{ "id": 1449592, "name": "Landis WILLIAMS, Jr. v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Williams v. State", "decision_date": "1995-10-02", "docket_number": "CR 95-322", "first_page": "635", "last_page": "640", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "321 Ark. 635" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "906 S.W.2d 677" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "315 Ark. 666", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1910512 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/315/0666-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 Ark. 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1897015 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/311/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 Ark. 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1455995 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/318/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "722 S.W.2d 842", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1872696 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/291/0138-02" ] }, { "cite": "291 Ark. 138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1872696, 1872710 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/291/0138-02", "/ark/291/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-10-102", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 Ark. 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1907747 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/316/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 Ark. 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1451218 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/320/0689-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 505, "char_count": 10466, "ocr_confidence": 0.891, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1387909159646203e-07, "percentile": 0.577951455857079 }, "sha256": "e49d94b1b2586aff05e1fb32439f3e796e743039fbc2cce4db20ca94575c7284", "simhash": "1:69f4f0b826077079", "word_count": 1747 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:21:00.559388+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Landis WILLIAMS, Jr. v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Donald L. Corbin, Justice.\nAppellant, Landis Williams, Jr., appeals the judgment of the Pulaski County Circuit Court convicting him of the first-degree murder of Lamont Cullins and sentencing him to imprisonment for sixty years. The sole point of error raised in this appeal is the denial of appellant\u2019s motion for directed verdict. The motion was based on two grounds; the evidence of appellant\u2019s intent to cause the victim\u2019s death was insufficient, and the evidence established justification for appellant\u2019s act. Neither ground has merit and we affirm the judgment.\nA motion for a directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Durham v. State, 320 Ark. 689, 899 S.W.2d 470 (1995). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the appellate court does not weigh the evidence but simply determines whether the evidence in support of the verdict is substantial. Young v. State, 316 Ark. 225, 871 S.W.2d 373 (1994). Substantial evidence is that which is forceful enough to compel reasonable minds to reach a conclusion one way or another. Id. In determining whether there is substantial evidence, the appellate court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee, and it is permissible to consider only that evidence which supports the guilty verdict. Id.\nPROOF OF APPELLANT\u2019S PURPOSE\nThe premise of the first ground of appellant\u2019s motion is that the state was required to prove appellant acted with the purpose of killing the victim. Such proof was not required in this case. The statutory definition of first-degree murder pursuant to which appellant was charged by felony information provides that a person commits murder in the first degree if, with a purpose of causing the death of one person, he causes the death of another. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-10-102(a)(2) (Repl. 1993); Henderson v. State, 291 Ark. 138, 722 S.W.2d 842 (1987). The state\u2019s burden, then, was to prove that appellant, with the purpose of causing the death of another person, caused the death of the victim.\nArkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 5-2-202(1) (Repl. 1993) provides: \u201cA person acts purposely with respect to his conduct or a result thereof when it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result[.]\u201d The law is well settled that a defendant\u2019s intent or state of mind is seldom capable of proof by direct evidence and must usually be inferred from the circumstances of the killing. Robinson v. State, 318 Ark. 33, 883 S.W.2d 469 (1994). The fact that the victim died of a single gunshot fired by appellant is uncontested. Three witnesses to the shooting, other than appellant, testified at the trial. Their testimonies reveal substantial evidence that, with the purpose of causing the death of the victim\u2019s cousin, Maurice London (also referred to in the record as \u201cMaurice Lawson\u201d and \u201cToby\u201d), appellant caused the victim\u2019s death.\nThe first witness to the shooting, Henry White, the victim\u2019s former brother-in-law, aged twenty-three years, testified he was living with the victim and his family at 5027 Buford in North Little Rock on November 4, 1993, the day of the shooting. White testified that, on that afternoon, he was returning to the Buford residence in his vehicle when he noticed a vehicle following him that was driven by appellant and contained three passengers. White testified the passengers were \u201cthrowing up little gang signs and stuff like that out the windows.\u201d White testified he drove into the driveway of the Buford residence, whereupon appellant asked if he (White) was \u201cthrowing gang signs\u201d and White answered no. White testified that Maurice London, a cousin of the victim who was living at the Buford residence, also had words with appellant at that time.\nWhite testified appellant and his passengers slowly drove past the Buford residence at least twice more that afternoon \u201clooking towards us.\u201d White testified nine other family members were in the front yard. White testified that, at one point after appellant drove by, London asked why appellant kept trying to bother them, and London fired one or two shots in the air. White testified appellant\u2019s vehicle turned around and stopped in front of the residence whereupon appellant said: \u201cOh, y\u2019all were shooting at me?\u201d or words to that effect. White testified London replied: \u201c[YJeah, nigger, I was shooting at you[.]\u201d White testified he then saw appellant go \u201cinto the drawer,\u201d point his gun and shoot. White testified he did not know where appellant aimed the gun. White testified he ducked, heard three shots and then saw the victim bleeding on the ground beside White\u2019s vehicle parked in the front yard of the Buford residence. White testified London then fired one more shot at appellant.\nWhite testified that, at the time of the shooting, he was standing on the driver\u2019s side of his vehicle parked in the front yard, approximately two feet away from London who was standing on the front porch. White testified that when he last looked at the victim prior to the shooting, the victim was sitting on the back of White\u2019s vehicle. White testified that when appellant shot his gun, appellant\u2019s vehicle was in the street near a big tree in front of the residence.\nThe second witness to the shooting, London, aged eighteen years, testified that, when he observed appellant talking to White in the front yard on the day of the shooting, he (London) told appellant \u201cto get off the front of my yard with that troublef.]\u201d London testified appellant drove past the Buford residence at least six times more that day. London testified that, after he (London) shot his gun twice into the air, he held it in his left hand pointing towards the porch upon which he stood. London testified that appellant then drove back before the residence, asked \u201c[W]as y\u2019all shooting at me?\u201d and London replied, \u201c[N]o, I didn\u2019t.\u201d London testified appellant then acted as though he was going to drive away, but stopped his vehicle and fired three times. London testified: \u201cI heard one bullet hit in front of me, hitting the house. I jumped back. A second bullet hit behind me, between the door panel.\u201d London testified the third bullet hit the victim, who was leaning against White\u2019s vehicle parked in front of the porch. London testified the victim was between him and appellant\u2019s vehicle. London testified appellant\u2019s vehicle was completely stopped when appellant fired the three shots and that appellant \u201cwas aiming his gun towards me.\u201d London testified that, after the three shots were fired, he (London) shot once more, aiming at appellant\u2019s vehicle that was then moving away.\nThe third witness to the shooting, April Cullins, a thirteen-year-old cousin of the victim, testified she was on the front porch of the Buford residence on the day of the shooting when someone told her to go inside. Cullins testified she went inside and, after a few seconds, looked out the front window and saw London, the victim, and White outside. Cullins testified she saw a vehicle come by, saw some \u201ctranslating back and forth,\u201d and saw London shoot his gun \u201cup in the air to scare them off.\u201d Cullins testified she saw the vehicle drive down the road and turn around, and that she heard more conversation. Cullins testified she saw appellant shoot. She testified: \u201c[A]fter they got past the tree, they shot, and my cousin turned his head, and a bullet caught him in his left eye[.]\u201d Cullins testified London stood on the front porch and the victim was standing against White\u2019s vehicle on the side facing the residence.\nAppellant testified he followed White home on November 4, 1993 after White \u201cstarted throwing up some gang signs,\u201d and that the two of them resolved the matter there without conflict. Appellant testified the second time he came by the Buford residence that day was after playing basketball when he heard shots and drove over to investigate. Appellant testified he saw White and the victim in the front yard and London on the front porch, asked White if he was shooting at appellant\u2019s vehicle, and heard the victim answer: \u201cYeah, I\u2019m shooting at your car, nigger.\u201d Appellant testified he and the victim then exchanged obscenities and \u201ca shot fired.\u201d Appellant testified he shot twice out the back window of his vehicle, without aiming at the victim or White or London, and then left.\nPulaski County Sheriff\u2019s Department Detective Terry Ward testified that the murder weapon, a 0.38-caliber automatic pistol, was recovered. Ward testified two fresh bullet holes were located on the Buford residence, one on each side of the front door. Ward testified the bullets were not recovered because they penetrated the walls of the residence too deeply.\nThe evidence of the verbal altercations between appellant and London on the afternoon of the shooting, of the \u201cwarning\u201d shots fired by London as appellant drove by, of London\u2019s armed presence on the front porch of the residence, of appellant\u2019s demand to know if he was being shot at, of the proximity of London\u2019s position on the porch to the fresh bullet holes in the door of the residence, of the proximity of appellant\u2019s vehicle to the residence at the time of the shooting, of the 0.38-caliber automatic pistol used by appellant, and of the victim\u2019s position between appellant\u2019s vehicle and London is substantial evidence that appellant caused the victim\u2019s death with the purpose of causing the death of London. Conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence were for the jury to resolve, as factfinder, and not for the trial court to resolve on a directed verdict motion. State v. Long, 311 Ark. 248, 844 S.W.2d 302 (1992).\nPROOF OF JUSTIFICATION\nWith respect to appellant\u2019s assertion that the evidence established justification for his act, we observe the jury was instructed on self-defense, but chose not to accept the defense. Consistent with the fact that, on review of the denial of a motion for directed verdict, this court need only consider that evidence that supports the guilty verdict, and irrespective of appellant\u2019s evidence of justification, this court concludes the proof of appellant\u2019s guilt is substantial. Banks v. State, 315 Ark. 666, 869 S.W.2d 700 (1994). The trial court did not err in denying the motion for directed verdict.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Donald L. Corbin, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Willard Proctor, Jr, for appellant.", "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by; Kent G. Holt, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Landis WILLIAMS, Jr. v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 95-322\n906 S.W.2d 677\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered October 2, 1995\nWillard Proctor, Jr, for appellant.\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by; Kent G. Holt, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0635-01", "first_page_order": 685, "last_page_order": 690 }