{ "id": 50403, "name": "BRUNS FOODS OF MORRILTON, INC. v. Marlin HAWKINS, et al.", "name_abbreviation": "Bruns Foods of Morrilton, Inc. v. Hawkins", "decision_date": "1997-05-05", "docket_number": "97-17", "first_page": "416", "last_page": "420", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "328 Ark. 416" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "944 S.W.2d 509" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "295 Ark. 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1893756 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/295/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 Ark. 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1916840 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/305/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "270 Ark. 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1709262 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/270/0652-01" ] }, { "cite": "26 Ark. App. 59", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137147 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Meisch v. Brady, 270 Ark. 652, 606 S.W.2d 112 (Ark. App. 1980)" }, { "parenthetical": "citing Meisch v. Brady, 270 Ark. 652, 606 S.W.2d 112 (Ark. App. 1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/26/0059-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 Ark. 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1660098 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1952, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/220/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "776 S.W.2d 662", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that a successor in interest in land is in privity with its grantor such that a prior ruling against the grantor is also binding against the successor" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 Ark. 538", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1872686 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that a successor in interest in land is in privity with its grantor such that a prior ruling against the grantor is also binding against the successor" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/291/0538-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 Ark. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1889909 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/298/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 S.W.2d 127", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1913, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 Ark. 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1344018 ], "year": 1913, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/107/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 S.W.2d 45", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1930, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "182 Ark. 920", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1389713 ], "year": 1930, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/182/0920-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 Ark. 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1872610 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/291/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 Ark. 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1891429 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/297/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 Ark. 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1902432 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/307/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "894 S.W.2d 136", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "supplemental opinion denying rehearing" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 Ark. 2", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "supplemental opinion denying rehearing" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 Ark. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1453561 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/319/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 Ark. 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1910545 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/315/0487-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 436, "char_count": 6489, "ocr_confidence": 0.733, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.351297161262299e-08, "percentile": 0.38964414527642344 }, "sha256": "aef6efdf4b767125bd5442a0093c48c9d38eab4274cd5a8a13bc1b09ae6f5db2", "simhash": "1:bb0b8c216a3ac57a", "word_count": 1083 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:26:32.867281+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Glaze, J., not participating." ], "parties": [ "BRUNS FOODS OF MORRILTON, INC. v. Marlin HAWKINS, et al." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice.\nThe appellant, Bruns Foods of Morrilton, Inc., appeals from a dismissal entered in favor of the appellees, Marlin and Marvine Hawkins. The sole issue on appeal is whether a previous decision in a lawsuit between the Hawkinses and a third party bars Bruns Foods\u2019s action against the Hawkinses. We find that it does, and thus we affirm.\nOn August 9, 1982, Marlin and Marvine Hawkins conveyed a 1.69 acre lot located in Morrilton to the McDonald\u2019s Corporation. The deed contained a twenty-year restrictive covenant whereby the Hawkinses agreed not to use the adjoining land for restaurant purposes except for a \u201csit down restaurant connected with a hotel or motel.\u201d Subsequently, McDonald\u2019s conveyed a franchise and lease to Bruns Foods for the operation of a McDonald\u2019s restaurant on the lot.\nTen years later, the Hawkinses filed a petition to abrogate the restrictive covenant as void against public policy. Bruns Foods was not a named defendant nor did it move to intervene in the Hawkinses\u2019s action. The trial court entered a default judgment against McDonald\u2019s for its failure to timely answer the complaint. We initially dismissed the appeal in McDonald\u2019s Corp. v. Hawkins, 315 Ark. 487, 868 S.W.2d 78 (1994), and, in a second appeal, we affirmed the trial court in two separate opinions. McDonald\u2019s Corp. v. Hawkins, 319 Ark. 1, 888 S.W.2d 649 (1994); McDonald\u2019s Corp. v. Hawkins, 319 Ark. 2-A, 894 S.W.2d 136 (1995) (supplemental opinion denying rehearing). Bruns Foods moved to intervene in McDonald\u2019s second appeal, and we summarily denied the motion.\nWhile the second appeal was pending before this court, Bruns Foods filed a separate action against the Hawkinses in the Conway County Chancery Court. In their complaint, Bruns Foods asked the court to declare that the restrictive covenant between the Hawkinses and McDonald\u2019s was enforceable and ran in the favor of Bruns Foods as the franchisee and lessee of McDonald\u2019s. The trial court held that the prior judgment against McDonald\u2019s voided the restrictive covenant and removed it as a cloud on the Hawkinses\u2019s title, which judgment withstood appellate challenges in McDonald\u2019s 1, II, & III. The trial court further found that Bruns Foods had no greater interest than its franchisor, McDonald\u2019s, and therefore, Bruns Foods\u2019s action was barred by the prior judgment. Accordingly, the court dismissed the action, and Bruns Foods appeals.\nFor its sole argument on appeal, Bruns Foods argues that the trial court erred when it found that the prior judgment affirmed in McDonald\u2019s II, & III barred Bruns Foods\u2019s lawsuit against the Hawkinses. As we have stated numerous times in the past, under the doctrine of res judicata, a valid and final judgment rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction bars another action by the plaintiff or his privies against the defendant or his privies on the same claim or cause of action. Robinson v. Buie, 307 Ark. 112, 817 S.W.2d 431 (1991); Toran v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 297 Ark. 415, 764 S.W.2d 40 (1989). Privity of parties within the meaning of res judicata means \u201ca person so. identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right.\u201d Robinson, supra; Spears v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins., 291 Ark. 465, 725 S.W.2d 835 (1987).\nOn appeal, Bruns Foods argues that res judicata does not bar its action because it was not in privity with McDonald\u2019s. We disagree with this assertion. It is well settled that a lessee only holds temporary possession of the land while the ownership rights remain in the lessor. Chastain v. Hall, 182 Ark. 920, 33 S.W.2d 45 (1930). Hence, the trial court was correct when it found that Bruns Foods, as lessee, had an inferior interest to that of McDonaid\u2019s, its lessor. Likewise, we have also held that when a landowner is barred by the statute of limitations, then so too is the tenant. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humphreys, 107 Ark. 330, 155 S.W.2d 127 (1913). Therefore, we hold that a tenant is in privity with his or her landlord such that a judgment that determines interests in real property against the landlord will bar relitigation of the matter by the tenant. See also, Ward v. Davis, 298 Ark. 48, 765 S.W.2d 5 (1989); Phelps v. Justiss Oil Co., 291 Ark. 538, 776 S.W.2d 662 (1987) (holding that a successor in interest in land is in privity with its grantor such that a prior ruling against the grantor is also binding against the successor).\nWe realize that the Hawkinses prevailed over McDonald\u2019s by default judgment and not by an adjudication on the merits. We, however, have previously recognized with regard to the doctrine of res judicata that a decree entered by default is as conclusive as any other judgment or decree. Lewis v. Bank of Kensett, 220 Ark. 273, 247 S.W.2d 354 (1952). The Court of Appeals has also held that for the purposes of res judicata:\nA judgment by default is just as binding and forceful as a judgment entered after a trial on the merits in a case; and it is not to be discredited or regarded lightly because of the manner in which it was acquired. A default judgment determines a plaintiffs right to recover and a defendant\u2019s liability just as any conventional judgment or decree.\nWilliams v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 26 Ark. App. 59, 759 S.W.2d 815 (1988) (citing Meisch v. Brady, 270 Ark. 652, 606 S.W.2d 112 (Ark. App. 1980)). This reasoning is sound because res judicata applies not only to issues which were actually litigated, but also to those issues which could have been litigated in the prior lawsuit. Lemon v. Laws, 305 Ark. 143, 806 S.W.2d 1 (1991); Swofford v. Stafford, 295 Ark. 433, 748 S.W.2d 660 (1988). Accordingly, we hold that an issue previously resolved by default judgment is barred from relitigation under the doctrine of res judicata.\nBecause we find that res judicata bars Bruns Foods\u2019s action against the Hawkinses, we need not address appellant\u2019s argument that this case is not barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine. For these reasons, we find that Bruns Foods\u2019s attempt to resurrect the stricken restrictive covenant must fail, and thus we affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling.\nAffirmed.\nGlaze, J., not participating.", "type": "majority", "author": "Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Chisenhall, Nestrud & Julian, P.A., by: Jim L. Julian and Jamie W. McFarlin, for appellant.", "Mark Cambiano and Phil Stratton, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BRUNS FOODS OF MORRILTON, INC. v. Marlin HAWKINS, et al.\n97-17\n944 S.W.2d 509\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered May 5, 1997\nChisenhall, Nestrud & Julian, P.A., by: Jim L. Julian and Jamie W. McFarlin, for appellant.\nMark Cambiano and Phil Stratton, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0416-01", "first_page_order": 442, "last_page_order": 446 }