{ "id": 922888, "name": "Clarence RICHARDSON v. Emment WILLIAMS", "name_abbreviation": "Richardson v. Williams", "decision_date": "1997-02-03", "docket_number": "96-516", "first_page": "156", "last_page": "159", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "327 Ark. 156" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "936 S.W.2d 752" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "258 Ark. 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1621179 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/258/0425-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ark. 34", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 12020206 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/326/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "640 F.2d 150", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1369842 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/640/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "781 F.2d 654", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1536230 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/781/0654-01" ] }, { "cite": "991 F.2d 489", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10513230 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/991/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "996 F.2d 947", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10516413 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/996/0947-01" ] }, { "cite": "439 U.S. 357", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11330305 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/439/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 Ark. 738", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1455685 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/318/0738-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-32-103", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 343, "char_count": 4785, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.0325422447409096 }, "sha256": "7951aa07319fa1743ddf2ff4ea2795986fa691ca5b7fa66a6c2179119aabe23e", "simhash": "1:78f4e5300b266bb4", "word_count": 772 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:50:41.435320+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Clarence RICHARDSON v. Emment WILLIAMS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice.\nAppellant Clarence Richardson brought suit against appellee Emment Williams for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident. The case was tried to a jury which returned a verdict in Williams\u2019s favor. Richardson appeals, and his sole argument for reversal is that the trial court erred in rejecting his contention that Arkansas\u2019s method of selecting jurors under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-32-103 (Repl. 1994) is unconstitutional by violating his rights under the Sixth Amendment and Equal Protection Clause.\nWe initially point out that, in this civil proceeding, Richardson has an equal protection right to jury selection procedures that produce juries from a representative cross section of his community. Cleveland v. State, 318 Ark. 738, 888 S.W.2d 629 (1994). However, in order to establish a prima facie violation of the cross-section requirement, he must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a \u201cdistinctive\u201d group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).\nHere, Richardson\u2019s argument is that Arkansas\u2019s jury-selection process does not represent a fair cross section of the community because it excludes from the jury pool and petit jury all unregistered voters who, as citizens, would otherwise be qualified to serve as jurors. At trial, Richardson submitted that the population of Phillips County was comprised of fifty-four to fifty-six percent persons of African-American descent, but African-Americans accounted only for forty-eight to fifty-two percent of those persons registered to vote. Specifically, Richardson asserts that, because a fewer proportional number of blacks register to vote in Phillips County, it is impossible to select a jury panel that reflects a representative fair cross section of the community. He concluded his argument below as follows:\nThere is nothing sacrosanct about the voter registration roll that calls for it to be the exclusive avenue for selection of jurors and to deny persons who do not participate in the electoral process service on the jury is, in our opinion, unconstitutional so we would ask that the jury panel be quashed on the basis that it excludes persons who are not registered voters.\nIn considering Richardson\u2019s constitutional argument on appeal, we immediately note that it is one which has been considered and decided on many occasions. In fact, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and this court have addressed this same jury-selection issue now raised by Richardson, and in doing so, have consistently approved the use of voter registration lists to select jury pools. Floyd v. Garrison, 996 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1993); U.S. v. Garcia, 991 F.2d 489 (8th Cir. 1993); Brown v. Lockhart, 781 F.2d 654 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Clifford, 640 F.2d 150 (8th Cir. 1981); Danzie v. State, 326 Ark. 34, 930 S.W.2d 310 (1996); Turner v. State, 258 Ark. 425, 527 S.W.2d 580 (1975).\nIn Floyd v. Garrison, Floyd asserted the contention Richardson now argues in this appeal, namely, that the use of voter registration lists as the sole source for selecting jury pools does not provide a fair cross section of the community because blacks do not register to vote in the same proportion as other persons. The Floyd court, citing United States v. Clifford, rejected Floyd\u2019s argument by stating the following:\nEven if proportionally fewer blacks register to vote, \u201c[t]he mere fact that one identifiable group of individuals votes in a lower proportion than the rest of the population does not make a jury selection system illegal or unconstitutional.\u201d Absent proof obstacles are placed in the path of blacks attempting to register to vote, voter registration lists may be used as the sole source for selecting jury pools.\nIn the present case, Richardson offers no proof that there has been exclusion of jurors based on any basis other than the mere failure to register to vote. Because he has failed to show any underrepresentation due to a systematic exclusion of a distinctive group, we hold \u00a7 16-32-103 is constitutional as applied in this cause. Therefore, we affirm.\nWe note that both Richardson and Williams are African-Americans and, as reflected in the abstract of the record, two of the twelve persons selected to serve on the petit jury were black.", "type": "majority", "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Wilson Law Firm, P.A., by: E. Dion Wilson, for appellant.", "Rieves & Mayton, by: Eric Newkirk, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Clarence RICHARDSON v. Emment WILLIAMS\n96-516\n936 S.W.2d 752\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered February 3, 1997\nWilson Law Firm, P.A., by: E. Dion Wilson, for appellant.\nRieves & Mayton, by: Eric Newkirk, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0156-01", "first_page_order": 184, "last_page_order": 187 }