{ "id": 50410, "name": "Larry LADWIG v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Ladwig v. State", "decision_date": "1997-04-28", "docket_number": "CR 96-1432", "first_page": "241", "last_page": "246", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "328 Ark. 241" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "943 S.W.2d 571" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "271 Ark. 611", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1756191 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/271/0611-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 Ark. 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1882818 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/303/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 Ark. 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 369170 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/325/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ark. 206", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 12021555 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/326/0206-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-90-804", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(2)(A)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-103", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-2-202", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 Ark. 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1912771 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/314/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ark. 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1935017 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/312/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 Ark. 34", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1753629 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/275/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "878 S.W.2d 409", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1443844 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/317/0686-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 Ark. 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1443770 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/317/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 Ark. 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1451135 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/320/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-10-102", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(3)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 569, "char_count": 9207, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.7663970266384127e-07, "percentile": 0.8339820198011544 }, "sha256": "9901040327fd4e69156702087a12c1c094eb77b9d924350be8a05286f3d7faf0", "simhash": "1:a35e6d224c0f1358", "word_count": 1629 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:26:32.867281+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Larry LADWIG v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "David Newbern, Justice.\nLarry Ladwig was charged with capital murder in connection with the death of Rakaan Ellsworth, the fifteen-month-old son of Mr. Ladwig\u2019s wife, Stephanie Ells-worth. He was convicted of first-degree murder as that crime is described in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-10-102(a)(3) (Repl. 1993), and sentenced to imprisonment for forty years. On appeal, Mr. Ladwig contends his motion for a directed verdict should have been granted because the State failed to prove that he, in the terminology of the statute, \u201cknowingly caused the death of a person fourteen years of age or younger.\u201d We hold that Mr. Ladwig\u2019s testimony is sufficient to support the jury\u2019s determination that his actions resulting in the child\u2019s death were done \u201cknowingly.\u201d Mr. Ladwig\u2019s other point concerns an alleged error in the sentencing procedure, but as it was not raised at the trial, we decline to consider it. The conviction is affirmed.\n\u00cd. Sufficiency of the evidence\nThe evidence demonstrated that on the morning of August 31, 1995, Mr. Ladwig was at home with the child. Rakaan\u2019s mother fed Rakaan and left for work before 7:00 a.m. At a few minutes after 8:00 a.m. she received a telephone call from Mr. Ladwig. He told her that Rakaan was making \u201cfunny noises\u201d and would not wake up.\nMs. Ellsworth rushed home to find Rakaan in his crib with his eyes dilated and unblinking. They took Rakaan to Jefferson Regional Hospital in Pine Bluff. Rakaan did not respond to any of the treatment administered at the Hospital, so he was airlifted to the Arkansas Children\u2019s Hospital in Little Rock. Rakaan did not regain consciousness. He was pronounced brain dead and removed from life support equipment. He died on September 1, 1995.\nWhen Rakaan was being treated at Jefferson Regional Hospital, the doctors noticed several bruises on his body and a large knot on his forehead. They determined that the bruises, the severe swelling of his head, and his other injuries were evidence of child abuse. Police detectives questioned Ms. Ellsworth and Mr. Ladwig at the Hospital.\nMr. Ladwig went to the police station. He was advised of his rights and signed a waiver at 10:07 a.m. He then gave the first of three statements. In the first statement he said that the knot on Rakaan\u2019s forehead was the result of a fall which occurred on the playground. He also claimed that he fell on Rakaan causing him to hit his head on the side of the swimming pool on the evening of August 30. According to the first statement, when he checked on Rakaan at about 7:35 that morning, he discovered that Rakaan had not finished his bottle. Mr. Ladwig told the officers that he could not awaken Rakaan, changed Rakaan\u2019s clothes, and then began to shake him to wake him up. He called Ms. Ellsworth because Rakaan remained unresponsive.\nLater, Mr. Ladwig admitted that he had not been entirely truthful and agreed to give a second statement. In that statement he confessed that the bruises on Rakaan\u2019s legs were probably caused by his squeezing the child\u2019s leg too hard. He explained the child\u2019s bruised stomach by saying that on the day before Rakaan\u2019s hospitalization, \u201cHe wouldn\u2019t be quiet and stuff, so I would lay him down and I would slap him with my hand open on his stomach and I\u2019d do that four or five times, and I don\u2019t know, I just kept doing it.\u201d\nWhen questioned about the knot on the victim\u2019s forehead, Mr. Ladwig said, \u201cHe was doing the same thing, and blew up and stuff and I pushed him from behind and [he] fell forward and hit his head on the door.\u201d Mr. Ladwig told investigators that he bruised Rakaan\u2019s ears by squeezing them and shaking the victim on two or three occasions. Although denying that he picked the child up by the ears, he said, \u201cI picked him up and had my hands on his ears and was shaking him and I probably squeezed too hard.\u201d That occurred \u201cin the last couple of days.\u201d Mr. Ladwig also admitted that in the same time period he \u201cprobably hit [Rakaan] up side the head once or twice\u201d in an effort to quiet him.\nWhen questioned about his activities on that morning, Mr. Ladwig continued to claim that he shook the child only in an effort to wake him. The police arrested Mr. Ladwig after this statement was concluded.\nMr. Ladwig gave a third statement on September 3, 1995. In this statement, he said that he panicked when he could not awaken Rakaan and that he placed his hands on the child\u2019s shoulders and shook him in his crib. He admitted that, at the time, he felt like his previous actions had caused the child\u2019s unconsciousness.\nWhen questioned about the knot on the back of Rakaan\u2019s head, he said:\nThe only thing I can think of is when I was shaking him in the crib he hit the, hit the crib, or I hit him on the top of the crib or something when I was shaking him, or something. ... I don\u2019t know. I mean he might have hit his head and he probably did, because I had him right by the top and it was shaking and his head was going back and forth, and that\u2019s probably where he hit his head. ... I probably shook him for more than ten minutes. ... I was shaking him more than a little bit.\nMr. Ladwig also admitted that he knew that slapping a child could hurt him, and that he had heard that a child could be injured if shaken. In regard to shaking a baby, Mr. Ladwig said:\nYou shake them so much that it, I mean you can do damage to their head. . . . You could kill, probably kill them, or serious, you know, seriously give them head damage or something. I don\u2019t know if that\u2019s \u2014 I don\u2019t know a whole lot about it, but I know you probably could kill them if you shook them or something.\nAt trial, the State introduced all three of the statements given by Mr. Ladwig. The State also produced testimony from Dr. Erickson, an associate medical examiner at the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory. He told the jury that the cause of death was craniocerebral trauma.\nA motion for directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Stewart v. State, 320 Ark. 75, 894 S.W.2d 930 (1995); Evans v. State, 317 Ark. 449, 878 S.W.2d 409 (1994); Glick v. State, 275 Ark. 34, 627 S.W.2d 14 (1982). The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Evans v. State, supra; Thomas v. State, 312 Ark. 158, 847 S.W.2d 695 (1993). Substantial evidence is evidence that is of sufficient certainty and precision to compel a conclusion one way or another. Evans v. State, supra; Coleman v. State, 314 Ark. 143, 860 S.W.2d 747, (1993). In determining whether substantial evidence exists, the Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee. Id.\nAccording to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-2-202 (Repl. 1993), \u201cA person acts knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.\u201d\nThe evidence was sufficient to show that Mr. Ladwig struck and shook the child knowing that the result could be serious injury or death. The motion for directed verdict was properly denied.\n2. Sentencing\nWhen the jury could not agree on sentencing, the Trial Court scheduled a hearing to render a sentence as is permitted by Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-103(b) (Repl. 1993). At that hearing, the Trial Court told Mr. Ladwig that he would depart upward from the presumptive sentence stated in the statutory sentencing guidelines, as permitted by Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-90-804 (Supp. 1995), and stated as the justification, required by Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-90-804(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 1995), the following:\nPrincipally because the Court finds, as did the jury, that your conduct was cruel and the victim in this matter was a small, vulnerable child. Secondly the Court is well aware that the jury in your case was deadlocked on the sentence to recommend to this Court. Eleven jurors were in favor of 40 years. One juror was holding out for life.\nThe Trial Court stated that there was \u201cno good reason to deviate from the coEective wisdom and judgment of the eleven jurors\u201d who sentenced Mr. Ladwig to forty years imprisonment.\nMr. Ladwig argues, for the first time on appeal, that the Trial Court erred in its upward departure from the sentencing grid. He claims, without referring to any direct evidence, that the Trial Court had an ex parte communication with the jury, and that the Trial Court failed to use his discretion when he sentenced him in accordance with the wishes of a majority of the jurors.\nWe will not consider an argument contesting the sentence if the appellant, even though present during the sentencing phase, failed to voice to the Trial Court his objection to the sentence. Whitney v. State, 326 Ark. 206, 930 S.W.2d 343 (1996); Reece v. State, 325 Ark. 465, 928 S.W.2d 334 (1996). A defendant who makes no objection at the time sentence is imposed has no standing to complain of it. Williams v. State, 303 Ark. 193, 794 S.W.2d 618 (1990); McGee v. State, 271 Ark. 611, 609 S.W.2d 73 (1980).\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "David Newbern, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Bynum & Kizer, by: Maxie G. Kizer, for appellant.", "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Kelly Terry, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Larry LADWIG v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 96-1432\n943 S.W.2d 571\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered April 28, 1997\nBynum & Kizer, by: Maxie G. Kizer, for appellant.\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Kelly Terry, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0241-01", "first_page_order": 267, "last_page_order": 272 }