{ "id": 9160802, "name": "Larry Dale BAXTER v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Baxter v. State", "decision_date": "1996-05-20", "docket_number": "CR 93-1098", "first_page": "440", "last_page": "447", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "324 Ark. 440" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "922 S.W.2d 682" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "278 Ark. 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1748113 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/278/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 Ark. 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1902383 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/307/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-64-401", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Repl. 1993 and Supp. 1995" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-401", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)(1)", "parenthetical": "Repl. 1993 and Supp. 1995" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-3-404", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(5)" }, { "page": "(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-501", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(2)", "parenthetical": "Repl. 1993 and Supp. 1995" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 Ark. 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1451135 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/320/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ark. 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1935011 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/312/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 Ark. 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1910458 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/315/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 Ark. 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1907841 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/316/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 U.S. 471", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 450611 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/371/0471-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 622, "char_count": 11394, "ocr_confidence": 0.809, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4195867412570942e-07, "percentile": 0.6487544254510591 }, "sha256": "a11030c98d8372ad0a0b8e9730b4f303c21d6d17c24730c59d2668351048a893", "simhash": "1:9debd0b6568ae3a2", "word_count": 1914 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:22:54.921906+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Dudley, J., not participating." ], "parties": [ "Larry Dale BAXTER v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice.\nAppellant Larry Baxter was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, criminal conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance, and with being a habitual offender. A jury found Baxter guilty of the criminal conspiracy charge, and he was sentenced as a habitual offender to fifty years\u2019 imprisonment.\nBaxter first argues his conviction should be overturned because his arrest was illegal and his statements given law enforcement officers were poisonous fruits of the unlawful arrest and should have been suppressed by the trial court. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).\nIn reviewing the trial court\u2019s denial of a suppression motion, this court makes an independent examination based on the totality of the circumstances, and reverses only if the trial court\u2019s ruling was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Hudson v. State, 316 Ark. 360, 872 S.W.2d 68 (1994). All presumptions are favorable to the trial court\u2019s ruling on the legality of the arrest, and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate error. Id. In assessing the existence of probable cause, our review is liberal rather than strict, and is guided by the rule that probable cause to arrest without a warrant does not require the degree of proof sufficient to sustain a conviction. Id. And finally, we must look to the officers\u2019 knowledge at the moment of arrest to determine whether probable cause exists. Friend v. State, 315 Ark. 143, 865 S.W.2d 275 (1993).\nUnder Ark. R. Crim. P. 4.1, a law enforcement officer may arrest a person without a warrant if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that person has committed a felony. In the present case, an informant told Officer Mike Davis that William Mumford would be returning to Little Rock from Texas on the evening of January 29, 1992, with a quantity of cocaine in his vehicle. Davis and other officers set up surveillance at Mumford\u2019s residence, and when Mumford arrived, the officers confronted him with the information they had received. After advising Mumford of his rights, Mumford admitted he was carrying cocaine, and the officers found three ounces in his car.\nThe same informant who had told the officers about Mumford also related that Mumford and Baxter had sold cocaine at a nightclub located in a certain Little Rock shopping center. Upon the officers\u2019 relating that information to Mumford, Mumford admitted he and Baxter had been involved in the purchasing of cocaine from a Texas man named Chip Diffenbacher. Mumford said that he had purchased the cocaine for Baxter, and had paid $800.00 an ounce.\nOn the same evening of his arrest, Mumford agreed to call Baxter, and in doing so, Mumford arranged to meet Baxter at the Little Rock shopping center where the two had allegedly sold cocaine. Prior to meeting Baxter, Mumford was wired with a microphone, but the microphone only conveyed static during Mumford\u2019s meeting and conversation with Baxter. The officers arrested Baxter after Baxter acquired some plastic sandwich bags at a K-Mart store, and, with Mumford, had entered a video store in the center. Although later denied by Baxter, the officers testified that, both before and after his arrest, Baxter expressed he wanted to turn state\u2019s evidence and provide information on cocaine trafficking between Texas and Little Rock. Baxter stated that, while he knew why he was being arrested, he could not be charged because he had not picked up any cocaine. Baxter later provided names of persons who were selling cocaine in the Litde Rock area, and admitted that he and Mumford had worked together since 1990. He said that he and Mumford would pick up cocaine in Texas from Chip Dif-fenbacher, but Mumford had picked up most of the cocaine. These were the statements Baxter sought to suppress.\nTaking a liberal view of the circumstances in this case and giving all favorable presumptions to the trial court\u2019s ruling on the legality of Baxter\u2019s arrest, we hold the officers had, under the terms of Ark. R. Crim. P. 4.1, reasonable cause to believe that, at the time of his arrest, Baxter had committed a felony. The officers had informant information implicating both Mumford and Baxter in the trafficking of cocaine. Acting on that information, the officers arrested Mumford, who then admitted to all the allegations that had been made by the informant, including Mumford\u2019s having worked with Baxter in the purchase and sale of cocaine.\nArmed with what proved to be recent, trustworthy information from an informant plus Mumford\u2019s statements, the officers asked Mumford to contact and arrange a meeting with Baxter. Mumford had no problem doing so, and in fact, Baxter met with Mumford the day after Mumford returned from Texas. We conclude these facts and circumstances were trustworthy and sufficient enough to permit a person of reasonable caution to believe Baxter and Mumford had worked together in the trafficking of drugs. See Hudson v. State, 316 Ark. 360, 872 S.W.2d 68 (1994); Friend v. State, 315 Ark. 143, 865 S.W.2d 275 (1993). Consequently, we uphold the trial court\u2019s ruling denying Baxter\u2019s suppression motion.\nIn his second point for reversal, Baxter argues his conviction for conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to deliver is not supported by sufficient evidence. The state points out that Baxter failed to preserve this issue for review. We must agree.\nAt the end of the state\u2019s case, Baxter moved for a directed verdict. Defense counsel stated as follows:\n\u201cYour Honor, at this time, I want to renew all previous motions I\u2019ve made. In particular, I want to also move for a directed verdict of acquittal, particularly as to \u2014 number one, as to count one. You\u2019ve now heard the testimony of Mr. Mumford and this \u2014 we\u2019ve got two counts: count one, possession with intent to deliver, and then we have count two is the conspiracy.\u201d\nCounsel then argued the first count. If there was any doubt as to what defense counsel intended to encompass within his directed verdict motion, that doubt was resolved by his cautionary remarks to the trial court, \u201cYour Honor, they\u2019ve (the state) got the conspiracy case. Let\u2019s go \u2014 let\u2019s keep this case clean and go to the jury on a conspiracy. . . .\u201d\nWe note that, at the close of all evidence, Baxter did move for a directed verdict on the conspiracy count, but this court has held that, to preserve the sufficiency of evidence issue, Baxter was required to move for a directed verdict at both the close of the state\u2019s case and at the end of the whole case. Hayes v. State, 312 Ark. 349, 849 S.W.2d 501 (1993). This court has stated that the movant of a directed-verdict motion must apprise the trial court of the specific basis on which the motion is made. Stewart v. State, 320 Ark. 75, 894 S.W.2d 930 (1995). Here, Baxter failed to include the conspiracy count in his directed verdict motion at the close of the state\u2019s case, and his attempt to include that basis at the end of all evidence was untimely.\nBaxter\u2019s next argument is that the trial court erred in allowing the enhancement of his sentence under the Habitual Offenders Act, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 \u00a7 5-4-501-504 (1987 and Supp. 1995). He asserts his two prior criminal cases were expunged under Act 346 of 1975, and because no adjudication of guilt is had under that Act, his two prior cases should not have been for enhancement purposes. Under \u00a7 5-4-501, a defendant who has previously been convicted or found guilty of other felonies may have his sentence enhanced upon conviction.\nBaxter\u2019s argument is meritless because the record reflects he was found guilty by a jury to the crimes of aggravated robbery and theft. He was sentenced to terms of imprisonment of five and three years respectively. In addition, the record shows that, after his adjudication of guilt, the trial court entered a conviction judgment committing Baxter to the Arkansas Department of Correction. After Baxter completed his sentence and was discharged by the Board of Pardons and Paroles, the trial court then entered an order expunging his conviction and sealed the robbery and theft crimes, making them only available to law enforcement and judicial officials.\nAlthough Baxter points to the earlier judgment of convictions which notes he was sentenced under the provisions of Act 346 of 1975, those provisions were not followed or utilized. Under Act 346, codified at \u00a7 16-93-303(a)(l), an accused enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere prior to an adjudication of guilt, the circuit court, without entering a judgment of guilt and with the consent of the defendant, may defer further proceedings and place him on probation for a period of not less than one year, under such terms and conditions as may be set by the court. Obviously, Act 346 was not utilized in Baxter\u2019s prior cases even though the conviction judgment entered made passing reference to that Act. In sum, Baxter\u2019s argument here simply is not supported by the record, and therefore we affirm on this point.\nBaxter next contends the trial court erred in submitting to the jury a verdict form containing the wrong sentence range. The sentencing range given was that for a habitual offender convicted of a Class A felony \u2014 a term of not less than six years nor more than fifty years. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-501(a)(2) (Repl. 1993 and Supp. 1995). Baxter asserts the object of his crime of conspiracy was an unclassified felony, and under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-3-404(5), he should have been punished for a Class A misdemeanor, which requires a sentence not to exceed one year. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-401(b)(1) (Repl. 1993 and Supp. 1995). Baxter is mistaken in classifying his criminal conspiracy.\nUnder Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-3-404(1) (Repl. 1993), a criminal conspiracy is a Class A felony if an object of the conspiracy is commission of capital murder, treason, or a Class Y felony. (Emphasis added.) Here, the object of Baxter\u2019s and Mumford\u2019s conspiracy was to purchase and possess cocaine with the intent to deliver it \u2014 a Class Y felony under the penalty section of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-64-401 (Repl. 1993 and Supp. 1995). Accordingly, the verdict containing the habitual sentencing range for a Class A felony was correct.\nFinally, Baxter argues his sentence compared to Mumford\u2019s is disproportional and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We first point out that the record fails to reflect Mumford\u2019s sentence, and this court may not take judicial notice of the record in a separate case. Smith v. State, 307 Ark. 223, 818 S.W.2d 945 (1991). We also note that, in rejecting this argument below, the trial court explained that the evidence supported the theory that Baxter was the main perpetrator of the crime, and Baxter used Mumford to commit it. In any event, this court has clearly held that the sentence received by a codefendant is not relevant to the appellant\u2019s guilt, innocence, or punishment. Robinson v. State, 278 Ark. 516, 648 S.W.2d 444 (1983).\nBecause we find no merit in Baxter\u2019s five points on appeal, we affirm.\nDudley, J., not participating.", "type": "majority", "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "A. Wayne Davis, for appellant.", "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Brad Newman, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Larry Dale BAXTER v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 93-1098\n922 S.W.2d 682\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered May 20, 1996\n[Petition for rehearing denied June 24, 1996.]\nA. Wayne Davis, for appellant.\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Brad Newman, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee.\nDudley, J., not participating." }, "file_name": "0440-01", "first_page_order": 464, "last_page_order": 471 }