{ "id": 1604792, "name": "Sammy Earl STEWART v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Stewart v. State", "decision_date": "1998-02-12", "docket_number": "CR 97-942", "first_page": "359", "last_page": "364", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "331 Ark. 359" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "961 S.W.2d 750" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "326 Ark. 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 12021718 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/326/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "912 S.W.2d 232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 Ark. 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1445687 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/323/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 Ark. 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1869720 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/293/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 Ark. 526", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 50375 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/328/0526-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 Ark. 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 298538 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/330/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-14-101", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(9)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-14-103", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 Ark. 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1910470 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/315/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 Ark. 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1898873 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/310/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 Ark. 739", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1453673 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/319/0739-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ark. 3", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 12019922 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/326/0003-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 Ark. 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 50260 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" }, { "page": "588" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/328/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 Ark. 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 298638 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466-7" }, { "page": "853" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/330/0458-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 505, "char_count": 8232, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5961777149813342e-07, "percentile": 0.6830600934649086 }, "sha256": "e18b8ff3b32de2a0615b97246f1db441a4f67e887e007e602f3b4d0e835c145a", "simhash": "1:7f6a786ae07ad452", "word_count": 1390 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:04:18.346145+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Sammy Earl STEWART v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "W.H. \u201cDub\u201d Arnold, Chief Justice.\nThe appellant, Sammy Earl Stewart, was convicted of the rape, aggravated robbery, and theft of property of a Russellville woman for which he was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of sixty years, forty years, and five years, respectively. On appeal, he argues that the State\u2019s evidence was insufficient to satisfy the penetration element of rape or to identify him as the perpetrator of the crimes. Because we conclude that neither argument has merit, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nThe State elicited the following testimony at trial. On the evening of April 9, 1996, the forty-nine-year-old victim was at home in bed when she was awakened by a crashing sound. When she sat up, she saw a man standing at- the end of her bed. She turned on the light and recognized the man because he had been to her front door earlier that evening asking to mow her lawn. The man ordered the victim to turn off the light, then held a knife to her throat and demanded money.\nAfter dragging the victim out of bed and into her living room, the man, still holding the knife to her throat, told her that he was going to rape her. He threw her on the couch and got on top of her. When the man removed the knife away from the victim\u2019s throat long enough to pull his pants down, she grabbed for the knife and cut her hand. Threatening to kill the victim if she called police, the man pushed her panties to one side without removing them. According to the victim, the man did not have an erection, but just \u201csmushed it in.\u201d According to the victim, there was no doubt in her mind that the man penetrated her. While in the living room, the appellant told the victim that he wanted some jewelry and inquired about her video cassette recorder. Eventually, she managed to escape and ran to a neighbor\u2019s house to call police. When the appellant returned to the residence with police, she noticed that her videocassette recorder and several rings were missing.\nPolice developed the appellant as a suspect in the case. On April 16, 1996, the victim identified the appellant and two or three others as suspects from an album containing photographs of approximately 170 males. Later that day, she identified the appellant and another man in a lineup as resembling her attacker. On a later date, when the victim had the opportunity to observe the appellant and hear his voice, she identified the appellant as her assailant. The victim identified the appellant again at trial, stating that \u201cit was the same man, no doubt.\u201d\nIn a statement given to Russellville Police Officer David Davis, the appellant initially denied that he had ever been to the victim\u2019s residence. However, he subsequently admitted that he had gone to the victim\u2019s house with another person who intended to break in. According to Officer Davis, the appellant claimed that he did not go inside because he thought that someone was there.\nFollowing a rape-kit examination that was performed on the victim, the victim\u2019s panties and vaginal swabs, both of which contained semen, were submitted to the State Crime Lab for testing. The State\u2019s expert who performed the DNA analysis testified that the probability of the victim\u2019s attacker being someone other that the appellant was one in fifteen thousand.\nA latent print taken from the victim\u2019s back door, determined by police as the perpetrator\u2019s point of entry, was also submitted to the State Crime Lab for analysis. Comparing this print to a fingerprint card bearing the appellant\u2019s prints, the State\u2019s fingerprint examiner testified that the impression left on the victim\u2019s back door was the appellant\u2019s left palm print.\nAt the close of the State\u2019s case in chief, the appellant moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the State failed to prove both the penetration element of the rape charge and that he was the person who committed the crimes charged. Following the trial court\u2019s denial of the motion, the appellant testified on his own behalf, claiming that police had conspired against him and that he did not leave his house on the night of the rape. The appellant also presented the testimony of his mother and grandmother, both of whom testified as alibi witnesses. At the close of all the evidence, the appellant renewed his motion for directed verdict. The trial court again denied the motion. The case was submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict finding the appellant guilty of all charges.\nWe have recently reviewed our guidelines for reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence in Green v. State, 330 Ark. 458, 466-7, 956 S.W.2d 849, 853 (1997), quoting McGehee v. State, 328 Ark. 404, 410, 943 S.W.2d 585, 588 (1997):\nMotions for directed verdict are treated as challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. Johnson v. State, 326 Ark. 3, 929 S.W.2d 707 (1996); Penn v. State, 319 Ark. 739, 894 S.W.2d 597 (1995). When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence convicting him, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the state. Dixon v. State, 310 Ark. 460, 470, 839 S.W.2d 173 (1992). Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if the trier of fact can reach a conclusion without having to resort to speculation or conjecture. Id. Substantial evidence is that which is forceful enough to compel reasonable minds to reach a conclusion one way or the other. Id. Only evidence supporting the verdict will be considered. Moore v. State, 315 Ark. 131, 864 S.W.2d 863 (1993).\nSpecifically, the appellant contends that his rape conviction should be reversed because the State failed to prove penetration. As defined in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-14-103(a)(1) (Repl. 1997), a person commits the offense of rape \u201cif he engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity with another person . . . [b]y forcibile compulsion.\u201d \u201cSexual intercourse\u201d is defined in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-14-101(9) (Repl. 1997) as the \u201cpenetration, however slight, of the labia majora by a penis.\u201d\nThe appellant maintains that there was insufficient evidence of penetration because a nurse who examined and questioned the victim after the incident initially wrote in her notes that the victim did not think that her attacker penetrated her. However, the victim testified at trial that the appellant \u201csmushed it in\u201d and that there was no doubt in her mind that he penetrated her. As we have held many times, the uncorroborated testimony of a rape victim is sufficient to support a conviction. Davis v. State, 330 Ark. 501, 956 S.W.2d 163 (1997); Johnson v. State, 328 Ark. 526, 944 S.W.2d 115 (1997). Moreover, any inconsistencies that may have been presented in the testimony were for the jury to resolve. Cope v. State, 293 Ark. 524, 739 S.W.2d 533 (1987). In support of the victim\u2019s testimony, the state offered testimony of a DNA expert that the vaginal swab taken from the victim\u2019s rape examination matched the DNA in appellant\u2019s blood. Thus, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the appellant\u2019s conviction for rape.\nThe appellant further contends that the State\u2019s proof that he was the person who committed the crimes was insufficient. The victim testified at trial that there was no doubt in her mind that the appellant was her assailant. We have held that the uncorroborated testimony of one state\u2019s witness is sufficient to sustain the appellant\u2019s convictions. See Galvin v. State, 323 Ark. 125, 912 S.W.2d 232 (1996). Nevertheless, the State produced evidence that appellant\u2019s left palm print was found on the back door of the victim\u2019s residence. We have held that fingerprints can constitute evidence that is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Lee v. State, 326 Ark. 229, 931 S.W.2d 433 (1996). Moreover, the DNA on the vaginal swab taken from the victim\u2019s rape examination matched the DNA in appellant\u2019s blood. In sum, the State\u2019s identification evidence was more than sufficient to sustain the appellant\u2019s convictions.\nBased on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.", "type": "majority", "author": "W.H. \u201cDub\u201d Arnold, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Irwin Law Firm, by: Robert E. Irwin, for appellant.", "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: C. Joseph Cordi, Jr., Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Sammy Earl STEWART v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 97-942\n961 S.W.2d 750\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered February 12, 1998\nIrwin Law Firm, by: Robert E. Irwin, for appellant.\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: C. Joseph Cordi, Jr., Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0359-01", "first_page_order": 381, "last_page_order": 386 }