{ "id": 922855, "name": "IN the MATTER of the ADOPTION of Baby Boy MARTINDALE", "name_abbreviation": "In re the Adoption of Martindale", "decision_date": "1997-03-24", "docket_number": "96-1258", "first_page": "685", "last_page": "691", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "327 Ark. 685" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "940 S.W.2d 491" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-56-126", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "873 S.W.2d 819", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-9-216", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)(l)" }, { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 Ark. 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1895782 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "elections are special proceedings to which the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply" }, { "parenthetical": "elections are special proceedings to which the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/294/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 Ark. 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8718005 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169-70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/273/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 Ark. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1672707 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" }, { "page": "613" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/263/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 Ark. 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8720338 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/257/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "897 S.W.2d 556", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1451147, 1451191 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/320/0412-01", "/ark/320/0392-02" ] }, { "cite": "320 Ark. 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1451147 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/320/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ark. 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1935160 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/312/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 Ark. 276", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1449537 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/321/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 Ark. 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1447503 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/322/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-9-201", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 561, "char_count": 10834, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.3684850418198432e-07, "percentile": 0.7951002162674349 }, "sha256": "f03ae426ec414701a6c1576eea24e292f09e53a495f32b204ed745377aac722b", "simhash": "1:82ccd2ea25665516", "word_count": 1745 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:50:41.435320+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Imber, J., not participating." ], "parties": [ "IN the MATTER of the ADOPTION of Baby Boy MARTINDALE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "W.H.\u201cDub\u201d Arnold, Chief Justice.\nThis case raises the issue of whether the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 41(a) voluntary nonsuit provision is applicable to adoption proceedings. Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Rule l-2(a) (3) as an interpretation of the Arkansas Revised Uniform Adoption Act, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-9-201 et seq. (1993 & Supp. 1995), and the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.\nAppellee is the biological mother of Baby Boy Martindale who was born on March 22, 1995. Prior to her child\u2019s birth, appellee contacted an adoption agency, Adoption Services, Inc., to make arrangements to place the child for adoption. On March 23, 1995, appellee signed a relinquishment of parental rights and a consent of adoption; both of these documents contained an acknowledgment signed by appellee that she understood she had ten (10) days to withdraw her consent. Appellee also signed an affidavit of paternity at that time; in the affidavit, she swore that she did not know the identity of the child\u2019s father because her pregnancy was the result of a rape by an unknown assailant.\nThe ten-day withdrawal period passed without appellee withdrawing her consent. After the ten-day period, the child was placed in the custody of the appellants, and an adoption decree was entered.\nOn September 15, 1995, approximately six months after she had given her consent to the adoption, appellee filed a petition with the probate court to set aside the adoption. In her petition, appellee claimed the information in the sworn affidavit of paternity was false because she knew the identity of the father and that the circumstances she provided regarding her pregnancy were fraudulent. She also claimed that she had contacted the social workers at Adoption Services, Inc., during the ten-day withdrawal period to inform them that she was having second thoughts, but they intimidated her and instructed that she should not pursue her right to withdraw consent.\nThe appellants responded to the petition, denying the allegations of intimidation and claiming that the consent was valid. A hearing was scheduled to begin on July 17, 1996.\nOn June 12, 1996, the attorney of record for the appellee filed a motion with the probate court requesting to be relieved as appellee\u2019s attorney. He claimed that the appellee had not responded to his communications, would not participate in the preparations for the proceeding, and had not complied with the arrangement for costs and fees. Appellants filed a response to the motion in which they did not object to the attorney\u2019s withdrawal; however, in the response, appellants stated they would object to any motion for continuance.\nThe probate court held a hearing on the attorney\u2019s motion on July 9, 1996. Appellee did not attend the hearing although her attorney gave a sworn statement that she had been given notice of the hearing. The probate court granted the attorney\u2019s motion to withdraw.\nOn July 18, 1996, the originally scheduled hearing on the petition to set aside the adoption was held. Appellee\u2019s former counsel made a special appearance on behalf of appellee, who had faded to obtain new counsel. Appellee offered a motion for a continuance; appellants objected. The probate court denied the motion ruling that it was appellee\u2019s fault that she was not prepared for trial. Appellee then moved for a dismissal without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a). Appellants objected on the grounds that such procedure was not permissible because the adoption proceeding was a special proceeding and moved that the petition be dismissed with prejudice. The probate court granted the appellee\u2019s motion to dismiss without prejudice, thus giving the appellee a year from the date of the order to refile her petition.\nAppellants filed this appeal challenging the probate judge\u2019s order dismissing the petition without prejudice. Appellants claim that the probate court erred in ruling that Rule 41(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure is applicable to adoption proceedings. Appellee claims that the right of voluntary dismissal is absolute and must apply to adoption proceedings.\nThis is a case of first impression, which requires interpretation of the Arkansas Revised Uniform Adoption Act, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-9-201 etseq. (1993 & Supp. 1995), and the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. In matters of first impression requiring the interpretation or construction of an act of the General Assembly or a judicially created rule, it is this court\u2019s responsibility to determine the meaning of the statute or rule in question. See, Arkansas DOH v. Westark Christian Action, 322 Ark. 440, 910 S.W.2d 199 (1995); Peters v. State, 321 Ark. 276, 902 S.W.2d 757 (1995); Furman v. Holloway, 312 Ark. 378, 849 S.W.2d 520 (1993).\nRule 1 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the Rules of Civil Procedure \u201cgovern the procedure. . .in all suits or actions of a civil nature with the exceptions stated in Rule 81.\u201d (Emphasis supplied.) Rule 81(a) excludes the application of the Rules \u201cin those instances where a statute which creates a right, remedy or proceeding specifically provides a different procedure in which event the procedure so specified shall apply.\u201d In Sosebee v. County Line School Dist., 320 Ark. 412, 897 S.W.2d 556 (Ark. 1995), we found that the Rule 81(a) exception \u201cis limited to special proceedings created exclusively by statute where a special procedure is appropriate and warranted.\u201d\nWe have addressed the distinction between an \u201caction\u201d and a \u201cspecial proceeding.\u201d In Coleman v. Coleman, 257 Ark. 404, 407, 520 S.W.2d 239 (1974), we defined an action as \u201can ordinary proceeding in a court of justice by one party against another for the enforcement or protection of a private right or the redress or prevention of a private wrong.\u201d All proceedings which are not ordinary proceedings are \u201cspecial proceedings\u201d created exclusively by statute.\nIn Poe v. Case, 263 Ark. 488, 490, 565 S.W.2d 612, 613 (1978), we determined that adoptions are \u201cspecial proceedings\u201d without utilizing the label \u201cspecial proceeding.\u201d In Poe, we found that \u201c[t]here is no mention of adoption, child custody or visitation rights in the Arkansas Constitution. Jurisdiction of adoption proceedings has been vested in the probate court by statute. Adoption proceedings were unknown to the common law, so they are governed entirely by statute.\u201d\nAlthough we have not addressed the specific issue of whether the Rules of Civil Procedure apply to adoption proceedings, we have determined that the Rules do not apply to other special proceedings. In Screeton v. Crumpler, 273 Ark. 167, 617 S.W.2d 847 (1981), a will contestant appealed from a probate court order dismissing her contest with prejudice on the contention that the contest should have been dismissed without prejudice. We upheld the probate court order and determined that a dismissal without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41 (a) is not an appropriate procedure in a will contest. We noted that will contests are special proceedings to which the rules of civil procedure do not apply. We stated:\n\u201cIt [the will contest] does not constitute a civil action within ARCP, Rules 2 and 3. A will contestant cannot take a nonsuit under Rule 41, because such a contest is not an independent proceeding in itself. It would seriously disrupt the administration and distribution of estates if a will contest could be dismissed voluntarily or without prejudice, and refiled at some indefinite later date.\u201d\nId. at 169-70. See, Garret v. Andrews, 294 Ark. 160, 741 S.W.2d 257 (1987) (elections are special proceedings to which the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply).\nAs we found in Poe, adoption was not known in common law and it was created entirely by statute, so it is a \u201cspecial proceeding.\u201d We now specifically follow the Screeton decision in holding that the Rules of Civil Procedure are not applicable to adoption proceedings because they are special proceedings.\nThe Arkansas Revised Uniform Adoption Act contains a one year statute of limitations for challenging adoption decrees. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-9-216(b)(l) (1993 & Supp. 1995). Specifically, the statute provides:\n\u201cSubject to the disposition of an appeal, upon the expiration of one (1) year after the adoption decree is issued, the decree cannot be questioned by any person including the petitioner, in any manner upon any ground, including fraud, misrepresentation, failure to give any required notice, or lack of jurisdiction of the parties or of the subject matter . . . .\u201d\n(Emphasis supplied.)\nWe have held that the legislature\u2019s one-year rule must be applied strictly in order to \u201censure adoption decrees obtained under the law possess that necessary and required finality so that an adoptive parent is not freed of the parental obligations he or she has willingly undertaken.\u201d Martin v. Martin, 873 S.W.2d 819 (Ark. 1994). In quoting commentary from the Uniform Revised Adoption Act which discusses the importance of the one year limit, the Martin opinion further states, \u201cthe policy of stability in a family relationship. . . outweighs the possible loss to a person [the natural parent] whose rights are cut off [even in instances of] fraud and ignorance.\u201d Id, at 822.\nClearly, adoption is a special proceeding with appropriate and necessary special procedures enacted to protect significant public policy concerns such as the rights of adoptive parents and minor children to establish a stable and secure family relationship. The Arkansas Revised Uniform Adoption Act\u2019s one-year statute of limitations provides a special procedure which cannot be annulled by Rule 41(a) and the savings statute that allows an action dismissed without prejudice to be refiled within one year of the dismissal. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-56-126 (1987).\nThe probate court was without authority to grant Appellee\u2019s motion for dismissal without prejudice and to find that Appellee could refile her claim at a later date. Allowing such a challenge after the appellants have had custody of Baby Boy Martindale for nearly two years would effectively ignore the legislative intent and nullify the plain meaning of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-9-216(b) by allowing the petition to be filed after the statute of limitations has expired.\nAccordingly, the order of the probate court granting dismissal without prejudice was without authority; the dismissal should have been with prejudice. Because appellee does not have the right to refile the petition to set aside the adoption decree, we reverse and dismiss.\nReversed and dismissed.\nImber, J., not participating.", "type": "majority", "author": "W.H.\u201cDub\u201d Arnold, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, by: Edgar J. Tyler, for appellants.", "Thurman, Lawrence and Heuer, by: Sam Heuer, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN the MATTER of the ADOPTION of Baby Boy MARTINDALE\n96-1258\n940 S.W.2d 491\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered March 24, 1997\nWright, Lindsey & Jennings, by: Edgar J. Tyler, for appellants.\nThurman, Lawrence and Heuer, by: Sam Heuer, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0685-01", "first_page_order": 719, "last_page_order": 725 }