{ "id": 703800, "name": "IN the MATTER OF the ADOPTION OF Samantha Tara SAMANT, A Minor, Annette Rose Samant, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "In re the Adoption of Samant", "decision_date": "1998-06-11", "docket_number": "97-1358", "first_page": "471", "last_page": "475", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "333 Ark. 471" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "970 S.W.2d 249" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "205 Ark. 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1488229 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1943, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/205/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 9-9-201", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "259 Ark. 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1619212 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "486" }, { "page": "522" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/259/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 Ark. 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1451260 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185" }, { "page": "542" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/320/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "236 Ark. 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1681259 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" }, { "page": "675-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/236/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 Ark. 842", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1734345 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "845", "parenthetical": "\"This Court has consistently held that the words 'domicile' and 'residence' are not synonymous.\"" }, { "page": "945", "parenthetical": "\"This Court has consistently held that the words 'domicile' and 'residence' are not synonymous.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/238/0842-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 Ark. 763", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8723952 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "766" }, { "page": "414" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/243/0763-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 Ark. 619", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1880885 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623" }, { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/304/0619-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 Ark. 195", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1869750 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" }, { "page": "8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/293/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-9-205", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 448, "char_count": 7623, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.135771028113528e-07, "percentile": 0.7664437193056429 }, "sha256": "c61e22b91f7bbea3cb469783daa0ba8db1c6ffffeb1f5303c614c99266313139", "simhash": "1:3906e81e268b9fa3", "word_count": 1265 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:30:04.030411+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "IN the MATTER OF the ADOPTION OF Samantha Tara SAMANT, A Minor, Annette Rose Samant, Appellant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "David Newbern, Justice.\nAppellant Annette Rose Samant petitioned to adopt Samantha Tara Samant, the biological daughter of Ms. Samant\u2019s husband, Dr. Sushil Raghunata Samant, and a surrogate mother, Rebekkah Ann Nelson. The Chancellor denied the petition because Ms. Samant and Samantha were only temporarily present in Arkansas to effect the adoption with, as the Chancellor put it, \u201cno pretense of residency or domicile.\u201d We reverse and remand because Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-9-205 (Repl. 1993), which establishes jurisdiction for adoption, poses no permanent residency or domicile requirement.\nMs. Nelson entered the surrogacy arrangement with the Samants, and Samantha was born in California where Ms. Nelson resides. In a California proceeding, Dr. Samant was declared to be the father of Samantha, and Ms. Nelson and her husband relinquished any parental rights they may have had with respect to Samantha. Ms. Samant and Samantha came to Little Rock where they stayed in a hotel for thirty days prior to the filing of the adoption petition.\nAt the hearing on the petition, Ms. Samant and her husband made it clear that they were in Arkansas solely for the purpose of the adoption of Samantha because the California law required a six-month presence as a prerequisite to adoption and because New York, their home state, did not permit surrogacy agreements. Dr. Samant and Ms. Nelson filed \u201cConsent to Adoption\u201d forms on the same date as the petition.\nAct 658 of 1991, entitled in part, \u201cAn Act ... to establish Minimum Contacts With the State for Adoptions in This State; and for Other Purposes,\u201d is codified at Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-9-205 (Repl. 1993). Subsection (a) deals with jurisdiction and provides:\nJurisdiction of adoption of minors:\n(1) The petitioner or petitioners or legal parent or parents must have been physically present (resided) in the State of Arkansas for at least thirty (30) days immediately preceding the filing of a petition for adoption, relinquishment of parental rights, or execution of consent to termination of parental rights or adoption;\n(2) Provided, however, that when the parental rights of the legal parent or parents have been relinquished or terminated more than thirty (30) days prior to the fifing of an adoption petition, or the consent of the legal parent or parents is not required under other laws relating to adoption, physical presence of the petitioner or petitioners or the individual to be adopted shall be sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction.\nThe Chancellor dismissed the adoption petition for lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter. She relied on In the Matter of the Adoption of Pollock, 293 Ark. 195, 736 S.W.2d 6 (1987), in which we were presented with facts similar to those here and held that our courts lacked jurisdiction in such cases because none of the parties \u201cresided\u201d in Arkansas. The operative statute in the Pollock case was Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 56-205(a) (Supp. 1985), which provided:\nProceedings for adoption must be brought in the court for the place in which, at the time of fifing or granting the petition, the petitioner or the individual to be adopted resides or is in the military service or in which the agency having the care, custody, or control of the minor is located.\nIt was argued by the petitioners that the statute was a venue provision and not one controlling the court\u2019s jurisdiction. We disagreed and held that, by requiring that the petitioner or the individual to be adopted reside in this State, the General Assembly intended that adoption jurisdiction be limited to instances in which this State \u201chas a genuine interest or contact with at least one of the parties.\u201d In the Matter of the Adoption of Pollock, 293 Ark. at 199, 736 S.W.2d at 8.\nThe Chancellor noted Act 658 and the words now permitting jurisdiction when the petitioner has been \u201cphysically present (resided)\u201d here for more than thirty days. She concluded, however, that, by placing the word \u201cresided\u201d in parentheses after the words \u201cphysically present,\u201d the General Assembly intended to require something more than physical presence as we held in the Pollock case.\nWe have observed the difference between the concepts of domicile and residence. See, e.g., Davis v. Holt, 304 Ark. 619, 623, 804 S.W.2d 362, 365 (1991); Hogan v. Davis, 243 Ark. 763, 766, 422 S.W.2d 412, 414 (1967); Stephens v. AAA Lumber Co., 238 Ark. 842, 845, 384 S.W.2d 943, 945 (1964) (\u201cThis Court has consistently held that the words \u2018domicile\u2019 and \u2018residence\u2019 are not synonymous.\u201d); Wilhelm v. Taylor, 236 Ark. 85, 87, 364 S.W.2d 674, 675-76 (1963). \u201c\u2018Residency\u2019 means the place of actual abode, not a home which one expects to occupy at some future time.\u201d Quinney v. Pittman, 320 Ark. 177, 185, 895 S.W.2d 538, 542 (1995). Domicile, however, requires actual residence plus the intent to remain in a particular place. Martin v. Hefley, 259 Ark. 484, 486, 533 S.W.2d 521, 522 (1976).\nBy requiring more than physical presence in the Pollock decision, we went beyond the traditional definition of \u201cresidence,\u201d and, without referring to \u201cdomicile,\u201d we seemed to require it as a basis for establishing a \u201cgenuine interest\u201d of this State in the welfare of the person to be adopted. Our basis for doing so was our general interpretation of the intent behind the Revised Uniform Adoption Act, now codified, with amendments, at Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 9-9-201 through 9-9-224 (Repl. 1993 and Supp. 1997), and our observation of the tendency of states \u201cto seek greater assurance of protection to the child being adopted.\u201d In the Matter of the Adoption of Pollock, supra (citing R. Leflar, American Conflicts Law \u00a7 239 (1977)).\nIn construing a statute, we presume that the General Assembly knew of our decisions made pursuant to the preexisting law on the same subject. McLeod v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 205 Ark. 225, 168 S.W.2d 413 (1943). The law has obviously been changed. The General Assembly has now effectively overruled our decision in the Pollock case by requiring only \u201cphysical presence.\u201d When both subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of Act 658 are considered, it becomes clear that the parenthetical inclusion of the word \u201cresidence\u201d in subsection (a)(1) adds nothing to the thirty-day physical-presence requirement.\nOur rationale in the Pollock case was centered upon our conclusion that the General Assembly intended that Arkansas have more than minimum contact with the parties to the petition so that courts could serve the best interest of the child to be adopted. Even if we could say that the General Assembly meant to continue the law as we declared it in the Pollock case by adding the word \u201cresidence\u201d to \u201cphysical presence\u201d in subsection (a)(1) of the statute, when we look at the entire section it becomes clear that is not so. By not including the word \u201cresidence\u201d in subsection (a)(2) of Act 658, thus permitting adoptions based upon physical presence of the petitioner or the person to be adopted when parental rights have been relinquished or terminated more than thirty days prior to the petition or where the consent of the legal parent is not required, the General Assembly has declared either that we were wrong in our assumption of the General Assembly\u2019s intent or that its intent has changed. The addition of the word \u201cresidence\u201d in subsection (a)(1) adds nothing beyond the traditional meaning of that word as described above.\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "David Newbern, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Kaye H. McLeod, for appellant.", "No response." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN the MATTER OF the ADOPTION OF Samantha Tara SAMANT, A Minor, Annette Rose Samant, Appellant\n97-1358\n970 S.W.2d 249\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered June 11, 1998\nKaye H. McLeod, for appellant.\nNo response." }, "file_name": "0471-01", "first_page_order": 501, "last_page_order": 505 }