{
  "id": 12025586,
  "name": "Sharilyn PATTERSON v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Patterson v. State",
  "decision_date": "1996-12-23",
  "docket_number": "CR 96-1001",
  "first_page": "1004",
  "last_page": "1007",
  "citations": [
    {
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      "cite": "326 Ark. 1004"
    },
    {
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      "cite": "935 S.W.2d 266"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
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    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
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      "year": 1993,
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      "cite": "317 Ark. 17",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1994,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
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    {
      "cite": "326 Ark. 189",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1996,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/326/0189-01"
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    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-37-207",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "year": 1993,
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:12:03.555215+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Sharilyn PATTERSON v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice.\nThe court of appeals certified this case as one involving statutory interpretation of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-37-207 (Repl. 1993). Appellant Sharilyn Patterson was charged under \u00a7 5-37-207 with using Val Hansen\u2019s credit card to obtain property exceeding $100.00 in value with knowledge the card was stolen. Following a bench trial, Patterson was found guilty and sentenced as a habitual offender to three years\u2019 imprisonment. Patterson\u2019s sole issue on appeal is that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction because the State failed to show Hansen\u2019s credit card was stolen.\nWe first point out the State\u2019s information charged Patterson under \u00a7 5-37-207, and Patterson has never questioned the information as being deficient. Cf. State v. Johnson, 326 Ark. 189, 931 S.W.2d 760 (1996). Section 5-37-207 sets out the criminal offense of fraudulent use of a credit card as follows:\n(a) A person commits the offense of fraudulent use of a credit card if, with purpose to defraud, he uses a credit card to obtain property or services with knowledge that:\n(1) The card is stolen; or\n(2) The card has been revoked or cancelled; or\n(3) The card is forged; or\n(4) For any other reason his use of the card is unauthorized by either the issuer or the person to whom the credit card is issued.\n(b) Fraudulent use of a credit card is a Class C felony if the value of money, goods, or services obtained during any six-month period exceeds one hundred dollars ($100). Otherwise, it is a Class A misdemeanor.\nAs is pertinent in the present case and facts discussed more fully hereinafter, a person\u2019s fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain property is not limited only to situations where a card is stolen, but as is provided in subsection (a)(4), it includes a person\u2019s acts when his or her use of the card is unauthorized by either the issuer or the person to whom the credit card is issued. In general, under the provisions of \u00a7 5-37-207, it is the use of a stolen, revoked or cancelled, forged, or unauthorized credit card that results in a criminal violation. Specifically, it is the use of the account numbers on a credit card which gives the plastic card any credit value.\nWe turn now to consider that evidence that is most favorable to the appellee-State, as we are required to do. See Robinson v. State, 317 Ark. 17, 875 S.W.2d 837 (1994); Brenk v. State, 311 Ark. 579, 847 S.W.2d 1 (1993). On June 29, 1995, an unknown male called the Dillard\u2019s store located at the Little Rock Park Plaza Mall. Salesperson, Michael Morris, answered the phone, and took an order from the caller for men\u2019s clothing valued at $165.36. The caller identified himself as Val Hansen and gave Morris Hansen\u2019s Visa-card number and driver\u2019s license number, and said his wife, \u201cTerry,\u201d would pick up the merchandise. Morris became suspicious of the caller\u2019s phone order, and notified a policeman working as a security guard in Dillard\u2019s. Sergeant Phil Wilson contacted the real Val Hansen, who denied having made any purchases by phone and denied having a wife named Terry. Approximately thirty minutes after the phone call to Morris, Patterson entered Dillard\u2019s, and told Morris that she was \u201cTerry\u201d and was there to pick up the merchandise. Upon receipt of the goods, Patterson started to walk out of Morris\u2019s department when she was arrested by Wilson.\nWhile Patterson argues the State failed to show that Hansen\u2019s credit card was stolen, the State, as required by \u00a7 5-37-207, presented substantial, albeit circumstantial, evidence that Patterson, without authorization, utilized Hansen\u2019s credit card account number to obtain merchandise from the Dillard store. In addition to establishing the facts oudined above in its case-in-chief, the State further offered Hansen\u2019s testimony that he did not know Patterson. Further evidence showed that when Officer Wilson stopped Patterson from exiting the store with the merchandise, she falsely identified herself as \u201cTerry,\u201d and refused to give the name of the person she claimed had asked her to pick up the goods.\nPatterson testified at trial, proclaimed her innocence, and told a story which varied substantially from that presented by the State. Of course, the trial court did not have to believe Patterson\u2019s version of what occurred. In fact, when testifying, she admitted to two prior felony convictions, theft by receiving and forgery in the second degree, and the trial court alluded to Patterson\u2019s criminal record when it rejected her story as implausible and found her guilty. As this court has held repeatedly, credibility of the witness is a matter for the trier of fact and such determinations will not be disturbed on appeal when there is substantial evidence to support the factfinder\u2019s conclusion. Brenk, 311 Ark. 579, 847 S.W.2d 1. Here, the State\u2019s evidence was more than sufficient to show Patterson used Hansen\u2019s credit card account number without his authorization to obtain merchandise from Dillard\u2019s. Therefore, we affirm.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "William R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, by: C. Joseph Cordi, Jr., for appellant.",
      "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: J. Brent Standridge, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Sharilyn PATTERSON v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 96-1001\n935 S.W.2d 266\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered December 23, 1996\nWilliam R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, by: C. Joseph Cordi, Jr., for appellant.\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: J. Brent Standridge, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "1004-01",
  "first_page_order": 1006,
  "last_page_order": 1009
}