{ "id": 1449604, "name": "Norvell GOODEN v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Gooden v. State", "decision_date": "1995-07-10", "docket_number": "CR 94-1085", "first_page": "340", "last_page": "343", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "321 Ark. 340" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "902 S.W.2d 226" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "288 Ark. 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8718593 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "191-192" }, { "page": "810-811" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/288/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 Ark. 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1907716 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/316/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 Ark. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1455978 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/318/0109-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 359, "char_count": 5745, "ocr_confidence": 0.886, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.016159380490119e-08, "percentile": 0.5036695189565106 }, "sha256": "6bb45f0da9a003b84206f1df8775c6c0c2c384e3442520d175aacfae854a14ba", "simhash": "1:0a78d9e26129ca1e", "word_count": 951 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:21:00.559388+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Norvell GOODEN v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice.\nAppellant Norvell Gooden was found guilty by a jury of arson and sentenced as a habitual offender to fifty years in prison. Gooden\u2019s sole point for reversal is that the trial judge erred in allowing the prosecution to cross-examine defense witness, Derrick Dodson, by asking him if he was aware of Gooden\u2019s four prior felony convictions. We hold the trial judge\u2019s ruling was correct.\nIn his case-in-chief, Gooden called Dodson who testified about being with Gooden on the day the arson occurred. Dodson also said that he did not have personal knowledge of Gooden setting the fire and added, \u201cI don\u2019t believe he would do anything like that. I\u2019ve been knowing him too long. He\u2019s not that type of guy.\u201d After Dodson\u2019s direct examination, the deputy prosecutor and defense counsel approached the bench and conferred with the trial judge who ruled the defense had \u201copened the door\u201d by placing Gooden\u2019s character in issue by Dodson\u2019s statement that Gooden \u201cwouldn\u2019t do that sort of thing.\u201d The state th\u00e9n cross-examined Dodson, asking him if he was aware that Gooden had two prior felony convictions of theft of property and two convictions of breaking and entering. Gooden objected to the state\u2019s questions as being irrelevant to the charge of arson, but the trial judge reiterated that Dodson had placed Gooden\u2019s character in issue and the state\u2019s questions were fair cross-examination. Dodson then responded to the state\u2019s revelation of Gooden\u2019s criminal background, stating that even being made aware of Gooden\u2019s previous convictions did not change his opinion of Gooden.\nGooden\u2019s objection as to the relevance of the type of crimes for which Gooden had been convicted is without merit because the cross-examination was allowed not to show Gooden had committed the arson, but to determine the weight to be given the character testimony of the witness.\nArk. R. Evid. 404(a) provides in pertinent part:\n(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person\u2019s character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:\n(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; . . .\nThis court has recognized that by producing a character witness the defendant opens the door to evidence which might otherwise have been inadmissible. Rank v. State, 318 Ark. 109, 883 S.W.2d 843 (1994). Once the admissibility of character evidence is established under Rule 404, Rule 405 establishes the methods of proof which may be utilized. Smith v. State, 316 Ark. 407, 872 S.W.2d 843 (1994). Ark. R. Evid. 405 clearly provides that in cross-examining a defendant\u2019s character witness, it is permissible to inquire into the witness\u2019s knowledge of relevant specific instances of conduct. Ark. R. Evid. 405(a) reads as follows:\nArk. R. Evid. 405. Reputation or Opinion. \u2014 (a) In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct. (Emphasis added.)\nIn Reel v. State, 288 Ark. 189, 702 S.W.2d 809 (1986), Reel was charged with murder, and at trial, he called his employer who testified that he had always regarded Reel as a truthful and honest employee. On cross-examination the trial judge permitted the prosecutor to question the witness with respect to an earlier misdemeanor conviction of Reel\u2019s. In affirming the decision of the court in Reel, this court explained the reason for the rule set out in Ark. R. Evid. 405(a) as follows:\nThe purpose of the cross examination of a character witness with respect to a prior offense is to ascertain the witness\u2019 knowledge of facts which should have some bearing on the accused\u2019s reputation. If the witness does not know that an accused was previously convicted of a crime, the witness\u2019 credibility suffers. If he knows it but then disregards it in forming his opinion of the accused, that may legitimately go to the weight to be given the opinion of the witness . . .\n4= 4= 4=\n... By presenting a character witness an accused opens the door which would otherwise be closed. If he wants us to know what his reputation is, we must be able to determine the witness\u2019 awareness of the relevant facts.\n288 Ark. at 191-192, 702 S.W.2d at 810-811.\nHere, Dodson\u2019s testimony that Gooden was \u201cnot that type of guy,\u201d is similar in nature to the character testimony given in Reel. Likewise, Dodson\u2019s character testimony opened the door for the state to inquire of Dodson\u2019s knowledge, or lack of knowledge, regarding Gooden\u2019s prior convictions, and such inquiries and testimony provided a means by which the jury could determine what weight and credibility it should give Dodson\u2019s opinion of Gooden.\nFinally, Gooden contends that, at the very least, the trial judge should have given an admonitory instruction to inform the jury that it should consider the reference to Gooden\u2019s conviction only to the extent of Dodson\u2019s knowledge of Gooden and the weight to be given his opinion of Gooden\u2019s character. While this court has recognized limiting instructions in these circumstances to assist the jury in placing the testimony in its proper light, Smith v. State, 316 Ark. 407, 872 S.W.2d 843 (1994), Gooden simply failed to request such an instruction.\nFor the reasons above, we affirm.", "type": "majority", "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Ronald Carey Nichols, for appellant.", "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Brad Newman, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Norvell GOODEN v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 94-1085\n902 S.W.2d 226\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered July 10, 1995\nRonald Carey Nichols, for appellant.\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Brad Newman, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0340-01", "first_page_order": 390, "last_page_order": 393 }