{ "id": 703772, "name": "Keith Allen MYERS v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Myers v. State", "decision_date": "1998-06-25", "docket_number": "CR 97-139", "first_page": "706", "last_page": "719", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "333 Ark. 706" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "972 S.W.2d 227" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "321 Ark. 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1449529 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/321/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "474 U.S. 52", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6197970 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/474/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "396 U.S. 1069", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "415 F.2d 483", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2176443 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/415/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 F.2d 898", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 119090 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/505/0898-01" ] }, { "cite": "280 Ark. 531", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1744757 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/280/0531-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 Ark. 270", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1604757 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/331/0270-01" ] }, { "cite": "818 F.2d 476", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1716666 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/818/0476-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 Ark. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1604771 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/331/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 U.S. 776", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 28169 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/483/0776-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 U.S. 475", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 2258 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/435/0475-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 914, "char_count": 24033, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.251822674527649e-08, "percentile": 0.5112037419942244 }, "sha256": "064d3e84b3427b1c90206fd4a9f914584529d04b66d54a327648de52b89ac87c", "simhash": "1:b35483a2fd4be264", "word_count": 4128 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:30:04.030411+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Keith Allen MYERS v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Per Curiam.\nThe appellant, Keith Allen Myers, was convicted of kidnapping and burglary and was sentenced to two concurrent terms of fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment. Myers\u2019s conviction and sentence resulted from his role in the kidnapping of Gina Plambuchen of Conway. Myers\u2019s wife and co-defendant, Amanda, was also charged for her role in the kidnapping. Amanda pleaded guilty to burglary and hindering apprehension. She was sentenced to two concurrent terms of five years\u2019 probation.\nBoth of the pleas were the result of a \u201cpackage deal\u201d offered by the prosecutor in exchange for each defendant\u2019s testimony against other members of the kidnapping conspiracy. One of the conditions of the offer, however, was that Myers and his wife both had to enter a guilty plea in order to consummate the deal. If either insisted on going to trial, it would automatically terminate the other\u2019s chance to enter a guilty plea. Throughout their plea negotiations, Myers and his wife were jointly represented by Mark Cambiano.\nAt the time of the kidnapping, Myers was on parole from a federal conviction for bank robbery. During his plea hearing, Mr. Cambiano explained to the trial court that a federal detainer had been filed against his client, and that it was likely that the kidnapping conviction would result in a revocation of Myers\u2019s federal parole. Mr. Cambiano then requested that the trial court recommend that his state time be served concurrently with the federal time that would result from the revocation. The trial court agreed to make the recommendation.\nDuring the sentencing hearing, Mr. Cambiano once again broached the subject of a recommendation to the federal authorities that Myers serve his state and federal time concurrently in a federal institution. At that time, it was made clear that the recommendation was not purported to bind the federal court. As of the date of the postconviction hearing, Myers was serving his term in a state institution and no further action had been taken by the federal authorities.\nMyers subsequently filed a timely petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Arkansas Criminal Procedure Rule 37. In his petition, Myers alleged that his attorney\u2019s joint representation of both him and his wife created a conflict of interest that interfered with Myers\u2019s right to effective assistance of counsel. Myers also alleged that his plea was not entered voluntarily and intelligently because Mr. Cambiano erroneously advised him that he would serve his State sentence concurrently with a federal sentence that he received pursuant to a prior conviction; and that the time would be served in federal prison. After a hearing, the Circuit Court denied relief. Myers now appeals that order. We affirm.\nMyers first assigns error to the Circuit Court\u2019s denial of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on his trial attorney\u2019s alleged conflict of interest. Myers alleges that Mr. Cambiano represented conflicting interests when he represented both Myers, who wanted to go to trial, and Amanda, who apparently wanted to accept the plea offer in order to avoid prison time. Myers also alleges that the conflict adversely affected his attorney\u2019s ability to represent him during the plea negotiations. Specifically, Myers contends that Mr. Cambiano, as well as his investigator, Wayne Lee, pressured him to accept the plea by telling him to \u201cbe a man\u201d and \u201ctake the fall\u201d for both him and his wife. Myers also asserts that Amanda and his attorney induced him to take the plea by assuring him that Amanda \u201cwould wait for him,\u201d during his incarceration when, in fact, she was planning to divorce him.\nDuring the postconviction hearing, Myers testified that he was incarcerated at the county jail while he awaited his trial. Amanda was free on bond. Myers claimed that Amanda, Mr. Cambiano, and Mr. Lee visited the jail in order to inform him that the prosecutor and the Hambuchen family were willing to enter into plea negotiations. According to Myers, his attorney asked him if he would accept twenty years\u2019 imprisonment. Amanda would receive five years\u2019 probation. Myers testified that he responded, \u201cI don\u2019t want Mandy to have any kind of time.\u201d When Mr. Cambiano asked him if he would accept fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment, Myers insisted upon going to trial.\nMyers also testified that when he expressed his desire to go to trial, Mr. Lee made the comment that \u201cif I was any kind of a man, if I loved my wife, I would take a plea bargain to assure her that she would not get any kind of jail time.\u201d Myers testified that when he asked Amanda what she wanted to do, she merely responded that she did not want to go to prison. Myers stated that he was told that his prior conviction in federal court for bank robbery \u201cwas making Mandy look real bad, and she was gonna suffer for my previous conviction.\u201d Myers\u2019s testimony also suggested that while he maintained his desire to go to trial, his wife and his attorney became incommunicado in an effort to compel him to change his decision.\nMyers stated that when the subject of taking a plea was reopened, he was assured by Amanda and Mr. Cambiano that she would wait for him during his incarceration, and that \u201cwhenever I got out, we were going to settle down and have children.\u201d Myers\u2019s testimony suggested that, while his attorney and Amanda were making these assurances, both knew that she intended to file for divorce. Myers alleged that his attorney also displayed his favoritism for Amanda when he allowed her to work in his law office while their case was pending.\nMyers also testified that he was not the only person who questioned the wisdom of accepting the State\u2019s \u201cpackage deal\u201d plea offer. Mona \u201cJaney\u201d McNutt, an attorney retained by Myers shortly before the plea hearing, advised Myers that a conflict of interest existed in Mr. Cambiano\u2019s representation of both him and his wife. During direct examination, Myers testified concerning Ms. McNutt\u2019s representation as follows:\nQ. Do you remember talking to Mona McNutt prior to this?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. On November 27th, \u201895, she filed the \u2014 the initial petition for post-conviction relief in this case?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. And she was retained by your family?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. Relate to the Court what contact you had with her prior to the last order that we just discussed with the Judge.\nA. We had hired her to give us a second opinion.\nQ. On what?\nA. On, uh, whenever the first plea \u2014 plea bargain was \u2014 \u2022 was put out there. There were so many people, you know, \u201cDon\u2019t take this plea bargain.\u201d It\u2019s ridiculous. It\u2019s ridiculous.\u201c So we hired on- \u2014 -we hired her to give us her opinion as to, you know, what should be done and what shouldn\u2019t be done. And she initially told Mark and Wayne \u2014 she wasn\u2019t on the case for very long. Because as soon as she\u2019d gone and gotten a copy of the discovery from Mark\u2014 Mark\u2019s office \u2014 Mark and Wayne had talked to her. And she immediately told him that there was clearly a conflict of interest, because I didn\u2019t want to take a plea. Mandy wanted to take a plea. And so then we were told that Janey needed to be fired.\n***\nQ. Did she communicate to you that there was a potential conflict of interest for the lawyers?\nA. Oh, yeah. Yeah.\nQ. And what did that mean to you, if anything? You\u2019re not a lawyer yourself.\nA. Yeah. Well, at that time, I mean, there was so much concern for Mandy\u2019s well-being that everything was just \u2014 was confusing. I mean, I didn\u2019t \u2014 I couldn\u2019t keep tabs on where she was. I didn\u2019t know what was going on with the case. So I, \u2014 you know, I didn\u2019t know.\nOn cross-examination, Myers testified as follows:\nQ. Okay. Who hired Mona?\nA. Mandy and I.\nQ. Okay. And for what purpose was Mona hired?\nA. For a second opinion.\nQ. All right. And did she make any court appearances?\nA. She came in one day to sit for a hearing, but I don\u2019t believe she said anything. She just sat in to hear.\nQ. Okay. And who got her off of the case?\nA. Mark asked me \u2014 no, Wayne asked me to ask her to step down because she was getting in the way.\n***\nQ. Okay. Were you pressured \u2014 is it your testimony under oath that \u2014 that Wayne and Mark deprived you of your free will and forced you to fire Mona McNutt after you had hired her?\nA. After we had given Mark as much money as we had, uh, he was running the show.\nQ. How much money did you give Mona?\nA. Not near as much as we had given Mark.\nQ. Had you given her money?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. Okay. Could you have kept her on the case if you\u2019d wanted to?\nA. Yeah, we could have, but we were given an ultimatum, \u201cEither get rid of her or I\u2019m gone,\u201d type deal.\nQ. So \u2014\nA. That was his exact words.\n***\nQ. And you had to make a choice whether to get rid of Mona or keep Mark?\nA. Uh-huh.\n***\nQ. And you decided to get rid of Mona and keep Mark?\nA. Uh-huh.\nQ. Okay. Then Mark was the lawyer that stayed with you and did all this until after the plea, and then you filed the Rule 37, right?\nA. Right.\nQ. I understand. Now \u2014 and let\u2019s see, Mona filed the first Rule 37, and when this was set down for a hearing originally, she showed up representing you at it, right?\nA. Bight.\nQ. Okay. Was there any collusion? Was this set up ahead of time when you hired Mona the first time, when Mark was working with you as well as you hired Mona to talk about this, and then you tell the Court you fired Mona, and then, after the plea went down and Amanda files for divorce and your codefendants get light sentences or are turned loose completely, you showed up in court with Mona asking that a Rule 37 be filed against your prior representation? Was\u2014 was that set up ahead of time, Keith?\nA. No, it wasn\u2019t. When I \u2014 when I got sentenced and after Amanda told me that she wanted a divorce, I didn\u2019t care. I wasn\u2019t looking for no appeals. I wasn\u2019t looking for anything. I\u2019m not ashamed to admit that whenever \u2014 the second week I was down at Diagnostics, I\u2019d attempted suicide, didn\u2019t care, didn\u2019t want to live, didn\u2019t want to five with it anymore. And my family and Janey, they had gotten together and said, \u201cIf Keith isn\u2019t gonna do this for himself, we\u2019re gonna do it for him.\u201d I\u2019ve gotten more involved as it\u2019s progressed, but before I \u2014 -I didn\u2019t care anything about it.\nMona McNutt testified that a few days before the plea hearing, Myers asked her for an opinion about the plea bargain. Ms. McNutt characterized her contact with Myers as \u201cmore or less an eleventh hour effort on Keith\u2019s part to get a second opinion in regard to whether or not he should take the plea bargain that had been offered jointly to him and Amanda.\u201d Ms. McNutt stated that Myers was \u201ctorn between the fifteen years that he didn\u2019t particularly want to spend versus the assurance that his wife would have no years.\u201d\nMs. McNutt stated that after she met separately with Myers and Amanda, she opined that it was a conflict of interest for one lawyer to represent both of them. Ms. McNutt also testified that she was not satisfied with the fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment that Myers would have to serve if he accepted the offer. On cross-examination, she stated that, according to what she was told about Myers\u2019s role in the crime, she could not foresee a jury sentencing him to fifteen years. Ms. McNutt did concede, however, that she would have encouraged a guilty plea if the offer had been for a shorter prison term. Ms. McNutt also testified that while she did not represent Mr. Myers during the plea hearing, she did subsequently prepare the Rule 37 petition.\nMark Cambiano testified that \u201cno one in my presence or on my behalf said (to Myers) that he couldn\u2019t put Mandy in the position of going to the pen and that he had to \u2018be a man.\u2019\u201d Mr. Cambiano stated that any claim that he avoided Myers while he insisted on going to trial was untrue. Mr. Cambiano also testified that Myers was uncertain about whether he should take the plea, and that he was indeed concerned about Amanda\u2019s fate should he decide to go to trial. He stated that he urged Myers to remove Amanda from his decision, and to only accept the plea if he thought it was in his best interest.\nMr. Cambiano advised Myers that it was in his best interest to take the plea, especially in fight of his federal conviction. According to Mr. Cambiano, there was a possibility that whatever sentence he received after a trial could run consecutive to a federal sentence that he received after his federal parole was revoked. The guilty plea, on the other hand, would increase the chance that the trial court would recommend that the state sentence and the federal sentence run concurrently.\nMr. Cambiano also testified that he had no objection once he learned that Myers retained Ms. McNutt to obtain her opinion about the plea offer. Mr. Cambiano stated that he felt good enough about his representation of Myers that he did not mind the scrutiny of another attorney. He stated that while Ms. McNutt initially had reservations about the wisdom of accepting the offer, she eventually agreed that it was in Myers\u2019s best interest to do so.\nIn the order denying relief, the Circuit Court ruled as follows on the first claim in Myers\u2019s petition:\n. . . This Honorable Court has had an opportunity oh numerous occasions throughout all the hearings and appearances had in the above styled case numbers, and in other cases to observe the demeanor of petitioner herein, Keith Myers, and has had an opportunity to hear sworn testimony given by him in support of his Rule 37 petition as well as in other hearings in the above styled case numbers and has had an opportunity to make a determination as to his credibility.\nThat based upon testimony given by witnesses and argument of counsel herein the Court doth find that Mr. Myers was competently represented by the Hon. Mona Jane McNutt prior to his entering a guilty plea in the above styled causes as well as Mr. Mark Cambiano, and that petitioner did dismiss Ms. McNutt after obtaining advice relative to the entry of said plea and did continue to be represented by Mark Cambiano.\nThat petitioner\u2019s argument that he entered his plea based upon his belief that his co-defendant wife would wait for him to be released from prison and that they would maintain their family relationship is without merit and in conflict with this Court\u2019s observation of the parties and the Court does find said claim to be without merit and not credible as well as if true failing to provide a legal basis for the relief sought.\nThe Court added toward at the conclusion of the order:\nAll of the petitioner\u2019s actions, statements and sworn testimony prior to the filing of this Rule 37 Petition are consistent with the fact that he was ably and competently represented and that he entered his guilty plea with full knowledge of the ramifications thereof and with no justified reliance upon any promises or representations made other than the written recommendations of the State and that petitioner\u2019s testimony to the contrary subsequent to the filing of said Rule 37 Petition is not credible based upon the Court\u2019s knowledge of the testimony and facts as adduced in this matter ab initio and its opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor.\nIt is settled that \u201c[Requiring or permitting a single attorney to represent co-defendants, often referred to as joint representation, is not per se violative of constitutional guarantees of ineffective assistance of counsel. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). Appointing or permitting a single attorney to represent co-defendants, however, does create a possible conflict of interest that could prejudice either or both clients. See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987). The possibility of prejudice does not justify an \u201cinflexible rule that would presume prejudice in all cases.\u201d Id. Instead, prejudice is only presumed if the defendant demonstrates that counsel \u201cactively represented conflicting interests,\u201d and \u201can actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer\u2019s performance.\u201d Sheridan v. State, 331 Ark. 1, 959 S.W.2d 29 (1998). In order to successfully assert a claim of ineffective counsel based on a conflict of interest, a defendant who entered a guilty plea must establish that there was an actual conflict of interest, and that the conflict adversely affected the voluntary nature of the guilty plea entered by the defendant. Thomas v. Foltz, 818 F.2d 476 (6th. Cir. 1987).\nIn its order, the Circuit Court did not make a finding as to whether an actual conflict of interest existed in Mr. Cambiano\u2019s representation of both Myers and his wife. Rather, the Circuit Court appeared to find that Myers waived any possible conflict when, after consulting Ms. McNutt for her opinion on the plea offer, he decided to keep Mr. Cambiano as his attorney during the plea process. The Circuit Court also found that Myers\u2019s testimony was not credible. We conclude that the Circuit Court\u2019s denial of postconviction relief is not clearly erroneous. Catlett v. State, 331 Ark. 270, 962 S.W.2d 313 (1998).\nIn Murray v. State, 280 Ark. 531, 659 S.W.2d 944 (1983), Murray and his wife were charged, tried, and convicted as co-defendants for sale of marijuana and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. Murray later sought postconviction relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. As in the instant case, Murray alleged that his counsel was ineffective because his joint representation of both Murray and his wife created a conflict of interest. Murray argued that the conflict caused his counsel to avoid pursuing an alternative defense strategy that would have called for Murray taking the stand and testifying that his wife was responsible for all of the wrongdoing.\nWe declined to reverse the lower court\u2019s denial of Murray\u2019s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Our primary reason for doing so was our observation that, in light of the other evidence that indicated Murray\u2019s substantial involvement in the crimes, a defense that placed all of the blame on his wife was not plausible. We concluded, therefore, that since the alternative strategy was not plausible, \u201cthe conflict was not actual or significant.\u201d\nWe also noted, however, that even if Murray\u2019s case presented an actual conflict, there was another reason to deny relief. We observed that Murray\u2019s attorney and his wife had occasion to represent them jointly in other criminal and civil matters, and more important, that \u201cduring the trial there was neither objection, nor claim, nor notice to the court of any potential conflict. The alleged conflict was not mentioned until the post-conviction proceeding . . . .\u201d We then stated the other legal basis for which we could have affirmed the denial of relief:\nThe Sixth Amendment right to counsel may be knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily waived. Here appellant knew of the alleged conflict, intentionally did not disclose it and voluntarily proceeded with his retained counsel. \u201cAppellant cannot now, after knowingly completing the trial with such counsel, urge that he was prejudiced.\u201d United States v. James, 505 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1975), quoting from Nelson v. United States, 415 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. den. 396 U.S. 1069 (1970).\nSimilarly, in this case, Myers testified that he retained Mona McNutt for a \u201csecond opinion\u201d concerning the plea offer shortly before the plea hearing. According to Myers, Ms. McNutt made him aware of the conflict of interest that allegedly existed as a result of Mr. Cambiano\u2019s joint representation of Myers, who desired to go to trial, and Amanda, who did not. Ms. McNutt also testified that she was retained by Myers shortly before the plea hearing, and that she recognized a potential conflict of interest in connection with Mr. Cambiano\u2019s representation. Ms. McNutt stated that she informed Mr. Cambiano of this conflict.\nDespite Ms. McNutt\u2019s advice about the potential conflict of interest, Myers chose to keep Mr. Cambiano as his attorney during the plea process and sentencing hearing. During the plea hearing, moreover, Myers declared that he was satisfied with the legal services rendered in his behalf, and that he did not have any complaints about the way he was represented. The alleged conflict of interest was not brought to the attention of the court until the Rule 37 petition was filed. In light of all of these circumstances, we conclude that Myers waived the alleged conflict of interest.\nMyers next argues that his guilty plea was not voluntary because he entered the plea upon Mr. Cambiano\u2019s representation that he would serve his term of imprisonment concurrently with the sentence he would receive when his federal parole was revoked. Myers asserts that Cambiano\u2019s advice on this issue, as well as his belief that he would serve both sentences in federal prison, was the basis of his decision to plead guilty. In other words, Myers contends that, but for Mr. Cambiano\u2019s advice that he would serve his time in that manner, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.\nWhile we are mindful of the fact that such an assertion is necessary in order to make the showing required by Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), there is an apparent inconsistency between that assertion and the first claim in Myers\u2019s petition. In that claim, Myers alleged that his guilty plea was compelled by his concern over his wife\u2019s fate and the pressure exerted by his attorney and his staff. We now understand Myers\u2019s position to be that he would not have yielded to his attorney\u2019s pressure or sacrificed himself in order to avoid his wife\u2019s incarceration if Mr. Cambiano had not also erroneously advised him that he would serve both of his sentences in federal prison.\nIn any event, we conclude that the Circuit Court\u2019s denial of relief on this claim was not clearly erroneous. In its order, the Circuit Court concluded that it was made clear that its recommendation concerning the manner in which Myers would serve his sentence would not bind the federal court. Indeed, Myers\u2019s abstract of the sentencing hearing reveals that the following discussion took place in open court:\nMr. Cambiano: Upon the basis of his plea was that he be sentenced concurrently with the charge with each other and concurrently with the federal charges, with recommendation that he serve his federal time first.\nThe Court: I believe that was part of it, and I have no problem with that.\nProsecutor: The only thing is with regard to the order purporting to bind the federal court.\nMr. Cambiano: It will not bind them. It\u2019s a recommendation.\nThe Court: All right, It\u2019s a recommendation. It\u2019s not binding.\nOther evidence introduced during the postconviction hearing revealed that after Myers was sent to a state, rather than federal facility, Mr. Cambiano became aware that the trial court\u2019s recommendation was omitted from the judgment and commitment order. At Mr. Cambiano\u2019s request, the judgment and commitment order was amended to reflect the recommendation.\nMr. Cambiano also testified as follows:\nHe (Myers) also wanted to make sure that he did his time in the federal penitentiary. And I told him we\u2019d do our best to get it to where he did do his time in the federal penitentiary, and that we would make our best efforts to do so. There was no guarantee that he would do it in the federal penitentiary. He knew that. And that\u2019s pretty much what we told him.\n***\nI absolutely made it clear to (Myers) that I could not bind the federal system or control or direct what they would do.\nThe Circuit Court apparently credited Mr. Cambiano\u2019s testimony about the extent of Myers\u2019s understanding of the likelihood that he would serve his federal sentence first. The resolution of credibility issues is within the province of the trial court. Johnson v. State, 321 Ark. 117, 900 S.W.2d 940 (1995). Accordingly, we affirm the Circuit Court\u2019s denial of relief on this claim.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Per Curiam." } ], "attorneys": [ "John Wesley Hall, Jr., for appellant.", "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: O. Milton Fine II, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Keith Allen MYERS v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 97-139\n972 S.W.2d 227\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered June 25, 1998\nJohn Wesley Hall, Jr., for appellant.\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: O. Milton Fine II, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0706-01", "first_page_order": 740, "last_page_order": 753 }