{ "id": 1655478, "name": "Kevin Dewayne BAKER v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Baker v. State", "decision_date": "1998-09-24", "docket_number": "CR 97-1050", "first_page": "330", "last_page": "338", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "334 Ark. 330" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "974 S.W.2d 474" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "321 Ark. 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1449615 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/321/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 Ark. 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 50314 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/328/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 S. Ct. 246", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 Ark. 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1445669 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/323/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 Ark. 137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 703778 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145", "parenthetical": "citing Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 915 S.W.2d 702, cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 246 (1996)" }, { "parenthetical": "citing Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 915 S.W.2d 702, cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 246 (1996)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/333/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 Ark. 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1748066 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/278/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ark. 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1935064 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/312/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-10-102", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 Ark. 726", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1880859 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/304/0726-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 Ark. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1447515 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68", "parenthetical": "citing Strawhacker v. State, 304 Ark. 726, 804 S.W.2d 720 (1991)" }, { "parenthetical": "citing Strawhacker v. State, 304 Ark. 726, 804 S.W.2d 720 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/322/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "940 S.W.2d 631", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 Ark. 631", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 922766 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/327/0631-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 S. Ct. 574", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 Ark. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 236254 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/329/0062-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 766, "char_count": 15015, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5579409055005254e-07, "percentile": 0.6764197449349364 }, "sha256": "a6e2f675c42c2b242f1cc45043667ccc88f7567687156e0056f40529161dd885", "simhash": "1:8e7ea09d7f2c9894", "word_count": 2434 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:44:18.632081+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Kevin Dewayne BAKER v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "W.H. \u201cDub\u201d Arnold, Chief Justice.\nOn July 24, 1997, a jury convicted the appellant, Kevin Dewayne Baker, of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction. Baker timely filed his notice of appeal to this court on August 4, 1997, and our jurisdiction is warranted pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(2) (1998). The appellant raises three points on appeal. First, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence eight crime-scene photographs depicting the deceased victims. Second, Baker contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting a State witness\u2019s \u201csurprise\u201d testimony, formerly unrevealed to either party. Third, Baker asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting testimony concerning an oral statement, attributed to the appellant, that \u201cit gets easier every time.\u201d We conclude that the appellant\u2019s arguments lack merit, and we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, we affirm.\nI. Facts\nOn March 14, 1996, a number of guests gathered at the appellant\u2019s home, including the appellant, Greg Cureton (the appellant\u2019s brother-in-law), David Davis, Greg Dufrene, and Clyde Dufrene. Witnesses testified that the Dufrene brothers taunted Cureton and told him that a named individual had taken out a \u201chit\u201d on Cureton\u2019s fife. According to the Dufrenes, a man named Paul Jones had been hired to kill Cureton. At approximately 9:00 or 9:30 p.m., the appellant and Cureton left the party en route to Paul Jones\u2019s home.\nAt trial, Cureton testified that after he and the appellant arrived at Jones\u2019s home, Jones came outside and they talked. According to Cureton, as he turned to return to the vehicle and leave, the appellant rushed past him, stabbed Jones and then stabbed Sheila Goodwin, Jones\u2019s friend who was also on the scene. Next, Cureton reported that Baker handed him the knife and asked him to stab Jones and Goodwin. He acknowledged that he pretended to do so, and, then, he and the appellant dragged the bodies into Jones\u2019s trailer. After leaving Jones\u2019s trailer, they encountered David Davis and his wife on the road. Cureton informed the Davises that they should not go to Jones\u2019s residence. Following this meeting, Cureton and the appellant disposed of the knife used to stab Jones and Goodwin. Subsequently, the police recovered a knife from a location identified by Cureton as the bridge where he and Baker had abandoned the knife. Finally, Cureton reported that he and the appellant traveled to the Davises\u2019 home where they burned clothes and Baker cleaned up and asked for thread to stitch up a deep gash in his hand.\nPaul Jones and Sheila Goodwin were found dead in Jones\u2019s trailer early on the morning of March 15, 1996. According to the autopsy report, the cause of death for both victims was multiple stab wounds. The day after the incident, the appellant visited his sister\u2019s home in Michigan where he was arrested and interviewed, also on the morning of March 15, 1996. In his defense, Baker contended that Cureton stabbed Jones and Goodwin and that he sustained the gash on his hand while he was attempting to stop Cureton.\nII. Admission of photographs\nRelying on Ark. R. Evid. 403, Baker first argues that the trial court erred by permitting the State to introduce eight crime-scene photographs of the victims\u2019 bodies as they were found by the police. Rule 403 provides for the exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. Although evidence is relevant, it may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Id.\nAbsent an abuse of discretion, this court will not reverse a trial court for admitting photographs. Jones v. State, 329 Ark. 62, 65, 947 S.W.2d 339, cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 574 (1997). Moreover, as to the admission of photographs, we have specifically discussed the guideposts for determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion. In Jones, we explained that although the relevancy and admission of photographs is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and that we are highly deferential to that discretion, we reject a carte blanche approach to the admission of photographs. Id. (citing Carmago v. State, 327 Ark. 631, 940 S.W.2d 631 (1997) (internal citations omitted)). In making the admission determination, we require a trial court to consider, first, whether the relevant evidence creates a danger of unfair prejudice, and, second, whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. Id. at 66.\nSignificantly, after applying the Rule 403 balancing test, we have held that\neven the most gruesome photographs may be admissible if they tend to shed light on any issue, to corroborate testimony, or if they are essential in proving a necessary element of a case, are useful to enable a witness to testify more effectively, or enable the jury to better understand the testimony. Other acceptable purposes are to show the condition of the victim\u2019s bodies, the probable type or location of the injuries, and the position in which the bodies were discovered. Of course, if a photograph serves no valid purpose and could only be used to inflame the jury\u2019s passions, it should be excluded.\nId.\nHere, the appellant argues that because the defense stipulated as to the cause of death, i.e., multiple stab wounds, that the photographs lost any relevance if admitted for the purpose of showing the cause of death. However, the State correctly points out that a defendant cannot prevent a photograph\u2019s admission simply by conceding the facts of the crime. See Schalski v. State, 322 Ark. 63, 68, 907 S.W.2d 693 (1995) (citing Strawhacker v. State, 304 Ark. 726, 804 S.W.2d 720 (1991)).\nThe appellant was charged with murder in the first degree. A person commits murder in the first degree if, with a purpose of causing the death of another person, he causes the death of another person. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-10-102 (Repl. 1997). At trial, the State\u2019s theory of the case was that Baker stabbed Jones and Goodwin outside Jones\u2019s home and then dragged the bodies inside the home with the assistance of Greg Cureton. As to the admission of the challenged photographs, the State responds that duplicative photographs were removed and that the trial court utilized the Rule 403 balancing test when it struck State\u2019s exhibit 10. According to the State, although the remaining photos were admittedly graphic and gruesome, they depicted locations and types of wounds, the location of the bodies, and evidence of a fire, that corroborated Greg Cureton\u2019s testimony and tended to prove the appellant\u2019s purposeful intent, an element of the crime.\nFor example, Investigator Lynn Benedict of the Arkansas State Police, testified that exhibit 8 depicted a deep cut on the left side of Goodwin\u2019s face and perhaps hair that may have been burned on the right side. He also noted that exhibit 9 showed stab marks to Goodwin\u2019s chest and nonpuncture scrapes, and that exhibit 11 depicted Goodwin\u2019s blue jeans with blood stains and tears on the left side. In light of the acceptable purposes for admitting photographs, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting these photographs.\nInvestigator Benedict also testified regarding Exhibit 12, a photo showing Jones\u2019s left arm lying on an artificial leg that was mostly consumed by fire. Benedict noted that the photo shows that Jones\u2019s head was charred and reveals cut and slash wounds, burns on the left side of the body, and a slash mark across the throat. Next, Benedict identified exhibit 13 as a photo depicting Jones\u2019s body and burned hair, a burned artificial limb, and a wood stove. Additionally, the photo revealed cut wounds on Goodwin\u2019s arm. Exhibit 15 reflected Jones\u2019s burned hair, deep cut wounds on Goodwin\u2019s body, including slash marks across the throat, and drag marks leading from the front door to Jones\u2019s body. Exhibit 16 showed an overview of both victims\u2019 bodies and the drag marks. Finally, Exhibit 18 showed the artificial limb laying under Jones\u2019s left arm, Goodwin\u2019s right hand charred and burned, and blood stains underneath Jones\u2019s body.\nAppellant suggests that one photograph could have fairly and accurately depicted the number, location, and nature of the victims\u2019 wounds. However, the State points out that Jones suffered twenty-one penetrating stab wounds to his body, back, chest, abdomen, left arm, left leg, and six wounds to his neck, not including defensive wounds. Goodwin suffered ten stab wounds to her body, neck, chest, and back, not including defensive wounds. Given the acceptable purposes for admitting photographs, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting these photographs.\nIII. Admission of David Davis\u2019s \u201csurprise\u201d testimony\nSecond, Baker contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to strike State witness David Davis\u2019s \u201csurprise\u201d testimony that \u201cKevin [Baker] told me to tell if anybody had asked me what happened to his hand, he had cut himself filleting fish.\u201d Immediately after this remark, the appellant objected and moved the trial court to strike the statement on the basis that the appellant had not been notified prior to trial that Davis would offer this evidence. However, both parties concede on appeal that neither party knew that Davis would make this statement, and the trial court noted that there was no evidence of intent by the State to elicit this specific testimony.\nUnfortunately, both parties cite inapposite authority to support their positions. For example, the appellant\u2019s reference to Ark. R. Crim. P. 17, which sets forth a prosecuting attorney\u2019s disclosure obligations to a defendant, is irrelevant here because the prosecution acquired the information contemporaneously with the defense. Likewise, the appellant\u2019s reliance on Scoggins v. State, 312 Ark. 106, 848 S.W.2d 400 (1993), is misplaced. Scoggins is distinguishable from the instant facts because it involved a prosecutor\u2019s failure to disclose, which is not at issue here. This is simply not a case about a potential discovery violation.\nThe State also cites irrelevant authority in support of its argument that the trial court properly admitted the challenged statement. The State points to Henry v. State, 278 Ark. 478, 647 S.W.2d 419 (1983), a case involving a police officer who testified about an undisclosed statement made by the defendant. Like the instant case, the prosecution was unaware of the statement until it was revealed at trial. Specifically, the defendant in Henry contested the introduction of his statement, made at the time of his arrest, \u201cdon\u2019t shoot \u2014 I give up.\u201d The Henry court characterized the statement by explaining, \u201cwe cannot say with any degree of certainty that the statement was either inculpatory or damaging to the client\u2019s defense.\u201d We agree with the instant appellant that the nature of the statement in Henry is distinguishable from the statement challenged on appeal.\nHowever, the material issue here is whether the trial judge erred in admitting the \u201csurprise\u201d testimony under a Rule 403 analysis. Accordingly, this court will not reverse the trial court\u2019s decision, absent an abuse of discretion. See Parker v. State, 333 Ark. 137, 145, 968 S.W.2d 592 (1998) (citing Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 915 S.W.2d 702, cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 246 (1996)). The appellant\u2019s general assertion that he was prejudiced by the statement, which may tend to demonstrate a guilty state of mind, is not a compelling basis alone for reversing the trial court\u2019s decision \u2014 for any evidence that tends to establish the guilt of the defendant is inherently prejudicial.\nPursuant to Rule 403, the trial court must consider whether the statement, although relevant, should be excluded because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Applying the Rule 403 balancing test, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony. Even assuming, arguendo, that the statement was prejudicial, it constituted harmless error in fight of the other evidence and testimony offered at trial. In light of the foregoing, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony and denying the appellant\u2019s motion to strike the statement.\nIV. Admission of Greg Cureton\u2019s testimony\nThird, Baker challenges the admission of Greg Cureton\u2019s testimony that, following the homicides and while he and the appellant were still at Jones\u2019s residence, the appellant told him, \u201cIt just gets easier every time.\u201d Anticipating this testimony, the appellant objected to its introduction on the basis of Rule 403, which permits exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. Again, we note that although evidence is relevant, it may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Id.\nThe appellant\u2019s cellmate, Donnie Dollarhyde, also a witness for the State, testified that the appellant admitted to the homicides, said that he had not lost any sleep over it, that it was a \u201crush,\u201d and, consistent with Cureton\u2019s testimony, that \u201cit just gets easier every time.\u201d Significantly, the appellant did not object to Dollarhyde\u2019s testimony regarding the statement \u201cit just gets easier every time.\u201d In support of barring our consideration of this point on appeal, the State cites Stephens v. State, 328 Ark. 81, 89, 941 S.W.2d 411 (1997), for the proposition that when a question previously objected to is repeated, and there is no second objection, the matter is waived on appeal. Moreover, even if the appellant makes a proper objection, he must preserve his argument by renewing that objection if the State subsequently attempts to introduce the same or similar evidence. See Mills v. State, 321 Ark. 621, 623, 906 S.W.2d 674 (1995). Given the subsequent admission of the statement through Dollarhyde, without objection, we hold that this issue was not preserved for our review on appeal, and we affirm the trial court.\nV. Rule 4-3(h)\nIn accordance with Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(h) (1998), the record has been reviewed for adverse rulings objected to by the appellant but not argued on appeal, and no reversible errors were found. Accordingly, the appellant\u2019s judgment of conviction is affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "W.H. \u201cDub\u201d Arnold, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hatfield & Lassiter, by: Jack T. Lassiter, for appellant.", "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: C. Joseph Cordi, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Kevin Dewayne BAKER v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 97-1050\n974 S.W.2d 474\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered September 24, 1998\nHatfield & Lassiter, by: Jack T. Lassiter, for appellant.\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: C. Joseph Cordi, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0330-01", "first_page_order": 356, "last_page_order": 364 }