{
  "id": 298642,
  "name": "Sterling BOSTON v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Boston v. State",
  "decision_date": "1997-10-09",
  "docket_number": "CR 97-589",
  "first_page": "99",
  "last_page": "102",
  "citations": [
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      "cite": "330 Ark. 99"
    },
    {
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      "cite": "952 S.W.2d 671"
    }
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
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    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
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      "cite": "271 Ark. 145",
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      "reporter": "Ark.",
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      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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      "year": 1980,
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      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        9158899
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      "year": 1996,
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          "page": "151"
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    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-39-101",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "pin_cites": [
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    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-73-120",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "weight": 3,
      "year": 1995,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "(c)(l)"
        }
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:33:54.141445+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Sterling BOSTON v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "W.H. \u201cDub\u201d Arnold, Chief Justice.\nAppellant Sterling Boston was convicted in violation of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-73-120 (Supp. 1995), the unauthorized carrying of a weapon. An officer approached Boston while he was sitting in his taxicab and asked for his license and registration. The officer requested that Boston get out of the vehicle; upon getting out, Boston informed the officer that he had a weapon in his back pocket. The officer arrested Boston for carrying a weapon without a license. Boston appeals the conviction claiming that the statutory defense for carrying a weapon in one\u2019s place of business authorized Boston\u2019s carrying the weapon in his taxicab because this was his place of business.\nThis case involves interpretation of the Arkansas Code and whether the term \u201cbusiness\u201d includes a taxi cab or any motor vehicle used for commercial purposes. Specifically, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a75-73-120 provides:\n(a) A person commits the offense of carrying a weapon if he possesses a handgun, knife, or club on or about his person, in a vehicle occupied by him, or otherwise readily available for use with a purpose to employ it as a weapon against a person.\n(c) It is a defense to a prosecution under this section that at the time of the act of carrying:\n(1) The person is in his own dwelling, place of business, or on property in which he has a possessory or proprietary interest.\nThere is no definition of the term \u201cplace of business\u201d in this statute.\nAppellant contends that a vehicle should be considered a \u201cbusiness\u201d in certain instances for purposes of \u00a75-73 \u2014 120(c)(1); although this specific code section does not define the term \u201cplace of business,\u201d appellant contends that a definition in the commercial burglary statute should be persuasive. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-39-101 (2) (A) criminalizes commercial burglary; this statute defines \u201ccommercial occupiable structure\u201d as any \u201cvehicle where any person carries on a business or calling.\u201d Relying upon the definition contained in the commercial burglary statute, appellant argues that his cab should be considered a business for Ark. Code Ann. \u00a75-73-120(c)(l).\nIn subsection (a) of \u00a75-73-120, the legislature clearly criminalized the carrying of a weapon in \u201ca vehicle.\u201d Appellant relies on the term \u201cbusiness\u201d in the exemptions to the rule found in subsection (c)(1). However, the specific language of that section exempts certain areas clearly relating to real property. Specifically, (c)(1) excludes from criminal prosecution the carrying of a gun in a person\u2019s \u201cown dwelling, place of business, or on property in which he has a possessory or proprietary interest.\u201d The plain meaning of this exception does not include automobiles, nor is there general language which suggests that the list is expandable.\nThe fundamental rule in considering the meaning of a statute is to construe the meaning of the statute just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning. Rush v. State, 324 Ark. 147, 151, 919 S.W.2d 933 (1996). The rule of construction applicable in this case is nonscitur a sociis. This doctrine means \u201cit is known from its associates.\u201d The practical application means that a word can be defined by accompanying words. See, McKinney v. Robbins, 319 Ark. 596, 892 S.W.2d 502, citing Weldon v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 271 Ark. 145, 607 S.W.2d 395 (1980).\nThe exemption for a \u201cbusiness\u201d is contained in a subsection of the statute which pertains to real property; therefore, we conclude that the legislature did not intend for this exception to include automobiles. In three of the other exemption sections, the legislature created exceptions in instances where a person was in an automobile. In \u00a75-73-120 (c)(8), a person is free to carry a weapon in an automobile if he or she has a license to carry a concealed weapon. In \u00a75-73-120 (c)(4) persons may carry weapons when on a journey and in \u00a75-73-120 (c)(6) while traveling to and from hunting. It is clear that the legislature considered vehicles when it crafted the exemptions. If the legislature had intended for a vehicular business to be included, it would have specified. This is particularly clear given the fact that the legislature has utilized such a definition before, in the commercial burglary section.\nWe apply the principle of construction nonscitur a sociis, and we hold that the word \u201cbusiness\u201d does not include vehicular businesses. Therefore, the statute does not provide a defense to Boston, and the trial court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "W.H. \u201cDub\u201d Arnold, Chief Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "William R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, by: Deborah H. Sailings, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.",
      "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Kelly Terry, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Sterling BOSTON v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 97-589\n952 S.W.2d 671\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered October 9, 1997\nWilliam R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, by: Deborah H. Sailings, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Kelly Terry, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0099-01",
  "first_page_order": 127,
  "last_page_order": 130
}