{ "id": 1445783, "name": "NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE v. TRI-STATE IRON AND METAL", "name_abbreviation": "National Union Fire Insurance v. Tri-State Iron & Metal", "decision_date": "1996-02-05", "docket_number": "94-1435", "first_page": "258", "last_page": "263", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "323 Ark. 258" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "914 S.W.2d 301" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "307 Ark. 385", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1902406 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/307/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "479 A.2d 1037", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 610216 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-super/330/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "650 A.2d 125", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 11313049, 11312958 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/650/0125-02", "/a2d/650/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "578 N.Y.S.2d 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 So.2d 443", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9723657 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/235/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 F.2d 284", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 746780 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/454/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ark. 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1935020 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "implied contract found to meet first \"contract for hire\" criteria of the dual employment doctrine" }, { "parenthetical": "implied contract found to meet first \"contract for hire\" criteria of the dual employment doctrine" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/312/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 Ark. 756", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1898906 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/310/0756-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-105", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-410", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 446, "char_count": 7931, "ocr_confidence": 0.906, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.816708401991687e-07, "percentile": 0.7186444074538708 }, "sha256": "9908715283732b0dbeb925b9fa15c805251dd581416ac8590c8ae74bcb55421c", "simhash": "1:595994e2dea41aa4", "word_count": 1218 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:17:29.924838+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Jesson, C.J., not participating." ], "parties": [ "NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE v. TRI-STATE IRON AND METAL" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice.\nThis case arose initially from a workers\u2019 compensation injury claim by Victor Cox against his employer Express Temporary Services (Express). Express had assigned Cox as temporary contract help to Tri-State Iron and Metal Company (Tri-State) to perform duties as a tire stripper. However, Cox was operating a forklift for Tri-State when he was injured, so Express and its workers\u2019 compensation insurance carrier, National Union Fire Insurance Company (National), brought Tri-State into the action, alleging Tri-State was the actual employer and liable for Cox\u2019s claim. Eventually, an administrative law judge and the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission held Express was Cox\u2019s general employer and therefore liable for his workers\u2019 compensation claim.\nDuring the pendency of Cox\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim, he filed a negligence suit against Tri-State in the Miller County Circuit Court. Because National had paid Cox over $20,000 in workers\u2019 compensation benefits, it intervened in this action to preserve its statutory lien rights under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-410 (Supp. 1993). Tri-State moved to dismiss this negligence action, contending Cox\u2019s rights and remedies were exclusively covered under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act as provided under that act\u2019s exclusivity statute, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-105 (1987). The circuit court agreed with Tri-State and dismissed the negligence suit. Before the trial court\u2019s dismissal order was filed, National amended its complaint-in-intervention, asserting Tri-State had breached its contract with Express because TriState had worked Cox as a forklift operator rather than a tire stripper. Cox did not join National\u2019s amended complaint which the trial court dismissed as untimely, nor does he participate in National\u2019s appeal of the trial court\u2019s rulings.\nNational\u2019s primary point for reversal of the Miller County Circuit Court\u2019s decisions is that the court erred in holding \u00a7 11-9-105, the exclusivity provision of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, barred suit against Tri-State. National argues that, under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-410 (Supp. 1993), the act does not affect the right of an employee to bring an action against a third party who is not an employer. In sum, National submits that, because the commission found Express to be Cox\u2019s employer for purposes of paying his workers\u2019 compensation benefits, Tri-State was not an employer within the meaning of the act\u2019s exclusivity provision, and Tri-State was collaterally estopped from arguing it was in the circuit court negligence action.\nThe flaw in National\u2019s argument is the commission did not find Tri-State was not an employer. Instead, the commission found that Tri-State was a \u201cspecial employer,\u201d but under the facts of this case, Tri-State was not liable for workers\u2019 compensation coverage. The commission analyzed Express\u2019s and TriState\u2019s status under the dual-employment doctrine, and in doing so relied on Daniels v. Riley\u2019s Health and Fitness Centers, 310 Ark. 756, 840 S.W.2d 177 (1992), where this court stated the following:\nWhen a general employer lends an employee to a special employer, the special employer becomes liable for workmen\u2019s compensation only if\n(a) The employee has made a contract for hire, express or implied, with the special employer;\n(b) The work being done is essentially that of the special employer, and\n(c) The special employer has the right to control the details of the work.\nWhen all three of the above conditions are satisfied in relation to both the general and special employers, both employers are liable for workers\u2019 compensation. See, IB Larson, The Law of Workmen\u2019s Compensation, \u00a7 48.00 (1995).\nObviously, in analyzing both Express\u2019s and Tri-State\u2019s status under the Workers\u2019 Compensation dual-employment doctrine, both very well could have been liable under the act for Cox\u2019s on-the-job injuries; however, that did not happen here. There simply was no separate contract for hire between Cox and his special employer, Tri-State, so Tri-State did not have to share in paying Cox\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation benefits. Additionally, nothing in the act reflects that its exclusivity provision is not applicable to Tri-State as a \u201cspecial employer,\u201d since Tri-State might well be liable for workers\u2019 compensation claims if the three conditions in Daniels are met. See also Cash v. Carter, 312 Ark. 41, 847 S.W.2d 18 (1993) (implied contract found to meet first \u201ccontract for hire\u201d criteria of the dual employment doctrine).\nThe present case is similar to Beaver v. Jacuzzi Brothers, Inc., 454 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1972), and that case is helpful in analyzing the factual situation. There, Joyce Beaver worked for Kelly Girl, Inc., a company whose business was supplying temporary workers to other businesses. While on temporary assignment to Jacuzzi Brothers, Beaver slipped and fell, sustaining injuries. She claimed and received workers\u2019 compensation benefits from Kelly Girl, but also filed a diversity, negligence action in federal court against Jacuzzi Brothers. The federal district court held Beaver\u2019s sole remedy was under the Arkansas Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. Although the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals never specifically mentioned the dual-employment doctrine by name, it stated the following:\nAs a matter of common experience and of present business practices in our economy, it is clear that an employee may be employed by more than one employer even while doing the same work. Biggart v. Texas Eastern Transportation Corp., 235 So.2d 443 (Miss. 1970).\nAs Jacuzzi Brothers was an employer within the meaning of the statute, plaintiff\u2019s sole remedy is that provided by the Workers\u2019 Compensation Law.\nAlthough in Beaver, the court never discussed Jacuzzi Brothers in terms of \u201cspecial employer,\u201d other jurisdictions have. For example, the court in Thompson v. Grumann Aerospace Corp., 578 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Ct. App. 1991), considered a situation where the plaintiff\u2019s general employer assigned plaintiff to work for Grumann. One year later, the plaintiff was injured while working for Grumann. The Beaver court ultimately held that the plaintiff\u2019s receipt of workers\u2019 compensation benefits from his general employer was his exclusive remedy and barred her bringing a negligence action against special employer Grumann. See also Sorenson v. Colibri Corp., 650 A.2d 125 (R.I. 1994); Supp v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 479 A.2d 1037 (Pa. Super. 1984).\nIn concluding the trial court correctly dismissed National\u2019s negligence action against Tri-State as being barred by the Arkansas Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, National\u2019s second argument must fail as well. In that argument, National urges the trial court erred in dismissing its amended complaint below which alleged Tri-State had breached its contract with Express since Tri-State used Cox as a forklift operator, not a tire stripper. Because we hold Tri-State was a special employer and falls within the exclusivity provision of the Worker\u2019s Compensation Act, neither a negligence nor contract action can be filed against Tri-State by Cox or National as a subrogee because the exclusivity provision makes no exceptions for contract actions. Gullett v. Brown, 307 Ark. 385, 820 S.W.2d 457 (1991). Moreover, National may not bring an action under \u00a7 11-9-410(b) because that section only provides for a carrier liable for compensation to maintain an action in tort, not contract, and then, only against a third party, not an employer. Finally, National may not bring a contract action as subrogee of its insured, Express, because Express never brought a contract action.\nAffirmed.\nJesson, C.J., not participating.", "type": "majority", "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Huckabay, Munson, Rowlett & Tilley, P.A., by: James E. Tilley and Julia L. Busjield, for appellant.", "Smith, Stroud, McClerkin, Dunn & Nutter, by: Nelson V. Shaw, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE v. TRI-STATE IRON AND METAL\n94-1435\n914 S.W.2d 301\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered February 5, 1996\nHuckabay, Munson, Rowlett & Tilley, P.A., by: James E. Tilley and Julia L. Busjield, for appellant.\nSmith, Stroud, McClerkin, Dunn & Nutter, by: Nelson V. Shaw, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0258-01", "first_page_order": 288, "last_page_order": 293 }