{ "id": 236197, "name": "Roderick Leshun RANKIN v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Rankin v. State", "decision_date": "1997-07-14", "docket_number": "CR 96-1025", "first_page": "379", "last_page": "401", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "329 Ark. 379" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "948 S.W.2d 397" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "27 Ark. App. 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6141259 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/27/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 Ark. 568", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1756222 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/271/0568-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 Ark. 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 922756 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102" }, { "page": "550" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/327/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 Ark. 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1906066 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246-47" }, { "page": "109-110" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/309/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 Ark. 843", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8724109 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Fogleman, J., concurring" }, { "parenthetical": "Fogleman, J., concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/244/0843-01" ] }, { "cite": "247 Ark. 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1600837 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Fogleman, J., concurring" }, { "parenthetical": "Fogleman, J., concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/247/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 Ark. 768", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1756059 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/271/0768-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 Ark. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1882760 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/303/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-89-107", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)(l)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 Ark. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1878591 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/284/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "286 Ark. 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8719414 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/286/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 Ark. 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8721081 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/273/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 Ark. 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1447576 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/322/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 Ark. 692", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 922898 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/327/0692-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-10-101", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "a" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 Ark. 8", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1447517 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/322/0008-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-30-102", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 Ark. 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1892765 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" }, { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/296/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 Ark. 258", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 9159645 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "264" }, { "page": "824" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/324/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-88-204", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 Ark. 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 369200 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/325/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-2-302", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 Ark. 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1912752 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/314/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "876 S.W.2d 588", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1443778 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/317/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 Ark. 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 Ark. 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1447518 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/322/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-618", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 Ark. 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 50314 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90" }, { "page": "416" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/328/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 Ark. 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1748221 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/278/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 Ark. 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1872693 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/291/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 Ark. 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1910493 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/315/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ark. 196", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 12021509 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" }, { "page": "432" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/326/0196-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 Ark. 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1910495 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/315/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "875 S.W.2d 814", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1907745, 1910447 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/316/0753-01", "/ark/315/0658-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 Ark. 753", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1907745 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/316/0753-01" ] }, { "cite": "892 S.W.2d 511", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1453628 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/319/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 Ark. 602", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1453677 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "603" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/319/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ark. 878", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 12025292 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "879" }, { "page": "251" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/326/0878-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 Ark. 813", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1455904 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "816" }, { "page": "719" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/318/0813-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 Ark. 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1447538 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "557" }, { "page": "665" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/322/0553-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 Ark. 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 369160 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283" }, { "page": "331" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/325/0278-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1482, "char_count": 40196, "ocr_confidence": 0.736, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.097751089686435e-07, "percentile": 0.9555937431101196 }, "sha256": "7b81e3a45b887eb679f5bc3c69ef543574e3fbe244d1b60347ff96a861c8156c", "simhash": "1:e7098006440ce5d0", "word_count": 6733 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:24:12.305718+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Roderick Leshun RANKIN v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "David Newbern, Justice.\nRoderick Leshun Rankin, the appellant, was sentenced to death for the capital murders of Zena Reynolds, her mother Ernestine Halford, and her stepfather Nathaniel Halford. Mr. Rankin raises six points on appeal. Most of Mr. Rankin\u2019s assignments of error are either meritless or procedurally barred from review. Mr. Rankin\u2019s argument concerning the admission of his incriminating custodial statements is, however, well taken. Mr. Rankin asserts that the Trial Court admitted his statements into evidence without first holding a hearing on his motion to suppress. As the record fails to reflect whether a hearing was held on the motion or whether a ruling was made, we reverse and remand. On remand, the Trial Court shall conduct a hearing on the record for the limited purpose of determining whether Mr. Rankin\u2019s statements were made after knowingly and intelligently waiving his right against self-incrimination.\nAt trial, the State introduced the testimony of Sonyae Reynolds, who was the sister of victim Zena Reynolds and the daughter of victim Ernestine Halford. Ms. Reynolds testified that she hid in a closet in the victims\u2019 home during the attack. She said that she believed the assailant was Mr. Rankin because she saw the assailant wearing clothes that she knew to be similar to Mr. Rankin\u2019s clothes. Ms. Reynolds admitted that she did not see the assailant\u2019s face and that she had previously told the police that the assailant was not Mr. Rankin because she thought the assailant had shorter legs than Mr. Rankin. The type of clothing described by Ms. Reynolds was later discovered at Mr. Rankin\u2019s home and admitted into evidence.\nMs. Reynolds\u2019s testimony established a motive for the murder. According to her testimony, Mr. Rankin had repeatedly threatened to kill Ms. Reynolds and her family if she left him. The testimony showed that Mr. Rankin and Ms. Reynolds were having \u201crelationship problems\u201d and that Mr. Rankin was often jealous of Ms. Reynolds\u2019s other male friends and had hit her on other occasions.\nSharon Carter, who lived next to the victims\u2019 home, testified that she saw someone fleeing after hearing the door being kicked open and then gunshots. She said that the person fleeing was tall. Her description of the clothes worn by this person was generally consistent with the description given by Ms. Reynolds and consistent with the type of clothes discovered at Mr. Rankin\u2019s home.\nThe scientific evidence established that a pistol found near the victims\u2019 home was used in the murder. That pistol, along with a VCR and some CDs, had been stolen from the home of Ernest R. Demmings, a local fireman. The evidence showed that the VCR and CDs were found at Mr. Rankin\u2019s home. The VCR in fact appeared to be hidden under dirty clothes. Although the evidence did not show that the pistol was ever seen at Mr. Rankin\u2019s home, the State argued that Mr. Rankin had come into possession of the murder weapon when he came into possession of the VCR and CDs.\nDetective James Cooper of the Pine BlufFPolice Department testified that he had been interrogating Mr. Rankin on the day of his arrest when he was told the murder weapon had been discovered. Detective Cooper testified that he relayed that information to Mr. Rankin. Another officer showed the pistol to Mr. Rankin, who responded, \u201cYou don\u2019t have to show me that because I\u2019m going to talk to you.\u201d The police then began to record the interrogation. The jury received transcripts of the interrogation and heard the tape played in court.\nIn the interrogation, the police officers asked Mr. Rankin if he had kicked in the door to the victims\u2019 house and shot the victims. They asked Mr. Rankin if he had experienced problems with Sonyae Reynolds; whether such problems led him to commit the murders; whether he was wearing blue shoes on the morning of the murders; and whether he had seen blood on the shoes. They asked him whether the .gun that they had shown him was the murder weapon and whether he had placed it at the location where it was discovered. Mr. Rankin\u2019s response to each of these questions was a simple \u201cYes, sir.\u201d\nThe police also asked Mr. Rankin who he saw first when he entered the house. He answered that he first saw Zena Reynolds and her children on the couch. The officers asked Mr. Rankin what happened next, and he answered, \u201cI don\u2019t know. It just\u2014 then everybody start running out and I \u2014 I guess I got scared.\u201d The officers asked him if he then started shooting, and he answered \u201cYes, sir.\u201d Mr. Rankin told the police that he shot Zena Reynolds, then Mrs. Halford, then Mr. Halford. He told the officers that he knew Sonyae Reynolds was also in the house but that he got scared and left. At the conclusion of the first interrogation, Mr. Rankin stated that \u201cthis is not what I meant to happen and I\u2019m sorry, but I know that won\u2019t bring them back.\u201d In the second interrogation that occurred on the afternoon of Mr. Rankin\u2019s arrest, the police asked Mr. Rankin how he arrived at the victims\u2019 home. He answered, \u201cI walked.\u201d Thereafter, Mr. Rankin reached for the tape recorder, turned it off, and indicated that he no longer wished to talk with the police.\n\u00cd. Sufficiency of the evidence\nMr. Rankin argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his capital-murder convictions and that the Trial Court therefore erred in denying his motion for directed verdict. We must address this point before considering other assignments of trial error in order to preserve Mr. Rankin\u2019s right to freedom from double jeopardy. Bradford v. State, 325 Ark. 278, 283, 927 S.W.2d 329, 331 (1996). We conclude that Mr. Rankin has faded to preserve the question of the sufficiency of the evidence for review and thus affirm on this point without reaching the merits.\nArkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure'33.1 requires a defendant to renew his motion for directed verdict at the \u201cclose of the case\u201d in order to preserve for review any question pertaining to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury verdict. Even if a defendant renews his motion at the close of his case-in-chief, the requirement of the rule to renew the motion at the \u201cclose of the case\u201d obligates the defendant to renew the motion again at the close of any rebuttal case that the State may present in order to preserve the sufficiency issue for appeal. Heard v. State, 322 Ark. 553, 557, 910 S.W.2d 663, 665 (1995); Christian v. State, 318 Ark. 813, 816, 889 S.W.2d 717, 719 (1994). The renewal of the motion for directed verdict must occur before the jury is charged. Webb v. State, 326 Ark. 878, 879, 935 S.W.2d 250, 251 (1996). An \u201cattempt to renew a motion for directed verdict after the jury has been charged is not timely and is not in compliance with the rule.\u201d Claiborne v. State, 319 Ark. 602, 603, 892 S.W.2d 511, 512 (1995). See Marshall v. State, 316 Ark. 753, 875 S.W.2d 814 (1994); Thomas v. State, 315 Ark. 504, 868 S.W.2d 483 (1994).\nCounsel for Mr. Rankin moved for a directed verdict at the close of the State\u2019s case and renewed the motion at the close of Mr. Rankin\u2019s case-in-chief. The motions were denied. The State then presented its rebuttal case. The State rested, and defense counsel indicated that he had no \u201csurrebuttal.\u201d The judge told the jury that the evidence-taking portion of the trial had concluded, and he read the jury instructions. The State made its closing arguments, and defense counsel made his closing arguments. After a recess, the State presented a rebuttal argument.\nDefense counsel did not attempt to renew the motion for directed verdict until after the State had completed its rebuttal argument. By that time, the jury had been charged, and closing arguments had been concluded. The attempt to renew the motion therefore was not timely. Because the motion was made after the jury had been charged, the motion was not renewed \u201cat the close of the case,\u201d and thus the sufficiency argument was not preserved for review..\n2. Mistrial\nMr. Rankin also argues that his conviction should be reversed because two of the State\u2019s witnesses, apparently in violation of an order of the Trial Court granting a motion in limine, testified that blood or possible blood stains were' found on Mr. Rankin\u2019s tennis shoe. Mr. Rankin contends that this testimony was prejudicial and required the Trial Court to order a mistrial. Prior to trial, Mr. Rankin moved in limine to exclude any laboratory reports or testimony showing that human blood had been found on Mr. Rankin\u2019s tennis shoe and blue jeans. The motion stated that the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory was unable to determine whether blood found on these items was related to the murders. The record does not contain a ruling from the Trial Court on Mr. Rankin\u2019s motion in limine.\nDuring the State\u2019s case-in-chief, Cathy Ruhl, a forensic crime-scene technician with the Pine Bluff Police Department, testified that she received a pair of navy blue Reeboks and a pair of black-top tennis shoes that the police had taken from Mr. Rankin\u2019s home during a consensual search. Ms. Ruhl identified the Reeboks in court and testified without objection that they \u201cwere sent to the State Crime Lab to have serology done on them\u201d because one of the shoes contained \u201cpossible blood stains.\u201d Ms. Ruhl testified without objection that the black-top tennis shoes were not sent to the Lab because \u201c[t]here were no visible signs of stains on the shoes.\u201d\nDetective Daniel Dykes of the Pine Bluff Police Department later testified that he participated in a consensual search of Mr. Rankin\u2019s home along with other officers on the morning of the murders. Detective Dykes stated that the police located one pair of tennis shoes by the couch on which Mr. Rankin had been sleeping and a second pair underneath the couch. Detective Dykes testified that \u201cthe tennis shoes had just a little bit of blood on them. Where I saw the blood was on the soles of the tennis shoes.\u201d\nDefense counsel then objected to Detective Dykes\u2019s statement that he observed blood on the shoe and expressed his belief that the Trial Court had granted the motion in limine and \u201chad instructed everyone to admonish their witnesses not to make any reference\u201d to suspected blood stains found on Mr. Rankin\u2019s shoes. The judge indicated that defense counsel\u2019s characterization of his ruling was \u201ccorrect.\u201d The judge recalled that, due to the inconelusive evidence linking any blood to Mr. Rankin or to the victims, he had ordered the State not to ask questions about blood stains found on Mr. Rankin\u2019s shoes and to admonish its witnesses \u201cnot to bring it up.\u201d The judge indicated that the testimony of Ms. Ruhl and Detective Dykes violated his order.\nDuring an in-chambers conference concerning the objection, counsel for Mr. Rankin mentioned the need for either a strong admonition to the jury to disregard the references to blood on the clothing or a mistrial. During the discussion of those possibilities, the Trial Court twice asked counsel what he was being asked to do. No motion for a mistrial was offered by counsel whose final word on the subject was the following:\nWell, I\u2019ll put it in my words, your Honor. I would ask the Court to go out and admonish the jury to disregard the testimony regarding any existence of blood on Mr. Rankin\u2019s shoes and then further admonish the jury that, in fact, it is the understanding of the Court from the parties that there is no credible evidence of blood relating Mr. Rankin to the scene of this crime.\nThe judge and counsel agreed that a cautionary instruction would be necessary in light of the testimony given by Ms. Ruhl and Detective Dykes. At the conclusion of Mr. Rankin\u2019s case-in-chief, the judge indicated to counsel that he would give the instruction, and counsel responded, \u201cThat\u2019s all we want.\u201d Prior to the State\u2019s rebuttal case, the judge gave the following instruction:\nLadies and gendemen, before we go any further, I have been asked by the attorneys that \u2014 to tell you that in response to some testimony that actually inadvertently was brought out earlier in the trial the attorneys have assured me that there is no scientific evidence available to prove that any substance found on the defendant\u2019s tennis shoes was related to or came from the crime scene.\nMr. Rankin now argues that the Trial Court erred by failing to grant a mistrial on account of the testimony given by Ms. Ruhl and Detective Dykes. Even if we assume that the testimony violated the Trial Court\u2019s order granting Mr. Rankin\u2019s motion in limine, we cannot say that the Trial Court erred by failing to order a mistrial in response to the violation in view of the ultimate failure of counsel to seek a mistrial and their agreement to the requested admonition. Generally speaking, a trial judge is under no duty to declare a mistrial sua sponte. See, e.g., Lovelady v. State, 326 Ark. 196, 199, 931 S.W.2d 430, 432 (1996). We typically decline to hold that a judge commits reversible error by failing to order a mistrial on his own motion when none was requested. Edwards v. State, 315 Ark. 126, 864 S.W.2d 866 (1993); Meadows v. State, 291 Ark. 105, 722 S.W.2d 584 (1987); Floyd v. State, 278 Ark. 86, 643 S.W.2d 555 (1982). Mr. Rankin \u201ccannot complain on appeal because he received all of the relief he asked for at trial.\u201d Stephens v. State, 328 Ark. 81, 90, 941 S.W.2d 411, 416 (1997).\n3. Mental retardation\nMr. Rankin further argues that the Trial Court erred by refusing to find that Mr. Rankin was mentally retarded at the time of the commission of the murders and was therefore ineligible for the death penalty under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-618 (Repl. 1993).\nAccording to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-618(b), \u201c[n]o defendant with mental retardation at the time of committing capital murder shall be sentenced to death.\u201d This provision was enacted by Act 420 of 1993. The statute provides that the defendant \u201chas the burden of proving mental retardation at the time of committing the offense by a preponderance of the evidence.\u201d \u00a7 5-4-618(c). A defendant is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of mental retardation if his intelligence quotient (\u201cIQ\u201d) is 65 or below, \u00a7 5-4-618(a)(2), but the definition of \u201cmental retardation\u201d encompasses more than an IQ score. The statute defines mental retardation as follows:\n(A) Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning accompanied by significant deficits or impairments in adaptive functioning manifest in the developmental period, but no later than age eighteen (18); and\n(B) Deficits in adaptive behavior.\n\u00a7 5-4-618(a)(l)(A)-(B).\nA defendant who wishes to invoke this provision must do so by written motion prior to trial. \u00a7 5-4-618 (d)(1). If such motion is filed, the trial court must determine prior to trial whether the defendant is in fact mentally retarded. \u00a7 5-4-618 (d)(2).\nA finding by the trial court that the defendant is mentally retarded prevents the jury from being \u201cdeath qualified.\u201d If the mentally retarded defendant is convicted of capital murder, the jury is required to sentence him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. \u00a7 5-4-618 (d)(2)(B).\nIf the trial court rejects the defendant\u2019s argument and finds that the defendant is not mentally retarded, then the defendant may take his case to the jury. Despite the trial court\u2019s adverse determination, \u201cthe defendant may raise the question of mental retardation to the jury for determination de novo during the sentencing phase of the trial.\u201d \u00a7 5-4-618(d)(2)(A). If the defendant proceeds under this provision, the jury shall receive a special verdict form on mental retardation when it retires to consider mitigating and aggravating circumstances. \u00a7 5-4-618 (d)(2) (A) (i). If the jury unanimously finds that the defendant was mentally retarded at the time of the commission of the capital offense, he is automatically sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. \u00a7 5-4-618 (d)(2) (A) (ii).\nIn a pretrial motion, Mr. Rankin moved the Trial Court to find him mentally retarded pursuant to \u00a7 5-4-618(d)(l). The Trial Court held a hearing on the motion, heard testimony, and ultimately denied the motion. Mr. Rankin elected not to present the issue of mental retardation to the jury under \u00a7 5-4-618(d)(2)(A). Thus, he appeals only the Trial Court\u2019s determination that he was not mentally retarded under this statute.\nAlthough we have discussed this statute in past cases, see Reams v. State, 322 Ark. 336, 909 S.W.2d 324 (1995); Fairchild v. Norris, 317 Ark. 167, 876 S.W.2d 588 (1994); Fairchild v. Norris, 314 Ark. 221, 861 S.W.2d 111 (1993), we have not announced the standard by which we will review a trial court\u2019s ruling on the question of mental retardation under \u00a7 5-4-618. That issue is now before us. We analogize this case to those in which we have reviewed a trial court\u2019s determination of a defendant\u2019s fitness to stand trial under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-2-302 (Repl. 1993). The standard there is whether the trial court\u2019s finding is supported by substantial evidence. Key v. State, 325 Ark. 73, 923 S.W.2d 865 (1996). We adopt the same standard for reviewing a trial court\u2019s determination under \u00a7 5-4-618. Thus, a trial court\u2019s finding that a defendant is not mentally retarded under \u00a7 5-4-618 will be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence.\nThe Trial Court\u2019s determination that Mr. Rankin was not mentally retarded at the time of the commission of the murders is supported by substantial evidence. At the hearing on Mr. Rankin\u2019s motion, the Trial Court received the testimony of David Nanak, a psychological examiner for the Southeast Arkansas Mental Health Center. Mr. Nanak testified that he administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale \u2014 Revised examination to Mr. Rankin in February 1995. As Mr. Nanak explained, this examination measures a person\u2019s IQ. Mr. Rankin scored a 66 on the February 1995 examination. According to Mr. Nanak, the test had a margin of error of 2.94 points.\nMr. Nanak testified that Mr. Rankin\u2019s IQ score of 66 placed him \u201cin the mild range of mental retardation,\u201d which was from 50-69. Mr. Nanak explained that his conclusion was \u201cbased strictly on the numbers obtained through the intellectual testing. It is not a diagnosis. That was a classification he tested into.\u201d\nHowever, Mr. Nanak testified that he reviewed the results of a second IQ test administered in September 1995 by Dr. Philip Murphy in Oklahoma City. Dr. Murphy\u2019s evaluation, done at the behest of defense counsel, showed that Mr. Rankin had an IQ of 72. Mr. Nanak testified that this reflected a six-point increase from his first score and that the standard variance between tests was three points. Mr. Nanak stated that this score removed Mr. Rankin from the \u201cmild mental retardation\u201d range. Mr. Nanak stated that it was his clinical impression that, based on the results of the September 1995 IQ test, Mr. Rankin was more accurately classified as \u201cborderline intelligent,\u201d although it appears from the record that Dr. Murphy concluded that Mr. Rankin was \u201cmildly to borderline mentally retarded.\u201d Mr. Nanak testified that Dr. Murphy\u2019s testing produced a \u201ccloser estimate of [Mr. Rankin\u2019s] actual functioning level\u201d than the February 1995 evaluation. Mr. Nanak testified that Dr. Murphy\u2019s \u201ctesting is probably more valid, more accurate than mine.\u201d Mr. Nanak stated that he endorsed the results obtained by Dr. Murphy\u2019s evaluation.\nMr. Nanak explained that the six-point difference in Mr. Rankin\u2019s two IQ scores was probably due in part to Mr. Rankin\u2019s adjustment to his incarceration. Mr. Nanak testified that he administered the February 1995 exam to Mr. Rankin in the county jail only a few months after his arrest. Mr. Nanak testified that Mr. Nanak probably had a high anxiety level at that point but that, by September 1995, he had probably adjusted. Mr. Nanak testified that he would expect Mr. Rankin to operate at a higher functioning level after having the opportunity to adjust to incarceration over the course of five or six months. Mr. Nanak conceded that a person who retakes an IQ test might achieve a higher score based simply on acquiring some degree of familiarity with the test, but he said that, in his experience, this would produce only a one- or two-point increase. Mr. Rankin achieved a six-point increase.\nMr. Nanak further testified that he administered the Wide Range Achievement test, an academic achievement test, and determined that Mr. Rankin was operating on fourth- or fifth-grade levels in reading and arithmetic. Mr. Nanak stated that Mr. Rankin told him that he had an eighth-grade education. He concluded that Mr. Rankin was functioning \u201csomewhat behind\u201d his education level.\nFinally, Mr. Nanak testified that he conducted an interview with Mr. Rankin in which he found that Mr. Rankin was able to communicate, to understand what he is hearing, and to respond in a coherent manner. Mr. Nanak stated that he believed Mr. Rankin was concerned about his appearance and his place in public and that he was able to get along with others, function within a group, sustain relationships, and take care of his personal needs.\nDr. John Anderson, a psychologist with the forensic unit at the Arkansas State Hospital, testified that he had analyzed the evaluations performed by Mr. Nanak and Dr. Murphy and concluded that their reports were \u201creasonable assessments of [Mr. Rankin\u2019s] functioning at the time he was evaluated.\u201d Dr. Anderson testified about the increase in Mr. Rankin\u2019s IQ score from a 66 to a 72. He explained that the five- to six-month interval between the two tests made it unlikely that the increase was due to any \u201ctest-retest effect.\u201d Dr. Anderson also indicated that the score on the portion of Mr. Rankin\u2019s IQ test that would have been most likely to increase on account of the \u201ctest-retest effect\u201d did not increase. Finally, Dr. Anderson testified that he found Mr. Rankin to be polite but somewhat evasive, uncooperative, and malingering. Dr. Anderson stated that Mr. Rankin was able to understand what he was telling him and that he was \u201ccompetent,\u201d \u201ccoherent,\u201d and was not suffering from a mental disease or defect at the time of the murders.\nMr. Rankin argues in his brief that the testimony introduced at the hearing established his entitlement to the rebuttable presumption of mental retardation under \u00a7 5-4-618(a)(2). We disagree. The testimony showed that Mr. Rankin scored a 66 on his first IQ test and a 72 on his second IQ test. These scores did not entide Mr. Rankin to the presumption under \u00a7 618(a)(2). Under that provision, a defendant is entided to the presumption only if his IQ is 65 or below. Mr. Rankin\u2019s scores do not fall within this range.\nMoreover, Mr. Nanak testified that he believed the score of 72 was more accurate than the score of 66. He further indicated that he believed Mr. Rankin was \u201cborderline intelligent\u201d rather than \u201cmildly mentally retarded.\u201d That testimony constitutes substantial evidence in support of the Trial Court\u2019s finding. We reject Mr. Rankin\u2019s suggestion that the Trial Court was obligated to accept the score of 66 over the score of 72 or to \u201creduce\u201d these scores by the possible three-point margin of error or \u201caverage\u201d them together in some way.\n4. Change of venue\nMr. Rankin also argues on appeal that the Trial Court erred by denying his motion to change the venue for his trial from Jefferson County. We affirm on this point.\nMr. Rankin filed a pretrial motion seeking a change of venue pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-88-204 (1987), and Article 2, \u00a7 10, of the Arkansas Constitution. The motion alleged that it would be \u201cimpossible to select a fair and impartial jury from Jefferson County as a result of pre-trial publicity\u201d and recited various instances of such publicity including a newspaper article that had reprinted Mr. Rankin\u2019s custodial statements and a radio announcement that urged listeners to attend the trial of \u201cthe man who killed\u201d the victims. The motion asserted that there had been \u201cmuch discussion\u201d about the case throughout the city.\nAttached to Mr. Rankin\u2019s motion were affidavits from six Pine Bluff citizens who asserted that Mr. Rankin would not be able to \u201creceive a fair trial in Jefferson County, Arkansas\u201d on account of the press coverage and the \u201cfrequent\u201d and \u201cgeneral\u201d discussions about the case that had occurred throughout the local community.\nThe Trial Court held a hearing on Mr. Rankin\u2019s venue motion. Mr. Rankin first introduced the testimony of James Gregory, a Pine Bluff resident who sells insurance and also works as a funeral director and mortician. Mr. Gregory testified that he had frequent contact with \u201cthe general public\u201d through his work and heard the case \u201cdiscussed in several different places.\u201d Mr. Gregory stated that the people that he had encountered were of the \u201cgeneral opinion\u201d that Mr. Rankin was guilty. According to Mr. Gregory, the public was simply wondering whether Mr. Rankin would receive the death penalty or life imprisonment. Mr. Gregory admitted that he encountered this sentiment mostly in the course of talking with Pine Bluff citizens.\nMr. Rankin also introduced the testimony of James Claybon, the general manager of KYDE, the Pine Bluff radio station that aired the announcement mentioned above. Mr. Claybon estimated that the announcement had been \u201csporadically\u201d aired some twenty-seven times over the course of two or three weeks. Mr. Claybon indicated that KYDE is a twenty-four-hour gospel station on the AM frequency. He conceded that the station\u2019s signal reaches only 68 percent of Jefferson County\u2019s physical area and misses entire areas of the county and the city of Pine Bluff. He could not pinpoint how much of the county\u2019s roughly 90,000 population receives the signal, but he testified that the Arbitran company had estimated that the station had roughly 38,000 mostly African-American listeners over a multi-county area that included Jefferson County.\nFinally, Mr. Rankin presented the testimony of Jessie Pearl Jackson, a Pine Bluff resident who owns her own beauty shop. Ms. Jackson testified that she caters to men and women customers of various races and ages, approximately 75 percent of whom are African-American. Ms. Jackson testified that she sees an average of 30 customers per week, many of whom are from Jefferson County. Ms. Jackson testified that there was a consensus among her customers that Mr. Rankin is guilty and that her customers wondered why the State had to waste money on a trial. She asserted that if there were any people in the county who could give Mr. Rankin a fair trial, \u201cthey are not coming to my salon.\u201d\nArkansas Code Ann. \u00a7 16-88-201 provides as follows:\nAny criminal cause pending in any circuit court may be removed by the order of the court, or by the judge thereof in vacation, to the circuit court of another county whenever it shall appear, in the manner provided in this subchapter, that the minds of the inhabitants of the county in which the cause is pending are so prejudiced against the defendant that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in that county.\nThe most important aspect of the issue concerning the effect of pretrial publicity upon the minds of the inhabitants of the county in which the case is to be tried is whether a fair jury can be selected. At the outset of Mr. Rankin\u2019s trial, the Trial Court mentioned that there had been some press coverage of the case. He asked the pool of potential jurors if they had independent knowledge of the case beyond the press accounts. Some answered yes; many said they had not formed an opinion about Mr. Rankin\u2019s guilt or innocence and would not be biased. Others mentioned that they would be biased, and they were excused. Defense counsel specifically asked if anyone had heard radio-station announcements, and none responded affirmatively. Many could not recall hearing any pretrial publicity. Those who could recall hearing press coverage stated that they had formed no opinions as to Mr. Rankin\u2019s guilt or innocence and could be fair and impartial and decide the case based on what was presented to them. Then the judge asked what he called a \u201ccatch-all question\u201d:\n. . . ladies and gendemen, is there anything that any of you know about your situation, your mind set, or whatever, that would keep you from hstening to the testimony and the evidence and making a decision at the conclusion of this case based only on what you hear in this courtroom in the way of evidence and the law as the Court would instruct you?\nThere was no response, and the Trial Court responded, \u201cAll right.\u201d\n\u201cThere can be no error in the denial of a change of venue if an examination of the jury selection shows that an impartial jury was selected and that each juror stated he or she could give the defendant a fair trial and follow the instructions of the court.\u201d Bell v. State, 324 Ark. 258, 264, 920 S.W.2d 821, 824 (1996). Nor was Mr. Rankin entitled to jurors who were \u201ctotally ignorant of the facts surrounding the case, as long as they can set aside any impression they have formed and render a verdict solely on the evidence at trial.\u201d Gardner v. State, 296 Ark. 41, 52, 754 S.W.2d 518, 523 (1988).\nIn addition, we note that Mr. Rankin used only eleven of the twelve peremptory challenges he was allowed during the selection of the jurors. His counsel attempted to use the twelfth challenge against a prospective alternate juror after the twelve regular jurors had been chosen, but they were not allowed to do so. That ruling was correct. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-30-102(c) (Repl. 1994). Having failed to exhaust his peremptory challenges prior to the seating of the jury, Mr. Rankin is in no position to demonstrate prejudice from a ruling denying his venue motion. Oliver v. State, 322 Ark. 8, 907 S.W.2d 706 (1995).\nIn light of the testimony introduced at the hearing which showed less-than-pervasive publicity, the failure of Mr. Rankin to demonstrate during voir dire that there were publicity-affected jurors, and the fact that he did not use all his peremptory challenges, we cannot say that the Trial Court abused his discretion by denying Mr. Rankin\u2019s change-of-venue motion.\n5. Death penalty\nMr. Rankin also argues that the Trial Court erred by denying his motion to declare the death-penalty statute unconstitutional. We also affirm on this point.\nThe State charged Mr. Rankin with three counts of capital murder pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-10-101 (a) (4) (Repl. 1993), which provides that \u201c[a] person commits capital murder if . . . [w]ith the premeditated and deliberated purpose of causing the death of another person, he causes the death of any person . . . .\u201d The information did not charge Mr. Rankin with any other offense, and Mr. Rankin did not object to the capital-murder instructions or request that instructions be given on any other offense.\nIn a pretrial motion, Mr. Rankin requested the Trial Court to quash the information on the ground that \u00a7 5-10-101(a)(4) is unconstitutional due to its \u201coverlap\u201d with the first-degree murder statute at \u00a7 5-10-102(a)(2). He asserted that first-degree murder is a \u201clesser-included offense\u201d of capital murder and that the two offenses were \u201cidentical.\u201d He claimed that he would have a right to an instruction on any lesser-included offenses at trial and that due process required that the jury be able to consider, and convict on, any lesser-included offense. Mr. Rankin also claimed that our statutory scheme is unconstitutional because it fails to provide the jury with any standard by which to differentiate between the offenses of capital murder and first-degree murder. Mr. Rankin further contended that our statutory scheme is unconstitutionally void for vagueness and that it fails to guarantee equal protection of the laws because it provides for different punishments for the same conduct depending on whether the State charges the defendant with capital murder or first-degree murder.\nMr. Rankin repeats most of these arguments on appeal. With respect to the argument that the jury was provided with no standard to differentiate between capital murder and first-degree murder, we point out that Mr. Rankin was not charged with first-degree murder and that Mr. Rankin did not request an instruction on that offense. The only choice given to the jury was to convict on the capital-murder counts or to acquit. In any event, we have rejected Mr. Rankin\u2019s \u201coverlap\u201d and \u201cvagueness\u201d arguments in numerous cases. See, e.g., Lee v. State, 327 Ark. 692, 942 S.W.2d 231 (1997); Nooner v. State, 322 Ark. 87, 907 S.W.2d 677 (1995). We also have rejected the claim that our statutory scheme creates an arbitrary classification in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 273 Ark. 508, 621 S.W.2d 482 (1981). See also Cannon v. State, 286 Ark. 242, 690 S.W.2d 725 (1985); Penn v. State, 284 Ark. 234, 681 S.W.2d 307 (1984).\n6. Suppression hearing\nWe finally address Mr. Rankin\u2019s assertion that the Trial Court erred by admitting into evidence his custodial statements \u2022 without conducting a suppression hearing. We remand the case so that such a hearing may be conducted.\nMr. Rankin gave two incriminating statements to the police on the day of his arrest that are discussed in detail at the outset of this opinion. In a pretrial motion filed on September 12, 1995, Mr. Rankin moved to suppress the statements. In his motion, he claimed that he made the statements while suffering from mental disease or defect and that this condition rendered him incapable of knowingly and intelligently waiving his right against self-incrimination. Mr. Rankin asserted that he made the statements as a result of fatigue and confusion, his youth and lack of education, mild retardation, and his inability to understand the nature of the questioning. Mr. Rankin alleged that he did not realize he was confessing to the murder of three people and that he was only \u201cagreeing\u201d to the police\u2019s statements. Mr. Rankin further alleged that he did not realize that he was entitled to counsel before answering the detectives\u2019 questions. He claimed he had requested to see his mother and brother so that they could get him a lawyer, but he said that he was advised by the detectives that he did not need a lawyer. Mr. Rankin maintained that admitting the confession into evidence would violate his right against self-incrimination, and he specifically requested that the Trial Court hold a hearing on, and ultimately grant, his motion to suppress.\nThe record contains no account of any hearing that occurred in response to Mr. Rankin\u2019s suppression motion, and it contains no ruling by the Trial Court on the motion.\nDuring the State\u2019s case-in-chief, the prosecutor was examining Detective James Cooper of the Pine Bluff Police Department about his interrogation of Mr. Rankin. The prosecutor asked Detective Cooper a question concerning statements made by Mr. Rankin that were not recorded. Defense counsel objected that such statements were not admissible because they were not recorded, and the Trial Court overruled the objection. Shortly thereafter, the prosecutor offered into evidence Mr. Rankin\u2019s inculpatory statements that were recorded, and they were received without objection.\nAccording to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-89-107(b)(l) (1987),\n. . . the determination of fact concerning the admissibility of a confession shall be made by the court when the issue is raised by the defendant; the trial court shall hear the evidence concerning the admissibility and the voluntariness of the confession out of the presence of the jury, and it shall be the court\u2019s duty before admitting the confession into evidence to determine by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession has been made voluntarily.\nHere, the admissibility of Mr. Rankin\u2019s custodial statements was clearly \u201craised by the defendant\u201d by way of Mr. Rankin\u2019s pretrial motion to suppress. That motion asserted that the statements should be suppressed because they were not made following a knowing and intelligent waiver by Mr. Rankin of his right against self-incrimination. Despite the State\u2019s contention that Mr. Rankin \u201cabandoned\u201d his suppression effort by failing to object to the admissibility of the statements when they were introduced at trial, Mr. Rankin\u2019s pretrial suppression motion was all that was required by the statute to raise the issue to the Trial Court and trigger its obligation to hold a hearing and address Mr. Rankin\u2019s claims. Moore v. State, 303 Ark. 1, 791 S.W.2d 698 (1990); Buey v. State, 271 Ark. 768, 610 S.W.2d 576 (198.1). We know of no authority, and the State cites none, that requires a defendant to raise the question of the admissibility of his incriminating custodial statements more than once.\nAs the record contains no account of any hearing held by the Trial Court in response to Mr. Rankin\u2019s motion, caution requires that we remand this case with instructions to the Trial Court to conduct a hearing on the record for the limited purpose of determining whether Mr. Rankin made the statements to the police after knowingly and intelligently waiving his constitutional rights. See Moore v. State, supra; Chenowith v. State, 247 Ark. 472, 445 S.W.2d 889 (1969)(Fogleman, J., concurring); Estep v. State, 244 Ark. 843, 427 S.W.2d 535 (1968) (Fogleman, J., concurring).\nSection 16-89-107(b)(1) directs the trial court to \u201chear the evidence concerning the admissibility and the voluntariness\u201d of the custodial statement and to determine, before admitting the statement into evidence, whether it has been made \u201cvoluntarily.\u201d \"We recognize that Mr. Rankin did not move to suppress his incriminating statements on the basis that they were involuntarily given. Rather, he based his motion on the assertion that he failed to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights prior to making the statement. As we have noted, there is a difference between the concept of an involuntary statement and a statement made without a knowing and intelligent waiver of one\u2019s constitutional rights. See Mauppin v. State, 309 Ark. 235, 246-47, 831 S.W.2d 104, 109-110 (1992).\nThe language of \u00a7 16-89-109(b)(l) appears to require the trial court to consider only whether the statement was \u201cvoluntary\u201d when the admissibility of the statement has been raised by the defendant. Our cases, however, clearly require the trial court, if the defendant has alleged that his statement is inadmissible due to the lack of a waiver, to consider in a suppression hearing whether the statement was made after a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights. See, e.g, Moore v. State, supra. Depending on the argument presented by the defendant in his suppression motion, a trial court should determine in the hearing whether the statement is inadmissible on account of its involuntariness or the lack of an effective waiver, or perhaps both of these grounds.\nAs we have done in other cases, see Williams v. State, 327 Ark. 97, 102, 938 S.W.2d 547, 550 (1997), we employ the \u201climited-remand procedure\u201d here and direct the Trial Court on remand to hold a hearing on the record for the limited purpose of considering the arguments and allegations presented in Mr. Rankin\u2019s pretrial suppression motion. If the Trial Court determines, at the conclusion of the hearing, that the statements were not given after a knowing and intelligent waiver, the Trial Court should suppress the statements and order a new trial. If the Trial Court determines that Mr. Rankin made his statements after knowingly and intelligently waiving his constitutional rights, a new trial will not be required. Moore v. State, supra; Harris v. State, 271 Ark. 568, 609 S.W.2d 48 (1980); Guinn v. State, 27 Ark. App. 260, 771 S.W.2d 290 (1989).\n7. Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(h)\nIn accordance with Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(h), the record has been reviewed for erroneous rulings prejudicial to Mr. Rankin, and none has been found.\nRemanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "David Newbern, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Cross, Kearney & McKissic, by: Gene E. McKissic, for appellant.", "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Brad Newman, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Roderick Leshun RANKIN v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 96-1025\n948 S.W.2d 397\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered July 14, 1997\n[Petition for rehearing denied September 11, 1997.]\nCross, Kearney & McKissic, by: Gene E. McKissic, for appellant.\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Brad Newman, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0379-01", "first_page_order": 403, "last_page_order": 425 }