{
  "id": 12021684,
  "name": "Ginger Wyre HOWARD v. OZARK GUIDANCE CENTER",
  "name_abbreviation": "Howard v. Center",
  "decision_date": "1996-10-07",
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    "parties": [
      "Ginger Wyre HOWARD v. OZARK GUIDANCE CENTER"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Andree Layton Roaf, Justice.\nAppellant, Ginger Howard, was a patient of the appellee, Ozark Guidance Center (\u201cOGC\u201d). Howard sued OGC, claiming that it negligently allowed an affair to continue between its receptionist and Howard\u2019s husband. The trial judge granted OGC\u2019s motion for summary judgment because the three-year statute of limitations for negligence actions had expired. On appeal, Howard claims that the trial court erred in not applying the continuous-treatment doctrine to toll the statute of limitations. We agree that the continuous-treatment doctrine does not apply to Howard\u2019s cause of action, and affirm.\nIn June of 1986, Ginger Howard began receiving counseling services at Ozark Guidance Center, Inc. During this time, Howard became romantically involved with Lee Wyre, another OGC patient and the two were married on May 20, 1989. After their marriage, both Howard and Wyre continued their individual therapy sessions and also began marriage counseling with OGC.\nIn February 1990, Howard began to suspect that OGC\u2019s receptionist, Stephanie VanBrunt, was having an affair with her husband. About this time, Howard and Wyre separated. After confirming her suspicions, Howard reported the affair to her therapist who in turn relayed this information to VanBrunt\u2019s immediate supervisor. On March 15, 1990, the supervisor gave VanBrunt a \u201cverbal reprimand\u201d that her behavior \u201cviolated the professional ethics outlined\u201d for OGC employees and directed VanBrunt to \u201crefrain from having contact with the designated client while at work.\u201d Despite this warning, VanBrunt continued her adulterous relationship with Wyre. On March 27, 1990, the supervisor gave VanBrunt a written warning which said:\nyour continued contact with this client is unacceptable and is affecting the effectiveness and reputation of Ozark Guidance Center. ... In the event that it is determined that you are continuing to associate with this client, Ozark Guidance Center will terminate your employment.\nOn June 12, 1990, Howard notified OGC that VanBrunt was continuing her sexual relationship with Wyre in violation of OGC\u2019s verbal warning and written reprimand. Instead of firing her as threatened, OGC suspended VanBrunt with pay for six days, transferred her to another OGC location, and again instructed her to end her relationship with Wyre.\nHoward and Wyre were divorced on October 18, 1990. It is not apparent when the relationship between Wyre and VanBrunt ended. However, on June 29, 1992 VanBrunt informed OGC that her relationship with Mr. Wyre would no longer be a problem because she had recently accepted a marriage proposal from Wyre\u2019s brother. It is also unclear when, if ever, Howard ceased attending her therapy sessions at OGC. According to her complaint, Howard continued her therapy until June 12, 1991. However, in her answers to OGC\u2019s interrogatories, Howard declared that as of December 3, 1993, she was \u201cstill under treatment of a case manager there at Ozark Guidance Center, whom I see once a week.\u201d\nOn June 7, 1993, Howard filed a complaint in the Washington County Circuit Court alleging that OGC was negligent because it failed to take adequate measures to end the affair, declined to terminate VanBrunt, and did not implement a company policy addressing romantic relationships between clients and nonprofessional staff members. Howard\u2019s complaint did not specifically allege \u201cmedical malpractice\u201d or refer to the medical malpractice statute.\nOGC filed a motion for summary judgment in which it alleged that the action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations for negligence actions. Howard responded by asserting that her action was one for medical malpractice, not negligence, and thus the continuous-treatment doctrine was applicable to toll the limitations period. The trial court found that Howard\u2019s lawsuit was barred by the three-year statute of limitations for negligence actions and dismissed the case with prejudice.\nHoward\u2019s sole argument on appeal is that the continuous-treatment doctrine applies to her case, and thus her action was improperly dismissed by the trial judge. In 1988, this court first recognized the \u201ccontinuous-treatment doctrine,\u201d which tolls the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions until the medical treatment is discontinued. Lane v. Lane, 295 Ark. 671, 752 S.W.2d 25 (1988). However, before we can reach the issue of the applicability of the continuous-treatment doctrine, we must first decide whether Howard\u2019s cause of action is one for negligence or medical malpractice.\nAll negligent acts that occur at a doctor\u2019s office do not give rise to an action for medical malpractice. For example, a person who slips and falls in a doctor\u2019s office might have a cause of action based on premises liability, not medical malpractice. In order for the medical-malpractice act to apply, the negligent act must cause a \u201cmedical injury\u201d which is defined as:\nany adverse consequences arising out of or sustained in the course of the professional services being rendered by a medical care provider, whether resulting from negligence, error, or omission in the performance of such services....\nArk. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-114-201(3) (1987) (emphasis supplied). Thus, the initial question to be answered in this case is whether Howard suffered a \u201cmedical injury\u201d as defined by the statute.\nThis court has addressed on several occasions the question of what constitutes a medical injury under the malpractice act. In Bailey v. Rose Care Center, 307 Ark. 14, 817 S.W.2d 412 (1991), a nursing home patient left the facility unnoticed in his wheelchair and was subsequently struck and killed by a car. We found that the patient\u2019s death was an issue of negligent supervision, and not \u201cthe result of a doctor\u2019s treatment or order,\u201d and that the case was thus one of negligence, not malpractice. Id.\nLikewise in Brown v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 292 Ark. 558, 732 S.W.2d 130 (1987), this court reviewed a case of alleged negligent supervision of a patient. In Broum, a patient at a alcohol treatment center walked out of an unlocked door onto the roof of the center and jumped or fell to his death. Id. Although we held that the failure by the treatment center to provide a safe environment for its patients constituted a \u201cmedical injury\u201d under the statute, we reconsidered this holding in Bailey, supra, and overruled the Broum decision, stating that:\nOn reexamination, we conclude that the facts set out in\nBrown did not fall within the definition of medical injury. ...[T]he circumstances in Brown did not involve a PROFESSIONAL SERVICE but instead raised only the question of whether a patient was properly supervised by the health center\u2019s staff.\nBailey, 307 Ark. at 19, 817 S.W.2d at 414.\nThree years later, this court again considered the definition of medical injury under the malpractice statute. Wyatt v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 315 Ark. 547, 868 S.W.2d 505 (1994). In Wyatt, a hospital nurse told a relative that Wyatt was being tested for AIDS. Id. Wyatt sued the nurse and the hospital for malpractice for the failure \u201cto maintain medical confidentiality.\u201d Id. This court found that \u201crevealing confidential information\u201d did not \u201cfall within our expressed view of what constitutes a medical injury.\u201d Id. Quoting a New York Supreme Court decision, we explained that:\nThe distinction between ordinary negligence and malpractice turns on whether the acts or omissions complained of involve A MATTER OF MEDICAL SCIENCE OR ART REQUIRING SPECIAL SKILLS not ordinarily possessed by lay persons....\nId., 315 Ark. at 554, 868 S.W.2d at 509. (quoting Bonillo v. Beekman Downtown Hospital, 537 N.Y.S.2d 219 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989)) (emphasis supplied). Thus, we determined that a breach of the patient-doctor confidentiality was an action in negligence, not malpractice. Id.\nIn sum, it is clear from our d\u00e9cisions that in order to be a \u201cmedical injury\u201d the injury must be the result of a \u201cprofessional service,\u201d \u201ca doctor\u2019s treatment or order,\u201d or \u201ca matter of medical science.\u201d Bailey, supra; Wyatt, supra. Howard\u2019s complaint alleges that OGC was negligent in its handling of an employee\u2019s relationship with a client. How a medical office supervises its staff is not a matter of \u201cmedical science\u201d or the rendition of a \u201cprofessional service\u201d; consequendy, it is not a medical injury as required by the malpractice statute. The trial court therefore correctly applied the three-year statute of limitations for negligence actions in this instance.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Andree Layton Roaf, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Brenda Horn Austin, for appellant.",
      "Davis, Cox & Wright, by: Walter B. Cox and Tim E. Howell, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Ginger Wyre HOWARD v. OZARK GUIDANCE CENTER\n96-175\n930 S.W.2d 341\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered October 7, 1996\nBrenda Horn Austin, for appellant.\nDavis, Cox & Wright, by: Walter B. Cox and Tim E. Howell, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0224-01",
  "first_page_order": 258,
  "last_page_order": 262
}