{
  "id": 703798,
  "name": "Pamela F. SKOKOS v. Theodore C. SKOKOS",
  "name_abbreviation": "Skokos v. Skokos",
  "decision_date": "1998-06-04",
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  "first_page": "396",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:30:04.030411+00:00",
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    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Pamela F. SKOKOS v. Theodore C. SKOKOS"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "David Newbern, Justice.\nPamela F. Skokos, the appellant, and Theodore C. Skokos, the appellee, each have filed a petition for rehearing following our decision in Skokos v. Skokos, 332 Ark. 520, 968 S.W.2d 26 (1998). The parties seek to clarify whether, upon remand, the Chancellor should redetermine the fair market value of their shares in the Little Rock Cellular Partnership (\u201cthe Little Rock company\u201d) in addition to the value of their shares in Atlantic Cellular/New Hampshire RSA One, Limited Partnership (\u201cthe New Hampshire company\u201d). In a separate motion, Ms. Skokos asks for her costs and attorney\u2019s fees on appeal.\nWe grant Ms. Skokos\u2019s petition for rehearing and hold that the Chancellor shall redetermine the value of the parties\u2019 shares in both cellular-telephone companies. We deny Ms. Skokos\u2019s motion for costs and attorney\u2019s fees.\n1. Shares in cellular-telephone companies\nIn Skokos v. Skokos, supra, we held that the Chancellor abused her discretion when she excluded the testimony of Matthew Fox, Ms. Skokos\u2019s expert witness, regarding the fair market value of the parties\u2019 shares in the New Hampshire company. We reversed the Chancellor\u2019s determination of the value of those shares and remanded for a new hearing.\nMs. Skokos raised an additional argument, however, that the Chancellor had erred by terminating her cross-examination of Thomas Buono, Mr. Skokos\u2019s expert witness. Mr. Buono had testified to the value of the parties\u2019 shares in the New Hampshire company and the Little Rock company. The Chancellor interrupted Ms. Skokos\u2019s counsel\u2019s cross-examination of Mr. Buono and allowed Mr. Buono to leave the courtroom in order to board an airline flight. Ms. Skokos argued that the ruling constituted an abuse of discretion and required reversal. We concluded that it was unnecessary to address the point in view of our holding with respect to the exclusion of Mr. Fox\u2019s testimony.\nIt was error for us to have concluded that our reversal on the point concerning Mr. Fox\u2019s testimony would resolve the question whether the value of the parties\u2019 shares in both cellular-telephone companies was required to be relitigated on remand. As Mr. Fox\u2019s testimony addressed only the New Hampshire company, the reversal on the basis of the failure to allow him to testify has no effect upon the valuation of the Little Rock company. It was, therefore, necessary for us to address Ms. Skokos\u2019s point concerning the Chancellor\u2019s decision to truncate the cross-examination of Mr. Buono. We grant rehearing on this point and hold that the Chancellor abused her discretion when she terminated the cross-examination.\nOur cases require a trial judge \u201cto permit a full, fair and reasonable cross-examination of a witness.\u201d Arkansas State Hwy. Comm\u2019n v. Dean, 247 Ark. 717, 720, 447 S.W.2d 334, 336 (1969), citing Helena Cotton Oil Co. v. Harrington, 170 Ark. 654, 280 S.W. 630 (1926). \u201cCourts should be especially liberal in allowing full and complete examination of an expert witness.\u201d Id. at 721, 447 S.W.2d at 336, citing Arkebauer v. Falcon Zinc Co., 178 Ark. 943, 12 S.W.2d 916 (1929).\nHere, the Chancellor terminated the cross-examination of an expert witness in order to facilitate the witness\u2019s travel plans. It also appears that the Chancellor\u2019s decision was motivated by a desire to expedite the proceedings. Athough neither concern is trivial, \u201cthe right of a Etigant to fuEy and properly cross-examine an adverse witness is more important and should not be abridged, even for the sake of expedition.\u201d Arkansas State Hwy. Comm\u2019n v. Dean, 247 Ark. at 720, 447 S.W.2d at 336, citing Trammell v. State, 193 Ark. 21, 97 S.W.2d 902 (1936).\nThus, we hold that the ChanceEor abused her discretion by (1) excluding Mr. Fox\u2019s testimony, and (2) terminating Ms. Skokos\u2019s cross-examination of Mr. Buono. Therefore, on remand, the ChanceEor shaE redetermine the fair market value of the parties\u2019 shares in the New Hampshire company and the Little Rock company.\n2. Costs and attorney\u2019s fees\nMs. Skokos\u2019s separate motion requests an award for appeal costs under Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-7 and an award for attorney\u2019s fees for services performed by her counsel on appeal. We deny her motion.\nAccording to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-7(d), we \u201cmay assess appeal costs according to the merits of the case\u201d where, as here, the appeal arises from a chancery court and the decree is affirmed in part and reversed in part. In addition, we have inherent authority in divorce cases to award attorney\u2019s fees for services rendered on appeal. See Jones v. Jones, 327 Ark. 195, 938 S.W.2d 228 (1997). See generally Howard W. Brill, Arkansas Law of Damages \u00a7 11-6, at pp. 165-66 (3d ed. 1996).\nThe points of appeal on which Ms. Skokos prevailed are important ones, but there are others on which she did not prevail. In addition, Ms. Skokos has given us no invoices or hourly fee figures upon which to calculate attorney\u2019s fees. Finally, although we declined to mention it in our initial opinion, we considered the abstract of the record presented by Ms. Skokos to have been repetitious and otherwise excessive, although not \u201cflagrantly deficient.\u201d See Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(b)(3). We deny the motion and direct that each party will be responsible for his or her own costs and attorney\u2019s fees.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "David Newbern, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Henry Hodges and Staley & Marshall, by: Robert L. Robinson, Jr., for appellant.",
      "Dover & Dixon, P.A., by: Judson C. Kidd, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Pamela F. SKOKOS v. Theodore C. SKOKOS\n95-1029\n968 S.W.2d 26\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion on granting of rehearing delivered June 4, 1998\nHenry Hodges and Staley & Marshall, by: Robert L. Robinson, Jr., for appellant.\nDover & Dixon, P.A., by: Judson C. Kidd, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0396-01",
  "first_page_order": 426,
  "last_page_order": 430
}