{ "id": 1445703, "name": "Richard A. WEISS, Director, Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration v. BEST ENTERPRISES, INC.", "name_abbreviation": "Weiss v. Best Enterprises, Inc.", "decision_date": "1996-03-18", "docket_number": "95-527", "first_page": "712", "last_page": "724", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "323 Ark. 712" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "917 S.W.2d 543" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 8-4-102", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 Ark. 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1174936 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328" }, { "page": "232" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/272/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23-1-101", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 Ark. 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1451252 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/320/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 Ark. 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1886957 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168" }, { "page": "854" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/300/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 26-1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 26-18-506", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "325" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 Ark. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1754971 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228" }, { "page": "521" }, { "page": "229" }, { "page": "521" }, { "page": "231" }, { "page": "522" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/274/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 Ark. 908", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8724541 ], "weight": 13, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "908" }, { "page": "72" }, { "page": "909" }, { "page": "72" }, { "page": "910" }, { "page": "72" }, { "page": "911" }, { "page": "73", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/244/0908-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ark. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1464544 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" }, { "page": "810", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/215/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 S.W. 1044", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1918, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 Ark. 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1573263 ], "year": 1918, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/134/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 Ark. 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1896940 ], "weight": 13, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322" }, { "page": "315" }, { "page": "330" }, { "page": "319" }, { "page": "316-17" }, { "page": "325" }, { "page": "316-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/311/0320-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 26-52-301", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 26-52-103", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(3)(E)" }, { "page": "(a)(3)(B)" }, { "page": "(a)(4)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 26-18-406", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(l)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "259 Ark. 767", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1619123 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/259/0767-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 Ark. 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1886957 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/300/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ark. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1464544 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/215/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 26-52-103", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(2)(E)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 942, "char_count": 21738, "ocr_confidence": 0.902, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.317852702137001e-08, "percentile": 0.43488867497680367 }, "sha256": "cf5f5f69d4e1fde3190fc9307973d03e609c862cab265fdb9179812c57963c0d", "simhash": "1:5b49c448f2365091", "word_count": 3601 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:17:29.924838+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Newbern and Corbin, JJ., dissent.", "Corbin, J., joins in this dissent." ], "parties": [ "Richard A. WEISS, Director, Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration v. BEST ENTERPRISES, INC." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Robert H. Dudley, Justice.\nBest Enterprises, Inc., charges a fee to place its portable toilets at customers\u2019 sites. The fee includes charges for pumping, cleaning, sanitization, and waste-disposal services for the toilets. The Department of Finance & Administration audited Best\u2019s records, administratively ruled that Best\u2019s operation was subject to the gross-receipts tax, and assessed a deficiency. Best paid the assessment, penalty, and interest under protest and filed suit for judicial relief in the chancery court. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 26-18-406(a)(l) (Repl. 1992). The chancellor ordered the tax, penalty, and interest refunded. We reverse and dismiss.\nIn its complaint, Best alleged that Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 26-52-103(a)(3)(E) excludes from gross-receipts taxation, with certain exceptions, furnishing or rendering of a service, and that Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 26-52-301(2) exempts sewer services from the gross-receipts tax. The Director answered that Best\u2019s lease of portable toilets was not excluded from taxation because the lease was an integral part of the business and, since the lease and the attendant cleaning services were not separated, it contended that the transaction was subject to taxation. The Director additionally answered that Best was not exempt from taxation as a sewer service because Best is not a utility or public service and only those entities are exempt.\nThe facts, which are largely undisputed, show that Best purchases portable toilets out of state, takes the toilets to its base of operation in Cabot and, from there, delivers the toilets to the customers\u2019 sites. After placing a portable toilet on a customer\u2019s site, Best provides pumping, cleaning, sanitation, and waste disposal services for the unit. It charges one fixed price for both the use of portable toilets and the attendant services. The fixed price is determined by using a chart that was formulated by Best. The fixed price includes the cost of the toilet and other equipment such as the service truck and chemicals, toilet tissue, gloves, boots, and uniforms; the cost of fuel for its truck and time for travel by service personnel to the site; and the cost of labor. The cost of equipment constitutes about eleven percent of the fixed price, and the cost of toilets amounts to about five percent of the fixed price.\nWhen a customer calls for a portable toilet, Best inquires about the number of people who will use the facility, the location, and the length of time the toilet or toilets will be needed. After receiving the information, Best determines the fixed price by using its chart. The customer signs a written contract. The toilet is delivered and subsequently serviced at least once a week. The frequency of service depends upon the number of people using the toilet. If a toilet is overused, the customer is informed and either frequency of service is increased or the number of toilets is increased, and the fixed price is increased. The customer is billed every four weeks.\nMost of the portable toilets are leased to contractors for use at construction sites. A six-month lease would be considered a short lease; some toilets have been on site since 1987. Best will supply a toilet for only one week, but the fixed charge is about the same as for four weeks.\nServicing the toilets includes pumping waste to the truck, recharging the holding tank with chemicals, deodorizing, cleaning, disinfecting, replacing toilet tissue, removing graffiti, and maintenance. The waste is transported by a service truck to Cabot where it is stored in larger tanks until disposed at a municipal waste-water treatment facility.\nThe chancellor ruled that providing portable toilets to customers did not constitute the rental of tangible personal property, but rather that Best is engaged in providing sewer and sanitation services which are exempt from taxation. We reverse and dismiss.\nThe Director\u2019s first point of appeal is that the chancellor erred in ruling that providing portable toilets did not constitute, in part, the rental of tangible personal property. The point is well taken.\nRentals of tangible personal property are taxable. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 26-52-103(a)(3)(B) (Repl. 1992). In determining whether a transaction constitutes a lease that is taxable under the Gross Receipts Act, we look to all of the factors involved to determine the true nature of the transaction. Leathers v. A & B Dirt Movers, Inc., 311 Ark. 320, 844 S.W.2d 314 (1992). No specific words are necessary to create a lease, but the words that are used must have the effect of divesting the owner of the right to the possession of his property and, for a consideration, investing the other party with the right to possession for a designated period or at will. Harbottle v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 134 Ark. 254, 203 S.W. 1044 (1918). Best\u2019s form contract states that it will \u201csupply the sanitation units\u201d and that the customer will \u201cretain absolute and sole control, possession, and custody of the sanitation units and return such units to the contractor at the end of the service period.\u201d It further provides that if the toilet is damaged, other than from ordinary wear and tear, the customer is liable for the damages, the customer cannot make alterations or make attachments to the toilets without Best\u2019s permission, and the customer will return the toilet to Best at the end of the contract period. One of Best\u2019s exhibits introduced at trial was basic industry data published by the School of Business and Public Administration of Howard University. It provides: \u201cAs a part of the cost of renting units, the portable sanitation contractor services on a regular basis.\u201d One of Best\u2019s employees admitted that the customers frequently called the transaction a rental of portable toilets.\nIn summary, Best, for a consideration, divested itself for a period of time of the right to the possession of its portable toilets, and invested the customer with the right of possession of its property. The transactions fit within the definition of leases, and we hold that they were leases. Similarly, a Tennessee court of appeals recently held that providing portable toilets to customers constituted a lease of toilets. Essary v. Huddleston, WL 384985 (Tenn. App. 1995).\nThe chancellor ruled that Best was not in the business of leasing portable toilets, but rather was a public utility providing sewer services, which are exempt from the gross-receipts tax. The Director also assigns this part of the ruling as error. The assignment has merit for two reasons.\nFirst, sanitation services are provided for the portable toilets leased by Best. Manifestly, the leasing of the portable toilets is an integral part of Best\u2019s business. Best offered testimony that it would service toilets owned by another company, but it did not deny that it primarily serviced its own toilets. Thus, it cannot be said that Best was solely providing sewer services.\nSecond, it is undisputed that part of the fixed charge is related to the cost of the toilets. Best estimated this to be approximately five percent of the charge. If the charges for the toilets and services had been separately stated, the amount charged for services would not have been taxable. However, since the nontaxable service was included as part of the total consideration received from the rental of the portable toilets, the charge for services constitutes part of the gross proceeds, and the entire proceeds are subject to taxation.\nIn Ferguson v. Cook, 215 Ark. 373, 220 S.W.2d 808 (1949), a monument dealer sought to deduct the cost of labor necessary to make and install monuments from the sales price. We held that the entire sales price was subject to the tax because the statute that is now codified as Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 26-52-103, states in pertinent part:\n\u201cGross receipts\u201d or \u201cgross proceeds\u201d means the total amount of consideration for the sale of tangible personal property and such services as are herein specifically provided for, whether the consideration is in money or otherwise, without any deduction on account of the cost of the properties sold, labor service performed, interest paid, losses, or any expenses whatever.\nArk. Code Ann. \u00a7 26-52-103(a)(4) (emphasis added). We concluded that \u201cwhere one sells an article in the preparation of which for sale he has expended labor, which adds to its value and was necessary to make it salable, he must pay the sales tax on the price received, without deduction for the value of the labor performed.\u201d Ferguson v. Cook, 215 Ark. at 376, 220 S.W.2d at 810 (emphasis added).\nIn Larey v. Dungan-Allen, 244 Ark. 908, 428 S.W.2d 71 (1968), the appellee taxpayer was a corporation engaged in commercial photography. Id. at 908, 428 S.W.2d at 72. The Director sought to tax it under the section of the act that levies the tax under \u201cphotography of all kinds.\u201d Id. The taxpayer argued that eighty-five percent of its revenue was recompense for services because in the course of its business, its employees \u201cfrequently [had] long consultations with their patrons about matters such as advertising layouts, promotional planning, material for magazine publication, and other activities going beyond the mere taking and developing of pictures.\u201d Id. at 909, 428 S.W.2d at 72. One of the principal stockholders testified that taking pictures was \u201cthe least of what they [did].\u201d Id. The stockholders offered testimony that for a day\u2019s work an advertising agency might be charged $200 for photographic services and $10 for five different pictures. Id. at 910, 428 S.W.2d at 72. The taxpayer argued that \u201cthe incidence of the gross-receipts tax should be similarly divided between nontaxable revenue from professional services and taxable revenue from the taking of pictures.\u201d Id. We stated that we had previously rejected such an argument in Ferguson v. Cook, 215 Ark. 373, 220 S.W.2d 808 (1949). We concluded by stating that while the tax would not apply in instances where the taxpayers \u201cwere paid for services only, such as consultations, without any photographs being involved . . . the principle cannot be extended to the point of separating the sale of the photograph from the exercise of that skill \u2018which adds to its value and was necessary to make it salable.\u2019 \u201d Larey v. Dungan-Allen, 244 Ark. at 911, 428 S.W.2d at 73 (citation omitted).\nIn Ragland v. Miller Trane Service Agency, 274 Ark. 227, 623 S.W.2d 520 (1981), the taxpayer was in the business of inspecting, servicing, and repairing commercial heating and cooling devices and had two different types of contracts. Id. at 228, 623 S.W.2d at 521. The first was an \u201cinspection only\u201d contract, and the Director agreed it was nontaxable. Id. at 229, 623 S.W.2d at 521. The second contract provided for the taxpayer to maintain and repair the units, in addition to inspecting them, a minimum of three times a year. Id. The trial court found that the full-coverage contract could be broken down into component parts for the purposes of collecting the gross receipts tax. In reversing, we stated that, under the rationale of our established case law, the inspection services enhanced the value of the full coverage contract, and increased the marketability of the taxable services; therefore, the entire transaction was taxable. Id. at 231, 623 S.W.2d at 522.\nMost recently, in Leathers v. A & B Dirt Movers, Inc., 311 Ark. 320, 844 S.W.2d 314 (1992), the taxpayer was a dirt hauler who contended that it provided the nontaxable service of hauling free dirt. Id. at 322, 844 S.W.2d at 315. The chancellor ruled that the transactions were not taxable. Id. We reversed because the taxpayer\u2019s records made the transaction appear as though it involved a sale of dirt, even though the record was devoid of any direct testimony that proved the sale of dirt. Id. at 330, 844 S.W.2d at 319. We held that Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 26-18-506(a) & (d) (1992) requires a taxpayer to keep adequate tax records, and when a taxpayer fails to maintain the required records, the Director may make an estimated assessment of tax due, as \u201cthe burden of proof of refuting this estimated assessment is upon the taxpayer.\u201d Id. at 325, 844 S.W.2d at 316-17; Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 26-1 \u00bf-506(d). We concluded that the transactions were taxable, because they involved the transfer and possession of tangible personal property.\nIn summary, just as in Leathers v. A & B Dirt Movers, Inc., the taxpayer\u2019s records show the transactions were leases. The transactions were the type of mixed transactions that are fully taxable under Larey v. Dungan-Allen and its progeny. Finally, because Best did not maintain the required records, the burden of refuting the assessment was upon the taxpayer, Leathers v. A & B Dirt Movers, Inc., 311 Ark. at 325, 844 S.W.2d at 316-17, and Best did not meet that burden.\nBest urges us to adopt a \u201cdominant-use test\u201d for this case. To do so would require us to reject the reasoning of the above cases, and we decline to do so.\nThe chancellor ruled that Best was entitled to a refund on the additional ground that it provided sewer and sanitation services in the furtherance of public health, and those services are nontaxable. The Director assigns the ruling as error.\nArkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 26-52-301 levies an excise tax upon utilities or public service companies \u201cexcept transportation services, sewer services, and sanitation or garbage collection services.\u201d Id. \u00a7 26-52-301(2). In short, utilities or other public services are subject to the tax, except for their transportation services, sewer services, and sanitation services. To prove that it comes within the exemption, Best must have proved that it was a utility or public service company engaged in sewer services.\nIn Ragland v. Meadowbrook Country Club, 300 Ark. 164, 777 S.W.2d 852 (1989), we said, \u201cThe difference between an exclusion and an exemption is that an exemption pertains to sales that would be covered were they not specifically exempted from the Act, while exclusion is simply not included in the first place.\u201d Id. at 168, 777 S.W.2d at 854. Stated differently, an exemption \u201cpresupposes a liability, and is properly applied only to a grant of immunity to persons or property which otherwise would have been liable to assessment, and exists only by virtue of constitutional or statutory provisions.\u201d 84 C.J.S. Taxation \u00a7 215 at 411 (1954). A taxpayer must prove entitlement to an exemption beyond a reasonable doubt. City of Fayetteville v. Phillips, 320 Ark. 540, 899 S.W.2d 57 (1995). Best failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it was exempt from taxation as a utility or public service.\nBest did not prove that it was regulated by the Arkansas Public Service Commission or the Arkansas Transportation Commission, that a city, state board, or commission had authorized it to service a territory, or that its rates were regulated by an official agency. In short, it failed to prove that it was a public utility as contemplated by Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23-1-101.\nIn Quinn-Moore v. Lambert, 272 Ark. 324, 614 S.W.2d 230 (1981), we said that a public utility is entitled to a guaranteed but limited return on its investment, and it cannot pick and choose whom it will serve, while a private entrepreneurship is entitled to pick and choose whom it will serve, but is not entitled to a guaranteed return on its investment. Id. at 328, 614 S.W.2d at 232. Indeed, the term \u201cpublic utility\u201d implies a public use and service to the public, and the principal determinative characteristic of a public utility is service to, or a readiness to serve, an indefinite public that has a legal right to demand and receive its services or commodities. See 64 Am. Jur. 2d Public Utilities \u00a7 1 at 549 (1972). A public utility holds itself out to the public generally and may not refuse any legitimate demand for service, while a private business independently determines who it will serve. The record is devoid of any evidence that Best is required to serve any area, or indefinite public, or that it is entitled to a return on its investment.\nIn addition, the lease and service of a toilet does not fit within the definition of a public utility sewer service. Section 8-4-102 of the Arkansas Code Annotated defines \u201csewage\u201d and \u201csewer system\u201d as follows:\n(1) \u201cSewage\u201d means the water-carried waste products from residences, public buildings, institutions, or other buildings, including the excrementitious or other discharge from bodies of humans or animals, together with such groundwater infiltration and surface water as may be present.\n(5) \u201cSewer system\u201d means pipelines or conduits, pumping stations, and force mains, and all other constructions, devices, and appliances appurtenant thereto, which are used for conducting sewage or industrial water or other wastes to a point of disposal.\nArk. Code Ann. \u00a7 8-4-102(1) & (5) (Repl. 1993). In summary, Best failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it was exempt as a public sewer service.\nWe need not address the Director\u2019s final point of appeal. Reversed and dismissed.\nNewbern and Corbin, JJ., dissent.", "type": "majority", "author": "Robert H. Dudley, Justice." }, { "text": "David Newbern, Justice,\ndissenting. In Ferguson v. Cook, 215 Ark. 373, 220 S.W.2d 808 (1949), a dealer in cemetery monuments reported to the tax authority only 50% of the gross proceeds of each sale because he attributed the other 50% to labor expended in the erection of the monuments. The case was tried on stipulations, and there was no evidence as to what might actually have been attributable to labor expended in the erection of monuments or in the creation of the monuments, engraving, etc. In that circumstance, we held the entire amounts taxable. The result in the Ferguson case also seems contrary to a statement of general principle written by Justice Frank G. Smith in that opinion, a statement with which I totally agree, as follows:\nThis language appears to mean, and we so construe it, that where one sells an article in the preparation of which for sale he has expended labor, which adds to its value and was necessary to make it salable, he must pay the sales tax on the price received, without deduction for the value of the labor performed.\nArk. Code Ann. \u00a7 26-52-103(a)(2)(E) (Supp. 1995) provides that \u201c \u2018sale\u2019 shall not include the furnishing or rendering of services, except as otherwise provided in this section.\u201d Section 26-52-103(a)(4), in pertinent part provides:\n\u201cGross receipts\u201d or \u201cgross proceeds\u201d means the total amount of consideration for the sale of tangible personal property and such services are herein specifically provided for, whether the consideration is in money or otherwise, without deduction on account of the cost of the properties sold, labor services performed, interest paid, losses or any expenses whatsoever.\nThe confusion caused by the outset provision that a \u201csale\u201d does not include services followed by a definition of \u201cgross proceeds\u201d which includes \u201clabor services performed\u201d has resulted in uncertainty and in conflicting decisions. For example, Ragland v. Meadowbrook Country Club, 300 Ark. 164, 777 S.W.2d 852 (1989), we held that the sale of food and beverages did not include the 15% \u201cgratuity\u201d included in the price to the customer for service. We distinguished Belvedere Sand & Gravel Co. v. Heath, 259 Ark. 767, 536 S.W.2d 312 (1976), in which we held taxable the total amount charged to customers by a sand and gravel company for its products, including the labor supplied to the taxpayer company by a contractor for delivery to its customer. Our distinction between the cases seemed to be that the \u201cgratuity\u201d in the Ragland case was added to the cost of the food and beverages after the sale whereas the delivery cost of the sand or gravel in the Belvedere case was somehow more integral to the sale. That is a distinction without a difference.\nWe are on the wrong track, and we have been on it since the decision in the Ferguson case. It is obvious to me that the General Assembly intended that any service which goes into the creation of an item for sale and indeed adds to its value should be taxable. In view, however, of the general statutory definition of \u201csale,\u201d which excludes services, services ancillary to a sale should not be included. Such an interpretation would be consistent with what Justice Smith said in the Ferguson case, albeit probably not consistent with the result reached there.\nThe unreasonableness of the interpretation given by the majority opinion, and its portent for continued uncertainty in this area, is underlined by the parties\u2019 apparent agreement that we will allow a taxpayer to avoid the tax on such services if they are \u201cseparately stated\u201d in the bill to the customer. The majority opinion states, \u201cSince the non-taxable service was included as part of the total consideration received from the rental of the portable toilets, the charge for services constitutes part of the gross proceeds, and the entire proceeds are subject to taxation.\u201d That suggests a merchant can avoid taxation on services if they are billed separately from the charge for the item sold, regardless whether the services helped create the value of the item or were ancillary to the sale. Surely that cannot be the intent of the General Assembly. If services ancillary to a sale are to be taxed, the General Assembly could clearly say so. In the absence of such statutory language we should not permit the gross receipts tax on sales to be applied to such services.\nI respectfully dissent.\nCorbin, J., joins in this dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "David Newbern, Justice," } ], "attorneys": [ "Joyce Kinkead, for appellant.", "Deininger Law Firm, by: Neil Deininger and Reba M. Wingfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Richard A. WEISS, Director, Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration v. BEST ENTERPRISES, INC.\n95-527\n917 S.W.2d 543\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered March 18, 1996\nJoyce Kinkead, for appellant.\nDeininger Law Firm, by: Neil Deininger and Reba M. Wingfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0712-01", "first_page_order": 746, "last_page_order": 758 }