{ "id": 377674, "name": "Timothy LEATHERS, In His Official Capacity as Commissioner of Revenues, Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration, Office of Driver Control v. William W. COTTON", "name_abbreviation": "Leathers v. Cotton", "decision_date": "1998-02-26", "docket_number": "97-619", "first_page": "49", "last_page": "54", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "332 Ark. 49" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "961 S.W.2d 32" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "243 Ark. 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8722106 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/243/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 Ark. 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1880005 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/283/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 Ark. 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 236208 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/329/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 Ark. 661", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1914654 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/313/0661-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-65-103", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 Ark. 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 298558 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/330/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-65-104", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 5, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(4)(A)" }, { "page": "(a)(9)(A)" }, { "page": "(d)(2)(B)" }, { "page": "(a)(9)(A)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 468, "char_count": 8956, "ocr_confidence": 0.737, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.360403295813551e-07, "percentile": 0.7942322119938267 }, "sha256": "0d28aef44d044e6556521ab1acd80135fcefe1f3b50802db8d5cc3004947746c", "simhash": "1:182c00d3431aa9b6", "word_count": 1458 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:26:57.770497+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Timothy LEATHERS, In His Official Capacity as Commissioner of Revenues, Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration, Office of Driver Control v. William W. COTTON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Annabelle Clinton Imber,\nJustice. This case presents a question of statutory interpretation. It specifically concerns the effect of a final adjudication of a lesser-included DWI offense on the administrative suspension of a driver\u2019s license.\nThe undisputed facts are as follows. On October 26, 1994, Cotton was convicted of DWI first offense in Fort Smith Municipal Court. On October 13, 1996, Cotton was charged with DWI second offense in Van Bur\u00e9n Municipal Court. Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-65-104 (Repl. 1997), Cotton\u2019s license was temporarily suspended by the Office of Driver Services of the Revenue Division of the Department of Finance & Administration, and Cotton subsequently exercised his right to an administrative hearing. Cotton, a sales manager for a distributing company, would lose his job without a driver\u2019s license or a permit. While he did not contest the suspension of his license, he did request a work permit due to hardship. Following a hearing on October 28, 1996, the hearing officer found that there had been a violation of Act 802 of 1995, and imposed second-offense sanctions, suspending Cotton\u2019s license for sixteen months, and denying the work permit \u201cas it [was] more than DWI 1st offense within three years.\u201d\nOn November 14, 1996, Cotton filed a petition for de novo review in Sebastian County Circuit Court pursuant to section 5-65-104(c). On January 8, 1997, the Van Bur\u00e9n Municipal Court found Cotton guilty of DWI first offense. Given that the municipal court had acquitted him of DWI second offense, Cotton asserted that the trial court now had jurisdiction to issue a work permit in the administrative review proceeding. Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court entered an order finding that Cotton\u2019s acquittal on the DWI second-offense charge in municipal court had \u201cturned this charge into a First Offense Driving While Intoxicated.\u201d The court further found that \u201c[s]ince this is a First Offense Driving While Intoxicated case by finding of the Van Bur\u00e9n Municipal Court, the Office of Driver Control cannot suspend the Plaintiffs drivers license for sixteen (16) months.\u201d Accordingly, the trial court ordered DF&A to suspend Cotton\u2019s license for 120 days \u201cfor Driving While Intoxicated, First Offense, in accordance with the Judgment of the Van Bur\u00e9n Municipal Court.\u201d Because this time period had already expired given the effective date of suspension, October 28, 1996, the trial court ordered Cotton\u2019s license reinstated. DF&A brings the present appeal.\nDF&A\u2019s sole argument for reversal is that the trial court erroneously interpreted section 5-65-104. Specifically, DF&A contends that the municipal court\u2019s acquittal on DWI second offense did not preclude it from considering the DWI first-offense conviction in calculating the total number of offenses for imposition of second-offense sanctions under section 5-65-104.\nAdministrative suspension or revocation of driver\u2019s licenses, which constitutes a remedial civil sanction, see Pyron v. State, 330 Ark. 88, 953 S.W.2d 874 (1997), is primarily governed by section 5-65-104. When DF&A initially suspends or revokes the driving privilege of a person arrested for DWI violating Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-65-103 (Repl. 1997), \u201c[t]he suspension or revocation shall be based on the number of previous offenses as follows:\u201d\n(A)(i) Suspension for one hundred twenty (120) days for the first offense of operating or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while intoxicated or while there was one-tenth of one percent (0.1%) or more by weight of alcohol in the person\u2019s blood, \u00a7 5-65-103;\n* * *\n(B)(i) Suspension for sixteen (16) months, during which no restricted permits may be issued, for a second offense of operating or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while intoxicated or while there was one-tenth of one percent (0.1%) or more by weight of alcohol in the person\u2019s blood, \u00a7 5-65-103, within three years of the first offense.\nArk. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-65-104(a)(4)(A)-(B). In determining the number of previous offenses a person has in considering suspension or revocation, the Office of Driver Services is required to \u201cconsider as a previous offense:\u201d\n(A) Any convictions for offenses of operating or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while intoxicated . . . under \u00a7 5-65-103 or refusing to submit to a chemical test under \u00a7 5-65-202 which occurred prior to July 1, 1996; and\n(B) Any suspension or revocation of driving privileges for arrests for operating or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while intoxicated . . . under \u00a7 5-65-103 or refusing to submit to a chemical test under \u00a7 5-65-202 occurring on or after July 1, 1996, where the person was not subsequently acquitted of the criminal charges.\nArk. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-65-104(a)(9)(A)-(B). If in a criminal case, a court of law renders any decision \u201carising from any violation of \u00a7 5-65-103,\u201d an acquittal \u201con the charges\u201d will reverse the administrative suspension or revocation of the driver\u2019s license suspended or revoked. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-65-104(d)(2)(B).\nThe basic rule of statutory construction to which all other interpretive guides must yield is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Mountain Home Sch. Dist. v. T.M.J. Bldrs., 313 Ark. 661, 858 S.W.2d 74 (1993). Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we determine legislative intent from the ordinary meaning of the language used. Id. The first rule in considering the meaning of a statute is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Id.\nIn determining the number of \u201cprevious offenses\u201d on which to base its sanction, DF&A is clearly directed to include \u201c[a]ny convictions\u201d for offenses under section 5-65-103. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-65-104(a)(9)(A) (emphasis added). Under this provision, it is obvious that two separate convictions of DWI first offense, both violations of section 5-65-103, should be counted as two \u201cprevious offenses.\u201d However, the crux of this case is the effect, if any, of the municipal court\u2019s acquittal on the DWI second offense charge in light of section 5-65-104(d)(2)(B). Cotton\u2019s position is that this acquittal of DWI second offense precludes DF&A from relying on the DWI first-offense conviction as a basis for imposition of second-offense sanctions. In other words, he was \u201cacquitted] on the charges\u201d as that phrase is used in section 5-65-104(d)(2)(B), requiring reversal of the administrative suspension.\nWe must reject Cotton\u2019s argument because it fails to take into consideration that DWI first offense is just as much a violation of section 5-65-103 as is DWI second offense. The difference is only one of quantity. See McElhanon v. State, 329 Ark. 261, 948 S.W.2d 89 (1997); State v. Brown, 283 Ark. 304, 675 S.W.2d 822 (1984). While the Van Buren Municipal Court acquitted Cotton of DWI second offense, it certainly did not acquit Cotton of the \u201ccharge\u201d of violating section 5-65-103. Once the municipal court convicted Cotton of DWI first offense, he simply had two separate convictions of violating section 5-65-103: one on October 26, 1994, and the other on January 8, 1997. Pursuant to section 5-65-104(a)(9)(A), DF&A was required to consider both of these violations of section 5-65-103 as \u201cprevious offenses.\u201d There was no \u201cacquittal on the charges\u201d under section 5-65-104(d)(2)(B) because the municipal court never acquitted Cotton of violating section 5-65-103. Given that there was no such acquittal, the decision of the Van Buren Municipal Court had no effect on the administrative suspension. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in finding that DF&A could not suspend Cotton\u2019s license for sixteen months.\nAs an alternative theory for affirmance, Cotton makes the assertion that \u201c[i]f the Appellant\u2019s contention is allowed to stand it would constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial power to the executive branch.\u201d His sole citation to authority to support this contention is Davis v. Britt, 243 Ark. 556, 420 S.W.2d 863 (1967), where this court held that a statute allowing the state hospital to retain a defendant in custody until he was determined \u201csane\u201d was an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power to the executive branch. We fail to see how Davis is apposite to the present case. Moreover, section 5-65-104 ultimately leaves the factual determination of whether there has been a violation of section 5-65-103 in the hands of the judiciary.\nThe judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "Annabelle Clinton Imber," } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel S. Smith, for appellant.", "Ray Hodnett, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Timothy LEATHERS, In His Official Capacity as Commissioner of Revenues, Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration, Office of Driver Control v. William W. COTTON\n97-619\n961 S.W.2d 32\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered February 26, 1998\nDaniel S. Smith, for appellant.\nRay Hodnett, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0049-01", "first_page_order": 73, "last_page_order": 78 }