{
  "id": 922779,
  "name": "F. Gordon DARR, Jr., as Administrator of the Estate of Tamara Bankston Darr v. David L. BANKSTON",
  "name_abbreviation": "Darr v. Bankston",
  "decision_date": "1997-03-24",
  "docket_number": "96-1417",
  "first_page": "723",
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      "year": 1978,
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    {
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      "year": 1988,
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    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-65-502",
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      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "year": 1987,
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    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-14-236",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:50:41.435320+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "F. Gordon DARR, Jr., as Administrator of the Estate of Tamara Bankston Darr v. David L. BANKSTON"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice.\nTamara and David Bankston were divorced on December 27, 1985, and the couple\u2019s two minor daughters were awarded to Tamara. David was ordered to pay Tamara $220 per month child support, plus two-thirds of the health insurance premiums for the children, and reimbursement of one-half of the dental and non-covered medical expenses incurred on the children\u2019s behalf. Over the years, David failed to make payments and accrued arrearages. In October of 1995, Tamara died intestate and Gordon Darr, Jr., was appointed administrator of her estate; in that capacity, Darr brought suit against David to recover the arrears David owed in child support, insurance premiums, and medical expenses. At the time of suit, David had custody of the children.\nDavid filed a responsive motion to dismiss Darr\u2019s complaint, alleging Darr had no standing. The chancellor agreed and dismissed Darr\u2019s suit. In reaching his decision, the chancellor relied on Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-14-236 (Supp. 1995), which defines a \u201cmoving party\u201d who brings suit for child-support arrearages to mean (1) the custodial parent, (2) any person or agency to whom custody of a minor child has been given or relinquished, (3) the minor child through his guardian or next friend, (4) a person for whose benefit the support was ordered, within five years of his or her obtaining majority, or (5) the Child Support Enforcement Office under prescribed circumstances. Because Darr failed to fall within any of these five categories, the chancellor held Darr had no standing. He specifically mentioned that Darr, as administrator of Tamara\u2019s estate \u201cdoes not equate\u201d with being the children\u2019s guardian under \u00a7 9-14-236, and therefore could not enforce any child-support arrearages. The chancellor is mistaken, and accordingly we reverse and remand.\nDarr correctly submits that, as administrator, he can recover a monetary judgment after the death of one entitled to the judgment. He cites Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-65-502 (1987), which provides in pertinent part as follows:\n(a)(1) If one (1) or more plaintiffs in a judgment or decree dies before the judgment or decree is satisfied or carried into effect, the judgment or decree, if for money or concerning personal property, shall survive to the executors or administrators of the deceased party, and, if concerning real estate, to his heirs or devisees.\n(2) In each of the preceding cases, execution may be sued out in the name of the surviving plaintiff, for the benefit of himself and legal representatives of the deceased party, or the judgment or decree may be revived in the name of the legal representatives and the surviving plaintiff, and execution may be sued out joindy.\nThis court has recognized the custodial parent\u2019s right to unpaid installments of child support in prior decisions. See Cunningham v. Cunningham, 297 Ark. 377, 761 S.W.2d 938 (1988); Sharum v. Dodson, 264 Ark. 57, 568 S.W.2d 503 (1978).- In addition, the General Assembly has also provided that a decree, containing a provision for child-support payments, shall be a final judgment as to any accrued payment until the time either party moves to set aside, alter, or modify the decree. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-14-234(b) (Supp. 1995).\nUnder applicable Probate Code provisions, Darr, as appointed representative of Tamara\u2019s estate, was entitled to take possession of all Tamara\u2019s personal property, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-49-101 (a) (1987), and to enforce her estate\u2019s entidement to any existing money or personal property judgment or decree. \u00a7 16-65-502.\nDavid\u2019s defense rings hollow in suggesting that \u00a7 9-14-236 precludes Darr from enforcing any surviving child-support debts David owed Tamara because \u00a7 19-14-236 does not specifically fist an administrator as one who can enforce such indebtedness. In support of his argument, David cites only general authority that an unambiguous statute should be applied simply as it is written, and that specific rules in one statute (\u00a7 9-14-236) are given over the general rules in another statute (\u00a7 16-65-502). See Valley Nat\u2019l Bank of Arizona v. Stroud, 289 Ark. 284, 711 S.W.2d 785 (1986).\nArkansas law is well settled that it is this court\u2019s duty, if possible, to reconcile our state\u2019s statutes to make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible. See Estate of Epperson, 284 Ark. 35, 679 S.W.2d 792 (1984). In the instant case, David offers no citation of authority or convincing argument specifying why \u00a7 9-14-236 cannot be read as being harmonious with Arkansas\u2019s applicable probate provisions. Instead, David offers a construction of \u00a7 9-14-236 which inexplicably denudes the plain language and purpose of Arkansas\u2019s survival-of-judgment statute, \u00a7 16-65-502, and strips an administrator from satisfying a deceased party\u2019s decree where it involves an arrearage in child-support payments. In fact, if we were to accept David\u2019s argument, no one in this case could presently enforce Tamara\u2019s right to accrued child-support payments except David, himself, since, as guardian, he is the only one authorized under \u00a7 9-14-236 to collect child-support arrearages. Obviously, such an interpretation would result in an absurdity and completely ignores the compatible purpose served by Arkansas\u2019s survival provisions.\nFor the above reasons, we reverse and remand the cause for further proceedings.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "McNutt Law Firm, by: Mona J. McNutt, for appellant.",
      "Jack, Lyon & Jones, P.A., by: Gary D. Jiles, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "F. Gordon DARR, Jr., as Administrator of the Estate of Tamara Bankston Darr v. David L. BANKSTON\n96-1417\n940 S.W.2d 481\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered March 24, 1997\nMcNutt Law Firm, by: Mona J. McNutt, for appellant.\nJack, Lyon & Jones, P.A., by: Gary D. Jiles, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0723-01",
  "first_page_order": 757,
  "last_page_order": 760
}