{ "id": 298560, "name": "TRI-COUNTY FUNERAL SERVICE, INC., d/b/a Howard Funeral Home v. EDDIE HOWARD FUNERAL HOME, INC.", "name_abbreviation": "Tri-County Funeral Service, Inc. v. Eddie Howard Funeral Home, Inc.", "decision_date": "1997-12-18", "docket_number": "97-220", "first_page": "789", "last_page": "801", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "330 Ark. 789" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "957 S.W.2d 694" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "366 F.2d 108", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2063214 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/366/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 A.L.R.3d 8", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 F.2d 240", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 64686 ], "year": 1944, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/143/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 P.2d 1212", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1215", "parenthetical": "\"Nor is it necessary for the plaintiff to prove present damage, since the purpose of the action is to prevent the damage which would arise if defendant becomes established under the deceptive name.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "190 Ark. 911", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1421886 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1935, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "912" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/190/0911-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 Ark. 937", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8724989 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/243/0937-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 Ark. 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1897006 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284" }, { "page": "309", "parenthetical": "\"When a business purchases goodwill and a trade name, it acquires a valuable property right, and that is the right to inform the public that it possesses the experience and skill symbolized by the original concern.\"; sale of trade name specifically mentioned in bill of sale" }, { "page": "282" }, { "page": "308" }, { "page": "282" }, { "page": "308" }, { "page": "284" }, { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/311/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 F.Supp. 895", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 1443215 ], "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "903" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/185/0895-01" ] }, { "cite": "846 F. Supp. 742", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 1200633 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "757" }, { "page": "757", "parenthetical": "stating the right to a trademark or trade name \"originates in common law by prior appropriation and use\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/846/0742-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 Ark. 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1876559 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23" }, { "page": "831" }, { "page": "23-24" }, { "page": "831" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/287/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 F. Supp. 150", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 683724 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157" }, { "page": "153-54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/85/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 N.W. 924", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "year": 1909, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "925" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 So. 140", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So.", "case_ids": [ 5315412 ], "year": 1913, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "143" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/la/132/1052-01" ] }, { "cite": "162 P.2d 146", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 2085815 ], "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "150", "parenthetical": "stating injunction should issue when statute imposes \"positive duty\" \"upon the court to grant injunctive relief. . . when the conditions set forth therein are made to appear\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or/177/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 Ark. 755", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1691766 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/233/0755-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 S.W.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1740730, 1740780 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/282/0417-01", "/ark/282/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 Ark. 395", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1740780 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/282/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 Ark. 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8719289 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/288/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-71-113", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 867, "char_count": 18681, "ocr_confidence": 0.732, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.437833896578933e-08, "percentile": 0.48449716566487083 }, "sha256": "602e1265bda81f609e5948d4f32f94c54d499f4c873b13972b154861e7aa57b7", "simhash": "1:83744036a5a38dc0", "word_count": 3143 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:33:54.141445+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Imber, J., not participating." ], "parties": [ "TRI-COUNTY FUNERAL SERVICE, INC., d/b/a Howard Funeral Home v. EDDIE HOWARD FUNERAL HOME, INC." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "David Newbern, Justice.\nThis is a trade-name infringement case. The appellant, Tri-County Funeral Service, Inc. (\u201cTri-County\u201d), which does business as Howard Funeral Home in Melbourne, sought an injunction pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-71-113 (Repl. 1996) to prohibit the appellee, Eddie Howard Funeral Home, Inc., also located in Melbourne, from using the name \u201cHoward\u201d in connection with its funeral business. The Chancellor declined to issue the injunction. Our determination in this de novo review is that Tri-County was entitled to the relief sought; thus we reverse the Chancellor\u2019s decision.\nIn 1949, Roman and Wilma Howard began working for the Roller Funeral Home in Melbourne. At some point in the 1950s they left that employment. The funeral home changed hands several times, and Mr. and Mrs. Howard returned as employees in 1961. A Mr. Robinson purchased the business while it was being operated as \u201cMcCollum Funeral Home,\u201d and in 1968 Mr. Robinson asked the Howards for permission to operate as \u201cHoward Funeral Home,\u201d although the Howards owned no interest in the business. Permission was granted.\nIn 1974, Billy Howard, Mr. and Mrs. Howard\u2019s son, joined them as an employee of Howard Funeral Home. In 1978, the business was sold to Justin Jones who, in 1984, sold it to Rhodes-Madden, Inc., the parent company of Tri-County. In the sales agreement, there was a provision selling the name, \u201cHoward Funeral Home.\u201d The ensuing bill of sale, however, did not mention the sale of the name. Tri-County continued to operate the business as Howard Funeral Home.\nRoman Howard retired sometime during the 1980s. Billy Howard left his employment with the business in 1984. Wilma Howard remained until 1989 when her employment was terminated because of rumors that Billy Howard was attempting to open a competing funeral business.\nIn 1991, Billy Howard was rehired by Tri-County to manage the business, and he rehired Wilma Howard as an employee. In 1992, Billy Howard hired his younger brother, Eddie Howard, to work in the business. Billy Howard died, and Eddie Howard became the manager in 1994. In 1996, Eddie Howard\u2019s employment was terminated due to his apparent efforts to begin a competing business. Wilma Howard then resigned from her employment with Tri-County.\nEddie Howard established \u201cEddie Howard Funeral Home, Inc.,\u201d a corporation of which he and his wife are the only shareholders. Tri-County sued to prevent that corporation from using the Howard name, alleging that the name had acquired a secondary meaning and that it constituted an interest protectable in accordance with \u00a7 4-71-113.\nEddie Howard and Wilma Howard intervened in the proceeding with a complaint seeking to enjoin Tri-County from using the name \u201cHoward,\u201d alleging that they had not been compensated for the use of the name and seeking to revoke the permission given to Tri-County\u2019s predecessor.\nAt the trial, Robert Eichelberger, secretary-treasurer of the parent company of Tri-County, testified that when his company purchased a funeral home it attempted to keep the same name and employees in the operation so that people may not even realize that a change in ownership has taken place. He testified further that there had been a slight decrease in the business of Howard Funeral Home since the Eddie Howard Funeral Home commenced operations and that some confusion had resulted from the fact that two funeral businesses are now using the Howard name.\nThe first of two orders issued by the Chancellor denied temporary relief to Tri-County. The Chancellor emphasized that the Howards had not been compensated for the use of their name and that Tri-County had failed to show that any property interest had been \u201cdamaged\u201d by use of the name by Eddie Howard Funeral Home, Inc. The subsequent order denied permanent relief but ordered Eddie Howard to return a customer list to Tri-County. In his order denying relief to Tri-County, the Chancellor dismissed the Howards\u2019 claim in intervention, and no appeal has been taken from that aspect of the order. Nor has the order to return the list been appealed by Eddie Howard.\nThe relevant language of \u00a7 4-71-113 is as follows: \u201cLikelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of ... a trade name valid at common law, shall be grounds for injunctive relief notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of goods and services.\u201d Eddie Howard Funeral Home, Inc., concedes that the Chancellor applied the wrong standard in holding that there had been no showing of \u201cdamage\u201d to an interest held by Tri-County, as the statute imposes no such requirement. The question for us is thus whether Tri-County had a \u201ctrade name valid at common law,\u201d and if so, whether there was \u201clikelihood of injury\u201d to Tri-County\u2019s \u201cbusiness reputation\u201d or \u201cdilution\u201d of its trade name. In addition, we consider whether Eddie Howard has an inherent right to use his own name in his business even if it runs afoul of an established secondary meaning and the protection offered by the statute.\nGenerally speaking, the granting or denying of an injunction is a matter within the discretion of a chancellor, and we do not reverse unless there has been a clearly erroneous factual determination, Warren v. Robinson, 288 Ark. 249, 704 S.W.2d 614 (1986); Bassett v. City of Fayetteville, 282 Ark. 395, 669 S.W.2d 1 (1984), or unless the decision is contrary to some rule of equity or the result of improvident exercise of judicial power. Mills v. Patton, 233 Ark. 755, 346 S.W.2d 689 (1961). We agree, however, with Tri-County\u2019s assertion that when a statute provides terms that constitute grounds for issuing an injunction, a chancellor\u2019s discretion is somewhat circumscribed. See State Industrial Accident Comm\u2019n v. Miller, 162 P.2d 146, 150 (Or. 1945)(stating injunction should issue when statute imposes \u201cpositive duty\u201d \u201cupon the court to grant injunctive relief. . . when the conditions set forth therein are made to appear\u201d); Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry. Co. v. Webster Sand, Gravel & Constr. Co., 62 So. 140, 143 (La. 1913); Sawyer v. Termohlen, 122 N.W. 924, 925 (Iowa 1909).\n1. Trade name property\nEddie Howard Funeral Home, Inc., suggests that Tri-County was not entitled to an injunction because it has no valid interest or property right in using the \u201cHoward\u201d name in connection with its business. The suggestion seems to be that Tri-County had not acquired an interest in the Howard name because (1) neither it, nor any of its predecessors, paid consideration to the Howards for the use of their name; (2) the Howards had orally given permission to Mr. Robertson to use their name, and that permission was later revoked with respect to Tri-County; and (3) the right to use the Howard name was not mentioned in the bill of sale and thus was not acquired by Tri-County from Mr. Jones. No authority is cited by the Howards or the Chancellor for the proposition that successful acquisition of a trade name depends on those factors.\nThere is ample authority for the proposition that a person acquires a property right in a trade name merely by using the name in connection with a particular business for a period of time.\n\u201cGenerally, the word \u2018trade name\u2019 applies to a business and its good will, while the word \u2018trade-mark\u2019 applies to the commodity to which it is affixed.\u201d King Pharr Canning Operations, Inc. v. Pharr Canning Co., 85 F. Supp. 150, 157 (W.D. Ark. 1949). \u201cTrade names are afforded protection under the law of unfair competition. They are protected by a registration statute and by the common law. See Ark. Stat. Ann. 70-539(E), 70-550 [now Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-71-113], and 70-552 (Repl. 1979).\u201d Pullan v. Fulbright, 287 Ark. 21, 23, 695 S.W.2d 830, 831 (1985). \u201c[W]hen a name, mark or symbol has acquired a \u2018secondary meaning,\u2019 the original user has a \u2018property right which equity will protect against unfair appropriation by a competitor.\u2019\u201d Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. Sunrise Land Corp., 846 F. Supp. 742, 757 (W.D. Ark. 1994), quoting Pullan v. Fulbright, supra.\nThe concept of \u201csecondary meaning\u201d has been explained as follows:\nThere are certain names, marks, and symbols which in their primary sense are merely generic or descriptive and do not ordinarily indicate the origin of goods or services. Such names, marks, or symbols, when used in their primary sense, cannot form the subject matter of a trade or service mark. However, a name, mark, or symbol by long and exclusive use and advertising by one person in the sale of his goods and services may become so associated in the public mind with such goods or services that it serves to identify them and distinguish them from the goods or services of others. When such an association exists, the name, mark, or symbol is said to have acquired \u201csecondary meaning\u201d in which the original user has a property right which equity will protect against unfair appropriation by a competitor.\nPullan v. Fulbright, 287 Ark. at 23-24, 695 S.W.2d at 831, quoting Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Ins. Co. of Tex., 185 F.Supp. 895, 903 (E.D. Ark. 1960).\nWe do not have many cases that thoroughly treat the question of how one acquires a property right in a trade name. Of course, we have recognized that a person may acquire such a right by purchasing the name. See Williams v. Spelic, 311 Ark. 279, 284, 844 S.W.2d 305, 309 (1992)(\u201cWhen a business purchases goodwill and a trade name, it acquires a valuable property right, and that is the right to inform the public that it possesses the experience and skill symbolized by the original concern.\u201d; sale of trade name specifically mentioned in bill of sale).\nOne may, however, acquire a protectable interest in a trade name, without purchasing the rights to it, simply by using the name in connection with a business over the course of time and giving a \u201csecondary meaning\u201d to the name. Clyde Campbell University Shop v. Campbell-Bell, Inc., 243 Ark. 937, 422 S.W.2d 875 (1968); Liberty Cash Groceries, Inc., v. Adkins, 190 Ark. 911, 82 S.W.2d28 (1935). See also Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. Sunrise Land Corp., 846 F. Supp. at 757 (stating the right to a trademark or trade name \u201coriginates in common law by prior appropriation and use\u201d), citing 4A Rudolf Callman, The Law of Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies \u00a7 25.03 (L. Altman ed., 4th ed. 1993); Restatement of the Law (Third) Unfair Competition \u00a7 18, at p. 184 (1995).\nTri-County has used the Howard name continuously in connection with its business since 1984, and prior owners of the business used the name continuously since 1968. No one else in the area used that name or a similar name in connection with any business. The Howards, themselves, had never used their own name in connection with a business they owned. Howard Funeral Home was one of only two funeral businesses in the area, and its share of the funeral business was near 70 percent before Eddie Howard opened his business in 1996. Tri-County advertised and promoted its name in various ways.\nThus, it is clear that Tri-County went through the necessary steps of acquiring \u201cHoward Funeral Home\u201d as a valid trade name with obvious \u201csecondary meaning.\u201d It occurred irrespective of any \u201cpermission\u201d initially given by the Howards to Mr. Robertson in 1968 and irrespective of the fact that the Howards later purported to revoke the permission with respect to Tri-County, after it had used the name beginning in 1984.\nThe Howard name was not previously appropriated when Mr. Robertson began to use it in connection with his funeral business in 1968. It was just a surname, and there is no protection given to a surname until it acquires a secondary meaning. 2 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition \u00a7 13.02[1], at p. 13-5 (3d ed. 1995). In 1968, the Howards had not used their name in connection with their business; it had not acquired a secondary meaning. Thus, it was not necessary for the Howards to \u201cpermit\u201d Mr. Robertson or anyone else to call the business the \u201cHoward Funeral Home\u201d because the Howards had not established a protectable interest in their name.\nIt also was irrelevant that the bill of sale was silent on the matter of whether the right to the Howard Funeral Home trade name passed in the transaction between Mr. Jones and TriCounty. Regardless of what transpired in connection with the bill of sale, Tri-County has continued to use, advertise, and promote the Howard Funeral Home name since 1984. Even if Tri-County did not \u201cacquire\u201d the right to that name at the precise point of the 1984 transaction with Mr. Jones, Tri-County most certainly gave the name a \u201csecondary meaning\u201d in the years thereafter.\n2. Infringement\nThe next question is whether Eddie Howard Funeral Home, Inc., by calling its business the \u201cEddie Howard Funeral Home,\u201d has infringed on Tri-County\u2019s trade name, \u201cHoward Funeral Home.\u201d According to the statute, Tri-County has presented grounds for an injunction against Eddie Howard Funeral Home, Inc., if the latter\u2019s actions have created a \u201c[l]ikelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of. . .a trade name valid at common law.\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-71-113 (Repl. 1996). That \u201clikelihood,\u201d if established, \u201cshall be grounds for injunctive relief notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of goods or services.\u201d Id. (emphasis added).\n\u201cThe issue is . . . one ... of the likelihood of dilution of the value of the trade name as an asset by its use by someone other than the owner.\u201d Williams v. Spelic, 311 Ark. at 282, 844 S.W.2d at 308. See also Wood v. Wood\u2019s Homes, Inc., 519 P.2d 1212, 1215 (Colo.App. 1974)(\u201cNor is it necessary for the plaintiff to prove present damage, since the purpose of the action is to prevent the damage which would arise if defendant becomes established under the deceptive name.\u201d)(emphasis added).\n\u201cAn infringement on a trade name is such a colorable imitation of the name that the general public, in the exercise of reasonable care, might think that it is the name of the one first appropriating it. Where such a similarity occurs, it tends to divert trade from a business rival who has previously adopted its name and operates as a fraud which may be restrained by injunction, although the prior users may not have an exclusive right to the use of the name.\u201d\nLiberty Cash Groceries, Inc. v. Adkins, 190 Ark. at 912, 82 S.W.2d at 28 (emphasis added), quoting 26 R.C.L., at p. 876.\nTri-County demonstrated all that the statute required it to demonstrate to be entitled to injunctive relief. It established at least a likelihood of harm or dilution, given the fact that the names are sufficiently similar, Howard Funeral Home had long established a secondary meaning, and \u2014 although seemingly made unnecessary by the statute \u2014 there was testimony about name confusion and a decrease in Howard Funeral Home\u2019s business following the opening of Eddie Howard\u2019s business.\n3. The right to use one\u2019s own name\nOlder cases suggested that a junior user, or \u201csecond comer,\u201d should never be enjoined from using his or her own name in connection with a business, even if a senior user of the same name could be harmed. See, e.g., Societe Vinicole de Champagne v. Mumm, 143 F.2d 240, 240 (2d Cir. 1944). As early as 1949, however, Judge John Miller in King Pharr Canning Operations, Inc. v. Pharr Canning Co., 85 F. Supp. 150, 153-54 (W.D. Ark. 1949), rejected the \u201csacred right\u201d theory in a case involving the federal trade-mark law.\nRecent cases reject the idea that a junior user has an absolute or \u201csacred\u201d right to use his or her own name in business if a first comer has been using that name and has established a secondary meaning. See generally Annotation, Use of \u201cFamily Name\u201d by Corporation as Unfair Competition, 72 A.L.R.3d 8 (1976). See also McCarthy, supra, at \u00a7 13.03[3], at p. 13-13. Because it may become a trade name subject to the rule of priority in order to prevent deception of the public, one has no absolute right to use one\u2019s own name, even honestly, as the name of a business. John R. Thompson Co. v. Holloway, 366 F.2d 108, 113 (5th Cir. 1966). See McCarthy, supra, at \u00a7 13.03[6], at pp. 13-25 to 13-28 (discussing cases imposing \u201cabsolute prohibition against use of personal name as business mark\u201d).\nNo doubt one may continue to use one\u2019s own name personally even after another has added a secondary meaning to it. The question, however, is whether one may use one\u2019s own name in a business if there is a likelihood of dilution of the trade name used by the party having established a secondary meaning or injury to the business reputation of the first user.\nIn Williams v. Spelic, supra, the office-supply portion of a business known as \u201cVowels Printing and Supply\u201d was sold to Mr. and Mrs. Spelic by Mr. and Mrs. Williams. The Vowels name had been used by Mrs. Williams\u2019s father in connection with the business for many years and Vowels apparently was Mrs. Williams\u2019s name prior to her marriage. The part of the business sold was the office-supply portion. The Williamses retained the printing portion that operated across the street from the office-supply store. The Chancellor found that the sales agreement had impliedly sold the Vowels name to the Spelics. The Williamses began using the Vowels name with their printing business. One of the Williamses\u2019 arguments on appeal of an injunction against their use of the Vowels name was that \u201ca family name may be used in the absence of fraud or deceit unless the exclusive right to the family name is contracted away.\u201d 311 Ark. at 282, 844 S.W.2d at 308. We held that the argument ignored the statutory grounds for injunction, noting that a showing of a likelihood of injury to the trade name was sufficient for the issuance of the injunction.\nAn inescapable conclusion to be drawn from our decision in the Williams case is that we reject the \u201csacred right\u201d argument because, \u201c[w]hen a surname is used as a trade name, it risks becoming a symbol of the business and losing its individual identity.\u201d Id. at 284, 844 S.W.2d at 309.\n4. Conclusion\nThe decision of the Chancellor is reversed. Eddie Howard Funeral Home, Inc., is enjoined from using the name \u201cHoward\u201d as part of the name of its business or to identify its business.\nImber, J., not participating.", "type": "majority", "author": "David Newbern, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Home, Hollingsworth & Parker, by: Allan W. Horne and Mark H. Allison, for appellant.", "Blair & Stroud, by: J. Scott Davidson and Robert D. Stroud, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "TRI-COUNTY FUNERAL SERVICE, INC., d/b/a Howard Funeral Home v. EDDIE HOWARD FUNERAL HOME, INC.\n97-220\n957 S.W.2d 694\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered December 18, 1997\nHome, Hollingsworth & Parker, by: Allan W. Horne and Mark H. Allison, for appellant.\nBlair & Stroud, by: J. Scott Davidson and Robert D. Stroud, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0789-01", "first_page_order": 827, "last_page_order": 839 }