{ "id": 12025671, "name": "SOUTHERN FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY v. Elisha ALLEN", "name_abbreviation": "Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance v. Allen", "decision_date": "1996-12-23", "docket_number": "96-122", "first_page": "1023", "last_page": "1030", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "326 Ark. 1023" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "934 S.W.2d 527" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "315 Ark. 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1910560 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/315/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 Ark. 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1445746 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/323/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 Ark. 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 369257 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/325/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 Ark. 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1449607 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/321/0269-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 Ark. 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1897026 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/311/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 Ark. 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1914676 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/313/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ark. 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1935112 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/312/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 Ark. 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1455855 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441-42", "parenthetical": "quoting Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 281 Ark. 128, 664 S.W.2d 463 (1983)" }, { "page": "590", "parenthetical": "quoting Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 281 Ark. 128, 664 S.W.2d 463 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/318/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "920 S.W.2d 483", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9159040, 9159841 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "487" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/324/0176-01", "/ark/324/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 Ark. 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 9159841 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/324/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 Ark. 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1742359 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/281/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 Ark. 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1914661 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/313/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 Ark. 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1443834 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/317/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 Ark. 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1910450 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/315/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23-89-203", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23-89-202", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 709, "char_count": 14009, "ocr_confidence": 0.821, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1297553698741547e-07, "percentile": 0.765640390617368 }, "sha256": "8ac95b6efb7dba74f44bfb71caa78e876cd13b2b1708737d19ccd42484724a76", "simhash": "1:896df0a3f92d8dab", "word_count": 2246 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:12:03.555215+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Special Justices Noyl Houston and Eldon F. Coffman, join in this opinion.", "Jesson, C.J., and Glaze, J., not participating." ], "parties": [ "SOUTHERN FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY v. Elisha ALLEN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "DONALD L. Corbin, Justice.\nAppellant, Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, appeals the judgment of the Desha County Circuit Court awarding its insured, Appellee Elisha Allen, $10,000.00 in compensatory damages pursuant to directed verdicts and $75,000.00 in punitive damages pursuant to a jury verdict. Appellant also appeals from a subsequent order awarding prejudgment and postjudgment interest, costs, penalty, and attorney\u2019s fees. For reversal, Appellant argues the trial court erred in submitting to the jury the tort claims of first-party bad faith and outrage. This appeal involves questions about the law of torts, and our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2 (a) (15). We find no merit to Appellant\u2019s arguments and affirm.\nFacts and Procedural History\nThe complaint alleges the following facts. Appellee is Appellant\u2019s insured. Appellee\u2019s son, Anthony Dewayne Allen, was living with Appellee when he was killed in a motor vehicle accident on February 29, 1992. Appellee\u2019s son, Eddie Allen, visited Appellant\u2019s local office and informed the agent that the family had incurred funeral expenses for Anthony Allen\u2019s funeral and that Anthony Allen was living at Appellee\u2019s home. The local agent, Joe Herron, then informed Eddie Allen that there was no coverage for Anthony Allen. In May 1993, Appellant determined there was coverage available for Anthony Allen and paid Leroy Hill, the driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident on February 29, 1992, $26,000.00 for personal and property damages.\nBased on the aforementioned facts, the complaint alleges two causes of action \u2014 breach of contract and the tort of first-party bad faith. As to the claim for breach of contract, the complaint states that Appellee\u2019s policy included coverage for Anthony Allen\u2019s funeral expenses under \u201cCOVERAGE C. MEDICAL PAYMENTS\u201d and that Appellant breached its obligation pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23-89-202 (Repl. 1992) to provide no-fault death-indemnity benefits. As to the tort claim for first-party bad faith, the complaint alleges among other things, that Appellant\u2019s acts of bad faith included failure to pay the funeral expenses under the medical-payments coverage and failure to pay benefits to Appellee after acknowledging coverage and paying benefits to Leroy Hill.\nThe case was tried to a Desha County jury. At the close of Appellee\u2019s case as plaintiff and with agreement from Appellant, the trial court directed a $5,000.00 verdict for Appellee on the medical-payments coverage. Citing section 23-89-202, and Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23-89-203 (Repl. 1992), and American Nat\u2019l Property & Casualty Co. v. Ellis, 315 Ark. 524, 868 S.W.2d 469 (1994), and over Appellant\u2019s protest, the trial court also directed a $5,000.00 verdict for Appellee on the death-benefits coverage on the basis that Elisha Allen\u2019s rejection of that coverage in 1980 was no longer effective because he had purchased and insured vehicles since the 1980 rejection without signing subsequent rejections. Appellant does not challenge the direction of these verdicts on this appeal.\nThe trial court denied Appellant\u2019s motion for directed verdict on the tort of bad faith and instructed the jury that the issues of medical-payments coverage and death-benefits coverage had already been decided, thus the only issue that would be presented to them was the issue of punitive damages. The jury returned a general verdict for Appellee and fixed punitive damages of $75,000.00. The trial court entered an order consistent with the directed verdicts of $10,000.00 in compensatory damages and the jury verdict of $75,000.00 in punitive damages. This appeal followed.\nClaim for Bad Faith\nAt the close of Appellee\u2019s case as plaintiff, Appellant moved for a directed verdict on Appellee\u2019s tort claim for bad faith on the basis that Appellee had not presented any evidence of affirmative wrongful acts by Appellant. Appellant admitted breaching its contract with Appellee, but contended the breach was from oversight rather than from hatred, ill will, or dishonesty. The trial court ruled that Her-ron\u2019s testimony presented a jury question as to bad faith and denied Appellant\u2019s motion.\nAppellant then presented its case, which consisted of a single witness, Appellant\u2019s employee Steve Murray, and three exhibits: (1) no-fault endorsements for medical benefits, accidental-death benefits, and income-disability benefits; (2) Appellee\u2019s application for insurance dated January 4, 1980, where he rejected uninsured-motorist coverage and no-fault coverage; and (3) Appellee\u2019s 1980 declaration sheet. Murray testified that he and Scott St. John, a claims representative for Appellant, determined that Anthony Allen was a resident of Appellee\u2019s household and therefore coverage existed. Murray stated that based on that determination, Appellant paid $27,500.00 to Hill and Hill\u2019s passenger. Appellant then rested and \u201crenew[ed] its motion for a directed verdict for the reasons stated before.\u201d Again, the court denied the motion, ruling there were issues to be decided by the jury.\nAs its first point for reversal of this ruling, Appellant contends there was no evidence from which a reasonable person could conclude Appellant committed the tort of bad faith, therefore the trial court erred in submitting this issue to the jury. Specifically, Appellant contends there is no substantial evidence of affirmative acts to support a claim of bad faith. Rather, in Appellant\u2019s view, there is only evidence that Appellant failed to recognke that Appellee had medical-payments coverage. In essence, Appellant contends its actions were negligent but not malicious and relies heavily on our prior decisions that negligence, gross ignorance, or a complete failure to investigate a claim are not sufficient to establish a claim for the tort of bad faith. First Marine Ins. Co. v. Booth, 317 Ark. 91, 876 S.W.2d 255 (1994); Reynolds v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 313 Ark. 145, 852 S.W.2d 799 (1993).\nWe recently summarized our law on the tort of bad faith:\nThe components of the tort of bad faith are affirmative misconduct by an insurer, without a good-faith defense, which is dishonest, malicious, or oppressive in an attempt to avoid liability under a policy. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 281 Ark. 128, 664 S.W.2d 463 (1983).\nR.J. Jones Excavating Contractor, Inc. v. Firemen\u2019s Ins. Co., 324 Ark. 282, 289, 920 S.W.2d 483, 487 (1996). This court has also said that a claim for bad faith\ncannot be based upon good faith denial, offers to compromise a claim or for other honest errors of judgment by the insurer. Neither can this type claim be based upon negligence or bad judgment so long as the insurer is acting in good faith. . . .[I]n an action of this type for tort, actual malice is that state of mind under which a person\u2019s conduct is characterized by hatred, ill will or a spirit of revenge. Actual malice may be inferred from conduct and surrounding circumstances.\nAmerican Health Care Providers, Inc. v. O\u2019Brien, 318 Ark. 438, 441-42, 886 S.W.2d 588, 590 (1994) (quoting Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 281 Ark. 128, 664 S.W.2d 463 (1983)).\nOur standard of review of the denial of a motion for directed verdict is whether the jury\u2019s verdict is supported by substantial evidence, which is evidence that goes beyond suspicion or conjecture and is sufficient to compel a conclusion one way or the other. Barnes, Quinn, Flake & Anderson, Inc. v. Rankins 312 Ark. 240, 848 S.W.2d 924 (1993). It is not our province to try issues of fact, we simply review the record for substantial evidence to support the jury\u2019s verdict. John Cheeseman Trucking, Inc. v. Dougan, 313 Ark. 229, 853 S.W.2d 278 (1993). In determining whether there is substantial evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the verdict is sought and give the evidence its strongest probative force. Integon Indem. Corp. v. Bull, 311 Ark. 61, 842 S.W.2d 1 (1992).\nAfter reviewing the evidence in this case, we find two instances of alleged wrongdoing on Appellant\u2019s part sufficient to ere-ate a jury question as to Appellant\u2019s bad faith. Those instances are the two conversations that occurred between Eddie Allen and Her-ron in Herron\u2019s office shortly after the fatal accident and then about one year later.\nThe central issue of the first conversation was Anthony Allen\u2019s residence. It is undisputed that, as a resident of Appellee\u2019s household, Anthony Allen would be an omnibus insured under Appel-lee\u2019s policy. Eddie Allen testified that he and Herron discussed that Anthony Allen\u2019s insurance policy had lapsed. He stated the two of them then began discussing coverage under Appellee\u2019s policy. Eddie Allen testified that Herron asked him where Anthony Allen lived at the time of the accident and that he told Herron Anthony Allen had been living with their father. Eddie Allen testified further that Herron informed him there was no coverage for Anthony Allen under Appellee\u2019s policy.\nAppellant relies on Herron\u2019s testimony as to this conversation. Herron stated that he never asked Eddie Allen any questions about coverage for Anthony. According to Herron\u2019s testimony, he recalled that Eddie Allen inquired about coverage for Anthony Allen and that he only checked for coverage under Anthony Allen\u2019s policy. Herron admitted knowing that people commonly insure their children on their policies, but expressly denied checking to see if Anthony Allen was covered under Appellee\u2019s policy.\nThe central issue of the second conversation between Herron and Eddie Allen, which occurred about one year after the first conversation, was the dispute between the parties to this lawsuit. Eddie Allen testified that Herron asked him if St. John had been out to talk to his father or had offered his father a setdement and if St. John and his father had been able to reach any kind of agreement. Eddie Allen stated that he told Herron he did not think they had reached an agreement and that Herron responded that the matter would probably end up in court. At trial, Herron denied ever asking Eddie Allen whether St. John and his father had talked or reached an agreement.\nViewing this conflicting testimony in the light most favorable to Appellee as we are required to do, it is evidence from which a jury could have concluded that Herron lied about coverage available under Appellee\u2019s policy and that Appellant actively concealed this coverage from Appellee. Any conflicts in the testimony were for the jury to resolve. Medlock v. Burden, 321 Ark. 269, 900 S.W.2d 552 (1995). Likewise, it was for the jury to determine the credibility of these two witnesses and the remainder of the evidence. Id. On appeal, we simply determine if there is substantial evidence to support the jury\u2019s verdict. We conclude that Eddie Allen\u2019s testimony that Herron asked about Anthony Allen\u2019s residence, said he would check Appellee\u2019s policy for coverage, and then told him there was no coverage provides substantial evidence of an affirmative act made in a dishonest attempt to avoid liability under a policy. We also conclude that Appellant\u2019s dishonesty and active concealment of available coverage are substantiated further by Eddie Allen\u2019s testimony as to the second conversation between Herron and him. Accordingly, we cannot say the trial court erred in submitting this issue to the jury and denying Appellant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict.\nClaim for Outrage\nAppellant\u2019s second point on appeal is that the trial court erred in submitting the issue of the tort of outrage to the jury based on insufficient evidence. We are procedurally barred from reaching the merits of this argument.\nOur review on appeal is limited to the record as abstracted in the briefs. Lakeview Country Club, Inc. v. Superior Prods., 325 Ark. 218, 926 S.W.2d 428 (1996). Here, the abstract does not reveal that the complaint alleged a cause of action for the tort of outrage. The abstract does state that, at the close of Appellee\u2019s case as plaintiff, in addition to moving for a directed verdict on the claim for bad faith Appellant also moved for a directed verdict on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on a lack of substantial evidence that Elisha Allen suffered severe emotional distress that a reasonable person could not be expected to endure. However, the abstract does not reveal that the trial court ever ruled on this particular motion. It was Appellant\u2019s burden to obtain a ruling on the motion, and the absence of the ruling constitutes a waiver of this issue on appeal. Haase v. Starnes, 323 Ark. 263, 915 S.W.2d 675 (1996). Given the absence of a ruling at this stage, Appellant\u2019s renewal at the close of all the evidence of his previous motion for directed verdict has no effect on preserving this issue for appellate review.\nAppellant waived this issue further because, although the abstract reveals that the jury was instructed on the definition of extreme and outrageous conduct, there is no indication in the abstract that Appellant objected to such an instruction. The absence of an objection to the outrage instruction distinguishes this case from Dillard Dep\u2019t Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 315 Ark. 303, 867 S.W.2d 442 (1993), where we stated that when an erroneous instruction has been given and a jury has rendered a general verdict from which prejudice due to the error cannot be ascertained, we must reverse unless some additional factor renders the erroneous instruction harmless.\nOn this record, we find no merit to Appellant\u2019s arguments. The judgment is affirmed.\nSpecial Justices Noyl Houston and Eldon F. Coffman, join in this opinion.\nJesson, C.J., and Glaze, J., not participating.", "type": "majority", "author": "DONALD L. Corbin, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Laser, Wilson, Bufford & Watts, P.A., by: Sam Laser and Brian Allen Broum, for appellant.", "Gibson Law Office, by: C.S. \u201cChuck\u201d Gibson, II, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SOUTHERN FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY v. Elisha ALLEN\n96-122\n934 S.W.2d 527\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered December 23, 1996\nLaser, Wilson, Bufford & Watts, P.A., by: Sam Laser and Brian Allen Broum, for appellant.\nGibson Law Office, by: C.S. \u201cChuck\u201d Gibson, II, for appellee." }, "file_name": "1023-01", "first_page_order": 1025, "last_page_order": 1032 }