{
  "id": 12023837,
  "name": "William R. NOLAND v. Olivia L. NOLAND",
  "name_abbreviation": "Noland v. Noland",
  "decision_date": "1996-11-18",
  "docket_number": "96-430",
  "first_page": "617",
  "last_page": "622",
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      "cite": "326 Ark. 617"
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      "cite": "263 Ark. 827",
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      "reporter": "Ark.",
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    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-13-312",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "year": 1987,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:12:03.555215+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "William R. NOLAND v. Olivia L. NOLAND"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice.\nThis appeal is from a divorce case between appellant William Noland and appellee Olivia Noland, but the sole issue is whether the chancery judge erred in denying William\u2019s motion for the chancellor to recuse. We affirm the chancery judge\u2019s decision.\nThe Nolands had been married for twenty-six years, but had lived separately during most of their marriage. The parties agreed William would take the divorce as an uncontested matter, and their home would be sold, but William contested the award of any alimony and Olivia\u2019s proposed division of marital debts and property, including his retirement pay.\nPrior to trial, on October 16, 1995, William had learned that Olivia\u2019s attorney, Arkie Byrd, had previously represented the chancellor involving a personal injury claim in 1992. He stated Byrd\u2019s representation reflected an actual conflict of interest and an appearance of impropriety which required the chancellor\u2019s recusal. A telephone-conference hearing was conducted on William\u2019s motion, and immediately following that hearing, the chancery judge denied William\u2019s request. On October 25, 1995, the parties tried the remaining alimony and property issues and the chancellor entered her decree on all matters on December 4, 1995. In William\u2019s appeal from that December 4, 1995 decree, William raises no points for reversal regarding the divorce decree, but instead only argues the chancellor erred in faffing to recuse.\nArkansas law is clear that a chancellor shall not sit on the determination of any cause or proceeding in which he or she is interested, or related to either party within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or shall have been of counsel. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-13-312 (1987); Ark. Const, art. 7, \u00a7 20. The interest which is disqualifying under these provisions is a personal proprietary or pecuniary interest or one affecting the individual rights of the judge. The liability, gain, or relief to the judge must turn on the outcome of the suit. Mears, Co. Judge v. Hall, 263 Ark. 827, 569 S.W.2d 91 (1987). None of these statutory or constitutional grounds are applicable to the present case.\nNonetheless, William contends the chancellor\u2019s prior business relationship with Ms. Byrd runs afoul of Canons 2 and 3 of the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct which generally provide a judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge\u2019s duties, and shall perform his or her duties impartially and diligendy. William particularly mentions Canon 3E(l)(a) which requires a judge to disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge\u2019s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including where the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party\u2019s lawyer.\nIn considering Canon 3, this court has stated that, where a judge exhibits bias or the appearance of bias, it will reverse. City of Jacksonville v. Venhaus, 302 Ark. 204, 788 S.W.2d 478 (1990). This court has also held that the proper administration of the law requires not only that judges refrain from actual bias, but also that they avoid all appearances of unfairness. Id. When it comes to applying or implementing these principles, the court has said that the fact a judge may have, or develop during the trial, an opinion, or a bias or prejudice, does not make the trial judge so biased and prejudiced as to require his or her disqualification. Matthews v. Rodgers, 279 Ark. 328, 651 S.W.2d 453 (1983). The Matthews court further ruled that, whether a judge has become biased to the point that he or she should disqualify is a matter to be confined to the conscience of the judge, since bias is a subjective matter peculiarly within the knowledge of the trial judge. The Matthews court concluded that, absent some objective demonstration of prejudice, it is a communication of bias which will cause us to reverse a judge\u2019s decision on disqualification. Matthews, 279 Ark. at 331, 651 S.W.2d at 455.\nAs mentioned earlier, the chancellor explained the circumstances surrounding Ms. Byrd\u2019s having represented her on her personal injury claim and that the claim had been settled three years ago. She said she had paid Ms. Byrd a fee at the time of settlement, and that Ms. Byrd\u2019s prior representation of her would not prevent her from rendering a fair decision in the Nolands\u2019 case. On these facts, we believe the chancellor absolved herself of any actual or statutory bias that would mandate recusal.\nBecause William has failed to show any actual bias that mandated the chancellor\u2019s recusal, it was his burden to show some objective demonstration of prejudice which compelled disqualification. Matthews, 279 Ark. 328, 651 S.W.2d 453 (1983); Venhaus, 302 Ark. 204, 788 S.W.2d 478. In this respect, William argued the chancellor demonstrated such prejudice when she questioned Olivia Noland during the trial.\nOlivia testified on direct examination concerning her income and expenses, and among other things, she related William had been paying the mortgage and utility payments. When asked about her need for support, Olivia said that she would like for William to pay her $300 per month. After Olivia was cross-examined by William\u2019s attorney, the chancellor said she was uncertain as to the amount of Olivia\u2019s income and whether the $300 Olivia was requesting was support in addition to the mortgage and utility payments already being paid by William. Olivia responded, \u201cI want \u2014 he won\u2019t be making my utility bill when this is settled, when I have to move out of the house, the house has been sold. I\u2019m asking $300 a month until I can finish school to help me be able to pay my bills.\u201d The chancellor then asked, \u201cUntil the house is sold are you asking that he pay the house note . . . and utilities?\u201d Olivia said, \u201cNo, ma\u2019am. I\u2019m not asking him to pay the house note or utilities because we have agreed to sell the house.\u201d Olivia then left the witness stand, but the chancellor recalled her because the judge believed Olivia did not understand the judge\u2019s earlier questions. Olivia expressed confusion, and over William\u2019s objection, she retook the stand and stated she would like for William to continue paying the house note and utilities until the house sold, but that she did not need the $300 per month support until after the house was sold.\nWilliam claims the foregoing reflects the chancellor\u2019s prejudice when she improperly recalled Olivia to the stand and permitted Olivia to clarify her request for support. Citing to Olivia\u2019s added testimony, William argues the chancellor wrongly awarded Olivia more support than she had previously requested. The chancellor\u2019s decree actually provided that William should make the mortgage ($677.50) and utility payment through November 1995, and if the house had not sold by then, he would pay $600.00 towards the mortgage payment, but Olivia would pay the balance of the payment and all the utility bills. The chancellor further ordered if the house was not sold before October 31, 1996, William would pay only $300 on the mortgage payment for six more months and afterwards Olivia would pay all mortgage and utility payments until the house sold. Commencing in November 1996, William was ordered to pay Olivia temporary spousal support of $300 per month for a period of one year.\nIn carefully reviewing the record, we believe either the chancellor or Olivia was confused when discussing the mortgage payments, utility bills, and need for spousal support. William had been paying the mortgage and utility payments at the time of trial, but Olivia was requesting temporary alimony to allow her time to finish school. The question arose during Olivia\u2019s examination as to when such support would be needed, and it was clearly appropriate for the chancellor to ask questions that touched on that issue. See Rule 614(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence.\nWilliam also complains that he does not have the income to satisfy the chancellor\u2019s awards, but as noted earlier, he fails to argue reversal on those grounds or contend the awards were clearly erroneous. Instead, he generally discusses the parties\u2019 affidavits of financial means, and concludes he is unable to make the payments directed and the awards exhibit actual bias on the part of the chancellor. In reviewing the parties\u2019 affidavits and testimony, one could argue that neither party could meet his or her expenses under the decree. Nonetheless, in her decree, the chancellor\u2019s award actually favored William by reducing his monthly payments and responsibility for the marital house as time passes and no sale occurs. The announced intention by the chancellor was to force Olivia to do her part to sell the house so both parties could benefit from the sale.\nContrary to William\u2019s argument, we hold the chancellor\u2019s award did not demonstrate any prejudice or reason for her recusal. For the reasons above, we affirm.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Montgomery & Wyatt, by: Orin Eddy Montgomery, for appellant.",
      "Mays & Crutcher, P.A., by: Arkie Byrd, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "William R. NOLAND v. Olivia L. NOLAND\n96-430\n932 S.W.2d 341\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered November 18, 1996\nMontgomery & Wyatt, by: Orin Eddy Montgomery, for appellant.\nMays & Crutcher, P.A., by: Arkie Byrd, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0617-01",
  "first_page_order": 619,
  "last_page_order": 624
}