{ "id": 377645, "name": "Michael SNYDER v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Snyder v. State", "decision_date": "1998-03-19", "docket_number": "CR 97-570", "first_page": "279", "last_page": "284", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "332 Ark. 279" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "965 S.W.2d 121" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-73-130", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)", "parenthetical": "\"Whenever a person under eighteen (18) years of age is unlawfully in possession of a firearm, the firearm shall be seized and, after an adjudication of delinquency or a conviction, shall be subject to forfeiture.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-97-104", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "180 S.W.2d 382", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"[I]f the words are free from ambiguity and doubt, and express plainly, clearly and distinctly the sense of the framers of the instrument, there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 Ark. 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1475860 ], "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"[I]f the words are free from ambiguity and doubt, and express plainly, clearly and distinctly the sense of the framers of the instrument, there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/209/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 Ark. 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 922647 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/327/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 12-12-901", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 Ark. 846", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1455950 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/318/0846-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 Ark. 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1872608 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/291/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 Ark. 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1871234 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/292/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 U.S. 37", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6212725 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/497/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "514 U.S. 499", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1339457 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/514/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 U.S. 24", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6181086 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/450/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-97-103", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 474, "char_count": 8044, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1022767050490406e-07, "percentile": 0.5686694475237746 }, "sha256": "12a356647701ddc34f0f924b9af7f42a83de6d42b6a37ed487a8bcf65347fda5", "simhash": "1:d72959f961a9ebd4", "word_count": 1324 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:26:57.770497+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Michael SNYDER v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "David Newbern, Justice.\nMichael Snyder, the appellant, was convicted of two counts of rape by deviate sexual activity with an eight-year-old boy. He was sentenced to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment on each count, to be served consecutively. Mr. Snyder argues that the Trial Court erred by admitting evidence, during the sentencing phase of his trial, of a prior juvenile delinquency adjudication. He contends that the prior adjudication was inadmissible pursuant to the law extant at the time the prior juvienile delinquency petiton was filed and at the time the adjudication occurred. He argues that the application of the current statute, which would allow its admissibility was a violation of the ex post facto legislation principle, citing cases interpreting the United States Constitution. He also argues that the Trial Court\u2019s order that his name be registered as an habitual child sex abuser was in error because his prior juvenile adjudication was not a \u201cconviction,\u201d and thus his case does not fall within the statutory mandate for registration. We agree with the latter point of appeal but not with the former; thus we affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.\n1. Juvenile delinquency adjudication\nMr. Snyder fails to cite the law applicable in 1991 to admissibility of juvenile adjudications in subsequent criminal proceedings. He contends, however, that it would have made the adjudication inadmissible in the proceedings now before us.\nThe current law dealing with admissibility of juvenile adjudications in subsequent criminal-trial sentencing proceedings is found in Act 535 of 1993, \u00a7 2(c)(3) and Act 551 of 1993, \u00a7 2(c)(3). Those acts are codified as Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-97-103 (Supp. 1997). Section 16-97-103 (3) (i) provides that prior juvenile adjudications are admissible only if the relevant value of the adjudication outweighs its prejudicial value. Mr. Snyder does not argue on appeal that his prior adjudication is inadmissible based on this provision. The statutory provision also provides that prior juvenile delinquency adjudications can only be admitted for crimes for which the juvenile could have been tried as an adult. \u00a7 16 \u2014 97\u2014103(3) (ii). Mr. Snyder, whose prior adjudication was based on rape, does not contend that he could not have been tried as an adult based on his crime of rape. The only time limitation on use of such an adjudication in the sentencing phase of a trial resulting from a subsequently committed offense is, \u201cThat in no event shall delinquency adjudications for acts occurring more than ten (10) years prior to the commission of the offense charged be considered; . . . .\u201d \u00a7 16 \u2014 97\u2014103(3)(iii). Mr. Snyder does not contend that the acts for which he was adjudicated delinquent occurred more than ten years prior to the acts of which he stands convicted in the case now before us.\nMr. Snyder argues that the admission of the prior juvenile delinquency adjudication violates the ex post facto clause, citing Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 27 (1981), in which the United States Supreme Court stated: \u201c[O]ur decisions prescribe that two critical elements must be present for a criminal or penal law to be ex post facto: it must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it.\u201d He contends that \u00a7 16-97-103 was applied retrospectively and that he was disadvantaged by its application. Assuming that there was a law in 1991 that would have prevented admissibility of Mr. Snyder\u2019s juvenile delinquency adjudication in a subsequent criminal trial, we cannot agree that application of the law applicable at the time of the subsequent trial would violate the ex post facto principle.\nThe United States Supreme Court, in California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 (1995), stated that although the Weaver case \u201csuggested that enhancements to the measure of criminal punishment fall within the ex post facto prohibition because they operate to the \u2018disadvantage\u2019 of covered offenders, . . . that language was unnecessary to the results in those cases and is inconsistent with the framework developed in Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41 (1990).\u201d Id. at 506 n. 3. The Supreme Court further explained that \u201c[a]fter Collins, the focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of \u2018disadvantage,\u2019 nor, ... on whether an amendment affects a prisoner\u2019s \u2018opportunity to take advantage of provisions for early release,\u2019 . . . but on whether any such change alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable.\u201d Id.\nMr. Snyder does not argue that the admissibility of the evidence of the prior juvenile adjudication changed the nature or definition of the offense for which he was tried and convicted or that it increased the penalty. It is thus clear to us that the ex post facto principle was not violated. Cogburn v. State, 292 Ark. 564, 732 S.W.2d 807 (1987); Smith v. State, 291 Ark. 163, 722 S.W.2d 853 (1987). Although not in the context of considering a prior juvenile adjudication, we have held that the provisions for admissibility of evidence in a sentencing proceeding found in \u00a7 16-97-103 do not violate the ex post facto principle. Williams v. State, 318 Ark. 846, 887 S.W.2d 530 (1994). We affirm the conviction.\n2. Habitual Child Sex Offender Registration Act\nIn his second point on appeal, Mr. Snyder argues that the Trial Court erred in certifying him as an habitual child sex offender pursuant to Act 587 of 1987, the Habitual Child Sex Offender Registration Act, since replaced by Act 989 of 1997, the Sex and Child Offender Registration Act of 1997, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 12-12-901 through 12-12-920 (Supp. 1997). His argument is that his juvenile delinquency \u201cadjudication\u201d should not be considered a prior \u201cconviction\u201d for purposes of the prior Act. At the time of Mr. Snyder\u2019s conviction, the Act imposed a registration requirement on persons who had been \u201cconvicted\u201d of certain sex offenses a second or subsequent time. See Act 587, \u00a72.\nWe adhere to the basic rule of statutory construction which is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Coleman v. State, 327 Ark. 381, 938 S.W.2d 845 (1997). Absent a clear indication that \u201ca drafting error or omission [has] circumvent[ed] legislative intent,\u201d we do not \u201cinterpret a legislative act in a manner contrary to its express language.\u201d Id. See City of Little Rock v. Arkansas Corp. Comm., 209 Ark. 18, 180 S.W.2d 382 (1945) (\u201c[I]f the words are free from ambiguity and doubt, and express plainly, clearly and distinctly the sense of the framers of the instrument, there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation.\u201d).\nThe clear language of Act 587, \u00a7 1, provided, in part, that a \u201c\u2018[h]abitual child sex offender\u2019 includes any person who, after August 1, 1987, is convicted a second or subsequent time .... [Emphasis supplied.]\u201d The General Assembly has recognized that there is a difference between a conviction and an adjudication. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-97-104 (Supp. 1997) (\u201cProof of prior convictions, both felony and misdemeanor, and proof of juvenile adjudications shall follow the procedures outlined in \u00a7\u00a7 5-4-502 \u2014 5-4-504.\u201d). See also Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-73-130(a) (Repl. 1997) (\u201cWhenever a person under eighteen (18) years of age is unlawfully in possession of a firearm, the firearm shall be seized and, after an adjudication of delinquency or a conviction, shall be subject to forfeiture.\u201d).\nWe reverse the order applying the Habitual Child Sex Offender Registration Act because Mr. Snyder does not have a prior \u201cconviction\u201d of a sex offense. We remand the case for orders consistent with this opinion.\nAffirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part.", "type": "majority", "author": "David Newbern, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Val P. Price, for appellant.", "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Kelly S. Terry, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Michael SNYDER v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 97-570\n965 S.W.2d 121\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered March 19, 1998\nVal P. Price, for appellant.\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Kelly S. Terry, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0279-01", "first_page_order": 305, "last_page_order": 310 }