{ "id": 377634, "name": "Phyllis June BROWN v. Billy Earl BROWN", "name_abbreviation": "Brown v. Brown", "decision_date": "1998-03-12", "docket_number": "97-646", "first_page": "235", "last_page": "240", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "332 Ark. 235" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "962 S.W.2d 810" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "586 So.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7490044 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "approving the Askins approach while allowing for exclusion in certain cases" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/586/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "778 P.2d 429", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 4781944 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nev/105/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "711 S.W.2d 594", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9978212 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/711/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "909 P.2d 525", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10338781 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/909/0525-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-12-315", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(1)(A)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 Ark. 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8717237 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/288/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 Ark. App. 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137005 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "interpreting a \"Reconciliation Agreement\"" }, { "parenthetical": "interpreting a \"Reconciliation Agreement\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/2/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 Ark. App. 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138655 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "interpreting a separation agreement" }, { "parenthetical": "interpreting a separation agreement" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/28/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "267 Ark. 605", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1719895 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "interpreting a sales contract and a \"Care Agreement\"" }, { "parenthetical": "interpreting a sales contract and a \"Care Agreement\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/267/0605-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 Ark. 333", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8720391 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/288/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Ark. App. 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138034 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/38/0099-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 542, "char_count": 10636, "ocr_confidence": 0.723, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.7727952967721216e-08, "percentile": 0.3605636853731627 }, "sha256": "e2e19575ebf9c289da0bf951d5aee40bd6a73eb0f32b094b9c9cc1533a906ba9", "simhash": "1:0287e1e95446c122", "word_count": 1743 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:26:57.770497+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Phyllis June BROWN v. Billy Earl BROWN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Robert L. Brown, Justice.\nThis appeal involves the distribution of a pension between divorced spouses. Appellant, Billy Brown, and appellee, Phyllis Brown, were married in 1951. In April 1981, Phyllis Brown began working at Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., in Fort Smith, and the following year, she began to participate in the business\u2019s retirement plan. On March 17, 1988, the couple separated, and they were eventually divorced on June 20, 1989. The divorce decree contained the following provision:\nThe Defendant (Phyllis Brown) has currently obtained an interest in a pension and savings plan through her employment at Hiram Walker. That the Defendant has been employed with this employer since April 20, 1981. The court finds that the Plaintiff (Billy Brown) shall have a one half interest in those pension and profit sharing benefits up to March 17, 1988.\nThere were, in fact, two pensions involved in the Browns\u2019 divorce decree. Billy Brown\u2019s military pension was also divided, with Phyllis Brown being awarded a one-half marital interest in ninety percent of his pension. The Arkansas Court of Appeals later held that her marital share included any postdecretal cost-of-living increases which enhanced the amount of Billy Brown\u2019s pension. Brown v. Brown 38 Ark. App. 99, 828 S.W.2d 601 (1992).\nPhyllis Brown continued to work at Hiram Walker until she retired in January 1996 at age 63. At that time, she began to draw retirement benefits in the amount of $978.72. That same year, her former husband filed this action in chancery court, seeking an accounting and a contempt order against her for failing to pay him the correct share of her pension benefits and refusing to provide him with information of what his share should be.\nPhyllis Brown answered, and after receiving briefs and supporting documents, the chancellor ultimately made several findings in a modified order:\n\u2022 that at the time of the divorce Phyllis Brown had accrued benefits in her retirement account in an amount which would allow her to receive approximately $414.00 per month if she continued to work at her current rate of pay until she retired on the normal retirement date of December 1, 1997;\n\u2022 that between March 17, 1988, and the date she retired on January 1, 1996, Phyllis Brown received periodic merit increases in her monthly salary totaling $775.00;\n\u2022 that these salary increases had the effect of raising her retirement benefits from $414.00 to $978.72 per month;\n\u2022 that Phyllis Brown retired from Hiram Walker on January 1, 1996, and began drawing retirement benefits in the amount of $978.72 per month.\nThe chancellor initially concluded that even though the 1989 divorce decree was drafted by Billy Brown\u2019s attorney, there was no merit to Phyllis Brown\u2019s argument that the decree should be interpreted stricdy against her former spouse. He next considered Phyllis Brown\u2019s postmarital enhancement argument that Billy Brown should not benefit from any increases in her salary following their separation. On this point, he concluded that Askins v. Askins, 288 Ark. 333, 704 S.W.2d 632 (1986), was controlling and that all postmarital appreciation in benefits, including the salary increases, should be included for purposes of determining Billy Brown\u2019s share in her pension. Accordingly, he awarded Billy Brown a share in her benefits of $978.72 per month.\nOn appeal, Phyllis Brown first contends that the divorce decree is subject to two interpretations and should be construed against the party under whose auspices the decree was drafted \u2014 in this case, Billy Brown. She cites cases to support her contention, but all of the cases she references involve the interpretation of a contract as opposed to a divorce decree. See Elcare, Inc. v. Gocio, 267 Ark. 605, 593 S.W.2d 159 (1980) (interpreting a sales contract and a \u201cCare Agreement\u201d); Sutton v. Sutton, 28 Ark. App. 165, 771 S.W.2d 791 (1989) (interpreting a separation agreement); DaCosse v. Ahrens, 2 Ark. App. 61, 616 S.W.2d 777 (1981) (interpreting a \u201cReconciliation Agreement\u201d). We agree with the chancellor that this argument is without merit. Divorce decrees are not contracts but are orders of the chancery court. Moreover, the decree did not specify the method to be used in calculating the appropriate shares of Phyllis Brown\u2019s pension. Hence, it was left to the chancellor to make that determination by subsequent order, which was done in this case.\nPhyllis Brown\u2019s second argument is that the chancellor erred in concluding that Askins v. Askins, supra, required the chancellor to include postmarital appreciation for purposes of calculating Billy Brown\u2019s share in the pension. In the alternative, she urges that if we decide that the Askins case mandates such a ruling, we reconsider our decision in that case.\nWe have previously held that pensions are marital property and subject to distribution as such. Askins v. Askins, supra; Young v. Young, 288 Ark. 33, 701 S.W.2d 369 (1986). In the instant case, a marital percentage was arrived at by using a numerator/denominator formula. Specifically, Phyllis Brown worked for 70 months while she was married to Billy Brown before separation and for a total time of 164 months, which included her years of marriage before separation and the following months until her retirement as well. This results in a fraction of 70/164 or 42.68% of her pension that was earned prior to separation. Billy Brown was entitled to a pension share based on one-half of the 42.68%, which is 21.34%. Both parties agree that this is the appropriate marital percentage to be applied.\nThe question for this court to decide is whether Billy Brown is entitled to one-half of Phyllis Brown\u2019s accrued pension amount at time of separation on March 17, 1988, or 21.34% of the accrued pension amount, which is based in part on salary enhancements, in 1996. The precise issue is whether Billy Brown is entitled to benefit from any postmarital salary raises, when he did not begin receiving his pension share until Phyllis Brown actually retired some seven years after their divorce.\nThe chancellor clearly agreed with Billy Brown that he was entitled to base his pension share on the entire pension actually received by his former spouse, beginning January 1, 1996. Phyllis Brown counters that his marital share should only apply to the pension amount that she had earned at the time of their separation. She contends that the reason for this is any postmarital enhancements after that date should not be considered marital property because they were solely the result of her efforts. The amount of her pension against which the marital percentage of 21.34% should apply, according to Phyllis Brown, is $414.00 as \u25a0opposed to $978.72.\nWe perceive the friction in this area to be the result of two competing principles of equitable distribution. On the one hand, there is the principle which Phyllis Brown espouses that all property acquired after divorce (or separation in this case) should not be part of the marital-property mix. On the other hand, there is the principle subscribed to by Billy Brown that both parties are entitled to increases in the value of marital property after divorce and before distribution, particularly when the divorced spouse does not begin receiving a share until some years after the divorce occurs.\nWe believe, as the chancellor concluded, that the issue of postmarital enhancement in benefits has been fully answered by this court. In Askins v. Askins, supra, we declined to exclude postmarital appreciation from the amount of the pension to be divided between divorced spouses. There, we first questioned whether the issue was procedurally barred but went on to hold that the chancellor operated within his discretion in dividing the pension as marital property the way he did. In our decision, we relied on two primary considerations. First, we recognized the fact that enhancements to a retirement plan are often most dramatic in the later years, and we indicated that it might be inequitable to allow a person who had supported his or her spouse through the lean years to be deprived of those later rewards. Secondly, we underscored that the chancellor has considerable discretion to divide marital property other than one-half to each party when it is equitable to do so. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-12-315(a)(1)(A) (Repl. 1993). Those two principles guide us in affirming the chancellor in the case before us, and we note that other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hunt, 909 P.2d 525 (Colo. 1995); Stoerkel v. Stoerkel, 711 S.W.2d 594 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Gemma v. Gemma, 778 P.2d 429 (Nev. 1989). See also Hare v. Hodgins, 586 So.2d 118 (La. 1991) (approving the Askins approach while allowing for exclusion in certain cases).\nWe are aware that there is a dispute in this case over the nature of Phyllis Brown\u2019s postmarital salary increases. She contends that the seven salary increases following her separation were all merit increases. In support of her position, she points to her employer\u2019s notices which describe the increases as \u201cmerit\u201d increases. Merit increases, she maintains, should not be included to increase Billy Brown\u2019s share, and she cites a case from the Louisiana Supreme Court as authority to support her argument. See, e.g., Hare v. Hodgins, supra. Billy Brown answers this argument by stating that in spite of the description on the notices, these were, in fact, little more than cost-of-living or longevity increases. He adds that the chancellor did find in his modified order that these were merit increases but declined to exclude them as improper enhancements.\nWe defer to the chancellor in this regard. Here, he considered the increases in Phyllis Brown\u2019s salary following the separation and divorce and decided that they constituted legitimate adjustments for retirement benefits in which Billy Brown could participate. We made it crystal clear in Askins that this is the chancellor\u2019s call under \u00a7 9-12~315(a)(l)(A), as is the case with all divisions of marital property. We do not read the chancellor\u2019s order in the instant case to say that the Askins case divested him of all discretion in this area.\nAffirmed.\nPhyllis Brown concedes in her brief in this appeal that the proper cutoff date for Billy Brown probably should have been the date of divorce, but the chancellor used the date of separation in his order and that is not an issue before us in this appeal.", "type": "majority", "author": "Robert L. Brown, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "J. Patrick McCarty, for appellant.", "Rex W. Chronister, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Phyllis June BROWN v. Billy Earl BROWN\n97-646\n962 S.W.2d 810\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered March 12, 1998\nJ. Patrick McCarty, for appellant.\nRex W. Chronister, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0235-01", "first_page_order": 259, "last_page_order": 264 }