{ "id": 12024905, "name": "Linda LIKE, et al. v. Dave PIERCE, d/b/a D & M Mobile Home Sales", "name_abbreviation": "Like v. Pierce", "decision_date": "1996-12-09", "docket_number": "96-835", "first_page": "802", "last_page": "804", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "326 Ark. 802" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "934 S.W.2d 223" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "798 S.W.2d 344", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 Ark. 568", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1882773 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/303/0568-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 Ark. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1907737 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/316/0655-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 318, "char_count": 4094, "ocr_confidence": 0.819, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.63764540081009e-08, "percentile": 0.40476838611054156 }, "sha256": "9b92b541b54b54c25e5a00724db1c28b83953f38244debdc1bd1dd482985991a", "simhash": "1:51e2de7b2b5571e8", "word_count": 688 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:12:03.555215+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Linda LIKE, et al. v. Dave PIERCE, d/b/a D & M Mobile Home Sales" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice.\nAppellant Linda Like brought this tort suit against Dave Pierce and his business, D & M Mobile Home Sales, after Like sustained a broken ankle when she was on D & M\u2019s premises to tour some mobile homes. She alleged that, in order to view the motor homes, she was required to exit the back door of D & M\u2019s office onto steps, and as she descended from the bottom step onto a gravel walkway, her ankle turned, causing her to fall. Like alleged the business\u2019s steps were of a faulty design, too narrow, and too steep for a safe exit from the office. Pierce filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting there was no evidence that Like\u2019s injury was caused by his or D & M\u2019s negligence. The trial court granted Pierce\u2019s motion, from which Like brings this appeal. We affirm.\nLike argues the trial court erred in finding no issue of material fact existed. She first notes that, because she was a business invitee, D & M owed her a duty to use ordinary care to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition. Young v. Paxton, 316 Ark. 655, 873 S.W.2d 546 (1994). Like further argues that D & M\u2019s back-door exit and staircase provided steps that were too steep and narrow, and this faulty condition of the steps caused poor footing onto the gravel. These allegations, Like suggests, present material factual issues that remain undecided and are reasons for reversing and remanding this matter for further proceedings.\nPierce concedes Like was a business invitee and, therefore, he owed a duty to use ordinary care to maintain his premises in a reasonably safe condition. Nonetheless, he argues Like still must show Pierce was negligent and that such negligence was a proximate cause of her damages. See AMI Civil 3rd, 203. Pierce claims the evidence presented by Like proves neither negligence nor proximate cause. We agree. In Like\u2019s deposition, she described exiting through D & M\u2019s back door and going down steep steps which had a safety rail on the right side. Like said that she had plenty of room for her foot on the steps, but when she departed the bottom step, her \u201cleft ankle turned in the gravel and [she] fell forward.\u201d She recalled the gravel walkway contained big, gray granite. From this description, Like simply falls short of showing that either the stairs or the gravel created a dangerous condition causing her fall and injuries.\nLike cites the case of Carton v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 303 Ark. 568, 798 S.W.2d 344 (1974), but that case, we think, only emphasizes the insufficiency of proof submitted by Like. The Carton decision involved an obvious danger where the plaintiff-driver slipped and fell at the railroad\u2019s terminal when walking on a gravel surface, which had become \u201cdirty, messy and greasy\u201d due to diesel-fuel spillage. The Carton court held that, although the duties of occupiers of land to business invitees usually ends when the danger is either known or obvious to the invitees, the obvious danger rule does not bar recovery when the invitee is forced, as a practical matter, to encounter a known or obvious risk to his job. In the present case, Like\u2019s proof appears marginal, at best, in establishing any negligence on Pierce\u2019s part in the placement of the stairs exiting D & M\u2019s office, but it is altogether wanting in Like\u2019s attempt to show Pierce\u2019s negligence, if any, caused Like\u2019s injuries. For instance, nothing Like presented showed the gravel was inherently dangerous or contained some type of substance making the walkway unreasonably unsafe or dangerous.\nBecause Like\u2019s pleadings and proof fail to show a genuine issue of material fact establishing her injuries were caused by Pierce\u2019s negligence, we affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling that Pierce was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\nLike\u2019s husband joined in this lawsuit, alleging loss of consortium.", "type": "majority", "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Webb & Doerpinghaus, by: Doyle Webb, II, for appellant.", "Pope, Ross, Dendy, & Cazort, by: Robert D. Ross, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Linda LIKE, et al. v. Dave PIERCE, d/b/a D & M Mobile Home Sales\n96-835\n934 S.W.2d 223\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered December 9, 1996\nWebb & Doerpinghaus, by: Doyle Webb, II, for appellant.\nPope, Ross, Dendy, & Cazort, by: Robert D. Ross, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0802-01", "first_page_order": 804, "last_page_order": 806 }