{
  "id": 9158635,
  "name": "Johnny Charles HENLEY v. H.A. TAYLOR, Circuit Judge",
  "name_abbreviation": "Henley v. Taylor",
  "decision_date": "1996-04-01",
  "docket_number": "CR 96-297",
  "first_page": "114",
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      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 20-47-207",
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      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
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        {
          "parenthetical": "before conviction, the defendant may be admitted to bail"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:22:54.921906+00:00",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Glaze and Corbin, JJ, dissent.",
      "CORBIN, J., joins this dissent."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Johnny Charles HENLEY v. H.A. TAYLOR, Circuit Judge"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PER Curiam.\nJohnny Charles Henley petitions for certiorari and mandamus contending the Lincoln Circuit Court improperly denied his motion for pretrial release. Certiorari is the proper remedy to review a circuit court\u2019s determination of the availability of bail. Thomas v. State, 260 Ark. 512, 542 S.W.2d 284 (1976).\nMr. Henley was charged with attempted murder and aggravated assault on February 14, 1996. On February 16, 1996, Circuit Judge Fred Davis, without conducting a pre-trial release inquiry, ordered Mr. Henley held without bond. Mr. Henley moved to set bond. The motion was heard by Judge H.A. Taylor.\nShordy after Mr. Henley filed his motion to set bond, the State moved the Circuit Court to commit Mr. Henley to the Southeast Arkansas Mental Health Center for a mental examination. The examination was to be \u201cfor the purpose of determining whether or not the Defendant is a clear and present danger to himself, to others, or both, as defined in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 20-47-207(c).\u201d Judge Taylor granted the motion.\nIn a report filed in the Circuit Court, Dr. Malik of the Southeast Arkansas Mental Health Center observed that Mr. Henley has a long history of violence and he tends to become violent when he uses drugs and alcohol. For those reasons, Dr. Malik concluded Mr. Henley was a danger to others.\nMr. Henley\u2019s petition states that based on Dr. Malik\u2019s opinion, Judge Taylor refused to set any conditions for his pretrial release, and in doing so stated, \u201cI am familiar with Rule 9.3 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, but if any judge is going to release Mr. Henley, it\u2019s not going to be this judge.\u201d Mr. Henley argues that under A.R.Cr.P. 9.3, Judge Taylor did not have the option to refuse his pretrial release. We agree.\nArticle 2, \u00a7 8, of the Arkansas Constitution provides that \u201cAll persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses, when proof is evident or the presumption great.\u201d Stated another way, a criminal defendant has an absolute right before conviction, except in capital cases, to a reasonable bail. Reeves v. State, 261 Ark. 385, 548 S.W.2d 822 (1977), See also Duncan v. State, 308 Ark. 205, 823 S.W.2d 886 (1992). If the defendant is determined to be dangerous, Rule 9.3 sets forth the conditions a judicial officer may place upon a defendant\u2019s bail if he is determined to be dangerous:\nProhibition of Wrongful Acts Pending Trial.\nIf it appears that there exists a danger that the defendant will commit a serious crime or will seek to intimidate witnesses, or will otherwise unlawfully interfere with the orderly administration of justice, the judicial officer, upon the release of the defendant, may enter an order:\n(a) prohibiting the defendant from approaching or communicating with particular persons or classes of persons, except that no such order shall be deemed to prohibit any lawful and ethical activity of defendant\u2019s counsel;\n(b) prohibiting the defendant from going to certain described geographical areas or premises;\n(c) prohibiting the defendant from possessing any dangerous weapon, or engaging in certain described activities or indulging in intoxicating liquors or in certain drugs;\n(d) requiring the defendant to report regularly to and remain under the supervision of an officer of the court.\nAs can be seen from the constitutional provision and the criminal procedure rule, a non-capital defendant\u2019s absolute right to bail may only be curbed by the setting of certain conditions upon his release, and not its complete denial. Although the mental examination provided Judge Taylor with a basis for setting stringent conditions on Mr. Henley\u2019s release, it did not give him the option of refusing to release him from incarceration.\nAlthough a probate court may in some instances, after appropriate hearings, involuntarily commit for an extended period a mentally ill person who is dangerous to himself or herself or others, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 20-47-201 through 20-47-228 (Repl. 1991 and Supp. 1995), the jurisdiction of a circuit court with respect to criminal defendants thought to be mentally ill is limited. See Schock v. Thomas 274 Ark. 493, 625 S.W.2d 521 (1981).\nWe grant the writ of certiorari and remand to the Circuit Court for further hearing and orders consistent with this opinion.\nGlaze and Corbin, JJ, dissent.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PER Curiam."
      },
      {
        "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice,\ndissenting. Noting Johnny Henley\u2019s long history of violence and a psychiatric evaluation reflecting that he is a danger to others, the trial judge denied Henley\u2019s release prior to trial. The trial court is mandated to conduct a pretrial release inquiry in felony cases where the prosecutor does not stipulate to a defendant\u2019s release, and the trial court did so in this case. However, contrary to the majority per curiam opinion, the trial court is not required to release the defendant after such an inquiry is conducted. In fact, A.R.Cr.P. Rule 9.1 provides that \u201cthe judicial officer may release the defendant . . . upon an order to appear.\u201d (Emphasis added.) See also Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-84-110 (Supp. 1995) (before conviction, the defendant may be admitted to bail). Consistent with Rule 9.1, A.R.Cr.P. Rule 9.3 provides as follows:\nIf it appears there exists a danger that the defendant will commit a serious crime or will seek to intimidate witnesses, or will otherwise unlawfully interfere with the orderly administration of justice, the judicial officer, upon the release of the defendant, may enter an order:\n(a) prohibiting the defendant from approaching or communicating with particular persons or classes of persons, except that no such order shall be deemed to prohibit any lawful and ethical activity of defendant\u2019s counsel;\n(b) prohibiting the defendant from going to certain described geographical areas or premises;\n(c) prohibiting the defendant from possessing any dangerous weapon, or engaging in certain described activities or indulging in intoxicating liquors or in certain drugs;\n(d) requiring the defendant to report regularly to and remain under the supervision of an officer of the court. (Emphasis added.)\nThe majority reads Rule 9.3 to read the trial judge must enter an order releasing a defendant, and in doing so imposes applicable restrictions (a) through (d) above. Such a reading is erroneous.\nObviously, the restrictions in Rule 9.3 are worthless if, for example, you have a defendant like Henley, who suffers from mental disease and an addiction which would likely cause him to be a danger to others. The judge voiced that concern here, the record supports his concern, and therefore, he clearly did not abuse his discretion in denying Henley\u2019s request to be released.\nIn conclusion, I am vitally concerned when this court interprets its own rules to permit dangerous defendants to assimilate into society with no more than a paper court order to protect people. Trial courts, after appropriate inquiry, should be given authority and discretion to make difficult release decisions, and the appellate court\u2019s review should be limited to determining if the lower court abused its discretion in making its decision. In my view, telling a trial court it has no discretion to deny a dangerous defendant a release is irresponsible on this court\u2019s part.\nCORBIN, J., joins this dissent.\nReporter\u2019s note: Also published at 922 S.W.2d 681 (1996).",
        "type": "dissent",
        "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "John F. Gibson, Jr., for petitioner.",
      "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Clint Miller, Deputy Att\u2019y Gen., Sr. Appellate Advocate for respondent."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Johnny Charles HENLEY v. H.A. TAYLOR, Circuit Judge\nCR 96-297\n918 S.W.2d 713\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered April 1, 1996\nJohn F. Gibson, Jr., for petitioner.\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Clint Miller, Deputy Att\u2019y Gen., Sr. Appellate Advocate for respondent."
  },
  "file_name": "0114-01",
  "first_page_order": 138,
  "last_page_order": 142
}