{ "id": 1445755, "name": "The PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY of America v. Melissa Conrad FRAZIER and Mellonie Conrad", "name_abbreviation": "Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Frazier", "decision_date": "1996-02-05", "docket_number": "94-1320", "first_page": "311", "last_page": "319", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "323 Ark. 311" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "914 S.W.2d 296" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "321 Ark. 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1449561 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/321/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 Ark. 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1451291 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/320/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 Ark. 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8726794 ], "year": 1858, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/19/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Ark. App. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140666 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "accounting is an equitable remedy; provides a means to compel one entrusted with property of another to render account of his actions, and for recovery of any balance due" }, { "parenthetical": "accounting is an equitable remedy; provides a means to compel one entrusted with property of another to render account of his actions, and for recovery of any balance due" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/38/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 S.W.2d 557", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "chancellor determined that guardian's failure to give bond rendered proceeding void and set aside partition sale of minor's land" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 Ark. 705", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1462419 ], "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "chancellor determined that guardian's failure to give bond rendered proceeding void and set aside partition sale of minor's land" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/196/0705-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ark. 853", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8724429 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1939, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "chancery court had jurisdiction to hear custody dispute between natural mother and guardian previously appointed in probate court" }, { "parenthetical": "chancery court had jurisdiction to hear custody dispute between natural mother and guardian previously appointed in probate court" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/197/0853-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ark. 1019", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1456664 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1940, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "chancellor imposed trust on property titled in guardian's name but purchased with minor's funds" }, { "parenthetical": "chancellor imposed trust on property titled in guardian's name but purchased with minor's funds" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/199/1019-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 Ark. 910", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8725152 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/228/0910-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 Ark. 602", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8722803 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/217/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Ark. App. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140666 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/38/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 Ark. 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1902430 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/307/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 Ark. 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1898844 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/310/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 Ark. 456", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1904349 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/308/0456-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-65-401", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "316 Ark. 609", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1907826 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/316/0609-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 Ark. 22", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8717796 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "stating that the two courts are wholly distinct and operate independently of one another and that [the] trial court, sitting as chancery in that case, correctly did not pass on questions reserved for probate" }, { "parenthetical": "stating that the two courts are wholly distinct and operate independently of one another and that [the] trial court, sitting as chancery in that case, correctly did not pass on questions reserved for probate" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/210/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 Ark. 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8718539 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that chancery and probate courts are separate tribunals, each having [its] own jurisdiction and that a chancery court cannot \"inherit jurisdiction\" from the probate court in same county" }, { "parenthetical": "holding that chancery and probate courts are separate tribunals, each having [its] own jurisdiction and that a chancery court cannot \"inherit jurisdiction\" from the probate court in same county" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/244/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 Ark. 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1619171 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"probate courts are vested with exclusive jurisdiction in matters relative to . . . guardians. . . .\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"probate courts are vested with exclusive jurisdiction in matters relative to . . . guardians. . . .\"" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/259/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "200 Ark. 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1453448 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1940, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357-58" }, { "page": "111" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/200/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-65-107", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "322 Ark. 256", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1447481 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "265-66" }, { "page": "307" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/322/0256-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 814, "char_count": 17402, "ocr_confidence": 0.896, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.396363787593674e-07, "percentile": 0.6438357989210954 }, "sha256": "65ad4d786b1143c565f7713d85931cbfc1d6384593dcf4d15cfddbb1a69d2efb", "simhash": "1:734af1a5d1ce3567", "word_count": 2769 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:17:29.924838+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Dudley, Newbern, and Corbin, JJ., dissent.", "Glaze, J., concurs.", "Dudley and Newbern, JJ., join in this dissent." ], "parties": [ "The PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY of America v. Melissa Conrad FRAZIER and Mellonie Conrad" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Andree Layton Roaf, Justice.\nAppellant, the Prudential Insurance Company of America, appeals from a judgment in an action for accounting, in which the chancellor awarded $30,519.60 in insurance proceeds to appellees, Melissa Conrad Frazier and Mellonie Conrad. The court of appeals certified this case to us as one requiring interpretation of the Probate Code of 1949. Jurisdiction is therefore properly in this court pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(d)(1) and (a)(3). For reversal, appellant argues that it properly paid the insurance proceeds to appellees\u2019 guardian and that, under the law of trusts, it had no further obligation to appellees as beneficiaries. We find no merit to these arguments and affirm.\nAppellees were aged eight and nine when their mother died on August 27, 1983. On October 25, 1983, an order was entered by the Garland County Probate Court appointing their uncle, Jerry Reid, as guardian of their persons and estates. The order stated that \u201cbond shall be determined.\u201d Bond was not determined and letters of guardianship were apparently never issued to Mr. Reid. On November 10, 1983, appellant paid the appellees\u2019 $30,519.60 share of their mother\u2019s life insurance proceeds to Reid as guardian of their estates. Reid and his wife adopted appellees in July 1984. After reaching the age of majority, appellees initiated this suit in 1994 by filing a petition for an accounting and for judgment, alleging that both Reid and appellant had failed and refused to account for the life insurance proceeds. After a bench trial, the chancellor found that Reid spent the proceeds for improper purposes and without court approval, that appellant and Reid were jointly and severally liable to appellees, and that Reid was liable to appellant for any payment of the judgment appellant made.\nUnlike the dissenters, we have no difficulty in concluding that the chancellor had subject-matter jurisdiction over an action against an insurance company and former guardian for accounting and judgment. See Nelson v. Wood, 199 Ark. 1019, 137 S.W.2d 929 (1940) (chancellor imposed trust on property titled in guardian\u2019s name but purchased with minor\u2019s funds); Hancock v. Hancock, 197 Ark. 853, 125 S.W.2d 104 (1939) (chancery court had jurisdiction to hear custody dispute between natural mother and guardian previously appointed in probate court); Grogan v. Weatherby, 196 Ark. 705, 119 S.W.2d 557 (1938) (chancellor determined that guardian\u2019s failure to give bond rendered proceeding void and set aside partition sale of minor\u2019s land); A&P\u2019s Hole-In-One, Inc. v. Moskop, 38 Ark. App. 234, 832 S.W.2d 860 (1992) (accounting is an equitable remedy; provides a means to compel one entrusted with property of another to render account of his actions, and for recovery of any balance due).\nAppellant first argues that it properly paid the insurance proceeds to Reid as appellees\u2019 guardian and was under no duty to ensure that the guardian would carry out his obligations. This argument challenges the chancellor\u2019s finding that appellant \u201cpaid insurance proceeds to Reid without court authority and without [ejnsuring the beneficiaries would be properly protected.\u201d Appellant presented no evidence at the bench trial. Appellant did, however, move for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence arguing that it had properly paid Reid the proceeds on November 10, 1983, because Reid had been appointed guardian by court order entered October 25, 1983.\nAppellees admitted into evidence, without objection, a certified copy of the entire file of the guardianship proceedings. The October 25, 1983 order appointing Reid guardian stated that \u201cbond shall be determined.\u201d There is nothing in the guardianship proceedings indicating that bond was ever determined or issued, or that letters of guardianship were ever issued. Appellees introduced a notice from the Probate file dated October 10, 1984, directing Reid to file an inventory of appellees\u2019 assets, and Reid\u2019s response dated November 9, 1984, which listed each appellee\u2019s sole asset as $437.00 monthly social Security benefits. The chancellor found that Reid did not disclose the insurance proceeds he received as guardian from appellant almost one year earlier. The chancellor also found that, because the proceeds were not disclosed, no bond or additional accounting was required by the court in the guardianship proceedings.\nOn appeal, appellant argues it properly paid the proceeds to Reid as guardian pursuant to the October 25, 1983 order because, at that time, there was no requirement that a bond be issued in a guardianship proceeding and Reid had accepted the appointment as guardian. Appellees respond to this argument with case law to the effect that a guardian is not appointed until bond has been issued. See e.g., Sturdy v. Jacoway, 19 Ark. 499 (1858).\nThe parties\u2019 reliance on the requirement of a bond or on Reid\u2019s acceptance of appointment as the determinative issue is misplaced. The issue before us is whether appellant paid the proceeds to Reid without court authority. This issue is controlled by Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 57-618 (Repl. 1971), in effect at the time the proceeds were paid, which provided that letters of guardianship, \u201cuntil revoked or cancelled by the court, shall protect persons who, in good faith, act in reliance thereon.\u201d As determined by the chancellor, no bond was ever set and no letters of guardianship were ever issued. The Probate code of 1949 did not authorize appellant to pay Reid the proceeds on the strength of a court order conditionally appointing him guardian, with bond yet to be determined. We find no error in the chancellor\u2019s ruling in this regard.\nAppellant\u2019s second argument for reversal is that, after paying the proceeds to the guardian, it had no further obligation to appellees under the law of trusts. We answer this argument summarily. First, the argument is premised upon the assumption that the trial court found a post-payment obligation of appellant to appellees as beneficiaries deriving from the law of trusts. The trial court made no such finding or any ruling that appellant had a continuing obligation to appellees after it paid the proceeds. Rather, the ruling was that appellant did not ensure that it properly paid the proceeds to the guardian and in fact paid the proceeds without court authority. Second, the abstract does not reveal that appellant relied on the law of trusts in the proceedings below. The record on appeal is confined to that which is abstracted. Mahan v. Hall, 320 Ark. 473, 897 S.W.2d 571 (1995). This court does not address arguments that were not raised below. Wacaser v. Insurance Comm\u2019r, 321 Ark. 143, 900 S.W.2d 191 (1995).\nWe find no merit to appellant\u2019s arguments and affirm the chancellor\u2019s order.\nDudley, Newbern, and Corbin, JJ., dissent.\nGlaze, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "Andree Layton Roaf, Justice." }, { "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice,\nconcurring. The suggestion that equity has no subject-matter jurisdiction in this case wholly ignores settled law and the facts. Although the majority opinion concludes the chancery judge here had jurisdiction of this case, I write to explain why the chancellor had the authority to rule as he did.\nMelissa and Mellonie Conrad were ages eight and nine years old when their mother, Betty, died in August of 1983. Betty had a life insurance policy with The Prudential Insurance Company of America which provided $30,519.60 in proceeds to the two girls. After Betty\u2019s death, Melissa and Mellonie went to live with their uncle, Jerry Reid, who was appointed their guardian on October 25, 1983. The guardianship order provided a \u201cbond shall be determined,\u201d but none was. Nonetheless, Prudential sent the insurance proceeds to Reid, stating the proceeds were \u201cfor the person and estates of Melissa and Mellonie Conrad,\u201d and Reid concedes he knew those proceeds belonged to the two girls. He also began receiving Melissa\u2019s and Mellonie\u2019s social security payments, totalling $847.00 a month. Reid initially placed the life insurance proceeds in certificates of deposit issued for the girls\u2019 benefit.\nReid testified that he became disabled sometime in 1983 and did not work, and while he made claims for workers\u2019 compensation and social security benefits, he only commenced receiving them between 1986 and 1988. Meanwhile, Reid purchased a bigger house in 1984 and admitted he used some of the girls\u2019 life insurance proceeds to do so. In the same year, he adopted Melissa and Mellonie, and said that he understood when he became their adopted father \u201ctheir assets were ours and our assets were theirs.\u201d Nevertheless, Reid asserted \u201cthe house does not contain money that belongs to the two young ladies.\u201d Reid claimed he used the two girls\u2019 monies to care for them, as well as his other four children.\nMelissa and Mellonie brought this action, alleging Reid was their appointed guardian when he received their life insurance proceeds from Prudential. They averred Reid, as guardian, breached his fiduciary duty and perpetrated fraud upon them by failing to disclose, protect, and deliver the assets, and such acts on Reid\u2019s part were intentional with knowledge of his fiduciary duty. The two women asked for a full accounting from Reid and Prudential, alleging Prudential, too, had failed to account for the life insurance proceeds or to require proof of bond when it paid Reid the proceeds. After a trial and being informed of Melissa\u2019s, Mellonie\u2019s and Reid\u2019s allegations and testimony of what occurred, the chancellor awarded damages to Melissa and Mellonie.\nAs is set out clearly and succinctly in A & P\u2019s Hole-in-One, Inc. v. Moskop, 38 Ark. App. 234, 832 S.W.2d 860 (1992), the court of appeals stated that an accounting is an equitable remedy designed to provide a means for compelling one, who because of a confidential or trust relationship has been entrusted with property of another, to render an account of his actions and for the recovery of any balance found to be due.\nAs this court said in Walters-Southland Institute v. Walker, Trustee, 217 Ark. 602, 232 S.W.2d 448 (1950), the existence of a fiduciary relation is one of the well-recognized grounds for equity jurisdiction of a suit for an accounting. An accounting may be had against a fiduciary to determine whether there is, in fact, anything due the plaintiff. Here, Reid, as guardian of Melissa\u2019s and Mellonie\u2019s estate, was a fiduciary. Omohundro v. Erhart, 228 Ark. 910, 311 S.W.2d 309 (1958). Consequently, Melissa and Mellonie, as wards and plaintiffs, have every right to ask equity to make Reid and Prudential account for those monies or assets that might be due the women, and chancery courts clearly had the authority to grant such relief.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice," }, { "text": "Donald L. Corbin, Justice,\ndissenting. This dissent focuses on this case to illuminate the ageless determination that probate courts have exclusive jurisdiction of guardianship matters concerning the persons and estates of wards. The chancery court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction of the guardianship matters in this case, and the case therefore should be reversed and dismissed. Moreover, this case illuminates the confusion this court creates when it interprets our antiquated constitutional judicial article and attempts to blend its separation of jurisdiction of trial courts into circuit, chancery, probate, juvenile, and various combinations thereof. While I agree with the majority, based on the cases cited therein, that chancery courts have jurisdiction of matters concerning trust, fraud, and accountings and fiduciaries other than those relating to guardianships, I do not agree that the chancery court has jurisdiction of such issues or claims when they concern guardianships.\nThis court has recently addressed the issue of a chancery court\u2019s lack of jurisdiction over guardianship matters in Dent v. Wright, 322 Ark. 256, 909 S.W.2d 302 (1995), where we affirmed in part a chancery court\u2019s rulings on issues of fraud and constructive trust, but reversed and dismissed in part, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the chancellor\u2019s appointment of a guardian. There, we explained the subject-matter jurisdiction relationship between chancery and probate courts as follows:\nJurisdiction of the probate court over all matters of guardianship, other than guardianships ad litem in other courts, is exclusive. Ark. Const. art. 7, \u00a7 34; Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-65-107(a) (1987) (emphasis added). The section of the Arkansas Constitution that is now Article 7, section 34, did not consolidate the chancery and probate courts, and, while the judge of the chancery court is also the judge of the probate court, the judge conducts each court separately. Wooten v. Penuel, 200 Ark. 353, 140 S.W.2d 108 (1940). The section does not permit courts of chancery to lift matters over which the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction out of probate courts and apply equitable principles in disposing of controversies cognizable only in probate. Id. at 357-58, 140 S.W.2d at 111; see also Hilburn v. First State Bank, 259 Ark. 569, 535 S.W.2d 810 (1976) (\u201cprobate courts are vested with exclusive jurisdiction in matters relative to . . . guardians. . . .\u201d); Thompson v. Dunlap, 244 Ark. 178, 424 S.W.2d 360 (1968) (holding that chancery and probate courts are separate tribunals, each having [its] own jurisdiction and that a chancery court cannot \u201cinherit jurisdiction\u201d from the probate court in same county); Janssen v. Blissenbach, 210 Ark. 22, 193 S.W.2d 814 (1946) (stating that the two courts are wholly distinct and operate independently of one another and that [the] trial court, sitting as chancery in that case, correctly did not pass on questions reserved for probate).\nDent, 322 Ark. at 265-66, 909 S.W.2d at 307.\nSubject-matter jurisdiction is determined from the pleadings. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. State ex rel. Faulkner, 316 Ark. 609, 873 S.W.2d 805 (1994). In this case, the complaint was for an accounting and judgment. As against Reid, appellees alleged that he breached his fiduciary duty and committed fraud. As against appellant, appellees alleged that appellant negligently paid the proceeds to Reid by failing to verify Reid\u2019s authority to collect the proceeds and by failing to require proof of bond. As against both appellant and Reid, appellees requested an accounting of and judgment for the proceeds. Thus, the critical and threshold issues were whether appellant paid the proceeds to Reid as the duly qualified, appointed, and serving guardian, and the accounting of the proceeds. Such determinations can only be made by the probate court \u2014 the court that is given exclusive original jurisdiction of guardianship matters. Ark. Const. art. 7, \u00a7 34; Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-65-107(a) (1987); Dent, 322 Ark. 256, 909 S.W.2d 302. There can be no cause of action for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, or negligence until the probate court has entered a ruling on the accounting and judgment for deficiency of the proceeds. Thus, while the pleadings raise tort issues that are cognizable in chancery court, the threshold issues of whether appellant properly paid the proceeds to Reid as the duly qualified, appointed, and serving guardian of appellees\u2019 persons and estates, and the accounting of the funds in appellees\u2019 guardianship estates are not cognizable in chancery court. The chancery court was not permitted to lift the guardianship matter from the probate court\u2019s exclusive jurisdiction. Id.\nThe majority opinion contributes to the jurisdictional confusion by concluding that the chancery court has jurisdiction of this case, without overruling Dent.\nThe majority opinion illustrates the problems courts face and compound when they erroneously exercise subject-matter jurisdiction by referring to Reid as appellees\u2019 \u201cformer\u201d guardian. Such a reference assumes facts not in the record. Under current law, a guardianship of the estate of a ward based solely on the ward\u2019s minority does not terminate automatically upon the ward\u2019s attainment of majority. See generally Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-65-401 (Supp. 1995). There is nothing in this record to show that the probate court has approved a final accounting of the appellees\u2019 accounts as wards and terminated Reid\u2019s guardianship. An accounting of a ward\u2019s account and termination of a guardianship are matters that lie exclusively in probate court. Section 28-65-107.\nThe majority\u2019s assumption that Reid is the \u201cformer\u201d guardian magnifies the lack of chancery\u2019s subject-matter jurisdiction in this case. Moreover, it demonstrates that the chancery court assumed jurisdiction of this case too soon. The chancellor should have transferred the case to probate, settled the accounting, and determined whether Reid was the duly qualified, appointed, and acting guardian. Once those determinations were made by the probate court, the chancellor could then have exercised jurisdiction of the fraud and negligence claims. See, 65th Center, Inc. v. Copeland, 308 Ark. 456, 825 S.W.2d 574 (1992); In Re Morgan, 310 Ark. 220, 833 S.W.2d 776 (1992); Forehand v. American Collection Serv., Inc., 307 Ark. 342, 819 S.W.2d 282 (1991).\nDudley and Newbern, JJ., join in this dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Donald L. Corbin, Justice," } ], "attorneys": [ "The Rose Law Firm, A Professional Association, by: Phillip Carroll, for appellant.", "Crawford Law Firm, by: Michael Crawford, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "The PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY of America v. Melissa Conrad FRAZIER and Mellonie Conrad\n94-1320\n914 S.W.2d 296\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered February 5, 1996\nThe Rose Law Firm, A Professional Association, by: Phillip Carroll, for appellant.\nCrawford Law Firm, by: Michael Crawford, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0311-01", "first_page_order": 341, "last_page_order": 349 }