{
  "id": 1655429,
  "name": "VILLAGE MARKET, INC. v. STATE FARM GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY",
  "name_abbreviation": "Village Market, Inc. v. State Farm General Insurance",
  "decision_date": "1998-07-16",
  "docket_number": "97-702",
  "first_page": "227",
  "last_page": "230",
  "citations": [
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      "cite": "334 Ark. 227"
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    {
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      "cite": "975 S.W.2d 86"
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      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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      "reporter": "Ark.",
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      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark. App.",
      "case_ids": [
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      "weight": 4,
      "year": 1995,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23-79-208",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "year": 1992,
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    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-22-308",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "year": 1994,
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    {
      "cite": "48 Ark. App. 136",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        6139327
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1995,
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    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23-79-208",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "year": 1992,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:44:18.632081+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Newbern, Brown, and Imber, JJ., dissent.",
      "Newbern and Brown, JJ., join in this dissent."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "VILLAGE MARKET, INC. v. STATE FARM GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Per Curiam.\nIn its petition for rehearing, appellant, Village Market, Inc., seeks reconsideration of only that portion of this court\u2019s opinion that awards State Farm General Insurance Company, Inc., attorney\u2019s fees under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-22-308 (Repl. 1994). The amicus petitioners timely join in Village Market\u2019s rehearing petition. Petitioners argue that the court\u2019s majority opinion failed to consider the statutory-construction argument originally offered by Village Market, and in disregarding that argument, caused error. We must agree.\nIn this court\u2019s initial consideration of the attorney\u2019s fee issue, Village Market pointed out that State Farm was awarded an attorney\u2019s fee under \u00a7 16-22-308, but that Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23-79-208 (Repl. 1992) is the statute that controls attorney\u2019s fee awards, and it provides no such fee to insurers when they prevail in an insured\u2019s claim under his or her policy. Village Market, citing State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Brown, 48 Ark. App. 136, 892 S.W.2d 519 (1995), explained that \u00a7 16-22-308 is a general statute that provides for attorney\u2019s fees in actions on breach of contract, but \u00a7 23-79-208 is a specific statute that provides for attorney\u2019s fees on insurance loss claims and allows such fees (and penalties) for only insureds and then only under special circumstances. Our earlier opinion did not specifically address Village Market\u2019s citations or argument, but instead stated the following:\nVillage Market reads into \u00a7 23-79-208 a prohibition against the recovery of attorney\u2019s fees by insurers that is simply not there. In fact, the statute is utterly silent as to what an insurer may or may not recover should it prevail in a claim brought by the insured for failure to pay the loss. We decline to interpret this silence as legislative intent to prohibit such a recovery.\nTwo major principles are controlling in this case. First, when interpreting statutes, the rule is settled that a general statute must yield when there is a specific statute involving the particular matter. Board of Trustees v. Stodola, 328 Ark. 194, 942 S.W.2d 255 (1997); see also Brown, 48 Ark. App. 136, 892 S.W. 2d 519. Second, we must consider the fundamental principle that attorney\u2019s fees are not awarded unless expressly provided for by statute or rule. McQuillan v. Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp., 331 Ark. 242, 961 S.W.2d 729 (1998). If we had fully considered Village Market\u2019s statutory-construction argument when interpreting \u00a7\u00a7 16-22-308 and 23-79-208, we would not have \u201cdeclined to interpret \u00a7 23-79-208\u2019s silence as to what an insurer may or may not recover should it prevail in a claim brought by the insured.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nIn considering and applying the foregoing statutory principles, we first read the plain language of \u00a7 23-79-208, which provides for attorney\u2019s fees in actions between policyholders and insurance companies. That statute allows attorney\u2019s fees to insureds under prescribed circumstances, but omits any reference for such fee awards to insurers. Next, in reading \u00a7 16-22-308, that statute never mentions insurance policies and never expressly provides attorney\u2019s fees for either insureds or insurers. Because attorney\u2019s fees are awarded only when expressly allowed by statute or rule, the silence of such fee awards to insurers in \u00a7\u00a7 16-22-308 and 23-79-208 can only be interpreted to mean that the General Assembly never intended that attorney\u2019s fees be awarded to insurers when an insured has filed an action seeking recovery for a claim under his or her policy.\nIn conclusion, we agree that Village Market\u2019s (and amici curiae\u2019s) construction of \u00a7\u00a7 16-22-308 and 23-79-208 is correct. Therefore, we grant its petition for rehearing and reverse only that part of the trial court\u2019s decision awarding State Farm attorney\u2019s fees.\nNewbern, Brown, and Imber, JJ., dissent.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Per Curiam."
      },
      {
        "text": "Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice,\ndissenting. Contrary to the intimation by the new majority, the arguments presented by Village Market and the amicus petitioners were fully considered when this case was originally submitted and decided. Thus, petitioners have failed to state a valid ground for rehearing under Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 2-3(g). State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Brown, 48 Ark. App. 136, 892 S.W.2d 519 (1995), relied on by the majority as a basis for rehearing, is remarkably not on point. There, the court of appeals rejected a claim by an insured for an attorney\u2019s fee under the breach-of-contract provision. Given that Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23-79-208 (Repl. 1992) is replete with references to when and how an insured may recover such a fee, the statutory-interpretation issue confronting the court of appeals in Brown was completely dissimilar from the present case. I dissent from the grant of rehearing for the reasons stated in the original majority opinion handed down on June 11, 1998.\nNewbern and Brown, JJ., join in this dissent.",
        "type": "dissent",
        "author": "Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Warner, Smith & Harris, PLC, by: G. Alan Wooten, for appellant.",
      "Jones, Jackson & Moll, PLC, by: Randolph C. Jackson and Jay W. Kutchka, for appellee.",
      "Morgan Welch & Associates, by: Morgan E. Welch, amicus curiae, for the Arkansas Trial Lawyers Ass\u2019n."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "VILLAGE MARKET, INC. v. STATE FARM GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY\n97-702\n975 S.W.2d 86\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered July 16, 1998\n[Petition for rehearing granted July 16, 1998.]\nWarner, Smith & Harris, PLC, by: G. Alan Wooten, for appellant.\nJones, Jackson & Moll, PLC, by: Randolph C. Jackson and Jay W. Kutchka, for appellee.\nMorgan Welch & Associates, by: Morgan E. Welch, amicus curiae, for the Arkansas Trial Lawyers Ass\u2019n.\nNewbern, Brown, and Imber, JJ., would deny."
  },
  "file_name": "0227-01",
  "first_page_order": 253,
  "last_page_order": 256
}