{
  "id": 703764,
  "name": "Ricky L. COOK v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Cook v. State",
  "decision_date": "1998-04-30",
  "docket_number": "CR 97-1215",
  "first_page": "22",
  "last_page": "26",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "333 Ark. 22"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "968 S.W.2d 589"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark.",
    "id": 8808,
    "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "282 Ark. 262",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1740866
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1984,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/282/0262-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "300 Ark. 513",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1886724
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1989,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/300/0513-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "319 Ark. 201",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1453633
      ],
      "weight": 4,
      "year": 1995,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "203"
        },
        {
          "page": "272"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/319/0201-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-50-306",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1994,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "(1)"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-65-104",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "weight": 3,
      "year": 1997,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "(a)(9)(c)"
        },
        {
          "page": "(f)"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 395,
    "char_count": 6445,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.776,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 6.935358779225125e-08,
      "percentile": 0.42057297549007683
    },
    "sha256": "71561cc90e3e08e51a104f43ddd08bdc70a7caf9a7ad9d7eaa4d709542ba34ff",
    "simhash": "1:ff6911a3310a8379",
    "word_count": 1084
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:30:04.030411+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Glaze, J., concurs."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Ricky L. COOK v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Robert L. Brown, Justice.\nOn November 2, 1997, appellant Ricky L. Cook was stopped by Trooper James P. Baker of the Arkansas State Police for driving ninety-one miles per hour in a sixty mile-per-hour zone. After failing four field sobriety tests, Cook was arrested and charged with DWI, first offense, and speeding. On May 15, 1997, following a bench trial Cook was found guilty of DWI, first offense. Sentencing was set for June 19, 1997. At the subsequent sentencing hearing, the circuit court asked if Cook\u2019s driver\u2019s license had been suspended by the Department of Finance and Administration (DF&A) pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-65-104 (Repl. 1997). Cook\u2019s counsel told the judge that a hearing had been conducted at DF&A and that DF&A had decided not to suspend Cook\u2019s driver\u2019s license because of the likelihood of Cook\u2019s success at trial. The circuit court then sentenced Cook to 365 days in jail with 360 days suspended, fined him $350 for DWI and $100 for speeding, and suspended his driver\u2019s license for 120 days.\nCook next moved for reconsideration of this judgment on the basis that the circuit court no longer had jurisdiction to suspend a driver\u2019s license after the enactment of Act 802 of 1995, now codified as \u00a7 5-65-104 (Repl. 1997), because that authority has been delegated to the executive branch. On July 10, 1997, the circuit court denied the motion for reconsideration. The circuit court also wrote a letter to counsel in connection with the denial of the reconsideration motion and told counsel that Act 143 of 1961 now codified as Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-50-306 (Repl. 1994), gave the court the authority to suspend drivers\u2019 licenses for moving traffic violations.\nCook\u2019s sole point on appeal is a reiteration of his motion for reconsideration that after the passage of Act 802 of 1995, the judiciary no longer has jurisdiction to suspend or revoke a person\u2019s driver\u2019s license for DWI. Rather, the General Assembly, according to Cook, has transferred this power to the executive branch, and specifically to DF&A. The State responds that this appeal is moot due to the fact that the 120-day suspension of Cook\u2019s driver\u2019s license has now passed, and Cook\u2019s driver\u2019s license has been reinstated.\nAs an initial matter, we acknowledge that this court is not required to address issues on appeal that have become moot. See, e.g., Wright v. Keffer, 319 Ark. 201, 890 S.W.2d 271 (1995). It is also clear from the facts of this case that the resolution of the issue presented has become moot with respect to Cook. Nevertheless, this court has recognized an exception to the mootness doctrine \u201cfor cases that are capable of repetition yet evading review, being cases in which the justiciable controversy will necessarily expire or terminate prior to adjudication.\u201d Wright v. Keffer, 319 Ark. at 203, 890 S.W.2d at 272. See also Nathaniel v. Forrest City School Dist. No. 7, 300 Ark. 513, 780 S.W.2d 539 (1989); Robinson v. Shock, 282 Ark. 262, 667 S.W.2d 956 (1984). Because it is likely that defendants in the future may well be confronted with this precise issue but yet be unable to appeal the point due to the passage of the suspension time, we will consider the merits of the issue. We turn then to the issue of whether the circuit court had the authority to suspend Cook\u2019s driver\u2019s license under these facts.\nSome history is helpful here. Prior to July 1, 1996, circuit courts had the express authority to suspend driver\u2019s licenses for DWI convictions under the Omnibus DWI Act. See \u00a7 5-65-101 through 311 (Repl. 1993). However, the General Assembly passed Act 802 of 1995, which completely replaced the procedures for suspension by establishing an administrative process. Under Act 802 of 1995, and the new \u00a7 5-65-104 (Repl. 1997), all suspensions are issued by the Office of Driver Services, a division of DF&A. The circuit court\u2019s involvement in the suspension process is limited under Act 802 to appeals of these suspensions. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-65-104(a)(9)(c) (Repl. 1997).\nAct 802 does, however, provide that any administrative suspension by DF&A will be in addition to those ordered by courts of competent jurisdiction:\nThe administrative suspension or revocation of a driver\u2019s license as provided for by this section shall be supplementary to and in addition to the suspensions or revocations of driver licenses which are ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction for offenses under \u00a7\u00a7 5-64-710, 5-65-116, and 27-16-914, or any other traffic or criminal offense wherein a suspension or revocation of the driver\u2019s license is a penalty for the violation.\nArk. Code Ann. \u00a75-65-104(f) (Repl. 1997). In light of this provision in Act 802, the question becomes whether any other statute gives the courts authority to suspend driving privileges under these facts.\nAs the circuit court stated in its Letter Opinion denying the motion for reconsideration, Act 143 of 1961, now codified as \u00a7 27-50-306, provides the circuit courts with authority to assess additional penalties for a moving traffic violation, including suspension of a driver\u2019s license for one year. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-50-306(1) (Repl. 1994). Thus, as applied to the case at hand, \u00a7 27-50-306(1) resolves the issue entirely. Cook was not only convicted of DWI, first offense, but he was also convicted of speeding, which entailed driving ninety-one miles per hour in a sixty mile-per-hour zone. The circuit court assessed suspension of the driver\u2019s license as a penalty for both convictions and did not specify whether it was tied to one or the other. Under \u00a7 27-50-306, the conviction for a moving traffic violation, speeding, is sufficient in and of itself to warrant a suspension of Cook\u2019s driver\u2019s license.\nBecause suspension of a driver\u2019s license is unquestionably a penalty available to the circuit court for speeding under \u00a7 27-50-306(1), we need not reach the issue in this case of whether suspension of a driver\u2019s license by the circuit court is an appropriate sanction where DWI is the sole offense involved.\nAffirmed.\nGlaze, J., concurs.\nThe May 15, 1997 order does not refer to speeding, but the June 19, 1997 order refers to Cook\u2019s guilt for both offenses, and he was sentenced accordingly.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Robert L. Brown, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Mashburn & Taylor, by: Scott E. Smith, for appellant.",
      "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Brad Newman, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Ricky L. COOK v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 97-1215\n968 S.W.2d 589\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered April 30, 1998\nMashburn & Taylor, by: Scott E. Smith, for appellant.\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Brad Newman, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0022-01",
  "first_page_order": 52,
  "last_page_order": 56
}