{ "id": 50407, "name": "Beatrice D. DOLPHIN v. Henrietta J. WILSON and Jimmie L. Wilson", "name_abbreviation": "Dolphin v. Wilson", "decision_date": "1997-04-07", "docket_number": "96-631", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "11", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "328 Ark. 1" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "942 S.W.2d 815" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "206 S.W. 745", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1918, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 Ark. 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1570006 ], "year": 1918, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/136/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 Ark. 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1627317 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/253/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 Ark. 1038", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1734314 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1040" }, { "page": "1039" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/238/1038-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-59-101", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "a" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "247 S.E.2d 754", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "570 A.2d 189", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "733 F.2d 813", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 577123 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/733/0813-01" ] }, { "cite": "516 F.Supp. 84", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 5604043 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/516/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "944 F. Supp. 566", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7652940 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/944/0566-01" ] }, { "cite": "470 U.S. 1028", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11309254, 11308839, 11308776, 11309512, 11308903, 11308972, 11309036, 11308593, 11308659, 11309428, 11309107, 11308725, 11309172, 11309339 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/470/1028-11", "/us/470/1028-05", "/us/470/1028-04", "/us/470/1028-14", "/us/470/1028-06", "/us/470/1028-07", "/us/470/1028-08", "/us/470/1028-01", "/us/470/1028-02", "/us/470/1028-13", "/us/470/1028-09", "/us/470/1028-03", "/us/470/1028-10", "/us/470/1028-12" ] }, { "cite": "745 F.2d 606", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 592987 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/745/0606-01" ] }, { "cite": "733 F.Supp. 1284", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7397021 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/733/1284-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ark. 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 12022369 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/326/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 Ark. 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 369138 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/325/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ark. 617", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 12023837 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/326/0617-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 Ark. 565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1455859 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/318/0565-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 Ark. 522", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1445697 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/323/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "924 S.W.2d 260", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "325 Ark. 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 369205 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/325/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ark. 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 12023229 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "487" }, { "page": "770" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/326/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 S.W.2d 485", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "206 S.W. 745", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1918, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "136 Ark. 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1570006 ], "year": 1918, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/136/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 Ark. 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1627317 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/253/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 Ark. 1038", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1734314 ], "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/238/1038-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 913, "char_count": 19780, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.910540752237125e-07, "percentile": 0.8457643669573014 }, "sha256": "6b5510760c340db9715593618f1c8eec7fd1cb23a64c4a478c78ebd5fc09ef71", "simhash": "1:83773e379c089e28", "word_count": 3344 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:26:32.867281+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Newbern, Glaze, and Corbin, JJ., not participating.", "Special Justices William Lee Fergus, Leon FIolmes, and John C. Lessel, join in this opinion.", "Thornton, J., dissents." ], "parties": [ "Beatrice D. DOLPHIN v. Henrietta J. WILSON and Jimmie L. Wilson" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "W.H. \u201cDub\u201d Arnold, Chief Justice.\nThe case concerns an alleged oral contract for the sale of land. The appellees, Jimmie L. Wilson and Henrietta J. Wilson, filed suit for specific performance against appellant Beatrice D. Dolphin. The chancellor ruled in favor of the Wilsons, and Mrs. Dolphin appeals, raising two issues. The first question presented is whether the chancellor, a former law partner of Mr. Wilson\u2019s, should have recused from the case. The second issue is whether the complaint for specific performance was barred by the statute of frauds. Because we disagree with the chancellor\u2019s conclusion that the proof of the alleged agreement was clear and convincing, we hold that the complaint was barred by the statute of frauds, and reverse and remand.\nMrs. Dolphin and her late husband owned approximately 22 acres of farm land in Phillips County. It was heavily encumbered by over $300,000.00 in liens. The great majority of the encumbrance was due to farm loans made by the Farmers Home Administration. Mrs. Dolphin left the Phillips County area in 1988 and had very little to do with the land thereafter.\nOn April 5, 1994, the FmHA obtained a judgment in the amount of about $271,000.00 as the result of an in rem foreclosure action filed in federal district court. The land was set to be sold at public auction when Mr. Wilson, an attorney, saw the auction notice in the newspaper and contacted Mrs. Dolphin in Ohio the week before the auction. At this point, Mrs. Dolphin and the Wilsons offer conflicting accounts of what happened. According to Mr. Wilson, Mrs. Dolphin agreed that, if he could purchase the land in her name for its appraised value, approximately $13,000.00, and if he could clear up all outstanding indebtedness, she would deed the land to him. However, when it came time to sign the deed, Mrs. Dolphin refused. Mrs. Dolphin denies the existence of an agreement.\ni. Recusal\nWe first consider the question of whether the chancellor should have recused from the case. After the Wilsons filed their complaint for specific performance, Mrs. Dolphin filed a motion asking Chancellor Kathleen Bell to recuse. The basis of the motion was that Mr. Wilson was Judge Bell\u2019s law partner from 1981 to 1989. The motion also stated that Judge Bell\u2019s name remained listed in the yellow pages of the Helena-West Helena telephone directory as an attorney in private practice with the same address and phone number as Usted for Mr. Wilson.\nOn appeal, Mrs. Dolphin argues that the chancellor\u2019s failure to recuse violates Canon 1, Canon 2(a), and Canon 3(e) of the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon 1 is general in nature, requiring a judge to uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary. Canon 2(a) requires a judge to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety. Canon 3(e) requires a judge to disqualify herself in a proceeding in which her impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including where the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party\u2019s lawyer.\nJudges must refrain from presiding over cases in which they might be interested and must avoid all appearance of bias. Reel v. State, 318 Ark. 565, 886 S.W.2d 615 (1994). However, we will not reverse a judgment on the basis of a trial judge\u2019s decision not to disqualify unless the judge has abused her discretion. Id. To decide whether there was an abuse of discretion, we review the record to determine if any prejudice or bias was exhibited. Id. The question of bias is usually confined to the conscience of the judge. Noland v. Noland, 326 Ark. 617, 932 S.W.2d 341 (1996). Judges are presumed to be impartial, and the party seeking disqualification has the burden of showing otherwise. Turner v. State, 325 Ark. 237, 926 S.W.2d 843 (1996).\nMrs. Dolphin did not mention Canon 1 at the trial level, so we will not address this portion of her argument for the first time on appeal. Douthitt v. Douthitt, 326 Ark. 372, 930 S.W.2d 371 (1996). Canons 2(a) and 3(e), also relied on by Mrs. Dolphin, do not address the situation in which a judge is a former law partner of an attorney who is before the judge. We are aware, however, of one federal district court case from Arkansas holding that a judge is not required to disqualify if a former law partner is counsel in the proceeding. Katz v. Looney, 733 F.Supp. 1284 (W.D. Ark. 1990). Cases from other jurisdictions have held likewise. Singer v. Wadman, 745 F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1028 (1985); Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London v. Oryx Energy Co., 944 F. Supp. 566 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Miller Industries, Inc., v Caterpillar Tractor Co., 516 F.Supp. 84 (S.D. Ala. 1980), affirmed, 733 F.2d 813 (11th Cir. 1984); Bonelli v. Bonelli, 570 A.2d 189 (Conn. 1990); Hall v. Hall, 247 S.E.2d 754 (Ga. 1978).\nIt does concern us that, in this case, Mr. Wilson is not appearing as an attorney, but as the party seeking specific performance of an alleged oral contract. However, no hearing was held on the issue of recusal, and none was requested. The decision on the part of a judge not to recuse is affirmed when there is no abuse of discretion. Reel v. State, supra. Mrs. Dolphin did nothing more on this issue than file a motion making the assertions described above, and the chancellor denied the motion without comment, so we have little information in the record. Because Mrs. Dolphin has not met her burden of proving that Judge Bell was biased, we must conclude that the chancellor did not abuse her discretion in faffing to recuse from the case. We add, however, that the recusal issue was not well developed in this case. We do not foreclose the possibility that the outcome might be different in another case with a better-developed record.\n2. Specific performance of an oral contract to sell land\nWe next consider whether the Wilsons\u2019 complaint for specific performance was barred by the statute of frauds. In a letter opinion, the chancellor ruled in favor of the Wilsons and granted the petition for specific performance. The chancellor found that, by clear and convincing proof, the terms of the oral contract had been proven. She also required the Wilsons to reimburse Mrs. Dolphin for the 1994 taxes she paid on the land.\nContracts for the sale of lands must be in writing to be enforceable. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-59-101 (a)(4) (Repl. 1996). There is no allegation in this case that a written agreement exists. Instead, Mr. Wilson claims that his payment for the land and his assumption of possession took the contract out of the operation of the statute of frauds. However, to take an oral contract out of the statute of frauds, both the making of the oral contract and its performance must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. French v Castleberry, 238 Ark. 1038, 386 S.W.2d 482 (1965); Pfeifer v Raper, 253 Ark. 438, 486 S.W.2d 524 (1972).\nThe trial in this case primarily consisted of the competing testimonies of Mr. Wilson and Mrs. Dolphin. According to Mr. Wilson, Mrs. Dolphin told him that she owed so much money on the property that she could not do anything about the public sale. It was Mr. Wilson\u2019s testimony that Mrs. Dolphin agreed that, if he could get the indebtedness satisfied and could pay for the land to keep it from being sold at auction, she would deed the land to him. According to Mrs. Dolphin, she told Mr. Wilson that he could \u201clook into\u201d the sale of the property. However, she testified that she specifically told him that he could not purchase the land in her name. She denied the existence of any agreement to deed the property to the Wilsons.\nThe only written evidence of communications between the parties is a facsimile that was sent from Mrs. Dolphin to Mr. Wilson on May 18, 1994. Mr. Wilson had told Mrs. Dolphin that he needed her authorization to obtain information from the FmHA about the indebtedness on the property. The one-page fax that Mrs. Dolphin sent read, according to her, as follows:\nThis is to certify that I, Beatrice Dolphin, authorize Jimmie L. Wilson, to obtain information relating to the sale of my property located at Lakeview (Phillips County Arkansas).\nPast due monetary amounts are not to be dispensed with.\ns/Beatrice Dolphin NOTARIZED\nThe record reflects that this exhibit is an original with a raised notary seal. Mr. Wilson denies that the sentence relating to past-due monetary amounts was included.\nAfter receiving the fax, Mr. Wilson sent a letter to the FmHA on his law firm\u2019s letterhead, in which he stated that Ms. Dolphin had contacted his office and had asked that he determine the appraised value of the property. The letter referenced the in rem action in federal district court, and stated that Mr. Wilson\u2019s representation in the matter was limited to tendering the settlement to FmHA. However, at trial, Mr. Wilson testified that he did not represent Mrs. Dolphin as an attorney. Attached to Mr. Wilson\u2019s letter to the FmHA was a copy of Mrs. Dolphin\u2019s May 18, 1994, fax; however, this authorization did not contain the sentence, \u201c[p]ast due monetary amounts are not to be dispensed with.\u201d\nOn May 24, 1994, one day before the auction, Mr. and Mrs. Wilson sent checks to the FmHA in the amount of $13,200.00 for the property, and $1,239.40 for costs. These payments stopped the public sale of the property, and resulted in a satisfaction of judgment being entered on the FmHA\u2019s foreclosure action in federal court. The Wilsons then began work on trying to reduce the $300,000.00 indebtedness on the property. Unbeknownst to them, Mrs. Dolphin was working on her own, during this same period, to get her debt forgiven. She filed a formal application for settlement on August 16, 1994, and the FmHA issued a satisfaction on August 17, 1994. On August 18, 1994, the FmHA county supervisor recommended that Mrs. Dolphin\u2019s debt be can-celled. The FmHA approved the cancellation of the debt on May 2, 1995.\nOnce the debt was satisfied, Mr. Wilson sent a warranty deed to Mrs. Dolphin so she could sign the property over to him. He also began to work on the land. He tried to clean up the property, and drained the back part of the land. He hired the city to mow the property a few times. He had someone disc the land, and he allowed others to plant a crop on part of the parcel. Sometime thereafter, he received notice from Mrs. Dolphin\u2019s attorney that she would not sign the warranty deed.\nThe factors that point to the making of the contract and its performance include the following. The Wilsons paid the appraised value of the land, and worked to remove the indebtedness from the land. After the debt was satisfied, the Wilsons performed maintenance on the land and allowed a crop to be planted on a part of it. Finally, the Wilsons prepared a warranty deed for Mrs. Dolphin to sign.\nThe cases of French v. Castleberry, supra, and Pfeifer v. Raper, supra, are instructive. Both involved tenants who claimed that their landlord had orally agreed to sell them the land which was the subject of their tenancy. In each case, the tenants claimed to have made improvements on the land in reliance on the oral contract. We observed in both cases that the improvements were of the type that might ordinarily be made by tenants. French, 238 Ark. at 1040; Pfeifer, 253 Ark. at 440. We also noted that, to satisfy the statute of frauds, the improvements must be so valuable and substantial that it would be inequitable to refuse specific performance. Id.; Blanton v. First Nat\u2019l Bank of Forrest City, 136 Ark. 441, 206 S.W. 745 (1918).\nThe improvements (mowing, discing to keep down the weeds, and bulldozing debris from a burned building into a pile) by the Wilsons in this case essentially amounted to maintenance. They are the type of maintenance an agent will do for an absentee landowner and hence are consistent with Mr. Wilson\u2019s representation to the FmHA that he was acting as Mrs. Dolphin\u2019s agent. For that matter, Mr. Wilson testified that he had known Mrs. Dolphin all of his life, and this type of maintenance could easily be done by a long-time friend of an absentee landowner. These acts are not \u201cunequivocally referable to the agreement\u201d; they are not \u201cunintelligible or extraordinary unless as an incident of ownership.\u201d 1 E. Allen Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts \u00a7 6.9, at p. 442, & n. 11 (1990), quoting Burns v. McCormick, 135 N.E.373 (N.Y. 1922). Thus, the only evidence of an agreement in this case is the Wilsons\u2019 payment for the land, in Dolphin\u2019s name, and the maintenance of the property. When examining this evidence, we must conclude that it \u201clacks the clarity and cogency that the law demands.\u201d French, 238 Ark. at 1039. When looking at the countervailing evidence on behalf of Mrs. Dolphin, the written evidence that she offered reflects that she only authorized Mr. Wilson to obtain information relating to the sale of her property. She also continued her own efforts to cancel the indebtedness on the land, and paid taxes on the l\u00e1nd in 1994. When considering all the evidence, we conclude that the chancellor clearly erred in finding that there was clear and convincing evidence that an agreement existed between the parties. Under these circumstances, we hold that the Wilsons\u2019 complaint was barred by the statute of frauds, and reverse and remand for entry of an order consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nNewbern, Glaze, and Corbin, JJ., not participating.\nSpecial Justices William Lee Fergus, Leon FIolmes, and John C. Lessel, join in this opinion.\nThornton, J., dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "W.H. \u201cDub\u201d Arnold, Chief Justice." }, { "text": "Ray Thornton, Justice,\ndissenting. I agree with the majority opinion that Chancellor Bell did not commit reversible error by not recusing from this case. As noted in the opinion, the record reveals no indication or expression of bias on the part of the chancellor. However, I must respectfully dissent from the majority decision that the chancellor erred in finding that there was an oral contract between Beatrice Dolphin and Jimmie L. Wilson whereby she would convey her interest in the land to Mr. Wilson in return for his efforts in stopping a foreclosure sale by paying the appraised value of the real property and effectively negotiating settlements of the outstanding debts owed on the land.\nAs the majority points out, in order to take an oral contract to convey land out of the statute of frauds, both the making of the oral contract and its performance must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. French v. Castleberry, 238 Ark. 1038, 386 S.W.2d 485 (1965). As we recently stated in Jones v. Jones, 326 Ark. 481, 931 S.W.2d 767 (1996): \u201cIn reviewing chancery cases, we consider the evidence de novo, but will not reverse a chancellor\u2019s findings unless they are clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.\u201d Id. at 487, 931 S.W.2d at 770; see also McGarrah v. McGarrah, 325 Ark. 81, 924 S.W.2d 260 (1995). Because the chancellor is in a superior position to judge the credibility of the witnesses, this court gives deference to the trial court\u2019s findings of fact unless the appellant can demonstrate that the chancellor abused her discretion by making a decision that was arbitrary or groundless. Holaday v. Fraker, 323 Ark. 522, 915 S.W.2d 280 (1996).\nAs in most cases where the existence of a contract is in dispute, the testimony of the parties in the case before us is contradictory; the decision whether a contract existed addresses itself to the sound discretion of the judge who hears the testimony, considers documentary evidence, and determines factual issues such as whether and to whom payment was made, and whether possession was assumed. Based upon substantial evidence presented at the trial, the chancellor found that Mrs. Dolphin\u2019s farm had become heavily encumbered by debt, and that after her husband\u2019s death in 1988 she took no action to stop a foreclosure proceeding scheduled for May 25, 1994, or to discharge the debt. For all intents and purposes, she had written off the land and the debt.\nThe chancellor considered Mr. Wilson\u2019s testimony that Mrs. Dolphin agreed to sell him the property if he could get the indebtedness satisfied and prevent the public auction by paying the appraised purchase price of FmHA. The chancellor then made the following specific findings:\nUpon reaching this agreement with Respondent, Wilson then contacted the County Supervisor . . . [and] was informed, by letter dated May 20, 1994, of the procedure required to ehminate the public sale of the property. As the result of this letter, Wilson caused to be issued two cashiers checks, both dated May 24, 1994 ... as follows:\n1. Department of Justice \u2014 $1239.40; and\n2. Farmers Home Administration \u2014 $13200.00.\nThe satisfaction of the judgment was filed June 7, 1994 and forwarded to Wilson.\nWilson also engaged the services of a farmers\u2019 organization directed by Calvin King, Arkansas Land and Farm Development Corporation. That organization engaged in mediation efforts with the state and national offices of FmHA. As the result, the mortgages reflecting the outstanding indebtedness of this Respondent were satisfied on August 17, 1994. This satisfaction was forwarded to Wilson.\nAfter the satisfactions were received, Petitioners [the Wilsons] assumed possession of the real property in question. The acts of possession of the Petitioners consisted of having the grass mowed at least 4 times by the City of Lakeview; had the land disced; hired someone to bulldoze debris; and had the back of the property drained .... Wilson then forwarded to [Mrs. Dolphin] the satisfaction referred to previously and a proposed deed. . . .\nThe majority refers to the cases of French v. Castleberry, supra, and Pfeifer v. Raper, 253 Ark. 438, 486 S.W.2d 524 (1972), where we observed that similar improvements made by tenants were insufficient to take an alleged oral agreement to convey the land out of the statute of frauds because such improvements were of the type that might ordinarily be made by tenants. However, Mr. Wilson had no right to be on the land as a tenant. His claim to possession was pursuant to the oral agreement that he testified he and Mrs. Dolphin had entered into.\nWe have noted that to take a contract out of the statute of frauds, the improvements must be so valuable and substantial that it would be inequitable to refuse specific performance. Id.; Blanton v. First Nat\u2019l Bank of Forrest City, 136 Ark. 441, 206 S.W. 745 (1918). Certainly the clear and convincing evidence is that Mr. Wilson made very valuable and substantial improvements to the property. He redeemed it from foreclosure and took action to assist in the satisfaction of the other debts. He also took possession of the property and made improvements including bulldozing and draining parts of the realty.\nWhen deference is given to the chancellor\u2019s findings of fact in this case, it does not appear that those findings are clearly erroneous or clearly against a preponderance of the evidence. The chancellor weighed the evidence, evaluated the credibility of the witnesses, and decided that clear and convincing evidence proved the existence of an oral contract to convey real property, and that Mr. Wilson\u2019s assumption of possession and making of improvements took the contract out of the operation of the statute of frauds.\nI would affirm the chancellor\u2019s order granting specific performance, and for that reason, I must respectfully dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Ray Thornton, Justice," } ], "attorneys": [ "David Solomon, for appellant.", "Wilson Law Firm, P.A., by: E. Dion Wilson, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Beatrice D. DOLPHIN v. Henrietta J. WILSON and Jimmie L. Wilson\n96-631\n942 S.W.2d 815\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered April 7, 1997\n[Petition for rehearing denied May 12, 1997.]\nDavid Solomon, for appellant.\nWilson Law Firm, P.A., by: E. Dion Wilson, for appellees.\nSpecial Justices \u00a5m. Lee Fergus, Leon Holmes, and John C. Lessel join. Newbern, Glaze, and Corbin, JJ., not participating." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 27, "last_page_order": 37 }