{ "id": 50268, "name": "Michael A. OLDNER v. The Honorable F.G. VILLINES, III, County Judge of Pulaski County; Arkansas Quorum Court Members, Bart Moreland, Sidney Newcomb, Tom Alexander, John Pagan, Sr., Wilandra Dean, James L. Wise, Robert Keltner, Annette McCaleb, Mary L. Williams, Johnnie Lee Mass, Lawrence Goddard, Dianne Hudson, Harold Fortson, Charles F. Roberson, John Hall; County Treasurer, Pat Tedford; and State of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Oldner v. Villines", "decision_date": "1997-04-28", "docket_number": "96-372", "first_page": "296", "last_page": "307", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "328 Ark. 296" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "943 S.W.2d 574" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "321 Ark. 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 Ark. 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1449586 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/321/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 Ark. 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1876585 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/287/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 Ark. 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1875317 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/289/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 Ark. 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 Ark. 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1886903 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/300/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 Ark. 476", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 Ark. 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1896990 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/311/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "35 S.W.2d 361", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 Ark. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1441854 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253-54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/183/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 Ark. 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8724824 ], "year": 1878, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/33/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ark. 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1464709 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/215/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 Ark. 822", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1672597 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/263/0822-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 Ark. 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1174873 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/272/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 S.W. 785", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1904, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 Ark. 195", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1505508 ], "year": 1904, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/72/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 Ark. 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1445668 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/323/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 Ark. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1882831 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/303/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 Ark. 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1884242 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/302/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 Ark. 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 9160731 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/324/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "655 S.W.2d 426", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1744848, 1744798 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/280/0106-01", "/ark/280/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "280 Ark. 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1744848 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/280/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 Ark. 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1916756 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/305/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ark. 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1935088 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/312/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 Ark. 241", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1889920 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244" }, { "page": "432" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/298/0241-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 Ark. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1877657 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/285/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 Ark. 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1906103 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/309/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 Ark. 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1910488 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/315/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 Ark. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1907818 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/316/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ark. 1007", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 12025623 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1010-11" }, { "page": "270" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/326/1007-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 26-74-301", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 915, "char_count": 20263, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5938845713437742e-07, "percentile": 0.6825641186030537 }, "sha256": "4745779c71812e6ab6b07585e5bb53549c06d098c7fe7cf7bd29b349e465cd2d", "simhash": "1:5e6604e6611e3efa", "word_count": 3488 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:26:32.867281+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Newbern, J., concurs." ], "parties": [ "Michael A. OLDNER v. The Honorable F.G. VILLINES, III, County Judge of Pulaski County; Arkansas Quorum Court Members, Bart Moreland, Sidney Newcomb, Tom Alexander, John Pagan, Sr., Wilandra Dean, James L. Wise, Robert Keltner, Annette McCaleb, Mary L. Williams, Johnnie Lee Mass, Lawrence Goddard, Dianne Hudson, Harold Fortson, Charles F. Roberson, John Hall; County Treasurer, Pat Tedford; and State of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Robert L. Brown, Justice.\nThis appeal raises the question of whether a one percent sales tax approved by the voters of Pulaski County in 1982 failed to comply with Article 16, \u00a7 11, of the Arkansas Constitution and, thus, constituted an illegal exaction. In particular, the plaintiff/appellant in the matter, Michael A. Oldner, complained that the ballot form violated the Arkansas Constitution by not informing the voters of Pulaski County of the \u201cpurpose\u201d of the tax. The chancellor dismissed the matter on the basis that Article 16, \u00a7 11, does not require the purpose of the tax to be stated in the ballot or county ordinance calling for the election when the sales tax is to be used for general purposes. We affirm the dismissal by the chancellor.\nAppellant Oldner is a resident and taxpayer in Pulaski County. On July 7, 1995, Oldner filed an amended complaint against the Pulaski County Judge, the members of the Pulaski County Quorum Court, and the State of Arkansas (the appellees) and asserted that a one percent sales tax levied against the residents of Pulaski County in 1982 constituted an illegal exaction in that the ballot did not state the object of the tax as required by Ark. Const, art. 16, \u00a7 11. Furthermore, he asserted that the ballot did not inform voters that cities in Pulaski County would be receiving a per capita share of the tax revenues collected. The ballot form for the 1982 election, as taken from Pulaski County Ordinance No. 81-OR-71, which called the sales tax election, read as follows:\n\u201cFOR ADOPTION OF A ONE PERCENT (1%) SALES TAX WITHIN PULASKI COUNTY\u201d\n\u201cAGAINST ADOPTION OF A ONE PERCENT (1%) SALES TAX WITHIN PULASKI COUNTY\u201d\nThe ballot form is precisely the form authorized by Act 991 of 1981, now codified at Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 26-74-301 to -314 (1987 and Supp. 1995). Oldner had previously moved for class certification.\nThe State answered the amended complaint and denied that the ballot did not state the object of the tax or that the sales tax constituted an illegal exaction. The State affirmatively pled failure to set forth facts upon which relief can be granted. The county officials moved to dismiss the amended complaint and Oldner\u2019s motion for class certification. The county officials asserted that the sales tax was a lawful delegation to the counties of the State\u2019s power to tax and, thus, was not a county tax. The county officials further asserted grounds for dismissal based on res judicata, collateral estoppel, laches, and failure to state facts upon which relief can be granted. Oldner countered in his response that the ballot form violated the Arkansas Constitution by not stating the object of the tax and denied that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel applied. Oldner attached to his brief in support of his response Pulaski County Ordinance No. 81-OR-71 (calling for the sales tax election) and an election ballot from Miller County, which he contended did comply with constitutional mandates. The county officials answered Oldner\u2019s response by stating that the ballot for the sales tax at issue had complied with Act 991 of 1981, which authorized counties to levy a one percent sales tax for general purposes.\nOldner next moved for summary judgment, again for the reason that the ballot failed to set forth the object of the tax and, therefore, was unconstitutional. He attached Pulaski County Ordinance No. 81-OR-71 (calling for the sales tax election), Pulaski County Ordinance No. 82-OR-12 (levying the one percent sales tax following the election), and the Miller County election ballot. He also attached the allocation of the sales tax proceeds to municipalities in Pulaski County.\nA hearing was held on the various motions. The county officials urged the chancellor that if the sales tax was to raise revenues for general usage, that purpose did not have to be stated in the ballot. According to county officials, only if the tax was for a specific purpose did that purpose have to be identified under the Arkansas Constitution. Oldner responded that a purpose, whether general or specific, was required to be stated in the ballot. The chancellor granted the motion to dismiss filed by the county officials, which was joined by the State, and her order of dismissal read in pertinent part:\nAfter reviewing the record, considering the briefs of counsel, and hearing oral argument on the pending motion, the Court finds, adjudges, and orders as follows:\n1. This case is not barred by res judicata.\n2. [Defendants\u2019] consolidated motion to dismiss is granted for failure to state facts upon (sic) relief can be granted.\n3. Article 16 \u00a7 11 of the Arkansas Constitution does not require the purpose of the sales tax to be stated in the ballot or Ordinance No. 81-OR-71 where the sales tax is to be used for general purposes. Only where the sales tax is to be used for other than general purposes does Article 16 \u00a7 11 require the ballot and ordinance to state the purpose or intended use of the tax.\n4. Distribution of tax proceeds to political subdivisions other than the levying body need not be stated in the ballot or ordinance No. 81-OR-71 where the sales tax is to be used for the general purposes of that political subdivision.\nI. Order of Dismissal\nThe sole issue on appeal is whether the chancellor erred in dismissing Oldner\u2019s complaint under Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We first must consider whether the chancellor\u2019s order was in fact a 12(b)(6) dismissal or a grant of summary judgment. When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the trial court must treat the facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the party who filed the complaint. Little Rock Cleaning Systems, Inc. v. Weiss, 326 Ark. 1007, 935 S.W.2d 268 (1996); Neal v. Wilson, 316 Ark. 588, 873 S.W.2d 552 (1994); Wiseman v. Batchelor, 315 Ark. 85, 864 S.W.2d 248 (1993). The trial court must not look beyond the complaint unless the court treats the motion as one for summary judgment. Little Rock Cleaning Systems, Inc. v. Weiss, supra; Deitsch v. Tillery, 309 Ark. 401, 833 S.W.2d 760 (1992). Moreover, the court must not lend consideration to factual conclusions reached through the arguments of counsel and exhibits. Guthrie v. Tyson Foods, 285 Ark. 95, 685 S.W.2d 164 (1985). Furthermore, the court may not base its decision on allegations contained in briefs and exhibits. Battle v. Harris, 298 Ark. 241, 766 S.W.2d 431 (1989).\nThe chancellor\u2019s final order states that she reviewed the record and considered the briefs and arguments of counsel in reaching her decision. Nevertheless, it is clear that the chancellor conducted the hearing as a Rule 12(b)(6) hearing, referencing more than once that the allegations of fact in the amended complaint were to be taken as true. See Little Rock Cleaning Systems, Inc. v. Weiss, 326 Ark. at 1010-11, 935 S.W.2d at 270; Battle v. Harris, 298 Ark. at 244, 766 S.W.2d at 432. A Rule 12(b)(6) decision is also evident on the face of the order. Furthermore, the chancellor specifically declined to hear a laches argument because she believed the topic more appropriate for a hearing on summary judgment because it was a \u201cfactual issue.\u201d We will treat the order as a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).\nII. Illegal Exaction\nOn the merits, Oldner\u2019s argument concerning a required statement of an \u201cobject\u201d in the ballot for the sales tax is straightforward, and his appeal must necessarily turn on this court\u2019s interpretation of Article 16, \u00a7 11, of the Arkansas Constitution. That section reads:\nNo tax shall be levied except in pursuance of law, and every law imposing a tax shall state distinctly the object of the same; and no moneys arising from a tax levied for one purpose shall be used for any other purpose.\nArk. Const, art. 16, \u00a7 11. Oldner argues that this section must be given its plain and normal meaning and that the trial court inappropriately carved out an unconstitutional exception when the tax is to be used for general purposes.\nOldner is correct in urging that when the language of the constitution is plain and unambiguous, each word must be given its plain, obvious, and common meaning. Brown v. City of Stuttgart, 312 Ark. 97, 847 S.W.2d 710 (1993); Snyder v. Martin, 305 Ark. 128, 806 S.W.2d 358 (1991); Bishop v. Linkway Stores, Inc., 280 Ark. 106, 655 S.W.2d 426 (1983). Using this standard, we initially question whether the \u201claw imposing the tax\u201d as required in Article 16, \u00a7 11, is the ballot submitted to the voters or the ordinance calling for the election (No. 81-OR-71), as Oldner maintained and as the chancellor apparently accepted. This issue was not addressed by the parties on appeal, but it would seem that the appropriate law imposing the tax is the levying ordinance by Pulaski County \u2014 No. 82-OR-12 \u2014 and not the ordinance calling the election, which was No. 81-OR-71. See Sanders v. County of Sebastian, 324 Ark. 433, 922 S.W.2d 334 (1996). Ordinance No. 82-OR-12, however, was not the subject of Oldner\u2019s complaint.\nWe have recognized recently that a local tax is not valid unless it is levied by the proper local authorities. See Price v. Drainage Dist. No. 17, 302 Ark. 64, 787 S.W.2d 660 (1990). In the instant case, the levying ordinance is No. 82-OR-12. The State and county officials suggested in the hearing before the chancellor that the operable law was Act 991 of 1981, which enabled and authorized counties to levy a one percent sales tax with the ballot form used in the instant case. But regardless of whether the law imposing the tax is Ordinance No. 82-OR-12 or Act 991, Oldner failed to sue or obtain a ruling with respect to either. This deficiency alone could well be grounds for dismissal. Be that as it may, we choose to go forward under these unique facts where the constitutionality of the sales tax is challenged and address the issue of whether the ballot violated Article 16, \u00a7 11, by failing to identify an object of the tax.\nThe appellees contend, in support of affirmance, that Article 16, \u00a7 11, does not apply to tax levies by municipal corporations. We disagree and take this opportunity to clarify the law on this point. Under Article 2, \u00a7 23, of the Arkansas Constitution, the framers of the constitution expressly conceded to the State the right to tax its citizens through the General Assembly. City of Little Rock v. Waters, 303 Ark. 363, 797 S.W.2d 426 (1990). In turn, the General Assembly has within its power the ability to delegate taxing authority to municipal corporations. Ark. Const, art. 2, \u00a7 23; City of Lowell v. M & N Mobile Home Park, Inc., 323 Ark. 332, 916 S.W.2d 95 (1996); Little Rock v. North Little Rock, 72 Ark. 195, 79 S.W. 785 (1904). When a municipal corporation acts within its delegated taxing authority, its ordinance is the equivalent of an Act of the General Assembly. Lowell v. M & N Mobile Home Park, Inc., supra. Counties have long been recognized as municipal corporations. Pulaski County Municipal Court v. Scott, 272 Ark. 115, 612 S.W.2d 297 (1981); Roberts v. Watts, 263 Ark. 822, 568 S.W.2d 1 (1978); City of Hot Springs v. Gray, 215 Ark. 243, 219 S.W.2d 930 (1949); Eagle v. Beard, 33 Ark. 497 (1878).\nIt is true that in 1931, this court held that Article 16, \u00a7 11, had no application to municipal corporations. See Shepherd v. Little Rock, 183 Ark. 244, 35 S.W.2d 361 (1931). In Shepherd, the issue was whether the City of Little Rock could levy a license tax on practicing attorneys and be consistent with the constitution. Although the Shepherd opinion does not mention the specific argument put forth by the attorneys, this court rejected the argument that Ark. Const, art. 16, \u00a7 11, decided the issue and did so in summary fashion:\nWe think this section has no application to municipal ordinances. This section is found in the article of the Constitution on finance and taxation. A number of sections in this article refer specifically to counties and municipalities, and, when the whole article is considered as it must be in order to arrive at a proper interpretation of the section involved, we think it clear that this section does not apply to municipal corporations.\nShepherd v. Little Rock, 183 Ark. at 253-54, 35 S.W.2d at 365.\nWhile the Shepherd case has not been expressly overruled, it has certainly been overruled by implication, as this court has in recent years, on more than one occasion, discussed the applicability of Article 16, \u00a7 11, to municipal corporations. See, e.g., Hasha v. City of Fayetteville, 311 Ark. 460, 845 S.W.2d 500 (1993), reh\u2019g denied, 311 Ark. 476-A, 847 S.W.2d 41 (1993); Hartwick v. Thorne, 300 Ark. 502, 780 S.W.2d 531 (1990), reh\u2019g denied, 300 Ark. 512-A, 780 S.W.2d 531 (1990); Ragan v. Venhaus, 289 Ark. 266, 711 S.W.2d 467 (1986); Bell v. Crawford County, 287 Ark. 251, 697 S.W.2d 910 (1985). In Hasha, for example, we held that a one percent sales tax approved by the voters of Fayetteville was an illegal exaction because the purpose of the approved tax was inextricably linked to the issue of school district bonds, and the tax could not be used to finance the bonds. In the Hasha opinion, we specifically referred to Article 16, \u00a7 11, as being applicable to the case. Similarly, in Hartwick v. Thorne, supra, we applied the mandates of Article 16, \u00a7 11, when funds from a bond issue for a drainage canal approved by the voters of North Little Rock were diverted for curbing and guttering improvements, and we affirmed the chancellor\u2019s finding of an illegal exaction. To the same effect is Bell v. Crawford County, supra. We, therefore, must conclude that the holding in Shepherd v. Little Rock, 183 Ark. 244, 35 S.W.2d 361 (1931), relating to the application of Article 16, \u00a7 11, to municipal corporations has been overruled by the subsequent cases referenced above.\nWe turn then to the issue of whether the sales tax ballot at issue in this case violated Article 16, \u00a7 11. We conclude that it did not. Counsel for the county officials and the State urged at oral argument that the words object and purpose used in Article 16, \u00a7 11, are not used synonymously. According to counsel the object of the tax is a tax on sales, and the purpose of the tax is to raise money for general purposes. Only the object need be included on the ballot, according to appellees\u2019 counsel. While this argument has some appeal, when we review the definitions in Black\u2019s Law Dictionary, the two terms appear to be synonymous:\nOBJECT, n. End aimed at, the thing sought to be accomplished; the aim or purpose, the thing sought to be attained.\nPURPOSE. That which one sets before him to accomplish or attain; an end, intention, or aim, object, plan, project. Term is synonymous with ends sought, an object to be attained, an intention, etc.\nBlack\u2019s Law Dictionary 1072, 1236 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).\nWe believe, however, that the intent of Article 16, \u00a7 11, can be garnered from the express language of the section. We quote it again for ease of reference:\nNo tax shall be levied except in pursuance of law, and every law imposing a tax shall state distinctly the object of the same; and no moneys arising from a tax levied for one purpose shall be used for any other purpose.\nArk. Const, art. 16, \u00a711. If we were to stop reading section 11 at the semicolon, we might agree with Oldner\u2019s interpretation. But reading the section in its entirety and using the words object and purpose interchangeably, the express intent of section 11 is for the object to be stated so that the tax revenues cannot be shifted to a use different from that authorized. Indeed, it is the use of the funds for a different purpose that we have held to be an illegal exaction in the past. See, e.g., Hartwick v. Thorne, supra; Bell v. Crawford County, supra. When explaining what constituted the illegal exaction in Hartwick v. Thorne, supra, we said:\nThe city may have been acting in the utmost good faith \u2014 nevertheless, it tried to appropriate monies arising from taxes for purposes other than the objective which caused the citizens to approve the bond issue.\n300 Ark. at 509, 780 S.W.2d at 534 (emphasis added).\nThus, it is not the mere absence of an object in the law imposing the tax that constitutes the illegal exaction, and Oldner has cited us to no case where we have so held. When a tax is enacted by the General Assembly or approved by a vote of the people without the statement of a purpose, the resulting revenues may be used for general purposes. We fail to see how the voting public could be misled on this point. It is only when a diversion of tax revenues occurs from a specific purpose that has been authorized to an unauthorized purpose that an illegal exaction occurs. We have no doubt that that is the evil sought to be remedied by Article 16, \u00a7 11.\nWe hold that the failure to state an object for the tax in and of itself does not constitute an illegal exaction under Article 16, \u00a7\u00a711 and 13. It is the use of tax revenues for an unauthorized purpose that does. In the instant case, the object of the tax was not stated, which meant the tax funds could be used for general purposes and were not limited to a specific purpose. Because Oldner\u2019s facts do not state a cause of action for illegal exaction under Article 16, \u00a7\u00a7 11 and 13, we affirm the dismissal of his complaint by the chancellor.\nAffirmed.\nNewbern, J., concurs.\nOldner\u2019s original complaint had alleged an illegal exaction based upon a tax that exceeded the one-half-of-one-percent limit set forth in Ark. Const, art. 16, \u00a7 9. Following this court\u2019s decision granting rehearing in the Foster case, Oldner admitted that the decision was dispositive of this claim. See Foster v. Jefferson County Quorum Court, 321 Ark. 105, 901 S.W.2d 809 (1995), supp. op. granting reh\u2019g, 321 Ark. 116-A, 901 S.W.2d 809 (1995).", "type": "majority", "author": "Robert L. Brown, Justice." }, { "text": "David Newbern, Justice,\nconcurring. The first portion of the majority opinion concludes that Michael A. Oldner, the plaintiff in the Trial Court, did not state facts upon which relief could be granted because he did not attack a \u201claw imposing a tax.\u201d I thoroughly agree with that conclusion. Obviously, the failure to state the object of a tax on a ballot does not violate Ark. Const, art. 16, \u00a7 11. The majority opinion should end with that statement. Instead, it unnecessarily goes forward into a tortured interpretation of the Constitution with which I thoroughly disagree.\nArticle 16, \u00a7 11, states:\nNo tax shall be levied except in pursuance of law, and every law imposing a tax shall state distinctly the object of the same; and no moneys arising from a tax levied for one purpose shall be used for any other purpose.\nThe majority opinion allows that the only evil addressed by that section is the one stated in the phrase prohibiting the use of moneys arising from a tax levied for one purpose for another purpose. The ultimate conclusion is that the first phrase of \u00a7 11 is meaningless. That conclusion is reached despite the majority\u2019s correct statement, supported by proper citations, that \u201cOldner is correct in urging that when the language of the constitution is plain and unambiguous, each word must be given its'plain, obvious, and common meaning.\u201d To me, it is apparent that there are two distinct thoughts expressed in \u00a7 11. They are even separated by a semicolon and a conjunction. I am unwilling to ignore either of them.\nWhen we go far beyond that which is necessary to decide litigation, even overruling precedent in the process, we encounter the danger of saying way too much and being sorry later. We will regret this decision that effectively nullifies the requirement that the object of a tax be stated in the law imposing it.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "David Newbern, Justice," } ], "attorneys": [ "Nichols,, Wolff, Ledbetter & Campbell, by: H. Gregory Campbell and Mark W. Nichols, for appellant.", "Pulaski County Attorney\u2019s Office, by: Nelwyn Davis and Stephen Cobb, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Michael A. OLDNER v. The Honorable F.G. VILLINES, III, County Judge of Pulaski County; Arkansas Quorum Court Members, Bart Moreland, Sidney Newcomb, Tom Alexander, John Pagan, Sr., Wilandra Dean, James L. Wise, Robert Keltner, Annette McCaleb, Mary L. Williams, Johnnie Lee Mass, Lawrence Goddard, Dianne Hudson, Harold Fortson, Charles F. Roberson, John Hall; County Treasurer, Pat Tedford; and State of Arkansas\n96-372\n943 S.W.2d 574\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered April 28, 1997\nNichols,, Wolff, Ledbetter & Campbell, by: H. Gregory Campbell and Mark W. Nichols, for appellant.\nPulaski County Attorney\u2019s Office, by: Nelwyn Davis and Stephen Cobb, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0296-01", "first_page_order": 322, "last_page_order": 333 }