{ "id": 377536, "name": "Alvie NELSON v. TIMBERLINE INTERNATIONAL, INC.; Crum & Forster, Carrier; and Second Injury Fund", "name_abbreviation": "Nelson v. Timberline International, Inc.", "decision_date": "1998-03-05", "docket_number": "97-439", "first_page": "165", "last_page": "182", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "332 Ark. 165" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "964 S.W.2d 357" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "298 S.E.2d 142", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 8578857 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/w-va/171/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "740 P.2d 98", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 396637 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/kan-app-2d/12/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 N.W.2d 454", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10602767 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/461/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 Ark. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1893822 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8" }, { "page": "543" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/295/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 Ark. 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 50385 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/328/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 Ark. 632", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1881017 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/304/0632-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 Ark. 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 922652 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/327/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 11-9-301", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "217 Ark. 821", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8724659 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/217/0821-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 Ark. App. 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6651074 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103-04" }, { "page": "103" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/17/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 Ark. App. 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6651268 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/17/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-1001", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "243 Ark. 947", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8725041 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/243/0947-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 U.S. 658", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1490618 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/436/0658-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 S.W.2d 717", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "719" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "195 Ark. 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8723684 ], "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/195/0669-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 Ark. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1892727 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/296/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 Ark. 641", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1900908 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/306/0641-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 Ark. 314", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 922861 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321" }, { "page": "559-60" }, { "page": "322" }, { "page": "560" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/327/0314-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 6651268 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/17/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 Ark. 314", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 922861 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/327/0314-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 Ark. 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1875370 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/289/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 Ark. 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1875385 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/289/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 Ark. 22", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1884268 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/302/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-713", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "306 Ark. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1900923 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/306/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 Ark. 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1900889 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/306/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 Ark. 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1900938 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/306/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-107", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "1993 Ark. Acts 796", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ark. Acts", "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-711", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "306 Ark. 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1900918 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "fifty-year construction of the standard of review in workers' compensation cases, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-711" }, { "parenthetical": "fifty-year construction of the standard of review in workers' compensation cases, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-711" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/306/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-12-315", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-56-105", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-112-103", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "327 Ark. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 922778 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "thirty-six-year interpretation of the habeas corpus act, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-112-103" }, { "parenthetical": "thirty-six-year interpretation of the habeas corpus act, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-112-103" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/327/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "21 S.W.2d 406", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1929, "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "180 Ark. 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1393520 ], "year": 1929, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/180/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 Ark. 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1672653 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/263/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "572 S.W.2d 146", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1668804 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/264/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 S.W.2d 418", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1652957 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/222/0968-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ark. 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1935041 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/312/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 S.W.2d 476", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1936, "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "192 Ark. 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1414963 ], "year": 1936, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/192/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 Ark. 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1914611 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/313/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 S.W.2d 717", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1938, "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "195 Ark. 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8723684 ], "year": 1938, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/195/0669-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 Ark. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1892727 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "five-year interpretation of the usury law contained in Ark. 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TIMBERLINE INTERNATIONAL, INC.; Crum & Forster, Carrier; and Second Injury Fund" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Ray Thornton, Justice.\nTimberline International, Inc., and Crum & Forster Commercial Insurance, its workers\u2019 compensation carrier, appeal the decision of the Arkansas Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission holding that the Second Injury Trust Fund is not liable for the permanent disability benefits awarded to Alvie Nelson, a former employee of Timberline, because his present condition resulted from the cumulative effect of successive injuries he received while in the same employment. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission\u2019s decision based on the authority of McCarver v. Second Injury Fund, 289 Ark. 509, 715 S.W.2d 429 (1986), and Riceland Foods, Inc. v. Second Injury Fund, 289 Ark. 528, 715 S.W.2d 432 (1986). Nelson v. Timberline Int\u2019l, Inc., 57 Ark. App. 34, 942 S.W.2d 260 (1997). We granted review of the decision of the court of appeals pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. l-2(f).\nThe primary issue is whether we should overrule McCarver and Riceland Foods, in which we affirmed decisions of the court of appeals interpreting Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1313(i) (Supp. 1985), now codified at Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-525 (Repl. 1996), to mean that the Second Injury Trust Fund is not liable for wage-loss disability benefits resulting from the cumulative effect of successive injuries when the claimant sustains the injuries in the same employment. We are persuaded by a careful review of the McCarver and Riceland Foods decisions that they should be overruled.\nThe facts of this case are not disputed. In 1988, Alvie Nelson suffered a lower-back injury while working as a diesel mechanic for Timberline. He eventually underwent back surgery resulting in a permanent impairment rating of fifteen percent to the body as a whole. When he recovered, Nelson returned to work at Timberline where he performed lighter work as a mechanic for about six months before being placed in the parts department where he worked for a year or so. Nelson then returned to his job as a diesel mechanic, and, in March 1992, he suffered another lower-back injury, for which he underwent two surgeries. Nelson has not returned to work or attempted to return to work since the second back injury. A neurosurgeon assessed his permanent impairment from the 1992 injury to be an additional fifteen percent to the body as a whole.\nTimberline accepted full responsibility for the payment of benefits for the permanent physical impairment resulting from Nelson\u2019s second injury. A hearing was held before an administrative law judge to determine the extent of Nelson\u2019s permanent disability and the liability for any wage-loss disability benefits in excess of Nelson\u2019s permanent physical impairment ratings. The judge found that Nelson was not permanently and totally disabled due to the March 1992 injury but that he had sustained wage-loss disability benefits of sixty percent. The judge also ruled that the Second Injury Trust Fund had no liability for these benefits.\nNelson appealed the administrative law judge\u2019s decision to the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission, and Timberline cross-appealed, asserting that the Second Injury Trust Fund was liable for the wage-loss benefits over and above Nelson\u2019s permanent physical impairment rating. The Commission rejected Nelson\u2019s claim of permanent and total disability, but reversed in part, finding that Nelson had sustained a thirty percent impairment to his earning capacity in excess of his physical impairment rating. Furthermore, the Commission, citing our decisions in McCarver and Riceland Foods, affirmed the determination that the Second Injury Trust Fund had no liability for Nelson\u2019s wage-loss disability benefits because he sustained the second disabling injury while working for the same employer for whom he had worked when he suffered his first compensable injury.\nBoth parties appealed the Commission\u2019s decision to the court of appeals, which affirmed on both points. In its opinion, the court of appeals urged that the \u201csame employer\u201d defense, created by the court in McCarver and Riceland Foods, deserves our reconsideration. Nelson, 57 Ark. App. at 36, 942 S.W.2d at 261. Nelson did not file a petition asking us to review the court of appeals\u2019 determination that there was sufficient evidence to support the Commission\u2019s finding that he was not permanently and totally disabled; therefore, we do not address that determination. On May 5, 1997, we granted Timberline\u2019s and Crum & Forster\u2019s petition for review solely to determine whether we correctly interpreted Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81 \u2014 1313(i), now codified at Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-525, in McCarver and Riceland Foods to provide that the Second Injury Trust Fund is not hable for permanent disability benefits which exceed those directly related to a second injury in the same employment. When we grant review following a decision by the court of appeals, we review the case as though the appeal was originally filed with this court. Stucco Plus, Inc. v. Rose, 327 Ark. 314, 938 S.W.2d 556 (1997).\nAt the outset, we consider appellee\u2019s, the Second Injury Trust Fund, argument that principles of stare decisis militate against revisiting our prior decisions interpreting the liability of the Fund under the statute. We are mindful that under the doctrine of stare decisis we follow the previous decisions of this court construing a statute. Scarbough v. Cherokee Enterprises, 306 Ark. 641, 816 S.W.2d 876 (1991); Southwest Ark. Communications, Inc. v. Arrington, 296 Ark. 141, 753 S.W.2d 267 (1988). In Southwest Arkansas Communications, Inc., we considered the principle of stare decisis in the context of interpreting a constitutional provision and stated:\nA cardinal rule in dealing with constitutional provisions is that they should receive a consistent and uniform interpretation so that they shall not be taken to mean one thing at one time, and a different thing at another time. Certainly, when a constitutional provision or a statute has been construed, and that construction consistendy followed for many years, such construction should not be changed.\nId. at 145, 753 S.W.2d at 269 (citing O\u2019Daniel v. Brunswick Balke Collender Co., 195 Ark. 669, 674, 113 S.W.2d 717, 719 (1938)). Nevertheless, as the United States Supreme Court has recognized, stare decisis has never been applied mechanically to prohibit overruling prior decisions that have determined the meaning of statutes. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, (1978). Indeed, this court has, on occasion, departed from a prior statutory interpretation. See Fountain v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 243 Ark. 947, 422 S.W.2d 878 (1968). We believe the ultimate inquiry is whether there are compelling reasons for abandoning our prior judicial interpretation of the statute. As discussed below, upon review of the McCarver and Riceland Foods decisions, we conclude that compelling reasons exist to overturn them.\nWe also note that Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-1001 (Repl. 1996) does not affect our ability to decide the issue before us. That statute provides:\nWhen, and if, the workers\u2019 compensation statutes of this state need to be changed, the General Assembly acknowledges its responsibility to do so .... In the future, if such things as the statute of limitations, the standard of review by the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission or courts, the extent to which any physical condition, injury, or disease should be excluded from or added to coverage by the law, or the scope of the workers\u2019 compensation statutes need to be liberalized, broadened, or narrowed, those things shall be addressed by the General Assembly and should not be done by administrative law judges, the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission, or the courts.\n(Emphasis added.)\nThis language does .not preclude our review in this matter because we are not \u201cliberalizing, broadening, or narrowing\u201d the scope of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. In addressing the liability of the Second Injury Trust Fund for permanent disability benefits under the statute, the issue relates only to the allocation of responsibility for payment of those benefits. The claimant receives the same compensation regardless of who bears the liability. We are not changing the scope of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act; rather, we are merely interpreting a statutory provision allocating responsibility for benefits, which is clearly a function of this court.\nPrior to 1979, employers who employed previously impaired workers were obligated under Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1313(f)(l) (R.epl. 1976) to pay benefits for permanent total disability in the event a new injury had the cumulative effect of causing such a permanent disability. That statute provided:\nIf an employee receives a permanent injury after having previously sustained another permanent injury in the employ of the same employer, for which he is receiving compensation, compensation for the subsequent injury shall be paid for the healing period and permanent disability by extending the period and not by increasing the weekly amount. When the previous and subsequent injuries received result in permanent total disability, compensation shall be payable for permanent total disability as provided in Section 10(a) 81-1310 of this Act.\nArk. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81 \u2014 1313(f) (1). In order to clarify the provisions of the Arkansas workers\u2019 compensation law and to provide improved benefits for persons qualifying under the Act, the Arkansas General Assembly passed Act 290 of 1981, which significantly changed the laws relating to second injuries and repealed all laws in conflict with its provisions. Section 4 of Act 290 provides in pertinent part:\nCommencing January 1, 1981, all cases of permanent disabilities or impairment where there has been previous disabilities or impairments shall be compensated as herein provided. ... If any employee who has a permanent partial disability or impairment, whether from compensable injury or otherwise, receives a subsequent compensable injury resulting in additional permanent partial disability or impairment so that the degree or percentage or disability or impairment caused by the combined disabilities or impairment is greater than that which would have resulted from the last injury, considered alone and of itself, and if the employee is entitled to receive compensation on the basis of combined disabilities or impairments, the employer at the time of the last injury shall be liable only for the degree or percentage of disability or impairment which would have resulted from the last injury had there been no preexisting disability or impairment. After the compensation liability of the employer for the last injury, considered alone, . . . has been determined . . . the degree or percentage of employee\u2019s disability that is attributable to all injuries or conditions existing at the time of the last injury was sustained shall then be determined . . . and the degree or percentage of disability or impairment which existed prior to the last injury plus the disability of impairment resulting from the combined disability shall be determined and compensation for that balance, if any, shall be paid out of a special fund known as a Second Injury Fund provided for in Section 47 (Ark. Stats. 81-1348).\n(Emphasis added.)\nThis language appears to reflect a clear legislative intent that any employer who employs a handicapped or disabled worker is responsible only for such actual anatomical impairment as may result from the last injury, and the Second Injury Trust Fund is obligated to provide compensation for any greater disability that may result from a combination of injuries.\nIn 1986, the court of appeals decided Second Injury Fund v. Riceland, 17 Ark. App. 104, 704 S.W.2d 635 (1986) and Second Injury Fund v. McCarver, 17 Ark. App. 101, 704 S.W.2d 639 (1986), in which the court of appeals interpreted Section 4 of Act 290 of 1981, now codified at Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-525. We begin our analysis by reviewing those opinions to determine the basis upon which the court of appeals declined to apply the above quoted language to cover circumstances where the claimant sustained successive injuries during the same employment.\nIn those companion cases, the court of appeals reviewed and reversed decisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission finding that the Fund was liable for the permanent disability benefits of the individual claimants even though all the injuries occurred while in the same employment. We consider the rationale employed by the court of appeals in each case separately.\nIn Riceland, the court of appeals reviewed a decision in which the administrative law judge and the Commission had determined that the Second Injury Trust Fund was hable for the permanent disability benefits based on the following language contained in paragraph three of Act 290, now codified at Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-525 (b)(5):\nIf the previous disability or impairment or disabilities or impairments whether from compensable injury or otherwise, and the last injury together result in permanent total disability, the employer at the time of the last injury shall be liable only for the actual anatomical impairment resulting from the last injury considered alone and of itself; ....\nRiceland, 17 Ark. App. at 106, 704 S.W.2d at 636. On review, the court of appeals found the statute was ambiguous and stated that \u201calthough it is possible to make the interpretation made by the law judge and the Commission, we do not think \u2018previous disabiHty or impairment\u2019 refers to a condition which occurred while in the employment of the second-injury employer.\u201d Id. at 107, 704 S.W.2d at 636. Instead, the court of appeals focused on general language contained in Ark. Stat. \u00a7 81-1313 (i), now codified at Ark. Code Ann. ll-9-525(a)(l):\nThe Second Injury Fund established herein is a special fund designed to insure that an employer employing a handicapped worker will not, in the event such worker suffers an injury on the job, be held liable for a greater disability or impairment than actually occurred while the worker was in his employment.\nId. at 106, 704 S.W.2d at 636 (emphasis in original). Based on this language, the court of appeals reasoned:\n[I]f . . . the employer employing a handicapped worker is to be liable only for the disability or impairment that occurs when the worker sustains an injury during that employment, then it must follow that such employer will be liable for all the disability or impairment that occurs when the worker is injured while in that employment.\nId. at 107, 704 S.W.2d at 636 (emphasis in original).\nThe reasoning employed by the court of appeals in Riceland was both logically and legally flawed. It does not follow from the premise that the employer \u201cis to be liable only for [injuries during an employment],\u201d that the employer \u201cwill be hable for all [injuries during an employment.]\u201d The establishment of the Second Injury Trust Fund was for the stated public purpose of encouraging employment of disabled or handicapped workers by assigning liabilities for some wage-loss consequences of a second injury to that Fund.\nIn McCarver, the court of appeals further reasoned that the Fund should not be liable for same employment injuries:\nThe legislature expressly stated that the purpose of the statute is to insure that an employer employing a handicapped worker will not be required to pay for a greater amount of the disability or impairment than that which the worker sustains while in the employment of that employer. Stretching the statute to require the Second Injury Fund to assume liability for part of the disability or impairment sustained by a handicapped worker while in an employer\u2019s employment reheves that employer of part of his statutory liability and grants him a windfall or subsidy. It was not, in our opinion, the legislature\u2019s intent to give employers that type of encouragement to hire or retain handicapped or injured workers.\nMcCarver, 17 Ark. App. at 103-04, 704 S.W.2d at 641. Contrary to the court of appeals\u2019 conclusion, if we interpret the Fund law to mean that an employer\u2019s liability is limited to the actual anatomical impairment resulting from the last injury, there is clearly no windfall to employers because it is the employers themselves who contribute to the Fund.\nThe court of appeals also inferred that the Fund could become insolvent if the statute was interpreted to allow employers to seek recovery from the Fund in instances where the employee sustained both injuries while employed by the same employer; therefore, the court of appeals reasoned that the solvency of the Fund required the application of what has become known as the \u201csame employer\u201d defense. Riceland, 17 Ark. App. at 107, 704 S.W.2d at 637; McCarver, 17 Ark. App. at 103, 704 S.W.2d at 641.\nOur recent holding in Stucco Plus v. Rose, 327 Ark. 314, 938 S.W.2d 556 (1997) points out the faulty reasoning in McCarver and Riceland Foods. In Stucco Plus, we rejected an argument of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission concerning the solvency of the Second Injury Trust Fund. In holding that the Commission\u2019s reliance on protecting the solvency of the Fund was misplaced, we stated:\n[I]n Mid-State Constr. Co. this court cited with approval Justice Newbern\u2019s dissent in McCarver v. Second Injury Fund, 289 Ark. 509, 715 S.W.2d 429 (1986), which pointed out that the court of appeals\u2019 reference to language from Arkansas Workmen\u2019s Compensation Comm\u2019n v. Sandy, 217 Ark. 821, 233 S.W.2d 382 (1950) on consideration of the Fund\u2019s solvency came from the Commission and not from this court. Secondly, we note that the funding mechanisms provided for the Fund in 1950 by Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81 \u2014 1313(f)(2)(iii) (Supp. 1949) were remarkably different from the current funding mechanisms provided in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 11-9-301 to -307 (Repl. 1996). This difference in funding sources underscores that any considerations of the Fund\u2019s solvency in this case is inappropriate. Finally, we note that, in the event the Fund becomes insolvent, the General Assembly has expressed an intent to provide claimants with arrearage once the Fund regains its solvency, without any possibility of reverter of responsibility for benefits to employers. Section 11-9-301(f).\nStucco Plus, 327 Ark. at 321, 938 S.W.2d at 559-60.\nIn 1986, we reviewed the decisions rendered by the court of appeals in McCarver and Riceland Foods. In our review, we affirmed the decisions of the court of appeals without fully addressing the rationale employed by that court in reaching its decisions, and we concluded:\nIf successive injuries in the same employment cause total and permanent disability the employer or his insurance carrier is responsible to the employee for all benefits. If the previous disability or impairment did not arise out of the employment by the same employer, the Second Injury Fund must pay the benefits.\nRiceland Foods, 289 Ark. at 531, 715 S.W.2d at 435.\nThe question before us now is whether this determination of the Second Injury Trust Fund\u2019s limited liability under the Riceland and McCarver decisions was correct. We begin our reconsideration by noting that the statutory language at issue is ambiguous; we must therefore interpret it using the tools of statutory construction. In considering the meaning of a statute, we construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning. Vanderpool v. Fidelity & Cas. Inc. Co., 327 Ark. 407, 939 S.W.2d 280 (1997). The basic rule of statutory construction, to which all other interpretative guides must yield, is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Graham v. Forrest City Housing Auth., 304 Ark. 632, 803 S.W.2d 923 (1991). In attempting to ascertain legislative intent, we look to the language of the statute, the subject matter, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, legislative history, and other appropriate matters that shed light on the matter. Board of Trustees v. Stodola, 328 Ark. 194, 942 S.W.2d 255 (1997).\nWe recently explained the legislative intent in the establishment of the Second Injury Trust Fund law as follows:\nIt is clearly expressed in section 11-9-525 that the purpose of the Fund is to fully compensate an employee for his total injuries while simultaneously protecting employers from having to pay for injuries that did not occur while the employee was working for that employer .... Moreover, the statute clearly and unambiguously provides for the Second Injury Trust Fund to make up the balance of the employees total benefits and the employer\u2019s share when it states that the \u201cfund pays the worker the difference between the employer\u2019s liability and the balance of his disability or impairment which results from all disabilities or impairments combined.\u201d\nStucco Plus, 327 Ark. at 322, 938 S.W.2d at 560.\nIn light of the legislative intent, we examine again the judicial analysis used to reach the results of McCarver and Riceland. Based upon the flawed logic and incorrect assumptions regarding the solvency of the fund and a potential windfall to employers, which buttressed those opinions, we conclude that McCarver and Riceland Foods were wrongly decided. It remains for us to exercise our authority and responsibility to overrule those cases if a compelling reason exists for doing so. Such a compelling reason was recently articulated in Mid-State Construction Co. v. Second Injury Fund, 295 Ark. 1, 746 S.W.2d 539 (1988). In Mid-State Construction, we reviewed an unpublished decision by the court of appeals that determined the Second Injury Trust Fund had no liability for the wage-loss benefits that resulted from the combination of a prior nonwork related impairment and a compensable injury. The court of appeals held that the employer and its carrier were liable for the full disability. In reversing that decision, we wrote the following regarding the result reached by the court of appeals:\nThat result impermissibly distinguishes between two types of handicapped persons, contravenes the statutory scheme which makes employers hable only for the \u201cdegree of percentage of disability or impairment which would have resulted from the [recent compensable] injury had there been no preexisting disability or impairment,\u201d and defeats the purpose of the Fund to encourage the hiring of the handicapped.\nMid-State Constr. Co., 295 Ark. at 8, 746 S.W.2d at 543.\nWe also note that the legislative intent to make available employment opportunities for injured workers is a more significant public policy consideration than the determination of which of two privately funded providers of compensation benefits shall be responsible for payment of wage-loss disability benefits. Our reinterpretation of ambiguous statutory language to give effect to the legislative intent merely reallocates responsibility for payment of claims by requiring that the cost of additional wage-loss benefits, beyond the actual anatomical impairment resulting from the second injury, is to be borne by the Second Injury Trust Fund.\nThe requirement that the risk of employing an injured worker should be spread over the entire pool of employers is so fair and reasonable that it is apparently followed in every other jurisdiction that has a second injury fund law. See, e.g., Second Injury Fund v. Hodgins, 461 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1990); Denton v. Sunflower Elec. Coop., 740 P.2d 98 (Kan. App. 2d 1987); Estep v. State Workmen\u2019s Compensation Comm\u2019n, 298 S.E.2d 142 (W.Va. 1982). We are unaware of any cases to the contrary.\nAs a result of our determination that Act 290 of 1981 must be reinterpreted to give effect to legislative intent, we also consider whether an earlier statute, Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a781-1313(f)(1) (Repl. 1976), remains effective. In Riceland, we noted that while Act 290 contained a clause repealing all provisions of law contrary to Act 290, Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1313(f)(l) was not inconsistent with Act 290 and need not be considered repealed by implication. Riceland, 289 Ark. at 532, 715 S.W.2d at 434. With the interpretation of Act 290 we adopt today, it is clear that Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1313(f)(1) is in conflict with Act 290, and accordingly is deemed repealed by implication by Act 290 from the time of this decision.\nWe conclude that our interpretation of Act 290 in McCarver and Riceland Foods was wrong and that it defeats the purpose of encouraging employers to retain employees with disabilities or impairments resulting from a prior injury in the same employment, in contravention of legislative intent. This is a compelling reason for overruling those decisions.\nFor the reasons stated, we reverse the Commission\u2019s decision and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nGlaze, J., concurs.\nCorbin and Imber, JJ., dissent.", "type": "majority", "author": "Ray Thornton, Justice." }, { "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice,\nconcurring. The dissenting opinion correctly sets out this court\u2019s sound principles bearing on stare decisis, and I certainly do not take issue with them. This court has and continues to follow those rules, but it should not do so blindly. As the majority opinion says, stare decisis has never been applied mechanically to prohibit overriding prior decisions that have determined the meaning of statutes.\nOnly recently, this court dealt with the Second Injury Fund in the case of Stucco Plus, Inc. v. Rose, 327 Ark. 314, 938 S.W.2d 556 (1997), where we held the Worker\u2019s Compensation Commission erred in relying on the Commission\u2019s public policy to protect the solvency of the Fund. In so holding, the Stucco Plus case stood at odds with this court\u2019s earlier cases of Riceland Foods, Inc. v. Second Injury Fund, 289 Ark. 528, 715 S.W.2d 432 (1986), and McCarver v. Second Injury Fund, 289 Ark. 509, 715 S.W.2d 428 (1986).\nThe Riceland Foods and McCarver cases were reviews of court of appeals\u2019 decisions which were infected with the court of appeals\u2019 belief that the solvency of the Second Injury Fund required the Fund law provisions to be strictly complied with. See Second Injury Fund v. McCarver, 17 Ark. App. 101, 704 S.W.2d 639 (1986); Second Injury Fund v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 17 Ark. App. 104, 704 S.W.2d 635 (1986). In short, the court of appeals inferred that the Fund might become insolvent, if the court adopted an interpretation of the Fund law that permitted employers to seek Fund relief in instances where the injured or handicapped workers sustain both the first and second injuries while with the same employer. See, Glaze, J., dissenting, Riceland Foods, Inc., 17 Ark. App. at 100. Unfortunately, this court in its review of Riceland Foods expressly and favorably recognized the court of appeals\u2019 solvency reference to the Fund as the state of the law. 289 Ark. at 532.\nAs already noted, our court, after deciding Stucco Plus as it did, had cases going opposite directions as to how Arkansas\u2019s Fund law should be interpreted and what, if any, effect insolvency of the Fund should play in awarding benefits. As I see it, this court was either correct in its holding in Riceland Foods and McCarver, or it was correct in Stucco Plus, and it is this court\u2019s province and duty to decide which case(s) should prevail. Stare decisis is simply not the issue; the issue, instead, is whether the rationale in Riceland Foods and McCarver prevails or whether the reasoning in Stucco Plus should stand.\nBecause I believe solvency of the Fund has no relevance when construing Fund provisions, I join with the majority court in overriding Riceland Foods and McCarver.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice," }, { "text": "Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice.,\ndissenting. There are two fundamental principles of statutory construction that prevent me from joining the majority. The first, as the majority acknowledges, is that statutes and constitutions:\nshould receive a consistent and uniform interpretation so that they shall not be taken to mean one thing at one time, and a different thing at another time. Certainly, when a constitutional provision or a statute has been construed, and that construction consistently followed for many years, such construction should not be changed.\nMorris v. McLemore, 313 Ark. 53, 852 S.W.2d 135 (1993); Southwest Ark. Communications, Inc. v. Arrington, 296 Ark. 141, 753 S.W.2d 267 (1988); O\u2019Daniel v. Brunswick Balke Collender Co., 195 Ark. 669, 113 S.W.2d 717 (1938); Tindall v. Searan, 192 Ark. 173, 90 S.W.2d 476 (1936). The second principle is that once we have construed a statute, our interpretation becomes part of the act just as if it had been so written by the legislature. See, e.g., Burns v. Burns, 312 Ark. 61, 847 S.W.2d 23 (1993); Gibson v. Gibson, 264 S.W.2d 418, 572 S.W.2d 146 (1978); E.C. Barton v. Neal, 263 Ark. 40, 562 S.W.2d 294 (1978); Merchant\u2019s Transfer & Warehouse Co. v. Gates, 180 Ark. 96, 21 S.W.2d 406 (1929).\nAdhering to these two principles, we have, on many occasions, refused to abandon our interpretation of a statute or constitutional provision in the absence of legislative action. See, e.g., Sawyer v. State, 327 Ark. 421, 938 S.W.2d 843 (1997) (thirty-six-year interpretation of the habeas corpus act, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-112-103); Morris v. McLemore, supra (one hundred-year interpretation of the statute of limitations for legal malpractice actions, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-56-105); Burns v. Burns, supra, (seven-year interpretation of the marital property act, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-12-315); Scarbrough v. Cherokee Enters., 306 Ark. 461, 816 S.W.2d 164 (1991) (fifty-year construction of the standard of review in workers\u2019 compensation cases, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-711); Southwest Ark. Communications, Inc. v. Arrington, supra (five-year interpretation of the usury law contained in Ark. Const., amend. 60); E.C. Lumber Co. v. Neal & Jones, supra (seventy-year construction of the mechanic\u2019s lien statute, Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 51-601); Gibson v. Gibson, supra (sixteen-year interpretation of the partition statute, Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 34-1801).\nEleven years ago, we held in Riceland Foods, Inc. v. Second Injury Fund, 289 Ark. 528, 715 S.W.2d 432 (1986), and McCarver v. Second Injury Fund, 289 Ark. 509, 715 S.W.2d 429 (1986), that pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-525, the Second Injury Fund is not liable when an employee sustains successive injuries while working for the same employer. As mentioned previously, once we reached this conclusion, our interpretation became part of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. Since that time, the General Assembly has convened on eight separate occasions, but no changes were made to Section 11-9-525 in response to our holdings in Riceland and McCarver. In fact, in 1993, the General Assembly made comprehensive revisions to the Workers Compensation Act, some of which were in response to particular cases decided by this court. 1993 Ark. Acts 796, \u00a7\u00a7 6 and 31. Yet, Section 11-9-525, and our interpretation thereof, remained unchanged.\nEven though the legislature has, by implication, approved of our holdings in Riceland and McCarver, the majority is willing to abandon our well-established precedent in favor of the policy considerations articulated by Timberline. Although these policy considerations appear persuasive, the identical arguments were considered and rejected by this court eleven years ago in Riceland and McCarver. In particular, the majority appears to have been persuaded by Timberline\u2019s contention that our construction of Section 11-9-525 discourages employers from retaining impaired or injured workers. However, the record before us is devoid of any evidence indicating that this concern has been realized over the last eleven years. In the absence of such evidence, I am hesitant to abandon our well-established interpretation of Section 11-9-525.\nFinally, as we said in Gibson v. Gibson, \u201ceven though we might feel that decision was wrong in retrospect, the construction of the statute . . . established a rule of [law], and we are not at liberty to overturn it.\u201d Once we considered the relevant policy considerations and interpreted the ambiguous language contained in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-525, our construction became part of the statute itself, and it was up to the legislature to amend the act if it disagreed with our interpretation. The General Assembly has simply refused to do so, and we should not act in their stead.\nFor these reasons, I respectfully dissent.\nCorbin, J., joins in this dissent.\nRegular Sessions in 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995 and Extraordinary Sessions in 1988, 1989, 1992.\nSpecifically rejecting our interpretations of the exclusive remedy provision, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-107, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Baysinger, 306 Ark. 239, 812 S.W.2d 463 (1991); Mapco, Inc. v. Payne, 306 Ark. 198, 812 S.W.2d 483 (1991); and Thomas v. Valmac Indus., Inc., 306 Ark. 228, 812 S.W.2d 673 (1991).\nSpecifically rejecting our construction of the provision regarding the modification of-workers\u2019 compensation awards, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-713, in International Paper Co. v. Tuberville, 302 Ark. 22, 786 S.W.2d 830 (1990).", "type": "dissent", "author": "Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice.," } ], "attorneys": [ "Barber, McCaskill, Jones & Hale, P.A., by: Tim A. Cheatham, for appellees-petitioners Timberline International, Inc., and Crum & Forster Commercial Insurance.", "Judy W. Rudd, for appellee-respondent Second Injury Fund." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Alvie NELSON v. TIMBERLINE INTERNATIONAL, INC.; Crum & Forster, Carrier; and Second Injury Fund\n97-439\n964 S.W.2d 357\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered March 5, 1998\nBarber, McCaskill, Jones & Hale, P.A., by: Tim A. Cheatham, for appellees-petitioners Timberline International, Inc., and Crum & Forster Commercial Insurance.\nJudy W. Rudd, for appellee-respondent Second Injury Fund." }, "file_name": "0165-01", "first_page_order": 189, "last_page_order": 206 }