{ "id": 922652, "name": "Curtis F. VANDERPOOL, Jr. v. FIDELITY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY", "name_abbreviation": "Vanderpool v. Fidelity & Casualty Insurance", "decision_date": "1997-02-24", "docket_number": "96-1198", "first_page": "407", "last_page": "418", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "327 Ark. 407" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "939 S.W.2d 280" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 Ark. 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1884225 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246", "parenthetical": "upholding circuit court's ruling enforcing statutory lien and subrogation rights" }, { "page": "735", "parenthetical": "upholding circuit court's ruling enforcing statutory lien and subrogation rights" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/302/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ark. 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 12022369 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "374" }, { "page": "373" }, { "page": "374" }, { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/326/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 Ark. 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1912745 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24" }, { "page": "108" }, { "page": "24" }, { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/314/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 Ark. 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1445746 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273" }, { "page": "680" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/323/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 Ark. 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 9160451 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" }, { "page": "597" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/324/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 Ark. App. 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137073 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/28/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 Ark. 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1627467 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/253/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 Ark. App. 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137421 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88" }, { "page": "679-80" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/28/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 Ark. 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1877726 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278-79" }, { "page": "417" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/285/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 Ark. 702", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1453680 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "706" }, { "page": "578" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/319/0702-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 Ark. 257", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 369325 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" }, { "page": "435" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/325/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 Ark. 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 369295 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55" }, { "page": "720" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/325/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 Ark. 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1449543 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/321/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 Ark. 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1627503 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350-51", "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "page": "723", "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/253/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ark. 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 12021243 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158" }, { "page": "420" }, { "page": "158" }, { "page": "421" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/326/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 Ark. 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1879992 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415" }, { "page": "846" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/283/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-805", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-410", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)(5)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 Ark. 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1447489 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/322/0308-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 832, "char_count": 19516, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.135388460957638e-07, "percentile": 0.956091648586462 }, "sha256": "9cdb9e99026ff0c0dc14e5ef5e629f49efab5cfe6539ad1ee610ed685583db8f", "simhash": "1:3fa994b753a409fa", "word_count": 3191 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:50:41.435320+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Glaze, J., not participating." ], "parties": [ "Curtis F. VANDERPOOL, Jr. v. FIDELITY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Ray Thornton, Justice.\nThis is a second appeal following an appeal previously decided by this court, Vanderpool v. Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co., 322 Ark. 308, 908 S.W.2d 653 (1995). Ark. Sup. Ct. R. l-2(a)(ll). The action arose after appellant Curtis F. Vanderpool, Jr., was injured in an automobile accident in which his work vehicle collided with a car driven by Vicki Kaiko. Vanderpool and appellee Fidelity & Casualty Insurance Company, his employer\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation carrier, entered into a joint petition for approval of settlement that was approved by the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission. He also received a settlement from Kaiko. The Pulaski County Circuit Court ordered Vanderpool to pay $22,133.97, with interest, to Fidelity in satisfaction of Fidelity\u2019s statutory lien against the settlement he received from Kaiko.\nVanderpool makes the following arguments on appeal: (1) the joint-petition settlement extinguished any right Fidelity had to a statutory hen; (2) a legal dispute existed as to whether the lump-sum payment of $17,000.00 ordered pursuant to the joint-petition settlement constituted \u201ccompensation\u201d as used in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-410; (3) the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute as to the size and existence of a statutory lien on benefits paid as workers\u2019 compensation. The development of the issues before us has been procedurally challenging, but we have considered the issues raised by appellant, and we affirm the order of the trial court. We first review the procedural history of the case.\nProcedural History\nOn May 11, 1993, Vanderpool entered into the joint-petition settlement with Fidelity under the terms of which Fidelity paid Vanderpool\u2019s medical expenses, attorney\u2019s fees, and $17,000.00 in exchange for a release of liability of Fidelity and its insured on the workers\u2019 compensation claim. The Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission approved the petition. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-805 (1987). Nearly a year after the approval of the joint petition, Fidelity sued Kaiko asserting subrogation rights to any recovery by Vanderpool for injuries caused by Kaiko\u2019s negligence, and on May 25, 1994, Vanderpool filed a personal-injury action against Kaiko. The matters were consolidated by the trial court, and Vanderpool moved for declaratory judgment that Fidelity\u2019s rights to a statutory lien had been extinguished by the joint petition. The trial court denied the motion on November 30, 1994, and on December 16, Vanderpool filed notice of appeal of the denial of the motion for declaratory judgment.\nOn March 14, 1995, the transcript was lodged with this court. At that point, the trial court was divested of jurisdiction of the case, as it then became a matter under review by this court. Glick v. State, 283 Ark. 412, 415, 677 S.W.2d 844, 846 (1984). Notwithstanding this divestiture of jurisdiction, on March 28, 1995, the trial court entered an \u201cAgreed Order\u201d in which it attempted to resolve the dispute whether the statutory Hen had been extinguished by Ark. Code Arm. \u00a7 11-9-805, holding in pertinent part: \u201cThis court\u2019s ruling in favor of Fidelity and Casualty Insurance Company resolves that issue for the purposes of appeal.\u201d This attempt to finally resolve the question whether the joint petition barred Fidelity\u2019s rights to a statutory Hen was beyond the jurisdiction of the trial court because that issue was central to the appeal from the motion for declaratory judgment already lodged in this court. We have held that \u201c[i]t is the filing of the transcript in an appellate court or the placing of the sentence into execution that deprives a trial court of jurisdiction, not the filing of the notice of appeal.\u201d Sherman v. State, 326 Ark. 153, 158, 931 S.W.2d 417, 420 (1996).\nThe March 28 \u201cAgreed Order\u201d also attempted to approve settlement agreements between Kaiko and Vanderpool and between Kaiko and Fidelity. These issues were not directly involved in the appeal from the motion for declaratory judgment then under review in this court, and the trial court\u2019s approval of the setdement of personal-injury litigation, as requested by all parties to that settlement, is not challenged by any party. In the order, the court also directed Vanderpool to retain disputed funds pending the result of the appeal in lieu of an appeal bond. The damages paid by Kaiko under the settlement agreement resolved the issue of Kaiko\u2019s liability, and provided for the establishment of a fund the disposition of which would be conditioned upon this court\u2019s decision on appeal of the motion for declaratory judgment. We have decided that the approval of the settlement agreements in the context of the factual and procedural circumstances of this case was not so directly involved in the appeal from the denial of a motion for declaratory judgment that we are required to declare the March 28 proceedings a nullity. In the circumstances of this case, approval of a settlement of damage claims against a third party was within the trial court\u2019s jurisdiction, because these matters were not included in the appeal that had been lodged in this court. We have previously held:\nThe rule that an appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction applies only to matters necessarily or direcdy involved in the matter under review. It does not stay further proceedings with respect to rights not passed on or affected by the judgment or decree from which the appeal is taken. Matters which are independent of, or collateral or supplemental, are left within the jurisdiction and control of the trial court.\nSherman v. State, 326 Ark. at 158, 931 S.W.2d at 421 (quoting Bleidt v. 555, Inc., 253 Ark. 348, 350-51, 485 S.W.2d 721, 723 (1972) (per curiam)); see also Marsh & McLennan of Arkansas v. Herget, 321 Ark. 180, 900 S.W.2d 195 (1995).\nThe appeal from the trial court\u2019s denial of the motion for declaratory judgment did not contain any record of the \u201cAgreed Order\u201d or the settlement of disputes between Kaiko and the other parties, and there was no appeal from the \u201cAgreed Order\u201d of March 28.\nOn November 6, 1995, we dismissed the appeal from the denial of the motion for declaratory judgment for lack of a final judgment. Vanderpool v. Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co., 322 Ark. 308, 908 S.W.2d 653 (1995). When the mandate was entered, jurisdiction was restored in the trial court to resolve the issues of the case.\nFideHty filed a Motion to Enforce Mandate, upon which the court held a hearing on March 6, 1996. Regrettably, at this time attorneys for FideHty erroneously advised the trial court that our November 6 decision had considered the trial court\u2019s March 28 \u201cAgreed Order,\u201d which had never been before this court, and had ruled that it was not a final order; they also told the trial court that all FideHty was required to do was to implement the portion of the trial court\u2019s March 28 order which ruled that FideHty\u2019s statutory Hen had not been extinguished by the joint-petition settlement under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-805. FideHty advised the trial court that \u201cthe only thing left is to direct [appeHant] to turn over $22,133.97, with any interest that has accrued. . . .\u201d\nFlowever, during the March 6, 1996, hearing, the trial court orally renewed and ratified its findings and rufings from the March 28, 1995, order, stating: \u201cI directed Curtis Vanderpool to retain a portion of the settlement sufficient to satisfy the Hen of FideHty and Casualty Insurance Company in an interest bearing account. So he should have done that or he\u2019s in contempt of court.\u201d The court added: \u201cWeH, then I\u2019ll order it turned over to you, and settle the case. And that\u2019s a final order, I suppose, at that point in time.\u201d\nThe trial court entered its order enforcing the mandate on March 15, 1996, making the foHowing findings:\n1. On November 29, 1994, the Court entered an Order denying Curtis Vanderpool\u2019s Motion for Declaratory Judgment against Fidelity & Casualty Insurance Company. Curtis Vanderpool appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court from that ruling.\n2. In heu of an appeal bond, Curtis Vanderpool was directed to retain a portion of settlement funds received from Vicki Lynn Kaiko sufficient to satisfy the lien of Fidelity & Casualty Insurance Company in an interest bearing account.\n3. On November 6, 1995, the Arkansas Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of Curtis Vanderpool.\n4. Fidelity & Casualty Insurance Company has a statutory Hen against the settlement proceeds in the sum of $22,133.97.\nIt is clear that the court adopted, ratified, and confirmed its ruling in favor of Fidelity on the issue of the statutory lien, and ordered Vanderpool to pay to Fidelity the sum of $22,133.97, together with interest from the time of the approval of the settlement with Kaiko. The March 15, 1996, order by the trial court is a final order determining the issue whether the statutory lien is barred by the joint petition. Vanderpool has appealed from this order, and we proceed to our examination of the merits of the appeal.\nMerits of Appeal\nVanderpool argues that because his claim for workers\u2019 compensation benefits was settled pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-805, Fidelity is no longer entided to pursue an action in tort against the negligent third party pursuant to \u00a7 11-9-410. Section ll-9-410(b)(l) provides in part that \u201can employer or carrier liable for compensation under this chapter for the injury or death of an employee shall have the right to maintain an action in tort against any third party responsible for the injury or death.\u201d (Emphasis added.) The purpose of these provisions is articulated in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-410(b)(5), which provides that \u201cthe purpose and intent of this subsection is to prevent double payment to the employee.\u201d\nThe thrust of Vanderpool\u2019s argument is that \u00a7 11-9-805 extinguishes the rights of all parties, including the right of an employer or carrier to bring an action for a statutory lien, once the joint petition is entered. Section 11-9-805 provides in pertinent part:\n(b) If the commission decides it is for the best interests of the claimant that a final award be made, it may order an award that shall be final as to the rights of all parties to the petition. Thereafter, the commission shall not have jurisdiction over any claim for the same injury or any results arising from it.\nId. \u00a7 ll-9-805(b) (emphasis added).\nIn considering the meaning of a statute, we construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Bill Fitts Auto Sales, Inc. v. Daniels, 325 Ark. 51, 55, 922 S.W.2d 718, 720 (1996). The basic rule of statutory construction to which all other interpretive guides defer is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Id. As a guide in ascertaining legislative intent, this court often examines the history of the statutes involved, as well as the contemporaneous conditions at the time of their enactment, the consequences of interpretation, and all other matters of common knowledge within the court\u2019s jurisdiction. Citizens to Establish a Reform Party v. Priest, 325 Ark. 257, 261, 926 S.W.2d 432, 435 (1996). Furthermore, in construing any statute, this court will place it beside other statutes relevant to the subject matter in question, giving it meaning and effect derived from the combined whole. Hercules, Inc. v. Pledger, 319 Ark. 702, 706, 894 S.W.2d 576, 578 (1995).\nIn Simmons First National Bank v. Thompson, 285 Ark. 275, 686 S.W.2d 415 (1985), this court recognized that \u201cthe purpose of workers\u2019 compensation statutes was to change the common law by shifting the burden of all work-related injuries from individual employers and employees to the consuming public.\u201d Id. at 278-79, 686 S.W.2d at 417. Likewise, Professor Larson has noted:\n[T]he entire compensation system has been set up and paid for, not by the parties, but by the public. The public has ultimately borne the cost of compensation protection in the price of the product .... The public interest is also thwarted when the employer and employee agree to a settlement which unnecessarily increases the cost of the product by giving the worker more than is due.\n3 Arthur Larson, Workmen\u2019s Compensation Law, \u00a7 82.41 (1988).\nThe purpose in allowing an insurance carrier and an employer to pursue an action in tort against a third party is to ensure that the employee is not doubly compensated to the detriment of the employer and insurance carrier and, ultimately, the consuming public. For this reason, it is clear that the finality of a joint-petition settlement is viewed from the claimant\u2019s standpoint, and it is the claimant\u2019s right to proceed further that is extinguished. See Stratton v. Death & Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund, 28 Ark. App. 86, 88, 770 S.W.2d 678, 679-80 (1989). In Hartz Seed Co. v. Thomas, 253 Ark. 176, 485 S.W.2d 200 (1972), we stated the following when considering a joint petition for final settlement:\nThe necessity for extreme caution in approving such settlements so clearly recognized by the commission\u2019s procedural rule lies in the fact that any award based thereon finally concludes all right of the parties, even foreclosing any right of appeal from the order of approval. This is the only procedure under our act which leaves the claimant without any further remedy, regardless of subsequent developments. ... It is necessary that the interest of both the employee and the public be protected ....\nId. at 179, 485 S.W.2d at 202.\nThe court of appeals correctly noted in Ward v. Fayetteville City Hosp., 28 Ark. App. 73, 770 S.W.2d 668 (1989), that \u201ca third-party tortfeasor is not subject to the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act[.] For that reason the insurance carrier can settle the claim with the claimant and reserve its right to proceed against the tortfeasor.\u201d Id. at 76, 770 S.W.2d at 670.\nThe joint petition in the instant case reflects that \u201cclaimant understands that approval of the settlement will forever bar and preclude any further claim against respondents.\u201d (Emphasis added.) The order entered pursuant to the joint petition states that \u201cupon payment of these sums this claim shall be forever barred.\u201d (Emphasis added.) The joint petition and order filed in this case stated only that the settlement barred and precluded any further claim against the respondents, and that \u201cthis claim\u201d was forever barred. The implication from the language in those documents is that Vanderpool\u2019s claim is forever barred and precluded as against Fidelity and Vanderpool\u2019s employer. The documents do not preclude Vanderpool from seeking compensation against the third-party tortfeasor nor do they preclude Fidelity from doing the same.\nWe also note that \u00a7 11-9-805 provides that a settlement pursuant to joint petition shall be final as to the rights of all parties to the petition. A third-party tortfeasor is not a \u201cparty\u201d covered under \u00a7 11-9-805; thus, both the insurance carrier and the injured employee can take action against the third party. Because a third-party tortfeasor, in this case Vicki Kaiko, is not a party to the joint petition presented to and approved by the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission, both Vanderpool and Fidelity have the right to proceed against her.\nThe trial court\u2019s March 15, 1996, order granting Fidelity a statutory Hen on sums recovered from a third-party tortfeasor was a final decision. By its order, the trial court concluded that the right to such a lien was not extinguished by the joint-petition setdement approved by the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission, and we affirm on that point.\nVanderpool next argues that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay the money to Fidelity without first determining whether the $17,000.00 paid to Vanderpool in a lump sum is included within the statutory definition of \u201ccompensation.\u201d The abstract does not show that this question was presented to the trial court for decision at the time of the entry of the \u201cAgreed Order\u201d of March 28, 1995. In the March 6, 1996, proceedings, leading to the final order on March 15, 1996, Vanderpool raised this issue in his brief, but he failed to obtain a ruhng from the trial court. Failure to obtain a ruhng from the trial court is a procedural bar to our consideration of the issue. We have held on many occasions that we will not address the merits of an argument where the appellant has failed to obtain a ruhng from the trial court. Howard v. Northwest Arkansas Surgical Clinic P.A., 324 Ark. 375, 378, 921 S.W.2d 596, 597 (1996); Haase v. Starnes, 323 Ark. 263, 273, 915 S.W.2d 675, 680 (1996). Therefore, we also affirm on this point.\nFinally, Vanderpool argues that because this was a workers\u2019 compensation action, the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to award payment to Fidelity and to determine what constitutes \u201ccompensation\u201d under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. Vanderpool did not receive a ruhng on this issue; however, where the question is one of subject-matter jurisdiction, it does not matter how it arises. Arkansas Dep\u2019t Of Human Servs. v. Hogan, 314 Ark. 19, 24, 858 S.W.2d 105, 108 (1993). This question may be raised for the first time on appeal or the court may raise it on its own, but the parties to an action may not confer subject-matter jurisdiction on a court. Id. at 24, 858 S.W.2d at 108. We have noted that the question of subject-matter jurisdiction is one that we are obligated to raise on our own, due to the fact that if the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, the appellate court also lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Douthitt v. Douthitt, 326 Ark. 372, 374, 930 S.W.2d 371, 373 (1996).\nUnder the Arkansas Constitution, circuit courts have original jurisdiction in all cases where jurisdiction is not expressly vested in another court; in order to successfully attack a circuit court\u2019s jurisdiction, a party must demonstrate that another court has been given exclusive jurisdiction. Daves v. Hartford Accident & Indent. Co., 302 Ark. 242, 246, 788 S.W.2d 733, 735 (1990) (upholding circuit court\u2019s ruling enforcing statutory lien and subrogation rights).. The section under which both Fidelity\u2019s and Vanderpool\u2019s actions were filed below, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11 \u2014 9\u2014 410, places jurisdiction in the circuit courts, as it provides for the maintenance of an action in tort. Circuit courts are courts of law, and an action in tort is an action at law; therefore, jurisdiction of this action was properly before the circuit court. Douthitt v. Douthitt, 326 Ark. at 374, 930 S.W.2d at 373. Further, subsection (c) states that any settlement of a third-party action shall be approved by either the commission or .the court, indicating concurrent jurisdiction over such matters.\nIn this case, the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction because circuit courts have original jurisdiction in all cases where jurisdiction has not been exclusively vested in another tribunal, and because \u00a7 11-9-410 provides insurance carriers with the right to maintain an action in tort against third-party tortfeasors.\nFor all of the above reasons, the decision of the trial court is affirmed.\nAppellee\u2019s motion to strike, to dismiss appeal, to stay briefing schedules, and for sanctions is denied.\nGlaze, J., not participating.", "type": "majority", "author": "Ray Thornton, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Dabbs, Graham & Pomtree, by: Jeffrey M. Graham, for appellant.", "Laser, Wilson, Bufford & Watts, P.A., by: Brian A. Brown and Walter Kendel, Jr., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Curtis F. VANDERPOOL, Jr. v. FIDELITY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY\n96-1198\n939 S.W.2d 280\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered February 24, 1997\nDabbs, Graham & Pomtree, by: Jeffrey M. Graham, for appellant.\nLaser, Wilson, Bufford & Watts, P.A., by: Brian A. Brown and Walter Kendel, Jr., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0407-01", "first_page_order": 439, "last_page_order": 450 }