorrectly that John Black had appeared for the earlier trial date but that he did not appear for the second trial date. The attorney stated, \u201cbut we felt that he was a cousin of the defendant and we seemed reasonably confident that he was going to be a witness all along.\u201d The attorney testified that he did not have the subpoena reissued. He stated that he did not request a continuance because of Mr. Vanderford\u2019s absence because \u201cwe felt that he was on the run because he had previous convictions and he would not be found and even if we got him here, I would anticipate that he would plead the Fifth Amendment.\u201d\nJohn Black testified at the Rule 37 hearing. He stated that he was not served with the subpoena. He testified that the victim reached across the bar and hit the appellant and that he would have testified to that. The appellant testified that David Vanderford was not a fugitive at the time of the trial and that he had appeared at the previous hearings. The appellant testified that Vanderford was not called because Vanderford\u2019s public defender advised him not to testify. The appellant testified that his counsel never suggested going ahead and subpoenaing him. None of the subpoenas appear in the transcript but on March 10 the court docket reflects that \u201cthe defendant requested an order to serve John Black.\u201d\nThe state argues correctly that the decision to call certain witnesses and reject other potential witnesses is largely a matter of trial strategy. Counsel must use his own best judgment to determine which witnesses will be beneficial to his client. Taggett v. State, 284 Ark. 211, 680 S.W.2d 696 (1984). In this case, however, the appellant\u2019s attorney failed to secure the testimony of the only witnesses available who could corroborate his client\u2019s version of the facts. His \u201cstrategy\u201d was to present John Black as a witness, but he failed to have Black served with a subpoena or to seek a continuance when he failed to appear, despite the fact that Black was apparently the only person who could testify in support of the self-defense claim.\nThe court\u2019s order stated:\nThe trial defense counsel and the prosecuting attorney timely caused to be issued subpoenas for Johnny Black, who apparently is a relative of the defendant and resides in rural Montgomery county. Mr. Black was never served with either subpoena though apparently efforts were made by the defense attorney to obtain service. The defendant, who was free on pretrial bond, apparently did not assist in obtaining the whereabouts of Mr. Black prior to trial.\nThere is nothing in the record to support the statement that the defense attorney made efforts to obtain service. In light of the fact that corroboration of the appellant\u2019s version of the facts was crucial to his allegation of self-defense, trial counsel was ineffective in failing to ask for a continuance when John Black did not appear on the morning of the appellant\u2019s trial. The trial judge\u2019s finding to the contrary is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.\nReversed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Per Curiam."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Mathis & De Janes, by: William T Mathis, II, for appellant.",
      "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Clint Miller, Deputy Att\u2019y Gen., Senior Appellate Advocate, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Ronald Allen FARMER v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 94-1398\n902 S.W.2d 209\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered July 3, 1995\nMathis & De Janes, by: William T Mathis, II, for appellant.\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Clint Miller, Deputy Att\u2019y Gen., Senior Appellate Advocate, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0283-01",
  "first_page_order": 333,
  "last_page_order": 338
}